# Sibley v. City of Lakeland

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 8, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10841525

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 8, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10841525

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a shotgun complaint does not “give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

LABLANCA SIBLEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2853-VMC-AEP

CITY OF LAKELAND,
NICHOLAS S. RIGGALL,
POLK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
JOHN DOES #1-10, and
JOHN DOES #11-20,

Defendants.
/

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on consideration of
Defendants City of Lakeland, Polk County Sheriff’s Office,
John Does #1-20, and Nicholas S. Riggall’s Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint (Doc. # 35), filed on March 12, 2025.
Plaintiff LaBlanca Sibley responded on April 2, 2025. (Doc.
# 41). The Motion is granted as set forth below.
I. Background
Plaintiff initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on
December 10, 2024, asserting claims arising from her arrest
and detention. (Doc. # 1). Defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint as a shotgun complaint and on the merits. (Doc. #
19). The Court granted the motion because the complaint was
a shotgun complaint but granted leave to amend. (Doc. # 21).
Although the Court did not address the merits arguments, the
Court “advise[d] Plaintiff to closely review all issues
raised in the motion to dismiss, including the inclusion of
John Doe defendants and the naming of the Polk County
Sheriff’s Office as a defendant, before amending the
complaint.” (Id.). The Court also advised that “Plaintiff

should be sure to specify in the amended complaint against
which Defendant or Defendants each count is brought.” (Id.).
On February 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed her amended
complaint, asserting four Section 1983 claims for excessive
force (Count I), false arrest (Count II), bodily integrity
(Count III), and for municipal liability (Count IV). (Doc. #
23). The amended complaint continues to name the Polk County
Sheriff’s Office and multiple John Does as Defendants. (Id.).
No count clearly specifies against which Defendants it is
brought and it does not appear that any count is actually
asserted against the Polk County Sheriff’s Office. (Id.).

The amended complaint contains the following factual
allegations. Plaintiff is an African-American woman living in
the City of Lakeland, in Polk County, Florida. (Id. at 3).
“On or around December 12, 2022, at approximately 12:41am,
Defendant Riggall” — a police officer employed by the City of
Lakeland — “arrives at ‘T-Bows 33 Lounge’ located at 4106
Lakeland Hills Boulevard, Lakeland, Florida (‘the
Establishment’), in response to a reported physical
alteration.” (Id. at 3-4).
“Upon arriving at the Establishment, Defendant Riggall
is approached by a reported victim of the physical alteration,
who tells him that an ‘unknown black female’ started a

physical altercation and then fled the area southbound on
Lakeland Hills Boulevard.” (Id. at 5). “At or about the same
time, Plaintiff is present in the parking lot of the
Establishment waiting for a Lyft driver to pick her up and
take her home.” (Id.). “Defendant Riggall approaches
Plaintiff in the parking lot of the Establishment and tells
her that he is a law enforcement officer.” (Id.). “Plaintiff
informs Defendant Riggall that she is unaware of the alleged
altercation within the Establishment and is not from the area
(Plaintiff, at the time, was living in Arizona) and proceeded
to walk past Defendant Riggall.” (Id.).

“Defendant Riggall does not inform Plaintiff that she is
being detained, is under arrest, or is otherwise required to
speak with him.” (Id.). “As Plaintiff walks past Defendant
Riggall, Defendant Riggall forcefully grabs Plaintiff’s arm.”
(Id.). “Surprised and scared for her safety, Plaintiff pulls
her arm away from Defendant Riggall.” (Id.). “Defendant
Riggall again grabs Plaintiff’s arm, forcibly bending and
torquing it behind her back and slamming her body against the
back of a police cruiser.” (Id.).
“Defendant Riggall then places Plaintiff in the back of
the police cruiser.” (Id.). “At this point, Plaintiff was
offered no explanation as to why she was forcibly detained

and placed in the back of a police cruiser.” (Id. at 6).
“Plaintiff pleads with the officers to explain why she is
being detained, and states that she has done nothing wrong.”
(Id.). “While handcuffed in the back of the police cruiser,
Defendant Riggall maces Plaintiff in the face without
justification.” (Id.).
“Plaintiff is then transported to Polk County Jail for
booking. Upon her arrival at the Polk County Jail, Defendant
Riggall and/or John Does #1-10 and/or John Does #11-20 remove
Plaintiff’s shirt and place her into a holding room for
multiple hours, while the mace remained on her face.” (Id.).

“Plaintiff is then placed into a holding cell apart from the
general jail population, where she remains for approximately
four days.” (Id.). “Plaintiff is charged with Resisting
Officer with Violence and Battery on a Law Enforcement
Officer.” (Id.). “Both charges against Plaintiff were dropped
in their entirety.” (Id.).
Now, Defendants again move to dismiss, arguing the
amended complaint is a shotgun complaint as well as raising
merits arguments. (Doc. # 35). Plaintiff has responded (Doc.
# 41), and the Motion is ripe for review.

II. Discussion
Defendants first argue that the amended complaint is a
shotgun complaint that should be dismissed with prejudice
because Plaintiff has already been given one opportunity to
amend. (Doc. # 35 at 3-6). The Court agrees the amended
complaint is a shotgun complaint and must be dismissed.
However, the Court will give Plaintiff one final chance to
amend.
“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule
10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as
‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s
Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). The Eleventh

Circuit has “identified four rough types or categories of
shotgun pleadings”: (1) “a complaint containing multiple
counts where each count adopts the allegations of all
preceding counts”; (2) a complaint that is “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint
that does “not separat[e] into a different count each cause
of action or claim for relief”; and (4) a complaint that
“assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants
without specifying which of the defendants are responsible
for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the
claim is brought against.” Id. at 1322-23. “The unifying

characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they
fail to . . . give the defendants adequate notice of the
claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
rests.” Id. at 1323.
The amended complaint falls into the fourth category of
shotgun complaint. The Court previously warned Plaintiff to
“be sure to specify in the amended complaint against which
Defendant or Defendants each count is brought.” (Doc. # 21).
Yet, Plaintiff did not take this advice. None of the four
counts explicitly states against which Defendant or
Defendants it is brought. And the first three counts are all

asserted against Defendant Riggall and at least ten John Does.
Multiple allegations in the amended complaint impermissibly
lump Defendant Riggall and various John Does with the same
conduct. For example, Plaintiff alleges “Defendant Riggall
and/or John Does #1-10 and/or John Does #11-20 remove[d]
Plaintiff’s shirt and place[d] her into a holding room for
multiple hours, while the mace remained on her face.” (Doc.
# 23 at 6). Another example: “While acting under color of
law, Defendant Riggall and/or John Does #1-10 and/or John
Does #11-20 deprived Plaintiff of her well-established right
to be free from excessive force.” (Id. at 7).
Plaintiff’s lumping of numerous John Doe Defendants in

each count along with Defendant Riggall deprives Defendant
Riggall of notice of what actions he has supposedly taken.
See Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)
(finding a complaint was a shotgun complaint because it
“name[d] fourteen defendants, and all defendants are charged
in each count” and was “replete with allegations that ‘the
defendants’ engaged in certain conduct, making no distinction
among the fourteen defendants charged, though geographic and
temporal realities make plain that all of the defendants could
not have participated in every act complained of”). Thus, the
Court would have to speculate about what actions Defendant

Riggall allegedly took in order to address Defendant
Riggall’s assertion of qualified immunity. See Milfort v.
Rambosk, No. 2:21-cv-366-SPC-MRM, 2022 WL 138097, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 14, 2022) (“Yet the Court cannot decide [the
qualified immunity issue] given the Third Amended Complaint’s
shotgun nature. Without pure speculation about who did what,
the Court cannot determine the conduct each officer allegedly
engaged in to violate Plaintiffs’ rights.”). This the Court
will not do.
There are other issues with the amended complaint that
relate to the shotgun complaint analysis. In its order
dismissing the original complaint, the Court “advise[d]

Plaintiff to closely review all issues raised in the motion
to dismiss, including the inclusion of John Doe defendants
and the naming of the Polk County Sheriff’s Office as a
defendant, before amending the complaint.” (Doc. # 21). The
amended complaint fails to correct these issues.
It was impermissible for Plaintiff to name John Does as
defendants at all. “[F]ictitious-party pleading is not
permitted in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d
734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). There is “a limited exception to
this rule when the plaintiff’s description of the defendant
is so specific as to be ‘at the very worst, surplusage.’” Id.

(citation omitted). That limited exception does not apply
here, as Plaintiff names twenty John Does and gives no
specific details about any of them. (Doc. # 23 at 3-6). Thus,
all claims are dismissed to the extent they are asserted
against the John Doe Defendants. See Vielma v. Gruler, 808 F.
App’x 872, 880 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he district court
correctly concluded that Plaintiffs failed to describe the
John Doe defendants with enough specificity to enable service
of process. . . . For some of the John Does, Plaintiffs’
provided no descriptions at all. The remaining descriptions
ranged in specificity from the highly generic (e.g., ‘a male
detective,’ ‘one of the officers at the hospital,’ or ‘an FBI

Agent’) to the ever-so-slightly less generic (e.g., ‘[a]
female white officer about 5 feet 10–11 inches in height’ or
‘a middle-aged white male [officer]’).” (citation omitted)).
Additionally, as Defendants have pointed out, “[t]he
Polk County Sheriff’s Office is not a legal entity subject to
suit.” (Doc. # 35 at 5); see Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013)
(“Florida law has not established Sheriff’s offices as
separate legal entities with the capacity to be sued. Thus,
the district court did not err by dismissing Faulkner’s claim
against MCSO because MCSO is not a legal entity with the

capacity to be sued under Florida law.”).
Even if the Sheriff’s Office were a proper defendant, no
count of the amended complaint appears to be asserted against
the Polk County Sheriff’s Office. Thus, this Defendant does
not have adequate notice of what claims are asserted against
it. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 (explaining that a shotgun
complaint does not “give the defendants adequate notice of
the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
rests”). Even if the Court were to assume that the Monell
claim was intended to be asserted against both the Sheriff’s
Office and the City of Lakeland, it is unclear what policy of
the Sheriff’s Office supposedly exposes it to liability.

Indeed, Count IV fails to mention the Sheriff’s Office at
all. (Doc. # 23 at 13-16).
For all these reasons, the amended complaint is
dismissed without prejudice as a shotgun complaint. The Court
will not address Defendants’ merits arguments at this time.
See Bennett v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. CV 15–00165–KD–C,
2015 WL 5294321, at *13 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2015) (“The
Defendants advance several arguments to dismiss the breach of
contract and FDCPA claims, but the undersigned declines to
address those arguments until these claims are repleaded for
the reasons expressed below.”). The Court will allow

Plaintiff to file a final complaint — a second amended
complaint — by April 22, 2025. Because this is the final
opportunity to amend this Court will give Plaintiff,
Plaintiff must closely review all arguments from Defendants’
previous motions to dismiss before amending.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendants City of Lakeland, Polk County Sheriff’s
Office, John Does #1-20, and Nicholas S. Riggall’s
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. # 35) is
GRANTED.
(2) The amended complaint is dismissed as a_ shotgun
complaint.
(3) If she wishes to pursue this action, Plaintiff must file
her second amended complaint by April 22, 2025. The
second amended complaint should correct the issues
addressed in this order.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 8th
day of April, 2025.

VIR IA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10841525. Public record. Not legal advice.