# Lane v. Baywood Hotels, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. Louisiana · April 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10840653

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** April 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

THOMAS LANE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-103

BAYWOOD HOTELS, INC., et al. SECTION M (4)

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-
distress claim for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by defendants Baywood Hotels, Inc. (“Baywood”) and 501EFA
Hotel, LLC (“501EFA”) (together, “Movants”).1 Plaintiff Thomas Lane responds in opposition,2
and Movants reply in further support of their motion.3 Having considered the parties’ memoranda,
the record, and the applicable law, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This disability discrimination case arises out of Lane’s experience at the Hampton Inn by
Hilton New Orleans French Quarter Market Area (the “Hotel”) in March 2024.4 According to the
complaint, “Lane is a qualified individual with a disability” under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (the “ADA”) and the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights (the “LCHR”), and requires
“guide/service dog attention.”5 Lane alleges that, when he checked into the Hotel, he was required
“to pay an additional fee for his service dog and to sign in his service dog.”6 He also alleges that,

1 R. Doc. 9.
2 R. Doc. 11.
3 R. Doc. 16.
4 R. Doc. 21 at 3. Lane alleges that Movants own and manage the Hotel. Id. at 2.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 3.
the following morning, he was “accosted” by a Hotel employee “regarding his service dog” in the
Hotel’s breakfast area, and that “the employee continued to yell at and berate” Lane even after he
explained that the dog was a service animal.7 Lane further alleges that he “was told [a manager]
would not be present for some time” when he asked to speak with one after this incident, and that
he received no response when at checkout he “reiterated his concerns about how he and his service

dog were treated.”8 Lane lastly alleges that “a claim was opened” by defendant Hilton Franchise
Holding, LLC (“Hilton Franchise”) six days later, and, although written statements were taken
from Hotel employees, “all camera footage” of the alleged events was destroyed.9
Lane brought this suit against Hilton Hotel Employer LLC (“Hilton Employer”), Baywood,
and 501EFA in state court in November 2024.10 It was removed to this Court in January 2025.11
On March 25, 2025, Lane filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a second amended complaint
substituting two new defendants, Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc. and Hilton Franchise, for
Hilton Employer,12 which the Court granted,13 making the second amended complaint the
operative complaint.14 Lane asserts claims for discrimination under the LCHR, La. R.S. 51:2231-

2241, and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12265, and seeks compensatory damages, injunctive
relief, costs and fees, and damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.15 Movants now
seek dismissal of Lane’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.16

7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 3-4.
10 R. Doc. 1-2.
11 R. Doc. 1.
12 R. Doc. 18.
13 R. Doc. 20.
14 R. Doc. 21. At the time the instant motion was filed, the first amended complaint (R. Doc. 7) was the
operative complaint. However, the underlying factual allegations in the second amended complaint are identical to
those in the first amended complaint. Compare R. Doc. 7 at 2-3, with R. Doc. 21 at 3-4.
15 R. Doc. 21 at 5-6.
16 R. Doc. 9.
II. PENDING MOTION
In their motion to dismiss, Movants argue that Lane has failed to state a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana law. Movants argue that “Lane’s allegations do
not fit within any of [Moresi’s] recognized categories”17 permitting the recovery of such damages,
but rather, “more closely describe a routine customer service issue.”18 Movants further argue that

Lane’s alleged emotional distress does not arise from special circumstances and, even if it did, “his
claims of embarrassment and distress amount to mere inconvenience and generalized allegations,
which are insufficient to establish [the] serious emotional distress needed to allege [the] cause of
action.”19
In his opposition, Lane argues that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to support
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress at the pleading stage. Lane first argues that
he has alleged sufficient facts to support a negligence claim because the complaint alleges that
defendants owed Lane a statutory duty under the ADA and LCHR,20 that defendants breached their
statutory duty of care to Lane,21 that Lane would not have suffered emotional distress but for the
conduct of the hotel staff,22 that his emotional harm fell within the scope of the defendants’ duty,23

and “that he suffered actual damages in the form of extreme emotional distress.”24 Lane then
argues that he has sufficiently alleged “special circumstances” permitting recovery of emotional-
distress damages because “[t]here is a very strong and obvious likelihood that a disabled
individual, such as Mr. Lane, would suffer genuine and severe mental distress if discriminated

17 R. Doc. 9-1 at 4 (discussing Moresi v. State through Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1096
(La. 1990)).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 5.
20 R. Doc. 11 at 5-6.
21 Id. at 6-7.
22 Id. at 7.
23 Id. at 8.
24 Id. at 8-9.
against, as contemplated by the ADA and LCHR[,] especially … when the discrimination is
repetitive, aggressive, and on complete public display.”25 Lastly, Lane asserts that “this Court has
denied similar [m]otions to [d]ismiss.”26
In their reply, Movants argue that Lane’s opposition “fails to articulate how his allegations
fit within the limited framework of Moresi.”27 Movants repeat their arguments that, “at most,

Lane’s allegations pertain to a customer service dispute” and that Lane’s “assertions of
‘embarrassment’ and ‘great distress’ [are] far too vague and insufficient to meet Louisiana’s strict
[negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress] standard.”28 Movants then argue that Lane’s
opposition “selectively omits critical language from Collett that clarifies the high threshold
required for [such] claims,”29 and that the facts of St. Martin’s are distinguishable from the facts
alleged in Lane’s complaint.30
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule
8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The statement of the claim must
“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

25 Id. at 9.
26 Id. (citing E.R. v. St. Martin’s Episcopal Sch., 2022 WL 558168, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2022) (Lemmon,
J.)).
27 R. Doc. 16 at 2.
28 Id. (alteration omitted).
29 Id. (discussing Collett v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2021 WL 5411330, at *4 (E.D. La. May 7, 2021), aff’d, 2022
WL 2387352 (5th Cir. July 1, 2022)).
30 Id. at 3-4.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A pleading does
not comply with Rule 8 if it offers “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action,” or “‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557) (alteration omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to dismiss

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on the face of the complaint “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility does not equate
to probability, but rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Thus, if the facts
pleaded in the complaint “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court employs
the two-pronged approach utilized in Twombly. The court “can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions [unsupported by factual allegations],
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. However, “[w]hen there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “‘[The] task, then, is to determine whether
the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success.’” Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir.
2012)).

A court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is limited to the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). A court may also take judicial notice of certain
matters, including public records and government websites. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540
F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 457 (5th
Cir. 2005). Thus, in weighing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, district courts primarily look to the
allegations found in the complaint, but courts may also consider “documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public
record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint
whose authenticity is unquestioned.” Meyers v. Textron, Inc., 540 F. App’x 408, 409 (5th Cir.
2013) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).
B. Analysis
Louisiana does not recognize an independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Collett, 2021 WL 2579801, at *5. It subscribes to “‘the general rule followed by the
great majority of jurisdictions [that] if the defendant’s conduct is merely negligent and causes only
mental disturbance, without accompanying physical injury, illness or other physical consequences,
the defendant is not liable for such emotional disturbance.’” St. Martin’s, 2022 WL 558168, at *4
(quoting Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1095). “[H]owever, it is now well-established that [a] plaintiff may
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury in certain
situations.” Collett, 2021 WL 2579801, at *5. The Louisiana supreme court recently reviewed its
jurisprudence on these types of claims and clarified the requirements for recovery:

[F]or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims absent physical damage/
injury, a plaintiff must prove “the especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental
distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that
the claim is not spurious.” This rule must be “stringently applied” in cases that are
inherently speculative in nature. The actions of the defendant must constitute
negligence. The plaintiff’s mental disturbance must be “serious.” Evidence of
generalized fear or evidence of mere inconvenience is insufficient. Evidence of
medical treatment is not required, nor is expert medical testimony; however, a
plaintiff bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence of the nature and extent
of the mental anguish suffered that was caused by the defendant’s conduct.
Whether the mental distress is “serious” is a matter of proof. Finally, we reiterate
that these guidelines must be applied with the policy considerations discussed
herein.
In reaching our conclusion, we further elaborate on what is not required to be
proven by a plaintiff seeking damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress
absent physical damage/injury. The existence of a special, direct duty owed by the
defendant is not required. We also decline to impose a requirement of outrageous
conduct on the part of a defendant. A claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress is a claim that, by definition, requires a plaintiff to prove negligence.
Further, we expressly reject application of the standard set forth in Lejeune. The
emotional distress suffered by a plaintiff need not be “reasonably foreseeable,” nor
“severe and debilitating.”

Spencer v. Valero Ref. Meraux, L.L.C., 356 So. 3d 936, 950 (La. 2023) (internal citations and
footnote omitted) (referencing Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990)).
1. Lane’s complaint states a claim for negligence under Article 2315.
Movants do not contest that Lane has satisfied the pleading requirements for a negligence
claim under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, but instead focus on whether Lane’s allegations
adequately support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.31 However, because “[a]
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is a claim that, by definition, requires a plaintiff
to prove negligence,” id., as a prerequisite to stating a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, Lane must first state a claim for negligence. To succeed on a claim under article 2315,
Louisiana’s general negligence law, a plaintiff must prove each of five elements:

“(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard
of care; (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her conduct to the appropriate
standard of care; (3) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff’s injuries; (4) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries; and (5) actual damages.”

Collett, 2021 WL 2579801, at *5 (quoting S.J. v. Lafayette Par. Sch. Bd., 41 So. 3d 1119, 1125
(La. 2010)).
While Louisiana law “does not recognize the negligence per se doctrine,” Pellerin v. Foster
Farms, L.L.C., 354 So. 3d 790, 797 (La. App. 2023), statutory duties like those set out in the ADA
and LCHR can establish the duty of care in a negligence analysis. See, e.g., Merrell v. 1st Lake
Props., Inc., 717 F. Supp. 3d 512, 517 (E.D. La. 2024) (“The Fifth Circuit has recognized that
Louisiana law may look to federal statutory and regulatory schemes in delineating the scope of a
duty under the duty-risk analysis.”). “Both [the LCHR] and ADA Title III ban discrimination by
places of public accommodation.” Smith v. France, 850 F. App’x 243, 248-49 (5th Cir. 2021). It
is clear that, as alleged owners and operators of the Hotel – a place of public accommodation under
both the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A), and the LCHR, see La. R.S. 51:2232(10) – Movants
had a statutory duty not to discriminate against any individual “on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations”

31 Id. at 1 (“In opposing [Movants’ m]otion to [d]ismiss, Lane, among other things, embarks on an extensive
negligence analysis under Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. However, that analysis fails to establish how
Lane’s allegations meet Louisiana’s stringent requirements for a [negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress] claim.”).
offered by the Hotel. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see also La. R.S. 51:2247. Lane alleges that he has a
qualifying disability under the ADA and LCHR,32 and that Movants discriminated against him “by
denying him the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations offered at the Hotel” in violation of the ADA and LCHR.33 In doing so,
Lane has alleged that he “fall[s] within the class of persons [the statutes] w[ere] intended to protect

and [that] the harm complained of was of the kind which the statute[s] w[ere] intended, in general,
to prevent.” Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571, 577 (La. 1990). Lane further alleges
that Movants’ breach caused him damages in the form of embarrassment and “great distress.”34
Therefore, for purposes of the instant motion to dismiss, Lane has sufficiently alleged that Movants
violated the ADA and LCHR and thereby negligently breached their statutorily imposed duty to
him. See George v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2025 WL 721312, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2025).
2. Lane must allege more than discrimination to state a claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress.

Because the alleged duty owed to Lane is established by the ADA and LCHR, the absence
of a statutory violation would vitiate Lane’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.
Adams v. United Ass’n of Journeyman & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of the
U.S. & Can., AFL-CIO, Loc. 198, 2022 WL 266687, at *6 (M.D. La. Jan. 27, 2022) (holding that
plaintiffs’ claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Louisiana law cannot survive
without first establishing the federal statutory violations to which they are tied). But the inverse
is not true. An alleged violation of Movants’ statutory duties is merely a prerequisite for Lane to
state a claim for negligence; it is not sufficient to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Lane contends that “[t]here is a very strong and obvious likelihood that a disabled

32 R. Doc. 21 at 2.
33 Id. at 5.
34 Id. at 3.
individual, such as Mr. Lane, would suffer genuine and severe mental distress if discriminated
against.”35 While discriminatory conduct may inherently cause some harm, “not every occasion
that causes some harm yields concomitant liability and compensatory damages.” Spencer, 356 So.
3d at 949. The Louisiana supreme court has adopted a fact-specific approach to determining the
viability of claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See id. (“To be certain, no one

fact, or lack thereof, necessarily entitles a plaintiff to a recovery, nor does it preclude recovery. A
trier of fact is to weigh all relevant facts of each case before it and give each due weight and
consideration.”). Thus, even if all of the alleged conduct violates the ADA or the LCHR, the
complaint must still contain specific factual allegations establishing that the alleged violations
occurred under “‘special circumstances,’” giving rise to an “‘especial likelihood of genuine and
serious mental distress.’” Id. at 950 (quoting Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1096). The Court will not
assume that every violation of an antidiscrimination statute, without more, will permit recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.36
3. Lane states a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as to one, but not
both, of his discrimination allegations.

Movants argue that “Lane’s allegations do not fit within any of [the categories] recognized
[in Moresi]” and instead “more closely describe a routine customer service issue.”37 As an initial
matter, the Court notes that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is not limited to
cases that “fit within” the six specific factual situations identified in Moresi.38 The Moresi court

35 R. Doc. 11 at 9.
36 The Court rejects Lane’s assertion that “Louisiana courts have recognized that mere discrimination against
a disabled individual, without more, gives rise to negligent infliction of emotional distress damages, and specifically
to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. at 1-2 (citing St. Martin’s, 2022 WL 558168, at *4). The court in St. Martin’s
did not make such a sweeping holding; it instead considered the “set of facts” alleged by the plaintiff and whether
they “support[ed] a likelihood of genuine mental distress caused by her circumstances.” 2022 WL 558168, at *5.
37 R. Doc. 9-1 at 4 (discussing Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1096).
38 The Moresi court identified several “deviations from the general rule” prohibiting recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress absent physical injury or damage in Louisiana jurisprudence, including cases involving:
itself acknowledged that “[t]here may be other cases,” so long as they, like the identified cases,
involve “the especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special
circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious.” Moresi, 567 So. 2d at
1096. In the same year Moresi was decided, the Louisiana supreme court permitted recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress in two additional types of cases: bystander cases, Lejeune,

556 So. 2d at 569, and cases where a defendant “violated a direct, special statutory duty to the
plaintiff and thereby caused her to become an actual participant in an accident in special
circumstances where mental anguish was clearly foreseeable.” Clomon, 572 So. 2d at 586. In the
decades since Moresi was decided, Louisiana courts have identified other situations that might
give rise to an “especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress.” See, e.g., Bordelon v.
St. Frances Cabrini Hosp., 640 So. 2d 476, 479 (La. App. 1994) (fear of contracting infectious
disease due to hospital’s failure to use the plaintiff’s blood for transfusion as requested by the
plaintiff); Lester v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 120 So. 3d 767 (La. App. 2013) (fear of developing cancer
due to workplace exposure to radioactive material). And, importantly, just two years ago, the

Louisiana supreme court reiterated the criteria first articulated in Moresi for negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims – that such claims present “‘the especial likelihood of genuine and
serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that
the claim is not spurious’” – and emphasized the fact-specific nature of this inquiry. Spencer, 356
So. 3d at 950 (quoting Moresi, 567 So. 2d at 1096). The Spencer court did not indicate that a claim

the negligent transmission of a message [by telegraph], especially one announcing death[;] the
mishandling of corpses; failure to install, maintain or repair consumer products; failure to take
photographs or develop film; negligent damage to one’s property while the plaintiffs were present
and saw their property damaged; and … for fright or nervous shock, where the plaintiff was actually
in great fear for his personal safety.
567 So. 2d at 1096 (internal citations omitted). The Court noted that all these cases shared “in common the especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee
that the claim is not spurious.” Id.
for negligent infliction of emotional distress must fall within the specific categories of cases
identified in Moresi. Id.
Applying the standard set out in Moresi and Spencer, the Court agrees with defendants
that, as to Lane’s allegation that “[a]t check in, a Hotel employee informed Mr. Lane he would
have to pay an additional fee for his service dog and to sign in his service dog,”39 Lane has failed

to allege the requisite special circumstances to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Lane does not allege any facts supporting an inference that this conduct would have
caused Lane “genuine and serious mental distress” or to support Lane’s conclusory allegation that
this employee acted in a “harsh and discriminatory”40 manner or was even aware of Lane’s
disability or the dog’s status as a service animal prior to this interaction. Thus, this allegation more
closely resembles “a routine customer service issue”41 that would cause “mere inconvenience” at
worst. Id. However, Lane’s allegation that, the next morning, another Hotel employee “accosted”
and “berate[d]” him for having his service dog in the dining area42 – considering that Lane has a
disability requiring his use of a service animal – is more likely to give rise to “the especial

likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress” necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.
Unlike being told to pay a fee or register an animal upon checking into a hotel, it is
reasonably foreseeable that being accosted and berated in a public setting could cause the average
person to experience some degree of mental distress – though that possibility on its own is
insufficient. Here, however, Lane alleges that he has a disability requiring his use of a service
animal; this is a special circumstance that could make him especially likely to experience genuine
and serious mental distress in response to being publicly berated for having his service dog with

39 R. Doc. 21 at 3.
40 Id.
41 R. Doc. 9-1 at 4.
42 R. Doc. 21 at 3.
him. Whether “a defendant knows that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress
… is a factor to be considered in the equation of the ‘special circumstances.’” Collett, 2021 WL
2579801, at *5 (citing Covington v. Howard, 146 So. 3d 933, 940 (La. App. 2014)). Lane alleges
that “the employee continued to yell at and berate” him after he informed the employee that the
dog was a service animal.43 If the Hotel employee knew that the dog was Lane’s service animal,

he knew or should have known that Lane would likely be particularly susceptible to emotional
distress in response to being berated for having the dog with him – this employee’s alleged conduct
is “easily associated” with the emotional distress Lane claims that it caused. See Bordelon, 640
So. 2d at 479 (“To evaluate [whether the resulting emotional distress was within the scope of the
defendant’s duty], a critical inquiry is whether there is an ‘ease of association’ of the harm to the
wrongful act.” (quoting Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1045 (La. 1991)). Moreover, once the
employee had knowledge that the dog was a service animal, the employee’s alleged conduct
potentially crossed the line from unnecessarily harsh enforcement of a hotel policy to overt
disability discrimination in violation of Movants’ “special, direct duty” to Lane under the ACA

and LCHR. Clomon, 572 So. 2d at 586. If so, the issue then becomes a matter of proof.
While the Louisiana supreme court in Spencer explained that “a special, direct duty owed
by the defendant is not required,” 356 So. 3d at 950 (emphasis added), courts applying Louisiana
law have considered the likelihood of mental distress posed by discrimination in declining to
dismiss negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims based on violations of the ADA and other
antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., St. Martin’s, 2022 WL 558168, at *5 (denying motion to dismiss
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim where plaintiff, a disabled student, alleged that
she “was denied a reasonable accommodation needed to pass her math class … because she is

43 Id.
disabled,” because “[a]rguably, the distress caused by this set of facts is at least on a footing as
that occasioned by a failure to install, maintain or repair consumer products, a failure to take
photographs or develop film, or witnessing negligent damage to one’s property”); Adams, 2022
WL 266687, at *6 (denying motion for summary judgment aimed at a negligent-infliction-of-
emotional-distress claim based on violations of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law

and Title VII because “[t]hese situations ‘all involve the especial likelihood of genuine and serious
mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serve as a guarantee that the claim
is not spurious’” (quoting Molden v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 465 F. Supp. 2d 606, 614 (M.D. La. 2006));
Barringer v. Robertson, 2008 WL 4763539, at *2-3 (La. App. 2008) (reversing directed verdict
dismissing negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because “[t]he record contain[ed]
ample evidence for reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment to
reach different conclusions on whether [the plaintiffs were] entitled to recover damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress based on [the defendant’s allegedly discriminatory]
conduct”).

In short, while not every alleged violation of the ADA and LCHR will give rise to a
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, Lane has sufficiently alleged an “especial
likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress” with respect to his allegation that a Hotel
employee publicly berated him for having his service dog with him, given that this alleged
“discrimination is [claimed to have been] repetitive, aggressive, and on complete public display.”44
Movants argue, though, that Lane’s “claims of embarrassment and distress amount to mere
inconvenience and generalized allegations, which are insufficient to establish serious emotional
distress.”45 But “[w]hether the mental distress is ‘serious’ is a matter of proof.” Spencer, 356 So.

44 R. Doc. 11 at 9.
45 R. Doc. 9-1 at 5.
3d at 950. Thus, at this motion-to-dismiss stage, Lane need only allege that he suffered “serious”
emotional distress as a result of Movants’ alleged negligent conduct. Id. The complaint alleges
that the Hotel “employees’ harsh and discriminatory actions … embarrassed Mr. Lane and caused
him great distress.”46 This is sufficient under the standard of review applicable at this stage of the
proceeding to survive the instant motion to dismiss.

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Baywood and 501EFA’s motion to dismiss Lane’s negligent-
infliction-of-emotional-distress claim (R. Doc. 9) is GRANTED in part as to the allegations
concerning checkin and DENIED in part as to the allegations concerning his treatment in the dining
area.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of April, 2025.

________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

46 R. Doc. 21 at 3 (emphasis added).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10840653. Public record. Not legal advice.