# (SS) Shane Mudaliar v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, E.D. California · April 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10843183

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** April 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding gaps in treatment 15 regimen was permissible reason for discounting symptoms testimony

## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 SHANE MUDALIAR, Case No. 1:20-cv-01692-JLT-BAM
12 Plaintiff,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
13 v. REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
14
LELAND DUDEK, Commissioner of Social
15 Security,1 (Docs. 17, 20.)
16 Defendant.

17
18

19 INTRODUCTION
20 Plaintiff Shane Mudaliar (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the
21 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for Supplemental
22 Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties’ briefing on the motion was
23 submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe for findings and
24 recommendations. (Docs. 17, 20.) Having considered the parties’ briefs, along with the entire record
25 in this case, the Court finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was supported
26

27 1 Leland Dudek became the Commissioner of Social Security in February 2025. Pursuant to Rule
25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Leland Dudek is substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as
28 Defendant in this suit.
1 by substantial evidence in the record and was based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, this
2 Court will recommend affirming the agency’s determination to deny benefits.
3
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
4
Plaintiff applied for Title XVI supplemental security income on October 18, 2016, alleging that
5
he became disabled on December 31, 2013. AR 210-182. The claim was denied initially on May 8,
6
2017, and on reconsideration on August 3, 2017. AR 125-30, 134-39. Plaintiff requested a hearing
7
before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and ALJ E. Alis held a hearing on April 25, 2019. AR 39-
8
69. ALJ Alis issued an order denying benefits on the basis that Plaintiff was not disabled on May 30,
9
2019. AR 18-38. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council denied.
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AR 7-12. This appeal followed.
11
April 25, 2019 Hearing Testimony
12
ALJ Alis held a hearing on April 25, 2019. AR 18-38. Laurence Hughes, an impartial
13
vocational expert, also appeared and testified. AR 61-69. Plaintiff’s non-attorney representative
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Malinda Davies also appeared. The ALJ began by admitting Exhibits 1A through 21F into evidence,
15
with Plaintiff’s representative confirming that Plaintiff had no objections. AR 43.
16
Upon examination by the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that he was not currently working and last
17
held a job five years prior when he worked at Foster Farm. AR 45. He said that he quit that job when
18
his hands started hurting. AR 46. Plaintiff further testified that he did “some IHSS work” after his
19
work at Forster Farm for approximately one year and had one client. Id. He said that in that job he
20
babysat a four-year-old and a fourteen-year-old and he worked four hours per day, seven days per
21
week. AR 46-47. Plaintiff additionally said that he had not tried to do other types of work, but he had
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applied to jobs as a mechanic and as a Mission Tortilla packager. AR 47. Plaintiff said that he had
23
not applied for the packager job but was planning on turning his application in. AR 47-48. Plaintiff
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said that he was planning on applying for a mechanic job as he had gone to school for a mechanic job
25
but needed insurance for it and did not know when he would apply to it. AR 48. Plaintiff said that he
26
27
2 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate
28 page number.
1 did not do any volunteer work, but worked for his uncle at a real estate company where he would
2 repair houses. AR 48-49. In that role, he said he worked six hours per week and was paid seven to
3 eight dollars per hour. AR 49-50. Plaintiff testified that he did not do any volunteer work with
4 religious or community organizations. AR 50.
5 Upon examination by his representative, Plaintiff testified that he lived with his mother, his
6 stepfather, and his 19-year-old younger brother. Id. Plaintiff said that he spent his time staying in his
7 room because there were “bad people outside.” AR 50-51. He said that he would play video games
8 when he was in his room but that he could not concentrate on the games so he would play them for a
9 short time before taking a break. AR 51. He stated that when he would take a break from video
10 games, he would rest. Id. Plaintiff testified that he was sometimes tired during the day as he had
11 problems sleeping at night due to daily nightmares. Id. He stated that he would feel angry after his
12 nightmares, in which he would relive or react to childhood molestation he experienced. AR 52.
13 Plaintiff testified that he did not have friends who he did things with, did not go to the movies, and did
14 not go to the mall. Id. He further said that he did not leave his house other than to go to the doctor.
15 AR 52-53. Plaintiff stated that working with his uncle was his attempt to be outside of his house. AR
16 53. He testified that he heard voices and saw things, felt that he still had depression and was taking
17 medication for it, and was not getting counseling as he thought it would not work. Id. Plaintiff said
18 that he was offered counseling, went once with his mother, but felt that it would not help him. AR 54.
19 He stated that he felt anxious and angry being in counseling and preferred being at home. Id.
20 Regarding his physical problems, Plaintiff testified that he was still having problems with his
21 jaw as it would lock up and cause him pain. Id. He said that his jaw would lock up every day for over
22 an hour every time he ate. AR 55. When this happened, he said he was unable to concentrate and that
23 he would rest until it went away. Id. Plaintiff testified that he had infections in his teeth and that his
24 teeth were removed; that he had infections in his body; and had regular abdominal pain, nausea, and
25 vomiting. AR 55-56. He said that his eyes were still blurry even with glasses, that he could only read
26 large print for a short time before he became cross-eyed and could not focus. AR 56. He stated that
27 he also experienced headaches and eye pain. AR 57.
28
1 Upon examination by the ALJ, Plaintiff said the he mainly stayed in his room, where he would
2 play video games for two to three hours before his eyes began hurting and he would be unable to
3 concentrate on the game. AR 57. The ALJ asked why Plaintiff believed he could not work despite
4 applying to different jobs and working with his uncle on home repair, and Plaintiff replied that he had
5 “a lot of problems” but said he “was gonna work.” AR 58. Plaintiff said that he would work but that
6 it was hard to find work. Id. Plaintiff said that he was prescribed Zyprexa for his mental health from
7 his physical doctor, but that he had not seen a psychiatrist or mental health specialist yet. Id. Plaintiff
8 said that he did not drink alcohol, did not use non-prescription drugs, did not use marijuana, and did
9 smoke cigarettes. AR 58-59.
10 Upon examination by his representative, Plaintiff said that he played video games a little bit
11 throughout the day adding up to two to three hours. AR 59. Plaintiff stated that he would not be able
12 to concentrate and see if he tried to play video games for two to three hours straight. Id. He said that
13 he did not get general relief, and that when he went out with his uncle he trusted his uncle “A little.”
14 AR 60. He said that if his uncle was not there, he would not be able to work five days a week, eight
15 hours per day and could not do everything on his own. Id. He added that if his uncle was not there, he
16 “could get hurt.” Id.
17 Following Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ elicited testimony from vocational expert (“VE”)
18 Laurence Hughes. AR 61-69. Plaintiff’s representative did not object to the VE’s qualifications, the
19 VE testified that he could give an impartial and neutral opinion in the case, the VE stated that he did
20 not discuss his testimony prior to the hearing, the VE said that he had reviewed Section E of Plaintiff’s
21 file. AR 61. The VE stated that there were two past jobs but questioned if they should be included
22 given duration. Id. The VE classified the jobs as Child Monitor (DOT No. 301.677-010, SVP 3,
23 medium work in the DOT but light work as described) and Carpenter Helper (DOT No. 869.664-014,
24 SVP 4, heavy work in the DOT and heavy work as described). AR 62.
25 The ALJ asked the VE hypothetical questions and asked the VE to assume an individual with
26 the same age, education, and work experience as Plaintiff who could perform work across all
27 exertional levels but would be limited to simple and routine tasks; could not do work at a production
28 rate or do jobs with high production quotas that need to be completed within strict time deadlines such
1 as on an assembly line; could occasionally interact with supervisors; could occasionally interact with
2 coworkers; could not work in a tandem team or group setting; and could occasionally interact with the
3 public but only on a superficial level, such as responding to greetings from customers or telling a
4 customer how to get to the nearest restroom. Id. Regarding past work, the VE testified that the Child
5 Monitor would not fit with the limitations, given the personal interaction, though the Carpenter Helper
6 position would likely fit the limitations. AR 62-63. The VE said that his testimony was consistent
7 with the DOT though he relied on his experience placing people in those jobs to form his opinion
8 regarding frequency of public contact. AR 63.
9 For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to consider an individual with the same
10 limitations as the first hypothetical but added a limitation to light work and that the individual could
11 lift or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, but would have no limitations on
12 standing, walking, or sitting. Id. The VE testified that such an individual could not do the carpenter
13 helper position as that was a heavy job, though there were other jobs including: Photocopy Machine
14 Operator (DOT No. 207.685- 014, SVP 2, light work, with 25,000 jobs nationally); Housekeeping
15 Cleaner (DOT No. 323.687-014, SVP 2, light work, with 200,000 jobs nationally); and Press Operator,
16 Laundry (DOT No. 363.685-010, SVP 2, light work, with 28,000 jobs nationally). AR 63-64. The VE
17 said that his testimony was consistent with the DOT. AR 64. The VE said that the Housekeeping
18 Cleaner position had no visual requirements, the Photocopy Machine Operator position required
19 occasional near acuity, and the Press Operator position did not require near acuity. Id. The VE said
20 that there was a Machine Tending position (DOT No. 363.685-022, with 40,000 jobs nationally) that
21 would meet the other limitations and did not require near acuity. AR 65.
22 The ALJ asked what the maximum amount of time an individual could be off-task and remain
23 employable, and the VE stated that there was no bright line but that five percent off-task time was
24 generally acceptable while 10 percent off-task time would be a “maximum outside border.” AR 65-
25 66. The VE said that an individual who was off-task 15 percent of the workday two days per week
26 could be employable, but that an individual who was consistently off-task 15 percent of the time
27 would not be employable. AR 66. The VE clarified that, per his experience, there would be no work
28 for someone who was off-task due to pain, visual impairment, or psychological impairment and unable
1 to work on a regular and consistent basis. Id. The VE further testified that there would be no work for
2 an individual who would be absent from work two days per month. AR 67. The VE further corrected
3 himself that there would be no past relevant work for the first hypothetical individual as the individual
4 was limited to simple and routine tasks but the Carpenter Helper position was semi-skilled. Id.
5 Plaintiff’s representative closed by noting that Plaintiff has mental and physical impairments,
6 including jaw pain, abdominal pain, nausea, and hallucinations, which prevent him from
7 concentrating. Id. Plaintiff’s representative further noted that Plaintiff worked with his uncle on a
8 part-time basis to try to get out into the world and to function. AR 68.
9 Medical Record
10 The relevant medical record was reviewed by the Court and will be referenced below as
11 necessary to this Court’s decision.
12 The ALJ’s Decision
13 Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ
14 determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 18-38. Specifically, the
15 ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date of
16 August 26, 2016. AR 23. The ALJ identified the following severe impairments: temporomandibular
17 joint disorder (TMJ); depressive disorder; schizophrenia; anxiety disorder; and attention deficit
18 hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Id. The ALJ also identified nonsevere impairments including dental
19 infections and abscesses, vision problems, and mental impairments. AR 23-27. The ALJ further
20 determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
21 medically equaled any of the listed impairments. Id.
22 Based on a review of the entire record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual
23 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work across all exertional levels with the limitations that
24 Plaintiff: could perform simple and routine tasks; would have “no work at a production rate (no work
25 with high production quotas that need to be completed within strict time deadlines such as what you
26 might find on an assembly line)”; could occasionally interact with supervisors; could occasionally
27 interact with coworkers but not in a tandem, team, or group setting; and could “occasionally interact
28 with the public, but only on a superficial level (such as greeting customers or directing a customer on
1 how to get to the nearest restroom).” AR 27. The ALJ considered “all symptoms and the extent to
2 which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence
3 and other evidence,” as well as “opinion evidence.” Id.
4 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, Plaintiff was defined as a younger
5 individual on the application date, Plaintiff had a limited education and was able to communicate in
6 English, and that transferability of job skills was not an issue because Plaintiff did not have past
7 relevant work. AR 32. Given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found
8 that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
9 perform. AR 32-33. The ALJ noted that examples of jobs consistent with Plaintiff’s age, education,
10 work experience, and RFC included: (1) Photocopy Machine Operator (DOT No. 207.685-014, light,
11 unskilled, 25,000 jobs available in the national economy); (2) Housekeeping Cleaner (DOT No.
12 323.687-014, light, unskilled, 200,000 jobs available in the national economy); (3) Press Operator,
13 Laundry (DOT No. 363.685-010, light, unskilled, 28,000 jobs available in the national economy); and
14 (4) Small Item Presser, Laundry (DOT No. 363.685-022, light, unskilled, with 40,000 jobs available in
15 the national economy). AR 33. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff had not been disabled
16 since the application date of August 26, 2016. Id.
17 SCOPE OF REVIEW
18 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to
19 deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this
20 Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.
21 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales,
22 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112,
23 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
24 adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be
25 considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the
26 Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the
27 evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. E.g.,
28 Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s
1 determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards,
2 and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of
3 Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).
4 REVIEW
5 In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in
6 substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has
7 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §
8 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such
9 severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his or
10 her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
11 exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The
12 burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir.
13 1990).
14 DISCUSSION3
15 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting
16 Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. (Doc. 17 at 7-11.) Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to
17 evaluate the third-party witness statement from Plaintiff’s mother. (Id. at 11-13.)
18 A. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptoms
19 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed harmful error by failing to provide clear and
20 convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony as inconsistent with the evidence. (Id. at 7-11.)
21 In deciding whether to admit a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ must engage in a two-step
22 analysis. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014); Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 1190,
23 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). First, the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of her impairment
24 that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptom or pain alleged. Garrison,
25 759 F.3d at 1014. If the claimant satisfies the first step and there is no evidence of malingering, the
26

27 3 The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including
arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific
28 argument or brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief.
1 ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only by offering
2 specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Id. at 1015.
3 Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
4 expected to cause the alleged symptoms. AR 28. However, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s statements
5 concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms, noting that the
6 statements were not consistent with medical evidence and other evidence in the record. Id. The ALJ
7 was therefore required to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s
8 subjective complaints.
9 First, the ALJ noted that “The record reflects a significant gap in the claimant's history of
10 treatment, which is not consistent with disabling levels of symptoms. He did not get treatment between
11 September 2014 and January 2015 (Exs. 4F, 9F).” AR 29. An ALJ may consider unexplained
12 treatment gaps in evaluating claimant symptoms testimony. See Roberts v. Berryhill, 734 F. App’x
13 489, 491 (9th Cir. 2018) (“unexplained gaps in treatment may support an ALJ's credibility
14 determination.”); Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding gaps in treatment
15 regimen was permissible reason for discounting symptoms testimony); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d
16 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ considering three or four month gap in treatment was permissible in
17 credibility determination). Indeed, the record reflects that Plaintiff did not show up to a June 2014
18 appointment, was discharged from a behavioral health facility in July 2014, and did not return to seek
19 treatment of his mental impairments until February 2015. See AR 473 (August 2014 Fresno County
20 Department of Behavioral Health Progress Note stating Plaintiff “was recently discharged from CBHC
21 on 7/25/14… [Plaintiff] was a ‘no show’ on 6/18/14 to complete his assessment at UCWC… Today
22 [Plaintiff] declined any mental health service with DBH.”); AR 385 (February 2015 visit note
23 including Anxiety diagnosis, finding no acute distress in Plaintiff’s general appearance, and stating
24 “Patient is here for medication refills and he is still awaiting to get a psychiatrist.”) This gap in
25 treatment was therefore a valid reason for discounting Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony.
26 Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff’s belief that treatment would not help is consistent with his
27 alleged symptoms and contends the ALJ failed to explain “why a 3-month period between
28 appointments… undermines Plaintiff’s claim.” (Doc. 17 at 8, 10.) However, the ALJ stated that the
1 “significant gap” in treatment was “not consistent with disabling levels of symptoms.” AR 29.
2 Additionally, though Plaintiff testified that he was not getting further counseling as he felt it would not
3 help and he became anxious and angry during counseling (AR 53-54), the evidence is also susceptible
4 to the ALJ’s interpretation that the gap was inconsistent with disabling symptoms. The Court must
5 therefore defer to the ALJ’s conclusion. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002)
6 (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the
7 ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.”) (citing Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
8 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.1999)). Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ improperly examined a gap in
9 treatment as part of discounting Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony are therefore unavailing.
10 Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations were not fully consistent with the medical
11 and other evidence, contrasting Plaintiff’s alleged impairments and symptoms with evidence from the
12 medical record. AR 27-28, 28-31. Although lack of supporting medical evidence cannot form the
13 sole basis for discounting testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider. See Burch, 400 F.3d at
14 681 (9th Cir. 2005).
15
Here, the ALJ contrasted Plaintiff’s allegations with the objective findings in part as follows:
16
Although the claimant alleged an onset date of December 2013, he did
17 not seek out mental health treatment until June 2014. At this time, the
claimant complained of nightmares due to being sexually abused as a
18
child. His mother reported that he was angry, impulsive, had auditory
19 hallucinations and engaged in self-harm. The claimant said that he last
drank alcohol seven years prior and last smoked marijuana three weeks
20 before. He failed to appear for his next appointment and thus was
discharged from care in July 2014 (Ex. 9F). The medical record is then
21
silent until February 2015 when the claimant presented to his primary
22 physician requesting a medication refill while he awaited obtaining a
psychiatrist. He was diagnosed with anxiety and provided a prescription
23 for Zyprexa. The following month, it was noted the claimant was using
marijuana daily. Psychiatric examination was positive for anxiety,
24 depression, irritability and poor concentration. He presented as
25 disheveled. No abnormal involuntary movements were noted. The
claimant appeared guarded and was hesitant to make eye contact. He did
26 not show any catatonic or conversion signs. The claimant's speech was
low with decreased productivity and tone. His affect was appropriate. A
27 diagnosis of schizophrenia was provided. In May 2015, the claimant
denied experiencing hallucinations. He was prescribed alprazolam for
28
1 anxiety. The claimant was instructed to follow up with psychiatry. The
following month, Zyprexa and alprazolam were refilled. At this visit, he
2 was diagnosed with depressive disorder. The claimant was seen for
medication refills in July, August and December 2015 (Ex. 4F).
3

4 In March 2016, his mother told the doctor that she was concerned about
his mood swings and violent tendencies. The claimant said that his jaw
5 pain was the cause of his mood swings (Ex. 4F). In June and September
2016, his psychiatric medications were refilled. Psychiatric examination
6
in November 2016 was negative for anxiety, depression, sleep
7 disturbance, irritability, mood swings or suicidal thoughts. At this time,
the claimant was appropriately dressed and did not appear anxious or
8 withdrawn. Speech and affect were appropriate (Ex. 8F). During an
ophthalmological evaluation later in the month, his mood and affect was
9 described as normal (Ex. lF). Psychiatric examination in December 2016
10 showed appropriate speech and affect. The claimant was appropriately
dressed and did not appear anxious or withdrawn. In February 2017, his
11 insight and judgment was good. The claimant had normal mood, affect
and memory (Ex. 13F). In March and May 2017, the claimant denied
12 experiencing anxiety or depression (Ex. 20F). In July 2017, his
prescription for Zyprexa was refilled (Ex. 15F). Psychiatric examination
13
in April 2018 revealed appropriate speech and affect. In addition, the
14 claimant was appropriately dressed and did not appear anxious or
withdrawn (Ex. 19F)…
15
In December 2015, claimant was diagnosed with TMJ. In March 2016,
16
the claimant was seen with ongoing complaints of jaw and face pain.
17 Since x-rays were normal a MRI of his TMJ was ordered. In addition, he
was prescribed ibuprofen 600 milligrams. Later in the month, the
18 claimant was prescribed a muscle relaxer and was referred to oral
surgery. At this time, he was not in acute distress (Ex. 4F). TMJ MRI
19 showed mild degenerative changes involving the mandibular condylar
20 heads suggesting early osteoarthritis. In June 2016, the claimant was
tried on tricyclic antidepressants to treat his TMJ. He was re-referred to
21 oral surgery in September 2016 (Ex. 8F). In March 2017, he reported
ongoing issues with TMJ. However, the claimant had only seen a dentist
22 and had yet to have an evaluation with an oral surgeon. Examination did
not reveal any limitation of movement of the TMJ, tenderness,
23
dislocation on opening jaw or pain with range of motion. In May 2017,
24 he was seen for ongoing issues associated with TMJ. It was noted that
all of the claimant's teeth had been extracted and had a large under bite.
25 He was again referred to oral surgery (Ex. l SF). The claimant continued
to experience severe TMJ issues and abnormal operation as well as
26
dislocation of the joint with mandibular motion in October 2018. He was
27 again referred to oral surgery (Ex. 19F).

28
1 The claimant took part in an internal medicine consultative evaluation
with Rustom Damania, MD in February 2017. He gave a history of
2 bilateral TMJ dislocation and a loss of all his teeth. The claimant also
stated that he had glaucoma bilaterally and a history of infections in both
3
groin axillae. Examination revealed lack of upper and lower teeth. The
4 mandibles seem to be well aligned, but he had difficulty fully opening
his mouth. Strength was full in all extremities and sensation was grossly
5 intact. His gait was within normal limits. The claimant was diagnosed
with bilateral TMJ dysfunction, endentulous and possible bilateral
6
hidradenitis in the groin and axillae that had resolved.
7
AR 29-31. The ALJ therefore properly discounted Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony by contrasting
8
Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms with medical evidence suggesting that Plaintiff’s TMJ
9
and mental impairments produced relatively normal findings. See AR 358 (March 2016 exam noting
10
that Plaintiff did not appear to be in acute distress while “TMJ shows marked popping on opening
11
jaw.”); 491 (February 2019 evaluation report noting “Mouth and Throat: The claimant has no upper or
12
lower teeth. The mandibles seem to be well-aligned but he had difficulty fully opening his mouth.”);
13
AR 419 (November 2016 report finding “Psychiatric: Appropriately dressed. Does not appear anxious
14
or withdrawn. Speech and affect are appropriate. Neurologic: Alert, oriented x3. No gross
15
abnormalities noted.”); 505 (February 2017 report noting psychiatric findings of “Insight: good
16
judgment. Mental Status: normal mood and affect and active and alert. Memory: recent memory
17
normal and remote memory normal.”).
18
Plaintiff argues, citing Ninth Circuit authority, that “providing a summary of medical evidence
19
... is not the same as providing clear and convincing reasons for finding the claimant's symptom
20
testimony not credible.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brown-
21
Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015)). However, in the same case, the Ninth Circuit
22
held that its “cases do not require ALJs to perform a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant's testimony,
23
nor do they require ALJs to draft dissertations when denying benefits.” Id. at 1277. Moreover, the
24
ALJ here did not merely provide a summary of the medical evidence. Instead, the ALJ first explained
25
Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms and impairments, then contrasted those allegations with evidence from
26
the medical record. AR 27-28, 28-31. Unlike in Lambert, the ALJ here detailed Plaintiff’s symptoms
27
testimony, then compared that testimony with opposing medical evidence. See Lambert, 980 F.3d at
28
1 1277 (““We cannot review whether the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for
2 rejecting [claimant’s] pain testimony where, as here, the ALJ never identified which testimony she
3 found not credible, and never explained which evidence contradicted that testimony.”) (quoting
4 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494). The identification of specific allegations and evidence contradicting
5 those allegations permitted the Court to review the ALJ’s reasoning. Plaintiff’s argument is therefore
6 unavailing.
7 Third, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “described daily activities, which are not limited to the
8 extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” AR 29. An
9 ALJ may properly discount a claimant's subjective complaints when the daily activities demonstrate an
10 inconsistency between what the claimant can do and the degree that disability is alleged. Molina v.
11 Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2012) (an ALJ may consider “whether the claimant engages
12 in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms”), superseded by regulation on other
13 grounds. Even where a plaintiff's activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds
14 for discrediting the claimant's testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally
15 debilitating impairment. Id. at 1113.
16 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s testimony based upon his
17 daily activities despite his testimony that he only performed minimal daily activities. (Doc. 17 at 9-
18 10.) Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that a claimant’s ability to complete minimal daily
19 activities does not detract from the claimant’s credibility. See Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561
20 (9th Cir. 1987) (“evidence that [claimant] could assist with some household chores was not
21 determinative of disability. ‘Disability does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a dark room
22 excluded from all forms of human and social activity.’) (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971
23 (3d Cir. 1981)); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (“This court has repeatedly
24 asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery
25 shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her
26 credibility as to her overall disability.”)
27 Here, the ALJ noted:
28
1 As mentioned earlier, the record reflects work activity after the alleged
onset date. Although that work activity did not constitute disqualifying
2 substantial gainful activity, it does indicate that the claimant's daily
activities have, at least at times, been somewhat greater than the
3
claimant has generally reported. Further, the claimant testified that he
4 was seeking employment and had an application that he was going to be
submitting in the near future which indicates that he has some belief that
5 he can be employed…

6
He testified that he spent two to three hours a day playing video games
7 with intermittent breaks, which necessarily requires some ability to
maintain concentration, persistence and pace. In March 2017, the
8 claimant told the psychological consultative evaluator that he was
working on his car when someone ran up and hit him resulting in a
9 broken jaw. He did not need help with bathing, dressing or grooming.
10 The claimant was noted to be able to travel alone. He was able to
prepare his own meals. He said that a typical day consisted of primarily
11 staying at home, watching television, playing video games and taking
naps (Ex. 14F).
12
AR 29. However, some of the activities – such as bathing, dressing, grooming, and traveling alone –
13
are the types of activities that the Ninth Circuit has cautioned against using to discount symptoms
14
testimony. See Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1050. Moreover, the ALJ utilized Plaintiff’s playing video
15
games with intermittent breaks as demonstrating his ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and
16
pace. AR 29. But Plaintiff testified that he would only play video games “a little bit throughout the
17
day” adding up to two to three hours, and that he would not be able to concentrate if he tried to play
18
video games for two to three hours straight. AR 59. The ALJ therefore erred in using Plaintiff’s daily
19
activities to discount Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony. Nevertheless, this is harmless error as the ALJ
20
also discounted Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony based upon a gap in treatment and the objective
21
medical evidence.
22
Accordingly, the ALJ appropriately discounted Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony based upon the
23
objective medical evidence and gap in treatment.
24
B. Evaluation of Pushpa Mudahiar’s Statement
25
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the statement of Plaintiff’s
26
mother, Puspha Mudahiar. (Doc. 17 at 11-13.) “In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an
27
ALJ must consider lay witness testimony concerning a claimant's ability to work.” Bruce v. Astrue,
28
1
557 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). “[L]ay testimony as to a claimant's
2
symptoms or how an impairment affects ability to work is competent evidence ... and therefore cannot
3
be disregarded without comment.” Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.
4
2006)). “[I]n order to discount competent lay witness testimony, the ALJ ‘must give reasons that are
5
germane to each witness.’” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (citation omitted).
6
In February 2019, Ms. Mudahiar wrote:
7 I, Pushpa Mudahiar, Shane’s mom like to tell you Shane’s jaw broken.
The Dr’s trying to find a specialist for 4 yrs. Didn’t found yet. He has no
8 teeth can’t wear dentures. He is still in Dr’s care (Dr. Rainwater Greg)
don’t know what’s going on in Shane’s body. He get depress, frustrated,
9
Anxiety, sometimes Shane gets panic disorder like chest pain, can’t
10 breath. 2 times already call ambulance for Shane, when his there
(hospital) for 6,7 hours then he panic’s wants to come home. Shane
11 when he sleeps he see bad dream’s, uneasiness, he won’t stay still,
shortness of breath, dry mouth, Nausea, muscle spasm and dizziness.
12
Can’t get relief then gets mad and throw things on loudly takes
13 humming sound. Too many things going on with him. In ’03 or ’04 his
ankle got cut with grinder while fixing car at home (deep cut) since now
14 having problem standing or walking, sometimes the ankle gets swollen
and pain. I hope judge will have mercy on my son Shane.
15
AR 312. In addressing the statement, the ALJ stated:
16

17 Pushpa Mudahiar, the claimant's mother authored a letter in 2019. She
said that her son's jaw was broken and that they had been trying to find a
18 specialist for four years. Mrs. Mudahiar reported that the claimant has
no teeth and is unable to wear dentures. She stated that her son gets
19 depressed, frustrated, has anxiety and occasionally experiences panic
attacks. Mrs. Mudahiar said that the claimant has nightmares as well.
20
She said that her son has problems standing and walking due to ankle
21 swelling that was the result of a deep cut sustained in 2003 or 2004 (Ex.
17E).
22
This statement has been given little weight, as it is a lay opinion based
23
upon casual observation, rather than objective medical examination and
24 testing. Further, it is outweighed by the accumulated medical evidence
regarding the extent to which the claimant's impairments limit his
25 functional abilities. Ultimately, this statement is not persuasive for the
same reasons set forth above in finding the claimant's allegations to be
26
less than wholly supportable.
27
AR 32.
28
1
The ALJ considered Ms. Mudahiar’s report and assigned it “little weight” as it was based upon
2
casual observation and was outweighed by other medical evidence. AR 32. As the ALJ provided
3
germane reasons for rejecting Ms. Mudahiar’s report, the ALJ did not err in granting little weight to
4
Ms. Mudahiar’s report. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. Further, there is no indication from the ALJ's
5
opinion that he rejected or failed to consider her statement. Rather, the ALJ granted it limited weight
6
due to the substance of the opinion.
7
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorrectly rejected Ms. Mudahiar’s statement as it was a lay
8
opinion rather than an objective medical assessment, citing caselaw suggesting that lack of medical
9
training is not a germane reason to discredit lay testimony. (Doc. 17 at 13); See Hurtado v. Colvin,
10
No. 16-CV-01075 NC, 2017 WL 373068, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2017) (“Here, the ALJ gave a
11
number of non-germane reasons for giving minimal weight to the lay witness statements; namely,
12
accusing [claimant’s] mother and neighbor of bias, and questioning the accuracy of their statements
13
because they are not medically trained.”). However, the ALJ did not discredit the statement based
14
upon Ms. Mudahiar’s lack of medical training or credentials, but instead discounted it because the
15
statement was based upon “casual observation” rather than “objective medical examination and
16
testing” as well as contradiction by the broader medical record. AR 32. Indeed, in a case cited by
17
Plaintiff, the court held that there was no error where the ALJ discounted a mother’s statement
18
because it was not consistent with the broader medical record. See Hurtado, 2017 WL 373068, at *5
19
(“However, the ALJ also noted that their statements were not consistent with the ‘preponderance of
20
the opinions and observations by medical doctors in this case.’ This is a germane reason for rejecting
21
the statements.”). As the ALJ did not discount Ms. Mudahiar’s statement simply because she was not
22
a medical expert, Plaintiff’s argument misreads the ALJ’s decision and is unsuccessful.
23
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ was not sufficiently specific in explaining why the statement
24
was discounted, citing Talley v. Astrue and caselaw from outside this district. (Doc. 17 at 13); See
25
Talley v. Astrue, 400 F. App’x 167, 169 (9th Cir. 2010); Seaman v. Berryhill, No. 4:16-CV-00027-
26
SLG, 2017 WL 3879084, at *7 (D. Alaska Sept. 5, 2017) (“A conclusory statement that an opinion is
27
not supported by the record or medical evidence does not suffice.”). However, in Talley, the Ninth
28
1
Circuit noted that the ALJ’s decision “did not account for or give a reason for discounting the
2
testimony of” the “other source.” Talley, 400 F. App’x at 169. Instead, the ALJ described Ms.
3
Mudahiar’s statement and explained that it was not based on objective medical examination and
4
testing, was “outweighed by the accumulated medical evidence regarding the extent to which the
5
claimant's impairments limit his functional abilities,” and was “not persuasive for the same reasons set
6
forth above in finding the claimant's allegations to be less than wholly supportable.” AR 32.
7
Additionally, while the ALJ’s reasoning may at first glance appear conclusory, the ALJ avoided
8
unnecessary repetition by pointing to the symptoms testimony analysis in the preceding pages of the
9
decision. Id. As Ms. Mudahiar’s reporting was largely duplicative of Plaintiff’s own symptoms
10
testimony, the ALJ stating that the statement is “not persuasive for the same reasons set forth above in
11
finding the claimant's allegations to be less than wholly supportable” is sufficient. Id. Plaintiff’s
12
argument that the ALJ’s was insufficiently specific in discounting Ms. Mudahiar’s statement is
13
therefore unavailing.
14
Accordingly, the ALJ appropriately discounted Ms. Mudahiar’s statement.
15
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1

2 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
3 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
4 evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, IT IS
5 HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:
6 1. Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social
7 Security be denied; and
8 2. The Clerk of this Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Leland
9 Dudek, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Shane Mudaliar.
10 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge
11 assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after being
12 served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections with the
13 Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and
14 Recommendations.” The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time
15 may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal.
16 Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391,
17 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
18

19 IT IS SO ORDERED.

20 Dated: April 10, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _
21 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10843183. Public record. Not legal advice.