# Peterson v. The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · April 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10839857

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** April 4, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10839857

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, “[o]ther tools of statutory interpretation, such as legislative history, customarily carry significant weight only when the text is ambiguous or its plain meaning leads to an absurd result”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

DEBORAH PETERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE LINCOLN NATIONAL LIFE
Case No. 4:23-CV-40097-MRG
INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

GUZMAN, D.J.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM & ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 29] AND DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 32]

I. INTRODUCTION
This is a long-term disability (“LTD”) insurance benefits denial case. Plaintiff-
plan participant Deborah Peterson has sued Defendant-insurance carrier The
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company alleging various state-law claims arising
from a failure to pay LTD benefits under an employee welfare benefits plan
administered by her employer, non-party Notre Dame Health Care Center, Inc.
(“NDHCCI”).
Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. [ECF
No. 29; ECF No. 32]. At the moment, the heart of the dispute is whether NDHCCI’s
benefits plan is governed by ERISA1 or if, conversely, it is a “church plan” and thus
exempt from the statute’s requirements.
After a careful review of the facts and an exercise in statutory interpretation,

the Court ultimately concludes that NDHCCI’s benefits plan is not a church plan
because it was neither (a) established or maintained by a church or association of
churches nor (b) is it maintained by a principal-purpose organization. Therefore,
Roberts’ state law claims are preempted by ERISA. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff’s ability to file a new action
asserting claims under ERISA.

II. BACKGROUND
a. The Facts2
i. NDHCCI

Plaintiff served as a Coordinator of Rehabilitation Services at non-party
NDHCCI until October 20, 2020, when a disability allegedly required her to cease
working. [ECF No. 10 at 4–5]. NDHCCI is a civil organization organized in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1990. [ECF No. 35-1]. According to its Articles
of Organization, its purpose is to:
To establish, maintain, own and operate health care facilities, including
nursing homes, to provide and render, and to employ others to provide

1 “ERISA” refers to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, a federal
statute. As a general matter, ERISA “obligates private employers offering pension
plans to adhere to an array of rules designed to ensure plan solvency and protect plan
participants.” Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 581 U.S. 468, 472 (2017)
(citations omitted).

2 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
and render, medical, minor surgical, custodial and other health—related
services as permitted by the law of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts; (b) to do any and all other acts which are necessary,
incidental or useful to the establishment and operation of an
organization for the foregoing purposes and related to the maintenance
and delivery of high-quality health care services; and (c) to engage in the
foregoing activities while adhering to applicable philosophy and tenets
of the Roman Catholic Church and the Sisters of Notre Dame De Namur.

[Id.]

In practice, NDHCCI has repeatedly stated in annual Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) filings that its mission and/or most significant activity is to “provide
quality nursing and hospice care for the elderly and poor residents of the community.”
[ECF No. 35-2 at 2–5]. According to its by-laws, the “Members” of the organization
are, ex officio, the moderator and the leadership team of the Sisters of Notre Dame
de Namur’s East-West Province. [ECF No. 30-5 at 5]. Further, there must be
between six and eighteen “Directors,” at least six of whom must be Sisters of Notre
Dame de Namur. [Id. at 7]. In terms of “Officers,” the organization must have a
president, a treasurer, and a clerk. [Id. at 10].
NDHCCI is a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit corporation, and it is included in The
Official Catholic Directory, which lists Roman Catholic institutions in the United
States. [ECF No. 10 at 3–4].
ii. The Plan and the Group Policy
NDHCCI maintains a suite of employee benefits plans, including health and
dental benefits, long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits, short-term disability benefits,
accidental death and dismemberment benefits, as well as life insurance benefits.
E.g., [ECF No. 43 at 2]. According to its by-laws, NDHCCI established its LTD
benefits plan (the “Plan”) “to assist employees in their efforts to financially take care
of themselves and their families if rendered temporarily disabled.” [Id.]
To fund the Plan, NDHCCI purchased a group insurance policy from

Defendant -- specifically Policy No. 10226010 (the “Group Policy”). [ECF No. 35-6;
ECF No. 35-7]. The Group Policy’s formal name is “Group Long Term Disability
Insurance For Employees of Notre Dame Health Care Center, Inc.” [See ECF No. 43
at 3–4]. Under the Group Policy, NDHCCI is the policyholder and pays the premium
for its employees’ LTD benefits coverage. [See id.] Notably, the policy application
that NDHCCI submitted to Defendant in December 2012 shows that NDHCCI

checked boxes indicating its understanding that the Plan was subject to ERISA and
that it was responsible for providing summary plan descriptions to its employees.
[ECF No. 35-3 at 5].3 Defendant contends that NDHCCI requested descriptions of
the Plan that it could provide to its employees, which it later did provide. [E.g., ECF
No. 35-7].4 Further, NDHCCI designated itself as the Plan Administrator of the Plan.
[Id.]5

The Group Policy defined “Total Disability” or “Totally Disabled” as follows:

3 Plaintiff admits that this document speaks for itself but notes that she does not
know what NDHCCI understood this form to mean when it completed it and further
stated that this fact should not have any bearing on the dispute. [ECF No. 43 at 3].

4 Plaintiff states that she is unaware of any requests that NDHCCI might have made
of Defendant but does acknowledges that Defendant did issue a description of the
Group Policy. [Id.]

5 Specifically, the description that Defendant provided to NDHCCI explained that
“[t]he [Group] Plan is administered directly by the Plan Administrator with benefits
provided in accordance with provisions of the group insurance policy issued by
[Defendant].” [Id. at 4].
1.) During the Elimination Period and Own Occupation Period, it means
that due to an Injury or Sickness the Insured Employee is unable to
perform each of the Main Duties of his or her Own Occupation.

2.) After the Own Occupation Period, it means that due to an injury or
Sickness the Insured Employee is unable to perform each of the Main
Duties of any Gainful Occupation.

[ECF No. 10 at 4–5].

iii. Plaintiff and Her Claim
Plaintiff has a significant medical history of scoliosis and kyphosis dating back
to her childhood. [Id. at 5]. In September 2014, Plaintiff underwent a 13-level spinal
fusion. [Id.] Complications from that surgery required a revision surgery in October
2015. [Id.] Plaintiff was hired by NDHCCI on or about July 17, 2017, [ECF No. 35-
8 at 2], and she participated in the Plan while she was an employee, [ECF No. 43 at
4].
Her disease allegedly progressed during her employment, and this required
short stints of disability leave. [ECF No. 10 at 5]. Over time, however, Plaintiff
allegedly became unable to fulfill the “Main Duties” of her occupation and she ceased
work on October 20, 2020. [Id.] Plaintiff timely submitted a claim to Defendant;
alleging that she was “Totally Disabled” for purposes of the Group Policy. [ECF No.
43 at 4–5].
iv. Defendant Denies the Claim; Plaintiff Pursues Internal Appeals
On July 12, 2021, Defendant notified Plaintiff that it had finished its claim
review and had determined that no LTD benefits were payable since she was not
Totally Disabled under the Group Plan’s definition. [ECF No. 10 at 6]. On January
3, 2022, Plaintiff appealed the claim denial. [Id.] On March 8, 2022, Defendant
informed Plaintiff it that was upholding its claim denial. [Id.] On November 18,
2022, Plaintiff sent Defendant a Chapter 93A6 demand letter which Defendant

construed as a request for second level internal appeal since it considered the Plan to
be covered by ERISA. [Id.] A second level internal appeal followed, and Defendant
issued its final decision denying the claim on February 28, 2023. [Id.] Plaintiff then
initiated the instant lawsuit.
b. Procedural History

Plaintiff originally filed this suit in Massachusetts Superior Court. [ECF No.
1-1]. Plaintiff’s original complaint, [id.], and the operative, Amended Complaint,
[ECF No. 10], contain state law claims that, among other things, claim entitlement
to benefits under the Plan. [See e.g., ECF No. 10 at 12 (Plaintiff demanding, among
other things, “judgment against Defendant…for all contractual benefits, pre-
judgment interest, paid premiums since the date of disability…”)]. Specifically,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains the following pending claims, each of which
purportedly arise under Massachusetts state law:

Count # Cause of Action
Count I Breach of Contract
Count II Violation of M.G.L. c. 93A, and M.G.L. c §176D
(9) (a), (f), and (g)
Count III Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing

6 See M.G.L. c. 93A § 9(3).
Defendant removed the case; arguing that this Court has federal question
subject matter jurisdiction (because, in its view, this is an ERISA case)7 and that,
alternatively, even if state law applies, the Court has diversity jurisdiction over the

action. [ECF No. 1 at 2–5].
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment; both of which
essentially ask this Court to rule on the same question (albeit with different answers):
is the Plan a “church plan” such that it is not subject to ERISA? See [ECF No. 29];
[ECF No. 32]. The parties extensively briefed the issue, and the Court held a hearing
on the cross-motions. [ECF No. 50]. This matter is now ripe for adjudication.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

a. Summary Judgment, Generally

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “genuine” when a reasonable factfinder could resolve
it in favor of the nonmoving party. Morris v. Gov’t Dev. Bank, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st
Cir. 1994). A fact is “material” when it may affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
At the summary judgment stage, the Court must view the record in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and must “indulge all reasonable inferences”
in their favor. Martins v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 662 F. Supp. 3d 55, 64 (D. Mass. 2023)
(citing O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993)). In the first instance,

7 See infra.
the moving party “bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. . . .” Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted). If a properly supported summary judgment motion is presented, the

adverse party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial,” and may not simply “rest upon mere allegation or denials of [their]
pleading,” but must instead “present affirmative evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 256–57(1986). “If, after viewing the record in the non-
moving party’s favor, the Court determines that no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary

judgment is appropriate.” Walsh v. Town of Lakeville, 431 F. Supp. 2d 134, 143 (D.
Mass. 2006).
“Neither party may rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated denials,
but must identify specific facts derived from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions and affidavits to demonstrate either the existence or
absence of an issue of fact.” Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997).
b. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

As the First Circuit has explained, “[c]ross-motions for summary judgment do
not alter the basic Rule 56 standard, but rather simply require [courts] to determine
whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are
not disputed.” Adria Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Ferre Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir.
2001) (citation omitted). When facing cross-motions for summary judgment, “the
court must consider each motion separately, drawing inferences against each movant
in turn.” Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (citation
omitted).
c. Statutory Interpretation, Generally

When engaging in statutory interpretation, a court’s inquiry “begins with the
statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd. v.
United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (citations omitted). A court must read the
text “according to its plain meaning at the of enactment.’” United States v. Hassan
Abbas, 100 F.4th 267, 283 (1st Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592
U.S. 43, 48 (2020). Further, a court must assume, “absent sufficient indication to the

contrary, that Congress intends the words in its enactments to carry ‘their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.’” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993) (citation omitted). Indeed, a reviewing court’s
“inquiry into the meaning of [a] statute’s text ceases when the statutory language is
unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” United States v.
Hassan Abbas, 100 F.4th 267, 283 (1st Cir. 2024) (citations omitted).
Canons of construction only apply in cases of textual ambiguity. See e.g.,

Littlefield v. Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, 951 F.3d 30, 40 (1st Cir. 2020)
(explaining that, “[u]nder the commands of the Supreme Court, a statute that ‘does
not contain conflicting provisions or ambiguous language’ does not ‘require a
narrowing construction or application of any other canon or interpretative tool’”)
(quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002)). Textual ambiguity
in a statute exists only if “it admits of more than one reasonable interpretation.”
United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). If a court
finds a statute’s text ambiguous, it may apply canons of construction and other
interpretative tools, such as a review of legislative history. See e.g., City of

Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that, “[o]ther tools
of statutory interpretation, such as legislative history, customarily carry significant
weight only when the text is ambiguous or its plain meaning leads to an absurd
result”) (citation omitted).
d. Statutory Interpretation in the ERISA Context

Since the undersigned must today interpret a portion of ERISA’s text,
prudence dictates briefly reviewing the general guidance for how to interpret this
particular statute. The Supreme Court has explained that ERISA is a
“‘comprehensive and reticulated statute,’ which Congress adopted after careful study
of private retirement pension plans.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 510 (1981) (citation omitted). In fact, the Court has observed that ERISA was
the end product of a “decade of congressional study” and that its “carefully crafted
and detailed enforcement scheme provides ‘strong evidence that Congress

did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly.’” Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251, 254 (1993) (citations
omitted).
Relatedly, although a reviewing court must of course begin its inquiry with the
statutory text, the court should not lose sight of the specific context in which the
language-in-question is used as well as the broader context of the ERISA statute. See
e.g., Castillo v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.3d 1224, 1232 (9th Cir. 2020) (conducting
a statutory interpretation analysis of a portion of ERISA’s text and quoting Supreme
Court precedent for the proposition that “[s]tatutory interpretation must account for

both ‘the specific context in which . . . language is used’ and ‘the broader context of
the statute as a whole’”) (citations omitted). Notably, the Supreme Court has been
“especially ‘reluctant to tamper with [the] enforcement scheme’ embodied in the
[ERISA] statute by extending remedies not specifically authorized by its text.” Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (emphasis added
and citation omitted).

Finally, ERISA is properly understood as a “remedial” statute, and consistent
with that purpose, should be “liberally construed in favor of protecting the
participants in employee benefit plans.” See, e.g., IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v.
Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). A
consequence of this is that “exemptions from ERISA coverage must be confined to
their narrow purpose.” See e.g., Alfa Laval, Inc. v. Nichols, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23159, at *32 (E.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2007) (citation omitted).

IV. LEGAL LANDSCAPE

a. Determining the Existence of an ERISA-Governed Plan

The First Circuit has explained that determining whether a “given employee
benefit or set of benefits is a plan properly governed by the strictures of ERISA
requires a certain level of judicial versatility” and is a mixed question of law and fact.
See e.g., Belanger v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 71 F.3d 451, 453 (1st Cir. 1995). The Court
has further acknowledged that ERISA itself offers “scant guidance” as to what
constitutes a “plan” but has observed that the Supreme Court has instructed courts
to only find that an employee benefits plan is a plan subject to ERISA if “it involves

the undertaking of continuing administrative and financial obligations by the
employer to the behoof of employees or their beneficiaries.” Id. (citing Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 12 (1987)). Indeed, the “existence of a plan turns
on the nature and extent of an employer’s benefit obligations.” Belanger, 71 F.3d at
454.
There are two common ways to show that a benefits decision falls outside of

ERISA’s ambit: (1) demonstrating the applicability of the regulatory “safe harbor
provision”, see 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j)8, and/or (2) showing that the plan-at-issue fails
under the five-part “conventional tests” for determining whether ERISA governs.
Gross v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 734 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2013). As the Gross Court
explained, an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan has five essential constituent
parts:
(1) a plan, fund or program (2) established or maintained (3) by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both (4) for the purpose
of providing medical, surgical, hospital care, sickness, accident,
disability, death, unemployment or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds, prepaid
legal services or severance benefits (5) to participants or their
beneficiaries.

Id. (citations omitted). Finally, the Gross Court also reiterated the rule that the
“crucial factor” in determining the existence of an ERISA-regulated plan “is whether

8 This provision is not relevant here.
the purchase of the insurance policy constituted an expressed intention by the
employer to provide benefits on a regular and long term basis.” Id. (citations omitted).
b. ERISA’s Purpose and Exclusive Cause of Action in Benefit Denial
Cases

ERISA “governs the rights and responsibilities of parties in relation to
employee pension and welfare plans,” and it “includes a cause of action for plan
participants, and other beneficiaries, ‘to recover benefits due to him [or her] under
the terms of his [or her] plan.’” Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1998)
(first citing New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 650–51 (1995); then quoting 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B)). Claims challenging denials and terminations of ERISA-regulated
employer-sponsored disability benefits must be brought under 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B). Indeed, as another Session of this Court has observed, in the context

this statutory provision is “the exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed under ERISA”
in the context of benefit denials. Andrews-Clarke v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 157 F. Supp.
2d 93, 105 (D. Mass. 2001).
c. ERISA Preemption

A consequence of ERISA providing the exclusive federal remedy for claimants
who are denied benefits under an employee welfare plan is that state law claims
purporting to seek similar relief may very well be preempted. See e.g., Green v. Corp.
Grp. Sys., No. 95-1026, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 12186, at *11 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 1996)
(unpublished) (explaining that, “Congress’s purpose in providing preemption of state
law claims was to enable employee benefit plans to be administered in a uniform way
without being affected by divergent regulatory schemes in different states . . .”).
There are two forms of ERISA preemption. As another Session of this Court
has recently explained,

“The first is complete preemption under [ERISA] § 502(a)(1)(B). The
Supreme Court has stated that ‘if an individual brings suit complaining
of a denial of coverage for medical care, where the individual is entitled
to such coverage only because of the terms of an ERISA-regulated
employee benefit plan, and where no legal duty (state or federal)
independent of ERISA or the plan terms is violated, then the suit falls
‘within the scope of' ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).’
***
The second form is conflict preemption under [ERISA] §
514(a). Under § 514, ERISA’s provisions ‘shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan.’ Although conflict preemption is an affirmative defense,
‘raising a colorable ERISA § 514 preemption defense is no basis for
federal jurisdiction.’

Tutungian v. Mass. Elec. Co., No. 24-10228-FDS, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64527, at
*3 (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2024) (emphasis added and citations omitted).9
Complete preemption under ERISA §502(a)(1)(B) is “[p]rincipally concerned
with jurisdiction,” and it allows “defendants to remove cases filed in state court even
when no federal cause of action is pleaded in the complaint.” Buiaroski v. State St.
Corp., No. 1:23-cv-12241-JEK, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129557, at *5 (D. Mass. July
23, 2024) (citation omitted). Conflict preemption is “more sweeping and is often
invoked as an affirmative defense to state law causes of action.” Id. (citation omitted).

9 When a court in this Circuit needs to determine if ERISA’s express preemption
mechanism applies, it must ask “two central questions: (1) whether the plan at issue
is an ‘employee benefit plan’ and (2) whether the cause of action ‘relates to’ this
employee benefit plan.” Hampers v. W.R. Grace & Co., 202 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted).
As another Judge in this District has explained, “conflict preemption does not provide
a basis for federal jurisdiction and complete preemption does. This is because conflict
preemption is a federal defense which, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, cannot

give rise to removal jurisdiction.” Flagg v. Ali-Med, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.
Mass. 2010) (citation omitted). Said differently, a defendant can remove state law
causes of action that are “within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of §
502(a)” to federal court, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987), but
cannot remove state law claims that are outside the scope of § 502(a), “even if [they
are] preempted by § 514(a)” because such claims “are still governed by the well-

pleaded complaint rule…,” Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted).
To determine if complete preemption applies, this Court must apply a two-part
test. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004). First, a defendant must
establish that (1) the plaintiff “could have brought his claim under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B),” (2) that there is “no other independent legal duty that is implicated by
a defendant’s actions….” Id. To determine if conflict preemption applies, Courts in

this Circuit must ask “two central questions: (1) whether the plan at issue is an
‘employee benefit plan’ and (2) whether the cause of action ‘relates to’ this employee
benefit plan.” Hampers, 202 F.3d at 49 (citation omitted).
Here, Defendant argues that the state law claims contained in Counts I, II,
and III are preempted under both forms of ERISA preemption. [See e.g., ECF No. 33
at 6–7 (Defendant arguing that “[Plaintiff’s] claims ‘relate to’ the Plan and are
expressly preempted under ERISA § 514(a)” and that “[b]ecause Peterson’s
[Amended] Complaint arises solely from the denial of benefits under the terms of the
Plan, she ‘could have brought her claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)’”) (citations

omitted)].
d. Church Plans

Importantly, ERISA expressly exempts from its coverage certain plans that
would otherwise meet its definition of an “employee benefit plan.” Scanlan v. Am.
Airlines Grp., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2019). One type of plan that is
expressly exempt from ERISA is a “church plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2).
The statutory definition of “church plan” came about in two distinct phases.
See Stapleton, 581 U.S. at 472. From ERISA’s inception, “church plan” has meant:
• “a plan established and maintained . . . for its employees . . . by a church or by
a convention or association of churches.” §1002(33)(A).

Then, in 1980, as Justice Kagan explained in Stapleton’s majority opinion,
“Congress amended the statute to expand that definition by deeming additional plans
to fall within it.” 581 U.S. at 472. Specifically, §1002(33)(C)(ii)(II) was added, which
provides that “for purposes of the church-plan definition, an ‘employee of a church’
would include an employee of a church-affiliated organization . . . .” Id. (citing
§1002(33)(C)(ii)(II)).
But Congress also added statutory language that is of particular importance
in today’s case. Specifically, it added the following provision:
• “For purposes of this paragraph […] A plan established and maintained
for its employees . . . by a church or by a convention or association of
churches includes a plan maintained by an organization . . . the
principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding
of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare
benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or a convention
or association of churches, if such organization is controlled by or
associated with a church or a convention or association of churches.”

§1002(33)(C)(i) (emphasis added).

As Justice Kagan explained in Stapleton’s majority opinion, the above-quoted
provision contained in §1002(33)(C)(i) is “a mouthful for lawyers and non-lawyers
alike,” and so, “to digest it more easily, note that everything after the word
‘organization’ in the third line is just a (long-winded) description of a particular
kind of church-associated entity—which this opinion will call a ‘principal-purpose
organization.’” 581 U.S. at 473 (emphasis added). The main job of a principal purpose
organization, the Court further explained, “is to fund or manage a benefit plan for the
employees of churches or (per the 1980 amendment’s other part) of church affiliates.”
Id.
As explained supra, the question of whether the Plan fits within the statutory
definition of a church plan for purposes of ERISA is presently at the heart of this case
and is at the heart of this opinion.
V. ORDER OF OPERATIONS

Before the Court reaches the Application section of this Opinion, it will provide
a roadmap of its decisional analysis.
• Step One: First, the Court will address the disputed and threshold
question of which party bears the burden of showing that the Plan is
or is not an ERISA-regulated benefits plan.

• Step Two: Second, the Court will decide whether the Plan is an
otherwise ERISA-governed plan and, if so, will then engage in statutory
interpretation to determine whether it fits within the statutory
definition of a church plan such that the Plan is ultimately exempt from
ERISA.

o Reasoning: Three prior ERISA decisions counsel tackling this question
before reaching preemption-related issues. See e.g., Morton v. Rocky Mt.
Hosp. & Med. Servs., No. 2:23-cv-01320-GMN-DJA, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
91423, at *4 (D. Nev. May 21, 2024) (explaining at the motion to dismiss
stage that, “[t]he Court will first address whether ERISA governs the
Health Plan, and then whether Plaintiff's claims are completely
preempted under Section 502(a)(1)(B) or expressly preempted under 514”)
(emphasis added); Fluker v. Anderson, No. 4:06-cv-3394, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 140441, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2008) (explaining at the summary
judgment stage that before it could reach the “merits of Plaintiff's claims,
the Court must address whether ERISA governs the Plan at issue, and, if
so, whether it preempts Plaintiff's state law causes of action”) (emphasis
added); Bailey v. Cigna Ins. Co., No. 01-1115, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24885,
at *5 (W.D. La. Dec. 17, 2001) (“To ascertain whether the Baileys' claims
are preempted by ERISA, the court must first determine whether the Plan
itself is governed by ERISA. If the Plan is governed by ERISA, the focus
shifts to whether preemption must apply to the Baileys' claims.”)

• Step Three: Third, if the Court finds that the church plan exemption
does not apply to the Plan, it will address whether Plaintiff’s state law
claims are preempted.

o Reasoning: Two prior ERISA decisions weigh in favor of addressing
Section 502 concerns before reaching Section 514 concerns. See e.g., Royal
Heritage Home, LLC v. Bluestone, No. 20-4157, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
155079, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2021) (“the Court must first determine
whether the Complaint is completely preempted under § 502 before
addressing any of Defendant's arguments under § 514”); Morton, 2024 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 91423, at *9–15 (resolving § 502(a)(1)(B)-related preemption
issues before reaching § 514(a) arguments.).

• Step Four: Finally, if the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are
preempted, it will determine whether they must be dismissed -- and if
so, whether this dismissal should be with or without prejudice.

• Reasoning: If a court finds that a plaintiff’s state law claims are
preempted by ERISA, then it may dismiss those counts. Cf., Lee v. Sheet
Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund, 697 F. Supp. 2d 781, 784 (E.D.
Mich. 2010) (“If the court determines that certain counts of the plaintiff's
complaint are preempted by ERISA, it can dismiss such counts under
Rule 12(b)(6)”) (citation omitted).

The Court will now begin resolving these issues according to this roadmap.

VI. APPLICATION

a. Step One: Who Bears the Burden?

The first contested question is which party bears the burden of showing that
their interpretation of the church plan question is correct. Defendant contends that
Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the Plan falls within the “Church Plan”
exemption. [E.g., ECF No. 33 at 8 (“Because Church Plans are an exception to
ERISA’s rule of general application, [Plaintiff] has the burden to prove that the Plan
is a Church Plan, and is therefore exempt from ERISA.”) (citations omitted)].
Plaintiff argues that “it makes the most sense for Defendant (who is the party seeking
to remove and dismiss claims based on subject matter jurisdiction) to initially bear
the burden of proof that ERISA applies.” [ECF No. 42 at 4].
For starters, the Court’s research revealed that there is no binding authority
on this precise question. In terms of persuasive authority, the most instructive case
is Hall v. USAble Life, 774 F. Supp. 2d 953 (E.D. Ark. 2011). In Hall, the Court
grappled with this very question and surveyed prior case law before ultimately
determining that:
When a complaint seeks benefits under an ERISA plan, there is federal
question jurisdiction. However, when a complaint seeks benefits under
a church plan, there is no federal question. Thus, a defendant
who removes the case has the burden to show federal question
jurisdiction exists, and that burden includes establishing that the
plan is not a church plan.
774 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (emphasis added). 10

This approach makes good sense and is in accord with the undisputed principle
that defendants claiming federal question jurisdiction as the basis for removal must
“make a ‘colorable’ showing that a basis for federal jurisdiction exists.” Danca v.
Private Health Care Sys., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Defendants
are of course correct that “the general rule of statutory construction [is] that the
burden of proving justification or exemption under a special exception to the
prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its benefits . . . .” FTC v.
Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1948) (emphasis added). However, this Court

concludes that this general rule should not be applied in this particular context.
Here, Plaintiff’s original and Amended Complaint did not seek benefits under
an ERISA plan, and these documents said nothing about the church plan exemption.
[See ECF No. 1-1; ECF No. 10]. Indeed, the only reason that this case — and this
issue — is presently before the Court is because Defendant removed the case in part
based on its ERISA church plan argument. [ECF No. 1 at 2–3]. Accordingly, this
Court finds that the burden most appropriately rests on Defendant to show that the

Plan is not a church plan. See Hall, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 957.11

10 See also, Roberts v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 2:23-129-DCR, 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 226539, at *4–5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 20, 2023) (“To determine
whether ERISA completely preempts a state claim, the party seeking removal has
the burden of showing that the plaintiff is complaining about a denial of benefits
under the terms of an ERISA plan and that the plaintiff alleges the violation of a
legal duty that is dependent on ERISA or an ERISA plan's terms”) (emphasis added
and citation omitted).

11 The undersigned recognizes that other courts have come down differently on this
issue but believes that its chosen approach is most appropriate under these
circumstances. See e.g., Durham v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 236 F. Supp. 3d 1140,
b. Step Two: Is the Plan an Otherwise ERISA-Governed Plan? If so,
Does it Fall Within the Statutory Definition of a Church Plan?

And now for the main event. To decide whether the Plan is ultimately
governed by or exempt from ERISA, the Court will proceed by (a) considering the
undisputed facts surrounding the Plan to determine if it is an otherwise ERISA-
governed employee welfare benefits plan, and if ‘yes’, will then (b) interpret the
relevant statutory language in light of the parties’ competing arguments to decide if
the Plan fits within the definition of a church plan. Accord Roberts, 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 226539 at *6 (explaining in an analogous situation that “[t]he undersigned
begins by considering the undisputed facts concerning [plaintiff’s] insurance plan
and then by examining the text of the church-plan exception”) (emphasis added).
i. The Plan Is Clearly an Otherwise ERISA-Governed Employee
Benefit Plan

After careful review, the Court concludes that the Plan is an otherwise ERISA-
governed employee welfare benefit plan. The following relevant facts are undisputed:
• NDHCCI is an employer whose mission and/or most significant activity is to
“provide quality nursing and hospice care for the elderly and poor residents of the
community.” [ECF No. 35-2 at 2–5].

• NDHCCI established the Plan in order to “to assist employees in their efforts to
financially take care of themselves and their families if rendered temporarily
disabled.” [ECF No. 43 at 2].

• NDHCCI funds the Plan through the Group Policy that it purchased from
Defendant [ECF No. 35-6]; [ECF No. 35-7].

1153 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“[T]he Court concludes that where the defendant asserts
ERISA preemption as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading
and proving any applicable exemption under [ERISA].”)
• NDHCCI serves as the Group Policy’s policyholder and pays the premium for its
employees’ LTD benefits coverage. See [ECF No. 43 at 3–4].

• NDHCCI designated itself as the Plan Administrator. [ECF No. 35-7]

• When NDHCCI applied for coverage from Defendant in December 2012, one of its
representatives checked boxes indicating its understanding that the Plan was
subject to ERISA and that NDHCCI was responsible for providing summary plan
descriptions to its employees. [ECF No. 35-3 at 5].12

• Nothing in the record suggests the existence of a benefit committee or other
organization that has a principal purpose or function of administering the Plan.

• Plaintiff was an NDHCCI employee, [ECF No. 35-8 at 2], and she participated in
the Plan during her employment. [ECF No. 43 at 4].

Applying the “five essential constituents” test cited by the First Circuit in
Gross, cited supra, the Court easily concludes that the Plan is an otherwise ERISA-
governed employee welfare benefit plan. See 734 F.3d at 6. First, it is certainly a
“plan.” Second and third, it was established by an employer -- namely NDHCCI.
Fourth, NDHCCI’s express purpose for establishing the Plan was to assist its
employees in financially taking care of themselves and their families if rendered
disabled. [See ECF No. 43 at 2].13 Fifth and finally, NDHCCI offered the benefits
provided by the Plan to its employees, including Plaintiff. Moreover, the Court finds

12 As noted supra, Plaintiff admits that this document speaks for itself but notes that
she does not know how NDHCCI construed this form when it completed it and further
stated that this fact should not have any bearing on the dispute in any case. [ECF
No. 43 at 3].

13 The satisfaction of this factor is especially important in this Circuit. See e.g.,
Wickman v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1083 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The crucial factor
in determining if a ‘plan’ has been established is whether the purchase of the
insurance policy constituted an expressed intention by the employer to provide
benefits on a regular and long term basis.”)
it significant that the NDHCCI representative that applied for insurance coverage
from the Defendant affirmatively acknowledged that the Plan was subject to ERISA.
[ECF No. 35-3 at 5].

Thus, when viewed through the reasonable person lens, see Gross, 734 F.3d at
6–7, the Court concludes from the surrounding and undisputed circumstances that
the Plan is an otherwise ERISA-governed plan that will only be exempt from the
statute if the church plan exemption applies, which is the next question that the
Court must address.
ii. The Statutory Text14

(A) The term “church plan” means a plan established and
maintained (to the extent required in clause (ii) of subparagraph
(B)) for its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a
convention or association of churches which is exempt from tax
under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS
§ 501].

(B) The term “church plan” does not include a plan—

(i) which is established and maintained primarily for the
benefit of employees (or their beneficiaries) of such church
or convention or association of churches who are employed
in connection with one or more unrelated trades or
businesses (within the meaning of section 513 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 513]), or

(ii) if less than substantially all of the individuals included in
the plan are individuals described in subparagraph (A) or
in clause (ii) of subparagraph (C) (or their beneficiaries).

(C) For purposes of this paragraph—

14 So that the statutory text at issue can be seen in context, see Castillo, 970 F.3d at
1232, and for ease of reference, the Court provides an excerpt from the text of 29
U.S.C. § 1002(33) here. For reasons explained infra, the emphasized text is
particularly relevant to the Court’s statutory interpretation inquiry.
(i) A plan established and maintained for its employees (or
their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or
association of churches includes a plan maintained by an
organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise,
the principal purpose or function of which is the
administration or funding of a plan or program for the
provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both,
for the employees of a church or a convention or association
of churches, if such organization is controlled by or
associated with a church or a convention or association of
churches.

(ii) The term employee of a church or a convention or association of
churches includes—

(I) a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a
church in the exercise of his ministry, regardless of the
source of his compensation;

(II) an employee of an organization, whether a civil law
corporation or otherwise, which is exempt from tax
under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 [26 USCS § 501] and which is controlled by
or associated with a church or a convention or
association of churches; and

(III) an individual described in clause (v).

(iii) A church or a convention or association of churches which
is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501] shall be deemed the employer
of any individual included as an employee under clause (ii).

(iv) An organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, is
associated with a church or a convention or association of
churches if it shares common religious bonds and convictions with
that church or convention or association of churches.

***
29 U.S.C. § 1002(33) (emphasis added).
iii. The Parties’ Arguments

The Court will begin its analysis by briefly reciting the conflicting positions of
the parties. See e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 240 (2008) (explaining
that “[i]n both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, courts
follow the principle of party presentation, i.e., the parties frame the issues for decision
and the courts generally serve as neutral arbiters of matters the parties present.”)
1. Plaintiff’s Position

Plaintiff contends that the Plan fits within the statutory definition of church
plan. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court understands her argument to basically
proceed as follows:
• Premise 1: When Congress amended the ERISA statute in 1980, it intended to
expand the definition of church plan not just through the addition of
§1002(33)(C)(i), but also through the addition of §1002(33)(C)(ii), §1002(33)(C)(iii),
and §1002(33)(C)(iv).15

• Premise 2: §1002(33)(C)(ii) operates such that a person who works for a church-
affiliated non-profit falls within the scope of §1002(33)(C)(ii)(II). Therefore, it
follows that an employee of a church-affiliated non-profit qualifies as an “employee
of a church . . .” See §1002(33)(C)(ii).16

15 [See e.g., ECF No. 42 at 5 (Plaintiff arguing that, “Defendant’s arguments seem to
incorrectly suggest (C)(i) is the only pertinent type of plan included with the
expansion, even though Congress included other clauses (ii-iv) which provide for
additional types of plans as part of the expansion.”)

16 [See e.g., ECF No. 31 at 10 (Plaintiff arguing that,

“[b]ecause a church or association of churches is deemed to be the
employer of anyone included under clause (C)(ii), plans for tax-exempt
church-affiliates who run their own plans qualify for the exemption
under the original definition as they are “a plan established and
maintained. . . for its employees. . . by a church or by a convention or
association of churches [(who is deemed the employer of anyone included
in (C)(ii))] which is exempt from tax under section 501 of title 26.” § 1002
(33)(A).]
• Premise 3: Since such a person would be considered an “employee of a church”
under §1002(33)(C)(ii)(II), it follows, then, that their employer must necessarily be
“deemed” a “church” under §1002(33)(C)(iii).17

• Deduction: Since an employee of a church-affiliated non-profit’s employer is a
“church” for purposes of §1002(33)(C)(ii)(III), it follows that an employee welfare
benefits plan established and maintained by a church-affiliated non-profit
necessarily constitutes a “church plan” under §1002(33)(A).

• Conclusion: Accordingly, there are three avenues by which a plan can fit the
statutory definition of a church plan: “[1] employees of a church (§ (33)(A)); [2] the
beneficiaries of church-affiliated PPOs (aka religiously-affiliated pension/welfare
benefit boards) (§(33)(C)(i)); and [3] employees of tax-exempt church-affiliates who
established and maintain their own plans (§(33)(C)(iii)), (inter alia); are all treated
equally under ERISA.” [Id. at 3].

2. Defendant’s Position

Defendant rejects Plaintiff’s contention that there are three avenues and
insists that the statute provides only two avenues: plans must be run by either
churches or so-called principal purpose organizations. [See e.g., ECF No. 33 at 8-10].
Defendant makes both textual and doctrinal arguments in support of this claim. Its
textual argument is that “there is nothing in the plain text of § 1002(33) that expands
the definition of Church Plan to all entities merely associated with a church.” [ECF
No. 44 at 6]. Thus, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has “reverse-engineered” the
text of §1002(33)(C)(ii) and §1002(33)(C)(iii) to generate a result that was not
intentional (i.e., allowing the employee welfare benefits plans of all entities merely
associated with a church to fall within the statutory definition of church plan). [Id.]

17 See e.g., id.
In service of that argument, Defendant argues that to read the statute this way
would violate the surplusage canon by rendering §1002(33)(C)(i)’s provision
superfluous. [See ECF No. 44 at 8 (Defendant arguing that “[Plaintiff’s] proposed

interpretation completely eliminates the need for § 1002(33)(C)(i)’s [principal-
purpose organization], since under [Plaintiff’s] construction, a plan established and
maintained by a church-affiliated non-profit would already be a church plan [i.e.,
under § 1002(33)(A)].”
iv. This Court’s Interpretation

The Court begins, as it must, with the text of the statute and reads it according
to its plain meaning at the time of enactment. See Hassan Abbas, 100 F.4th at 283
(citation omitted). The first question is whether the text is ambiguous. After careful
review, the undersigned finds that the statutory provisions at issue are not
ambiguous since they do not permit “more than one reasonable interpretation.” See
e.g., Godin, 534 F.3d at 56 (citation omitted). Indeed, the plain text only permits one
reasonable interpretation, namely that there are only two types of organizations that
can qualify for the ERISA church-plan exemption: (1) churches, and (2) principal-

purpose organizations. See §1002(33)(A); §1002(33)(C)(i). Nowhere does the plain
text expand the definition of church plan to encompass all entities or organizations
that are merely associated with a church. See §1002(33).
Indeed, if Congress had wanted to expand the definition to this effect, it is
highly unlikely that it would have required the textual gymnastics necessary to land
at Plaintiff’s conclusion, summarized supra. Although the Court need not apply any
canons of construction here because the text is unambiguous, see e.g., Littlefield v.
Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, 951 F.3d at 40, the Court is struck by the
applicability of the late Justice Scalia’s oft-cited principle that, “Congress . . . does not

alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions -- it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citations omitted). Applying this
heuristic here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument that Congress intended to
dramatically expand the definition of a church plan with a new, third definitional
avenue in such a vague and ancillary way unconvincing.

This reading also makes the most sense in light of the principles of statutory
construction endemic to the ERISA context, referenced supra. Indeed, the Court
must remain mindful that ERISA is a remedial statute that should be construed in
favor protecting the participants in employee benefit plans, see e.g., IUE AFL-CIO
Pension Fund, 788 F.2d at 127, and the converse principle that
“exemptions from ERISA coverage must be confined to their narrow purpose.” See
e.g., Alfa Laval, Inc. v. Nichols, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23159, at *32 (E.D. Va. Mar.

29, 2007) (citation omitted). Dramatically expanding ERISA’s church plan exemption
to those organizations that are merely associated with a church would offend both
principles.
Finally, this Court’s interpretation also comports with an apparent majority of
(the few) federal courts that have directly considered arguments that are the same or
roughly similar to Plaintiff’s. See Roberts v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2023 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 226539 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 20, 2023); Casto v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 508 F.
Supp. 3d 243 (E.D. Tenn. 2020).18 In Roberts, Eastern District of Kentucky Chief
Judge Reeves applied rule statements contained in Stapleton19 and found that “it is

clear that two types of plans are exempt under § 1002(33)—plans established by a
church or by a convention or association of churches and plans maintained by
principal-purpose organizations.” 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 226539 at *9 (citation
omitted). The court then rejected the plaintiff’s proposed construction of the church
plan statute -- which is virtually the same as Plaintiff’s in this case -- and reasoned
that “if Congress intended to define ‘church’ for purposes of § 1002(33)(A), the

addition of § 1002(33)(C)(ii)(II) to the statute would have been an awfully roundabout
way of doing so.” Id. at *10.
Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. For instance, she argues
in part that,
Ms. Peterson is an employee of NDHCC[I], which is a tax-exempt civil
law corporation that is closely affiliated with the Diocese of Worcester
and Roman Catholic Church. §1002(33)(C)(ii)(II). NDHCC[I] is
associated with a church for purposes of the exemption because it shares
common religious bonds and convictions with the Roman Catholic
Church where the Church holds NDHCC[I] out as a member of its
church and thus can be found in The Official Catholic Directory
§1002(33)(C)(iv). Because Ms. Peterson is an individual included as an
employee under clause (ii) and because NDHCC[I] is closely affiliated
with the Roman Catholic Church for purposes of clause (iv), either the

18 But see, Cruz v. Standard Ins. Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244406 (E.D. Ky. May
10, 2022).

19 Specifically, 581 U.S. at 476, wherein Justice Kagan explained that §1002(33)(C)(i)
had the effect of creating a second type of plan that should receive church plan
exemption status. See also, Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 877 F.3d 1213,
1221 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[a]s [Stapleton] makes clear, two types of organization
qualify for the church-plan exemption: churches and so-called principal-purpose
organizations”) (emphasis added).
Diocese of Worcester or the Roman Catholic Church is deemed to be her
employer for purposes of this exemption. §1002(33)(C)(iii). Thus,
NDHCC[I]’s plan is “a plan maintained and established… for its
employees… by a church or by a convention or association of churches
which is exempt from tax under section 501 of titles 26.” §1002(33)(A).
Accordingly, NDHCC’s plan is a “church plan” that is exempt under
ERISA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2).

[ECF No. 31 at 14].
The required length of such a reading signals that it is likely not assigning to
the cited statutory text provisions “‘their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.’” See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 388 (citation omitted). Turning to
the argument’s substance, a close review of the various logical leaps adds further
credence to the view that Congress only intended there to be two, narrow avenues for
an organization to qualify as a church plan: being a church or a principal purpose
organization. In other words, Congress apparently did not want it to be too easy to
qualify as one -- which is an interpretation that follows from an appreciation for the
statute’s broader purpose. See, e.g., IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund, 788 F.2d at 127
(explaining that ERISA is a “remedial” statute which should be “liberally construed
in favor of protecting the participants in employee benefit plans.”)
In Casto, the court rejected the notion of a third way that ran by way of
§1002(33)(C)(ii)(II). 508 F. Supp. 3d at 246 (concluding that “[t]here is no other
addition to the definition of church plan that would expand it to all entities merely
associated with a church.”) Further, the court in Casto convincingly speculated that
§1002(33)(C)(ii)(II)’s true purpose may have been to just “expand those who can
benefit from a church plan” giving an example of how the provision “would make a
plan administered by the Catholic Church for employees of an associated hospital
a church plan. That plan would be administered by a church under § 1002(33)(C)(i)
for the employees of a church-associated entity under § 1002(33)(C)(ii)(II)” Id. at 248
(emphasis added). While this Court need not decide §1002(33)(C)(ii)(II)’s legislative

purpose, this plain explanation makes much more sense than the one Plaintiff urges.
v. The Bottom Line
Given this Court’s interpretation of the statute, for the Plan to be a church
plan, NDHCCI would need to be either a church or a principal-purpose organization.
Both parties agree that it is neither. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Plan is
not a church plan, and it is therefore covered by ERISA. According to its roadmap,

the Court now turns to issues of ERISA preemption.
c. Step Three: Are Plaintiff’s Claims Preempted?

The Court need not and will not wade deep into the waters of ERISA
preemption here since the parties agree that if the Plan is covered by ERISA -- and
this Court has just determined that it is -- all of Plaintiff’s claims are preempted. [See
e.g., ECF No. 42 at 2-3 (Plaintiff stating that she “acknowledges and does not dispute
that the law of the First Circuit is that Plaintiff’s state law claims and remedies would
be preempted as ERISA would be the exclusive enforcement mechanism”)]. Indeed,
the Court agrees that each of Plaintiff’s pending claims are now preempted.20 The
Court thus continues on to the final stop on its roadmap, where it will determine

20 Since the issue of which precise form of ERISA preemption applies was not
directly briefed by both parties and because they both agree that the claim is
preempted in any event, the Court need not and will not reach this sub-issue. See
e.g., Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 240.
whether to dismiss the case, and what effect this might have on the Court’s
jurisdiction.
d. Step Four: Should the Court Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims? And, if so,
Should the Dismissal be With or Without Prejudice?
Plaintiff’s complaint is made up solely of state law claims. Plaintiff has asked
for permission to amend her complaint to allege ERISA claims. [ECF No. 42 at 3].
Defendant agrees with this request. [ECF No. 33 at 11 (“Defendant has no objection

should [Plaintiff] move to amend her Complaint to state a claim for benefits under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).”)]. However, the Plaintiff has not
filed a motion seeking leave to amend nor has she tendered a proposed amended
complaint. Thus, this Court is in a similar position as the Roberts Court after it found
that the plaintiff’s state law ERISA claims were preempted. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
226539 at *15 (observing at this stage that “plaintiff has neither filed a motion

seeking leave to amend nor has she tendered a proposed amended complaint.
Granting the requested relief [of leave to amend] would leave this matter in the odd
position of being without an operative pleading and thus without a claim over which
this Court could exercise jurisdiction.”) Here, too, granting Plaintiff’s requested relief
would leave this Court without a pending claim over which it could potentially
exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, the matter will be DISMISSED, without
prejudice to Peterson’s ability to file a new action asserting her claims under

ERISA. See id.
VII. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant’s summary judgment motion [ECF No. 32] is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment [ECF No. 29] is
DENIED.

SO ORDERED. /s/ Margaret R. Guzman
MARGARET R. GUZMAN
April 4, 2025 United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10839857. Public record. Not legal advice.