# Al-Barr v. Garrett

> District Court, E.D. Arkansas · March 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10840160

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** March 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
DELTA DIVISION

LORD JUDAH AL-BARR, PLAINTIFF
Reg. # 40258-509

v. 2:25CV00025-BSM-JTK

CHAD GARRETT, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
INSTRUCTIONS
The following recommended disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to United
States District Judge Brian S. Miller. Any party may file written objections to all or part of this
Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or
legal basis for your objections; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14)
days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of
fact.
DISPOSITION
I. Introduction
Lord Judah Al-Barr (“Plaintiff”) is in custody at Forrest City Medium Federal Correctional
Institution (“FCI-Forrest City”). (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff sued FCI—Forrest City officials
alleging: equal protection violations; 1 violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth
Amendment;2 due process violations; negligence; assault; false imprisonment, and intentional

1 Plaintiff refers to this claim as a discrimination claim.

2 Plaintiff refers to cruel and unusual punishment and “decent conditions,” which the
Court interprets as an unlawful conditions of confinement claim.
infliction of emotional distress. (Id.). On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff paid the $405 filing and
administrative fee to initiate this lawsuit. (Doc. No. 8). The Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, regardless of fee status. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a); Lewis
v. Estes, 242 F.3d 375 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (§ 1915A’s screening requirement applies
regardless of fee status).

II. Screening
The PLRA requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a
governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a
complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or
malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(b).
An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Whether a plaintiff is represented by counsel or is appearing
pro se, his complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent,
780 F .2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.1985).

An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing a pro se complaint under ' 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must
give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts
alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
III. Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff sued former FCI-Forrest City Warden Chad Garrett, Assistant Warden Edge,
Associated Warden Hailaire, Case Manager Coordinator Jefferson, Unit Manager Wilson, Case
Manager Barrett, and Counselors Williams and Pike (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1).

Plaintiff asserts Defendant Barrett refuses to correct an error in Plaintiff’s BOP records. (Id. at 4-
5). Plaintiff says Defendant Barrett’s refusal to correct the error has prevented Plaintiff from
being eligible for earlier release from federal custody. (Id. at 4-5). According to Plaintiff, all
other Defendants conspired with Defendant Barrett for the error in his files to go uncorrected. (Id.
at 4-6).
Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 8).
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff’s federal claims fail for the reasons set out below and should be dismissed.
Plaintiff also raised state-law claims. If the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court
should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.

A. Federal Claims
Plaintiff alleges Defendants, through a conspiracy, violated Plaintiff’s equal protection
rights, due process rights, rights under the Eighth Amendment, and falsely imprisoned him.
1. Equal Protection
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall
‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
Plaintiff says Defendants violated his equal protection rights, but he does not provide any
factual allegations in support of his equal protection claim. Plaintiff provides no explanation as
to how Defendants treated him differently than similarly situated individuals. To the extent
Plaintiff claims his equal protection rights were violated, that claim is conclusory. Bare

allegations void of factual enhancement are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2. Eighth Amendment
Plaintiff claims Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and unlawful
conditions of confinement. These allegations constitute a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate
violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (internal citations
omitted). Again, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory. Plaintiff does not identify any
substantial risk of harm and does not explain how any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to
that risk.

3. False Imprisonment
Plaintiff maintains he is falsely imprisoned. He says Defendants conspired to allow
Defendant Barrett’s failure to correct an error in Plaintiff’s BOP records, which harmed Plaintiff
by “hindering [his] ability to apply time-earned credits that would all [him] to drop in custody and
advance toward freedom.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4).
To the extent that states a federal claim, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The crux of Plaintiff’s claim is that
he could be released sooner if Defendants corrected the error in his records.
As the United States Supreme Court has instructed:
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s
action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding
criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in
the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. This approach prevents “a collateral attack on the conviction through the
vehicle of a civil suit.” Id. at 485 (internal citations omitted). To succeed on his claims here,
Plaintiff would need to establish the unlawfulness of the length of his sentence considering he was
prevented from applying “time earned credits,” which is the type of claim barred by Heck. See
Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff cannot challenge the length of
his sentence in this civil rights action; his only federal recourse is habeas corpus. See Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).3
4. Due Process
Plaintiff also claims Defendants violated his due process rights. Plaintiff’s claims fall
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Id.
at 3-4). “[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suit brought against state officials under . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006). A claim under Bivens is
the same as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “except that the former is maintained against federal
officials while the latter is against state officials.” Sanchez v. U.S., 49 F.3d 1329, 1330 (8th Cir.
1995) (per curiam). Generally, case law analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims applies to Bivens
cases. See Ibrahim v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a habeas action on December 2, 2024. Al-Barr v.
U.S.A., 3:24-cv-00238-BSM (E.D. Ark.). The Court further notes that Plaintiff also filed a
Motion for Compassionate Release and Pro Se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct sentence
in his federal criminal case. United State v. Al-Barr, 3:21-cv-00014-1-BSM (E.D. Ark.)
In determining whether Plaintiff’s allegations may proceed under Bivens, the first question
is whether his case is “the type for which a Bivens remedy is available.” Farah v. Weyker, 926
F.3d 492, 497 (8th Cir. 2019). The United States Supreme Court has recognized an implied
cause of action under Bivens on only three occasions. (Id. at 497-98). The three cases in which

the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens claim included: the ground-breaking Bivens case itself,
403 U.S. 388 (allegedly unlawful arrest and warrantless search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (failure to treat prisoner’s asthma in violation
of the Eighth Amendment); and Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (sex discrimination in
violation of Fifth Amendment due process rights).
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court warned that while “Bivens is well-settled law in
its own context . . . expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Ziglar
v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to
extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants . . . .” Id. (internal citation
omitted). “[F]or almost 40 years, [the Supreme Court] [has] . . . rebuffed requests to add to the

claims allowed under Bivens.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020). Instead, “private
rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” Id. at 742 (internal citation
omitted).
Courts now undertake a two-step analysis to determine if an implied cause of action under
Bivens exists. Farah, 926 F.3d at 498. The first step is to ascertain whether the case presents “one
of ‘the three Bivens claims the [Supreme] Court has approved in the past’ or whether, instead,
allowing the plaintiffs to sue would require us to extend Bivens to a new ‘context.’” Id. If the
claim presented is not one that has been previously recognized, courts consider whether “special
factors counsel[] hesitation” in extending Bivens to the claims at hand. Id.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants conspired to allow for Defendant Barrett’s failure to correct
an error in Plaintiff’s BOP records, which harmed Plaintiff by “hindering [his] ability to apply
time-earned credits that would all [him] to drop in custody and advance toward freedom.” (Doc.
No. 1 at 4).

a. New Context
In Davis v. Passman, noted above, the plaintiff alleged violation of her due process rights.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228. Here, too, Plaintiff says his due process rights were violated. (Doc. No.
1 at 4).
While both this case and Passman involve a due process claim against federal actors, the
facts of the cases and the nature of the alleged violations are different. As such, the Court must
determine if the differences “‘are meaningful enough to make [this] context a new one.’” Farah,
926 F.3d at 498. The context will be considered new if “the case is different in meaningful way
from the previous Bivens cases” decided by the Supreme Court. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. In
deciding whether a context is new, courts consider the following factors, among others:

the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or
specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer
should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other
legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion
by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; [and] the presence of
potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.

Farah, 926 F.3d at 498 (citing Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859-60).

In Passman, the issue was discrimination. The plaintiff, a congressional staffer, was
terminated from her employment on the basis of sex. Passman, 442 U.S. at 230. She sought
damages in the form of backpay for the alleged violation of her Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at
231. Here, Plaintiff, an inmate with administrative remedies available to him, alleges his due
process rights were violated when Defendants refused to correct an error in his prison file.
The factual differences between this case and Passman are vast, with respect to both how
the claims arose and the damage alleged. “When . . . meaningful differences exist, it is not enough
to identify a few similarities.” Ahmed v. Weyker, 984 F.3d 564, 570 (8th Cir. 2020). When
meaningful differences exist, a modest extension is nonetheless an extension, “even if [the claim]

involves ‘the same constitutional provision.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). In cases more
similar to the one at hand than Passman, courts have found “new context” for Abbasi purposes.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that a federal prisoner’s due
process claim arising out of disciplinary proceedings against him was a new context under Abbasi.
Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2018). And other courts that considered an
inmate’s due process claims in connection with the loss of personal property have found that
allowing the claim to proceed would extend Bivens to a new context. See Berry v. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 5:20-CV-424-KKM-PRL, 2021 WL 4166181, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2021).
While not binding, such decisions are informative.
Considering the differences between Passman and this case, the Court finds Plaintiff’s

claims present a new context for the purposes of Abbasi.
b. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation
Because the Court determined Plaintiff’s claims present a new context, the determination
as to whether an implied cause of action under Bivens exists proceeds to the second step of the
analysis: do any “special factors counsel[] hesitation” in allowing the case to proceed as a new
Bivens cause of action in the absence of affirmative action by Congress? Farah, 926 F.3d at 500.
The Court finds there are special factors that counsel hesitation in allowing this case to
proceed under Bivens. An inmate may seek relief through the BOP’s grievance procedure.
Allowing Plaintiff’s claims to proceed under Bivens would engage the courts in disputes that could
be and should be raised administratively, which is disfavored. (See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1865;
Farah, 926 F.3d at 501-02; 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.19). Providing a damages remedy for
Defendants’ alleged wrongs in this case lies in Congress’s realm. See Id. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s due process claims should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim on

which relief may be granted.
B. State-Law Claims
In addition to his federal claims, Plaintiff brought the state-law claims of negligence,
assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). This Court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if no live federal claims remain
in this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. “‘[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine . . . will point towards declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims.’” King v. City of Crestwood, Missouri, 899 F.3d 643, 651 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal
citation omitted). Having already determined that Plaintiff’s federal claims should be dismissed,
the Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims.
V. Conclusion
IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that:
1. Plaintiff’s federal claims be DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The Court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
3. This action be DISMISSED.
4. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis
appeal from any Order adopting these recommendations and accompanying Judgment would not

be taken in good faith.
Dated this 7 day of March, 2025. ir é
JEROME T. KEARN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10840160. Public record. Not legal advice.