# Charles Bechert, III v. Luciana Surban Bechert O/B/o, O.B.

> District Court of Appeal of Florida · April 9, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10841779

## Case

- **Court:** District Court of Appeal of Florida
- **Decided:** April 9, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

CHARLES HAROLD BECHERT, III,
Appellant,

v.

LUCIANA SURBAN BECHERT, o.b.o. O.B.,
Appellee.

No. 4D2024-0951

[April 9, 2025]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Susan Lebow, Senior Judge, and Elaine A. Carbuccia,
Judge; L.T. Case No. DVCE23-000072.

Natalie P. Mescolotto of NM Legal, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, and
Christopher N. Link of Christopher N. Link, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.

Adam B. Swickle of Swickle & Associates, PLLC, Fort Lauderdale, for
appellee.

CONNER, J.

Charles Bechert (“the father”) appeals a domestic violence injunction
(“DV injunction”) entered against him to protect his minor daughter. The
father raises three arguments on appeal for reversal. We affirm the trial
court on two of the arguments without discussion. We agree with the
father’s third argument that his actions, consistent with the trial court’s
findings, as opposed to the “terribly exaggerated” claims in the underlying
petition, were appropriate physical punishment of his daughter, and not
domestic violence. On that issue we reverse. Adopting the reasoning the
First District Court of Appeal employed in G.C. v. R.S., 71 So. 3d 164 (Fla.
1st DCA 2011), we hold under established Florida law, reasonable and
non-excessive parental corporal discipline is not domestic violence as a
matter of law. We therefore reverse the DV injunction, explain our
decision, and remand for the trial court to vacate the DV injunction issued
against the father. 1

1 Although the DV injunction under review has now expired, we still “reverse and

remand with instructions to vacate the injunction due to the collateral
Background

The underlying petition for a DV injunction was filed by the mother on
behalf of the parties’ then-fourteen-year-old daughter. The parents
divorced in 2018. The incident giving rise to the injunction occurred on
December 31, 2022.

The petition alleged the father: (1) punched the daughter in the head,
stomach, and back; (2) grabbed the daughter by the hair, pulled her to
ground, and sat on top of her; (3) while sitting on top of the daughter,
“squish[ed]” her head into the floor and punched and slapped her head
and face until she started throwing up; and (4) continued to punch the
daughter and then stood up and kicked her in the stomach and back
multiple times.

The trial court appointed a Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) to address the
best interests of the daughter concerning the DV injunction proceedings.

At the final hearing, the father testified that on the night of the incident,
he and the daughter had just returned from a Colorado ski vacation. After
arriving at the father’s house, the daughter gave the father a Christmas
present of socks. Shortly after, the father became concerned the socks
were stolen. The father searched the daughter’s room to see if there were
other stolen items. In her backpack she carried on the trip, the father
found marijuana, a pipe, and a vape pen. The father announced he was
going to punish the daughter for stealing, lying, and possessing marijuana
and a vape pen by taking away her phone. The daughter refused to give
the father the phone and they “tussled” over it. At some point, the
daughter snapped the father’s finger back and broke it. The father denied
punching her, pulling her hair, sitting on her, or that she vomited.

The father next testified the daughter followed him out of her room to
the kitchen, demanding her phone. The father refused and the daughter
threw a metal thermos and an orange juice bottle. A video recording of
what transpired in the kitchen was entered into evidence.

consequences such an injunction might cause.” Stone v. Stone, 128 So. 3d 239,
242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); see also Bell v. Battaglia, 332 So. 3d 1094, 1097–99
(Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (listing cases where “Florida appellate courts have routinely
decided appeals from expired [DV] and stalking injunctions on the merits because
of the ‘collateral consequences’” resulting from the injunction).

2
The daughter left the home and went to a next-door neighbor’s house.
The neighbor testified he did not see any bruises or red marks on her face
or other injuries, but she was crying. The daughter used the neighbor’s
phone to text her mother to pick her up. The daughter told the neighbor
she had gotten into an argument with her father but did not need the
neighbor to call the police. The daughter then went back to the father’s
house. The neighbor testified the daughter did not seem fearful to return
to her father’s house. She then came back to the neighbor’s house and
asked for a ride to the mother’s house. During the car ride, the neighbor
did not see any physical injuries on the daughter.

The mother testified she was away from her home but came home when
she received her daughter’s text message. When the mother gave the
daughter a hug, the mother saw a bruise on the daughter’s back. The
daughter also had a bruise on her leg and arm. The mother took pictures
of the daughter’s back, leg, and the upper right arm around 9:00 am the
next day. The pictures were admitted into evidence along with a picture
of the daughter’s face.

The Child Protective Investigator (“CPI”) testified there were “no
indicators of mental or physical injury because the parties were deemed
as mutual combatants.” The CPI observed “a little black and blue” on the
daughter’s shoulder and arm but no bruising or marks; there were also no
welts or bruises on her face. A copy of the CPI’s report was admitted into
evidence.

The GAL testified she believed the New Year’s Eve incident was a mutual
combatant situation, and it was “absolutely 100 percent inappropriate.”

The daughter gave in-camera testimony.

In closing argument, the father argued there was no evidence the
daughter was the victim of domestic violence or in objective fear of
domestic violence. The father also argued he had merely disciplined his
child and he did not commit domestic violence. The mother argued the
father’s actions did not constitute corporal punishment because they
caused harm to the daughter.

At the end of the final hearing, the trial court summarized the testimony
and its findings:

That before this incident on December the 31st of 2022 [the
daughter] was primarily with Mom. Although there had been
a parenting plan setting forth 50/50 time-sharing, for

3
whatever reason, it doesn’t matter what the reasons were, [the
father] was not seeing her on a regular basis. Then came this
winter break and an opportunity for her to go with him to
Colorado, which everyone seemed to be in agreement with.
She had a wonderful time. She loved seeing the snow, she
had a great time skiing and then she came home. When I say
"home" she came to [the father]’s home. And Mr. – she gave
[the father] as a Christmas gift a pair of socks. [The father]
was concerned that she did not pay for those socks and he
came into the room and confronted her. She denied that she
had stolen them. There was also [the father]’s testimony that
he found pot and a vape pen. She refused to reply about the
socks and he told her she was going to lose her phone. And
with that there is the issue of physicality. Because she
resisted giving him the phone, he, physically, wrenched it from
her. During that process she -- I believe that the evidence is
that she had this fear. There’s no evidence to substantiate
any previous type of physical assault on this child. And at the
age of 14 to all of a sudden have a parent become physically
assertive, to use a nice word, is -- it’s not unreasonable for her
to have a fear of him, physically.

The trial court noted it was “in the child’s best interest right now to feel as
secure as I can make her feel.” The trial court also found “the violence
that [the mother] put in that petition . . . was terribly exaggerated. But,
this child has a fear that she’s going to be made into, you know, all of a
sudden having to spend time with this father she doesn’t know and doesn’t
trust.” (emphasis added). The trial court further found there was
reasonable competent substantial evidence that the daughter is in fear.
Accordingly, the trial court granted the injunction for six months and
ordered the father and daughter to engage in reunification therapy.

The father gave notice of appeal after his rehearing motion was denied.

Appellate Analysis

“An order granting an injunction in the domestic violence context is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Chiscul v. Hernandez, 311 So. 3d 55, 57
(Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citing Selph v. Selph, 144 So. 3d 676, 677 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2014)). A trial court’s order granting an injunction must be
supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id. “‘[L]egal sufficiency . .
. as opposed to evidentiary weight, is the appropriate concern of an
appellate tribunal.’” Id. (quoting Selph, 144 So. 3d at 677). “Whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to support entry of an injunction is a question

4
of law that is reviewed de novo.” Fingers v. Fingers, 353 So. 3d 1283, 1285
(Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (citation omitted).

The DV injunction in this case was entered pursuant to section
741.30(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2022), which allows the entry of a DV
injunction to protect a person “who is either the victim of domestic violence
as defined in s. 741.28 or has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in
imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence . .
. .” Section 741.28(2), Florida Statutes (2022) defines “domestic violence”
as “any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual
assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false
imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death
of one family or household member by another family or household
member.”

The father argues there was no competent, substantial evidence
presented to the trial court to support the DV injunction. The premise of
his argument is the evidence showed the altercation between father and
daughter was nothing more than the father exercising his right to
discipline his child. The father further argues the trial court’s findings of
fact support the conclusion his actions were appropriate physical
discipline, rather than an assault, battery, aggravated assault, or
aggravated battery.

The father correctly argues there was no evidence of a history of
domestic violence by the father toward the daughter or that the father had
engaged in behavior in the past that would give the daughter reason to
objectively believe she was imminently about to be subjected to domestic
violence. The father also correctly argues the trial court found the
daughter’s fear as to the future was “a fear she’s going to be made into,
you know, all of a sudden having to spend time with this father she doesn’t
know and doesn’t trust.”

The DV injunction in this case was based solely on the New Year’s Eve
physical incident between the father and daughter. In its oral summary
of the evidence, the trial court described the “physicality” used by the
father as “he, physically, wrenched [the cellphone] from her.”
Significantly, the trial court made no mention of any other physical contact
by the father or injury to the daughter.

Based on oral statements of the trial court at the final hearing, we agree
with the father’s argument that the trial court determined his physical and
verbal actions in taking away the daughter’s cell phone was punishment
for perceived theft and possession of marijuana and a vape pen. The father

5
argues his actions were appropriate physical punishment, not domestic
violence.

We agree with the father’s arguments and reverse because we adopt the
First District’s holding in G.C. v. R.S., 71 So. 3d 164 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
In G.C., the First District held, under established Florida law, reasonable
and non-excessive parental corporal discipline is not domestic violence as
a matter of law. Id. at 165.

G.C. reviewed a final DV injunction entered after the trial court
determined the legislature did not permit any exceptions to the protection
against domestic violence afforded by the statute, including parental
discipline. Id. at 166. The First District’s analysis began with the
proposition that “the common law recognize[s] a parent’s right to discipline
his or her child in a ‘reasonable manner.’” Id. (quoting Raford v. State, 828
So. 2d 1012, 1015, n.5 (Fla. 2002)). The First District then noted that in
Raford, the supreme court held “the parental privilege to use corporal
discipline does not provide absolute immunity to charges of child abuse
under section 827.03, however, it may be asserted as an affirmative
defense to criminal child abuse charges. Id. (citing Raford, 828 So. 2d at
1020). The First District then reasoned, “[a]lthough chapter 741 governing
domestic violence injunctions does not expressly incorporate the common
law principle ‘that parents may administer corporal discipline to their
children; provided, [] the discipline is reasonable’ . . . neither does it
exclude the common law defense.” Id. (internal citation omitted)
(emphasis added). The First District then cited our opinion in Moore v.
Pattin, 983 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), as authority for concluding
the DV injunction in G.C. should be reversed because the father’s corporal
discipline was reasonable. Id.

As G.C. observed, we implicitly recognized in Moore that appropriate
parental discipline can be a defense to a DV injunction. 983 So. 2d at
664–65.

In Moore, the trial court issued the DV injunction after disagreeing with
the father’s argument that his action disciplining his child was
constitutionally and statutorily protected. Id. at 663–64. The trial court
concluded the child’s spanking was excessive and not protected. Id.

Our analysis began with the premise that, under the common law,
“parents may administer corporal discipline to their children; provided,
however, that the discipline is reasonable.’” Id. at 664 (quoting A.A. v.
Dep’t of Child. & Fam., 908 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)). We also
recognized the statutory provisions protecting against child abuse contain

6
an exception for “corporal discipline of a child by a parent.” Id. (citing §
39.01(2), Fla. Stat.). After reviewing the record evidence, we concluded in
Moore, the DV injunction was proper because we agreed with the trial court
that the corporal punishment in that case was excessive. Id. at 665.

In the instant case, we are satisfied the father’s actions in trying to take
the cellphone away from the daughter was a form of physical discipline,
but it was not traditional corporal punishment. However, even if we were
to consider the father’s “wrenching” the cellphone away from the daughter
was corporal punishment, such was not excessive punishment because
the daughter refused to surrender the phone and “[b]ecause there was no
evidence of disfigurement or significant bruising[.]” Moore, 983 So. 2d at
665; see also J.C. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fam., 773 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA
2000) (father spanking his child with a belt which on one occasion left a
mark did not constitute abuse within the meaning of the dependency
statutes as it was not excessive or abusive corporal punishment). The trial
court below even recognized the evidence was not “clearly about the
physical injury . . .” and the violence alleged in the petition was “terribly
exaggerated.”

The trial court entered the DV injunction below to make the daughter
“feel as secure” as the trial court could. However, the daughter’s fear of
being forced “to spend time with this father she doesn’t know and doesn’t
trust” is not competent, substantial evidence supporting entry of a DV
injunction. Instead, the competent, substantial evidence showed the
father imposed an appropriate and lawful form of corporal punishment
against his daughter, which is not grounds for a DV injunction against
him. See G.C. 71 So. 3d at 165.

Conclusion

Having determined the record does not contain competent, substantial
evidence that the father engaged in domestic violence against the
daughter, and instead, establishes the father used appropriate physical
punishment to discipline his daughter, we reverse the DV injunction
entered against the father and remand for the trial court to vacate the
injunction.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

LEVINE and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

7
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

8

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10841779. Public record. Not legal advice.