# Bosman v. Harris County Domestic Relations Office

> District Court, S.D. Texas · April 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10840741

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** April 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ate □□□ et
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CAREL DIRK BOSMAN, §
Plaintiff,
Vv. Civil Action No. H-25-0649
HARRIS COUNTY DOMESTIC
RELATIONS OFFICE, et al., §
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a Harris County pretrial detainee at the time of filing, filed a complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a Harris County agency, its employees, and the mother of the minor
complainant in plaintiff's criminal prosecution. He proceeds pro se and seeks leave to
proceed in forma pauperis.
Having screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, the
Court DISMISSES this lawsuit for failure to state a viable claim for which relief can be
granted under § 1983.
J. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS
At the time of filing, plaintiff was a Harris County pretrial detainee awaiting trial on
felony charges for super aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of six. On March
10, 2025, a jury found him guilty of the charges and he was sentenced to a 35-year term of
incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

Plaintiff names as defendants in this lawsuit the Harris County Domestic Relations
Office (“HCDRO”), HCDRO division director Yvette Edwards, family court employee Edith
E. Forett, and Melissa Bosman, who is the mother of the minor complainant. Plaintiff claims
that the HCDRO, Edwards, and Forett are liable to him for professional malpractice and
negligence in their investigation of the complainant’s assertions against him. Plaintiff
further claims that Bosman is liable to him for malicious prosecution, witness tampering, and
parental interference. Plaintiff claims that all of the defendants conspired against him.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, disciplinary actions, and sanctions against the
defendants. Because the Court has no authority to initiate disciplinary actions against the
defendants or impose sanctions against them under the allegations pleaded by plaintiff, the
Court construes the lawsuit as seeking monetary compensation.
This lawsuit is one of at least eight civil lawsuits plaintiff filed in this Court against
various individuals and entities for claims arising from his then-pending criminal detention
and prosecution.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must evaluate the

complaint.and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds that the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A).
A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation ofa legal interest which
clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Sth Cir. 1998). A claim has no
arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional
facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211,
213 (Sth Cir. 1998).
When reviewing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the courts must construe the factual
allegations as liberally as possible. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). However, a
plaintiffs pro se status does not afford him “an impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has

no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation and abuse
already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359
(Sth Cir. 1986). Even under the liberal standards afforded by Haines, pro se litigants must
still “abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d
475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014). They must properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally
construed, state a plausible claim to relief. Jd.
When the allegations of a plaintiff, taken as true, do not show a violation of a
constitutional or federal right, the complaint is properly dismissed for failure to state a viable

claim. See, e.g., Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (Sth Cir. 2009); Rios v. City of Del
Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 421 (Sth Cir. 2006).
B. Malpractice, Negligence, Official Misconduct
Plaintiff claims the defendants are liable to him under claims for professional
malpractice, negligence, and official misconduct in their investigation of the criminal
charges. He pleads no factual allegations supporting these conclusory claims, nor is an issue
ofa federal constitutional dimension raised for purposes of § 1983. Although the Court at
the screening stage must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a complaint “that offers labels and conclusions” or “naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” does not state a viable claim for screening
purposes. See, ¢.g., Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 291 (Sth Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff's claims against the defendants for professional malpractice, negligence, and
official misconduct are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure toraiseaviable

claim for relief under § 1983.
C. Conspiracy
Plaintiff claims that the defendants conspired to have criminal charges brought against
him. A conspiracy by itselfis not actionable under § 1983. See Pfannstiel v. City of Marion,
918 F.2d 1178, 1187 (Sth Cir. 1990). Instead, to state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege specific facts showing: (1) an agreement between the defendants to
commit an illegal act, and (2) an actual deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights in

furtherance of that agreement. See Krueger v. Reimer, 66 F.3d 75, 77 (Sth Cir. 1995); see
also Montgomery v. Walton, 759 F. App’x 312, 314 (Sth Cir. 2019). Coney assertions.
of conspiracy that do not reference specific facts are not sufficient to state a conspiracy claim
under § 1983. See Montgomery, 759 F. App’x at 314; Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022,
1023-24 (Sth Cir. 1982).
As stated above, the Court at the screening stage must accept all well-pleaded facts

as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. However, as in this
instance, a complaint “that offers labels and conclusions” or “naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement” does not state a viable claim for screening purposes. See
Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 420 (Sth Cir. 2004) (“Allegations that are merely
conclusory, without reference to specific facts, will not suffice” to establish a § 1983
conspiracy claim). Therefore, to establish his conspiracy claim in this instance, plaintiff was
required to plead specific, non-conclusory facts establishing that the defendants entered into

an agreement to violate his constitutional rights and then took actions that did so.
Plaintiff pleads no factual allegations sufficient to meet these pleading requirements.
His bare assertion that the defendants conspired against him is wholly conclusory and fails
to raise a viable claim for conspiracy under § 1983.
Plaintiffs conspiracy claims against the defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.

D. State Actor
Plaintiffs claims against defendant Melissa Bosman fail to raise viable claims under
§ 1983 for an additional reason. Defendant Bosman is the mother of the complainant child
in plaintiffs super aggravated sexual assault prosecution. Plaintiff claims Bosman is liable

to him for malicious prosecution, witness tampering, and parental interference.
“Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to
provide aremedy for violations of statutory and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v. Texas Dep't
of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759 (Sth Cir. 1997). To state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a state actor — that is, by a person
acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez v Galman,
18 F.4th 769, 775 (Sth Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff pleads no factual allegations establishing that Bosman was a state actor and
not a private citizen for purposes of § 1983, and no viable § 1983 claim is raised against her.

Although plaintiff stated Bosman conspired with the other defendants to have criminal
charges brought against him, the Court dismissed plaintiffs conspiracy claims for his failure
to plead factual allegations sufficient to raise such claims. Plaintiff's conspiracy claims
provide no basis for allowing plaintiff to proceed against Bosman as a state actor.
Plaintiff's claims against Melissa Bosman are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for failure to state a viable claim for relief under § 1983.

E. HCDRO
Plaintiff's claims against the HCDRO also fail to raise viable claims under § 1983
for an additional reason. The HCDRO is a municipal agency or division of Harris County
and is a non-sui juris entity that cannot be sued in its own name. Plaintiff pleads no factual
allegations showing that the HCDRO has been recognized as an independent municipal
division for purposes of civil liability, and his claims against the HCDRO are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See, e.g., Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311, 313
(Sth Cir. 1991); Potts v. Crosby Ind. Sch. Dist., 210 F. App’x 342, 344-45 (5th Cir. 2006).
I. CONCLUSION
For the reasons shown above, plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under §. □□□□□
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A. Any and all pending motions are DISMISSED AS MOOT.
This dismissal constitutes a STRIKE for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and stands

as plaintiffs second strike. See Bosman v. Davis, C.A. No. H-25-0604 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18,
2025) (dismissed with imposition of a strike).
Signed at Houston, Texas, on this the 7 ie April, 2025.

KEI HP. tee
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10840741. Public record. Not legal advice.