# Pumphrey v. Kinnan, Kinnan

> District Court of Appeal of Florida · April 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10839412

## Case

- **Court:** District Court of Appeal of Florida
- **Decided:** April 4, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT

RICK MILLS and TROY PUMPHREY,

Petitioners,

v.

JOSEPH KINNAN and LINDA KINNAN,

Respondents.

Nos. 2D2024-0891, 2D2024-0896
CONSOLIDATED

April 4, 2025

Petitions for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Manatee County;
Hunter W. Carroll, Judge.

David A. Wallace of Bentley Goodrich Kison, P.A., Sarasota; and Robert
K. Robinson of Rob Robinson Attorney, P.A., Sarasota, for Petitioner Rick
Mills.

Robert K. Robinson of Rob Robinson Attorney, P.A., Sarasota, for
Petitioner Troy Pumphrey.

Jennifer Seymore of Seymore Justice, Tallahassee; John Romano and
Corey Friedman of Romano Law Group, West Palm Beach; and Elizabeth
Zwibel, Saint Petersburg, for Respondents.
ATKINSON, Judge.
Rick Mills and Troy Pumphrey have each petitioned this court for a
writ of certiorari seeking review of the trial court's order denying their
respective motions for summary judgment. They request that this court
quash the portion of the trial court's summary judgment order that
denied their claimed entitlement to common law absolute immunity from
Joseph and Linda Kinnan's malicious prosecution claims. We
consolidate their petitions for purposes of this opinion. Because the trial
court departed from the essential requirements of law by denying them
common law absolute immunity from the Kinnans' malicious prosecution
claims, thereby causing material injury that cannot be corrected on
postjudgment appeal, we grant their petitions and quash the trial court's
order in part.
Background
The underlying litigation concerns the Manatee County School
Board's investigations into alleged misconduct of plaintiff Joseph Kinnan,
the school district's then-business manager and athletic director.
Defendant Rick Mills was the school district's superintendent, and
defendant Troy Pumphrey was an investigator in the school district's
Office of Professional Standards (OPS).
Two investigations of Mr. Kinnan were conducted by Mr. Pumphrey
at Mr. Mills' direction. The first investigation concerned the Manatee
High School baseball program. Mr. Pumphrey prepared a written report
that, in relevant part, detailed the scope of his investigation, explained
his findings regarding the allegation that Mr. Kinnan knowingly allowed
the high school's baseball coach to serve as a paid coach without the
proper certification, and alleged that Mr. Kinnan's conduct violated the
Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in

2
Florida. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-10.081. Mr. Pumphrey sent a copy
of his report to the Florida Department of Education, as well as an
employee misconduct reporting form that summarized the allegations.
The second investigation was prompted after the publication of a
newspaper article containing statements from Mr. Kinnan that allegedly
misrepresented the facts concerning the investigation of the high school's
baseball program. Mr. Pumphrey investigated the issue and sent a
second employee misconduct reporting form to the Department of
Education reporting that Mr. Kinnan "intentionally provided false
information to the news media regarding an internal School Board
investigation."
A school district disciplinary committee reviewed Mr. Pumphrey's
findings and recommended disciplinary sanctions against Mr. Kinnan,
and school district superintendent Mr. Mills agreed with the committee's
recommendations. The School Board filed a complaint against Mr.
Kinnan in the Division of Administrative Hearings seeking disciplinary
sanctions, but the School Board dismissed the complaint after Mr.
Kinnan retired.
The Department of Education conducted its own investigation,
following which it notified Mr. Kinnan that it found probable cause to
justify sanctions against his Florida Educator Certificate. The
Department of Education filed an administrative complaint with the
Education Practices Commission—the state agency responsible for
applying the standards of professional practice and imposing discipline
upon educators—seeking sanctions against Mr. Kinnan's certificate, but
it later voluntarily dismissed the complaint.
Mr. and Mrs. Kinnan filed a multicount complaint against the
School Board, superintendent Mr. Mills, and investigator Mr. Pumphrey,

3
but the only claims relevant to this opinion are their claims against Mr.
Mills and Mr. Pumphrey for malicious prosecution. Their fifth amended
complaint alleged that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey knowingly fabricated
the allegations against Mr. Kinnan and that their provision of those
fabricated allegations to the Department of Education caused the
department to file the administrative complaint without probable cause
to do so. They specifically alleged the following in the count against Mr.
Mills:
352. The [Department of Education] Administrative
Complaint was initially caused to be filed by MILLS, who
supervised PUMPHREY, against J. KINNAN under dubious
circumstances and relied upon a deeply flawed investigation
that was forwarded to [the Department of Education].
353. The actions instigated by MILLS were done with
malice and were commenced without probable cause because
the "probable cause" that did exist was a fabrication from
MILLS and PUMPHREY and were used to cause J. KINNAN to
retire under duress.
354. [The Department of Education]'s finding of
"probable cause" stemmed from false allegations in [the first
employee misconduct reporting form] that J. KINNAN had
"direct knowledge" of [the baseball coach]'s expired
certification and "allowed" [the baseball coach] to coach
anyway.
355. [The Department of Education]'s finding of
"probable cause" was influenced by the [Manatee High School]
Report [concerning the baseball program investigation] and
[the School Board's] Administrative Complaint which were full
of misrepresentations and false allegations.
356. After J. KINNAN responded to the initial
[Department of Education] preliminary investigation letter of
November 8, 2013, with responses to [the Department of
Education] on November 24, 2013, and February 6, 2014, in
which [the school district] clearly became aware of, MILLS
orchestrated and directed the following misrepresentations to
be made to [the Department of Education]:

4
a. On January 28, 2014, Glisson faxed a document to
[the Department of Education] that misrepresented her
role in monitoring coaching certifications. This
communication is believed to be in response to J.
KINNAN's November 24, 2013, information.
b. On February 11, 2014, Saunders, who directly
reported to MILLS, faxed to [the Department of
Education] information that misrepresented J.
KINNAN's contracted position with [the school district].
This communication is believed to be in response to J.
KINNAN's February 6, 2013, amended response to [the
Department of Education]. Curiously, MILLS had met
with Florida Superintendent of Education, Pam Stewart,
the day before on February 10, 2014.
c. On March 12, 2014, PUMPHREY sent a second
[employee misconduct reporting form], EMRF2, to [the
Department of Education], falsely claiming that " . . .
Kinnan intentionally misrepresented the facts of the
SCHOOL BOARD investigation in order to influence the
public's opinion. Further, Kinnan intentionally provided
false information to the news media regarding an
internal SCHOOL BOARD investigation."
The Kinnans made identical allegations for the malicious prosecution
claim against Mr. Pumphrey.
Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey jointly moved for summary judgment.
One of their arguments was that they were entitled to absolute immunity
from the malicious prosecution claims because the claims were
predicated upon allegedly false statements that they made within the
scope of their employment. The trial court denied their motion.
Analysis
To obtain certiorari relief, a "petitioner must establish (1) a
departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in
material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected
on postjudgment appeal." Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works,
Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). "The last two elements are

5
jurisdictional and must be analyzed before the court may even consider
the first element." Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011).
I.
This court has certiorari jurisdiction to review a trial court's denial
of absolute immunity because the immunity, when applicable, "protect[s]
a public official from having to defend a suit at all," and "[t]his
entitlement is lost if the defendant is required to go to trial." Stephens v.
Geoghegan, 702 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Absolute immunity
provides immunity from suit. As such, being forced to defend the suit is
itself a material injury to an immune public official. And because a
public official who is forced to defend a suit "cannot be reimmunized
after-the-fact . . . , an appeal after final judgment would not be an
adequate remedy" to review whether the immunity was erroneously
denied. Id.; see also Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Monk, 68 So. 3d 316,
318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ("[A]bsolute immunity protects a party from
having to defend a lawsuit at all, and waiting until final appeal to review
an order denying dismissal on immunity grounds renders such immunity
meaningless if the lower court denied dismissal in error."); Crowder v.
Barbati, 987 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ("[A]ny remedy that
enforced immunity upon final appeal, after the case had been fully
defended, would be meaningless." (citing Jenne v. Maranto, 825 So. 2d
409, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002))). Thus, Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey have
satisfied the jurisdictional elements necessary for certiorari review.
II.
A departure from the essential requirements of law occurs "when
there has been a violation of [a] clearly established principle of law
resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Williams, 62 So. 3d at 1133
(quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla.

6
1995)). This court in Stephens explained when a trial court's denial of a
public official's claim to immunity from suit meets this standard:
We hold that when a public official moves for summary
judgment on the ground that he or she enjoys immunity from
suit arising under either state or federal law, and the record
conclusively demonstrates that the public official is entitled to
immunity, it is a departure from the essential requirements of
law to deny it.
702 So. 2d at 525.
A.
"Public officials who make statements within the scope of their
duties are absolutely immune from suit for defamation." Id. at 522. The
immunity applies "regardless of the branch of government or the level of
the official," Cassell v. India, 964 So. 2d 190, 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007);
see also Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 522 (providing that absolute immunity
protects "low-level, as well high-placed, public officials"), and it applies
no matter how "false, malicious, or badly motivated the words may be,"
Harrison v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 382 So. 3d 695, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA
2023) (quoting Gay v. Jupiter Island Compound, LLC, 358 So. 3d 780,
786–87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)). This court has recognized that the
rationale for such a broad immunity is that it is "in the end better to
leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject
those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation." See
Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 522 (quoting McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428,
431 n.12 (Fla. 1966)).
The Kinnans argue that absolute immunity cannot apply in this
case because they sued Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey for malicious
prosecution, not defamation. However, the specific cause of action is not
dispositive. It is the public official's underlying conduct that is afforded
absolute immunity—that is, statements made within the scope of the

7
official's duties. Absolute immunity protects a public official from a
defamation suit because such suits are necessarily predicated on the
alleged falsity of the defendant's statements, which is the type of conduct
protected by absolute immunity. See Kieffer v. Atheists of Fla., Inc., 269
So. 3d 656, 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ("Clearly, a false statement about
another is a required element of defamation." (citing Cape Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Reakes, 840 So. 2d 277, 279–80 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003))). Several recorded
opinions clearly establish that absolute immunity also protects a public
official when a plaintiff "retool[s]" a defamation claim by recasting it as
another cause of action. See Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 525 ("We hold that
the defendants' writings and comments, for which they are immune from
suit for defamation, are likewise protected against a retooling of the claim
couched in terms of intentional infliction of emotional distress.");
Harrison, 382 So. 3d at 698 ("The privilege applies to other torts beyond
defamation, such as tortious interference and infliction of emotional
distress." (first citing City of Stuart v. Monds, 10 So. 3d 1134, 1134 (Fla.
4th DCA 2009); and then citing Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 196)); Prins v.
Farley, 208 So. 3d 1215, 1217–18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (granting
certiorari on the basis that absolute immunity applied because
"Respondent's complaint [w]as, in essence, a retooled defamation claim"
(citing Lock v. City of W. Welbourne, No. 6:12-cv-680, 2015 WL 1880732,
at *27 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2015))); Monds, 10 So. 3d at 1134 (concluding
the trial court's refusal to apply absolute immunity to claims for tortious
interference and negligent violation of a statute departed from the
essential requirements of the law and rejecting the argument "that the
doctrine of absolute immunity is inapplicable because of the absence of a
defamation claim"); Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 196 ("We further hold that
absolute immunity bars India's claim of intentional infliction of emotional

8
distress. This claim is simply a recast of the defamation claim; it too is
barred by the privilege." (citing Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 525)).
Thus, decisional authority clearly establishes that it is not the
specific type of cause of action against a public official that gives rise to
absolute immunity; rather, it is liability for statements made by a public
official within the scope of his or her duties that is precluded by the
immunity. Consequently, courts cannot determine the applicability of
the immunity in the abstract simply by identifying the specific cause of
action asserted; no type of cause of action against all public officials is
categorically barred by absolute immunity, but rather a specific type of
conduct is categorically protected by absolute immunity—statements
made in the scope of a public official's duties, requiring a case-by-case
examination of the public official's underlying conduct upon which the
cause of action is premised.
In this case, a review of Mr. and Mrs. Kinnan's fifth amended
complaint confirms that their malicious prosecution claims are premised
on allegedly false statements that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey made or
otherwise caused to be made about Mr. Kinnan. Malicious prosecution
occurs when the following elements have been established:
(1) an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding against the
present plaintiff was commenced or continued; (2) the present
defendant was the legal cause of the original proceeding
against the present plaintiff as the defendant in the original
proceeding; (3) the termination of the original proceeding
constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor
of the present plaintiff; (4) there was an absence of probable
cause for the original proceeding; (5) there was malice on the
part of the present defendant; and (6) the plaintiff suffered
damage as a result of the original proceeding.
Debrincat v. Fischer, 217 So. 3d 68, 70 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Alamo Rent-A-
Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Fla. 1994)). The Kinnans

9
allege that it was Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey who maliciously caused
the Department of Education to file its administrative complaint against
Mr. Kinnan. While they acknowledge that the Department of Education
found probable cause to file the complaint, they allege that "the 'probable
cause' that did exist was a fabrication" that "stemmed from false
allegations" in the materials Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey provided to the
Department of Education or "orchestrat[ed]" others to provide to the
Department of Education. So, according to Mr. and Mrs. Kinnan's
complaint, it is the falsity of the allegations made against Mr. Kinnan by
public officials that demonstrates the absence of probable cause for the
Department of Education's administrative complaint. Indeed, the
Kinnans' response brief in these certiorari proceedings succinctly sets
forth the theory "that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey intentionally and
maliciously submitted false complaints of misconduct against [Mr.
Kinnan] to the Florida Department of Education, which filed an
Administrative Complaint against Mr. Kinnan[] that was ultimately
dismissed." Their claims are therefore contingent on establishing that
the statements were false, demonstrating that they seek to hold Mr. Mills
and Mr. Pumphrey liable for the type of conduct protected by absolute
immunity. Cf. Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 525 ("The Geoghegans attempt to
salvage their emotional distress action by arguing that the defendants'
memorandum to police personnel, which serves as a partial basis for the
defamation claim, was 'intentionally drafted to deceive' those who read it,
setting it apart from the defamation claim. This argument emasculates
the notion of absolute immunity—letting survive a claim that the
offending speech or writing was intentionally designed to provoke a given
response, while protecting the tortfeasor from the substantive tort of
defamation itself."). Accordingly, under the circumstance of this case,

10
absolute immunity protects Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey from having to
defend the malicious prosecution claims—provided that their conduct
occurred within the scope of their respective duties.
B.
"The controlling factor in deciding whether the absolute privilege
applies is 'whether the communication was within the scope of the
officer's duties.' " Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 194 (quoting City of Miami v.
Wardlow, 403 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. 1981)). "The scope of an officer's
duties is to be liberally construed" and is "not confined to those things
required of the officer, but rather extends to all matters which he is
authorized to perform." Id. (citing Goetz v. Noble, 652 So. 2d 1203, 1205
(Fla. 4th DCA 1995)); see also Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 523 (reasoning
that "the scope of an official's duties extends beyond enumerated,
required tasks, and includes discretionary duties that are associated
with a given position" (citing Wardlow, 403 So. 2d at 416)). Conduct is
within the scope of the officer's duties "if it is the type of conduct which
the employee is hired to perform, the conduct occurs substantially within
the time and space limits authorized or required by the work to be
performed, and the conduct is activated at least in part by a purpose to
serve the employer." Alfino v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 676 So. 2d
447, 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (citing Craft v. John Sirounis & Sons, Inc.,
575 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)).
Here, the record conclusively demonstrates that Mr. Mills' and Mr.
Pumphrey's conduct was within the scope of their respective duties. Mr.
Pumphrey was hired as an OPS investigator. The School Board's
personnel manual authorized—and in fact required—OPS investigators to
"conduct investigations into alleged employee misconduct or other
matters concerning the school district and make recommendations as to

11
the disposition of such complaints or matters," as well as to "report
legally sufficient complaints concerning certificated employees" to the
Department of Education. As the superintendent, Mr. Mills had overall
responsibility for all school district employees. The superintendent's role
in the investigative process was to review OPS reports concerning alleged
employee misconduct, decide whether to send them to a disciplinary
review committee, and make the final decision regarding disciplinary
measures. Mr. Mills also had a statutory obligation to report certain
employee matters to the Department of Education. See § 1012.795(5)(b),
Fla. Stat. (2013) ("Each district school superintendent . . . shall report to
the department the name of any person certified pursuant to this chapter
. . . [w]ho that official has reason to believe has committed or is found to
have committed any act which would be a ground for revocation or
suspension [of an educator certificate] under subsection (1) . . . .");
§ 1012.796(1)(d) ("Each school district shall file in writing with the
department all legally sufficient complaints within 30 days after the date
on which subject matter of the complaint comes to the attention of the
school district."); see also § 1012.795(1)(j) (providing that the Education
Practices Commission may revoke or suspend an educator certificate if
the educator has "violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the
Education Profession prescribed by the State Board of Education rules").
The Kinnans argue that the conduct was outside the scope of Mr.
Mills' and Mr. Pumphrey's duties because it was "not taken in the
interest of the public good" but rather to serve their "political interests
and personal animosity" against Mr. Kinnan. But even presuming for the
sake of analysis that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey had such interests or
animosity—an issue this court need not and does not decide in this
proceeding—whether it was in the interest of the public good to

12
investigate Mr. Kinnan and report his alleged misconduct to the
Department of Education does not bear upon the question of whether
such conduct was within the scope of their duties.
The decisions have, indeed, always imposed as a limitation
upon the immunity that the official's act must have been
within the scope of his powers; and it can be argued that
official powers, since they exist only for the public good, never
cover occasions where the public good is not their aim, and
hence that to exercise a power dishonestly is necessarily to
overstep its bounds. A moment's reflection shows, however,
that that cannot be the meaning of the limitation without
defeating the whole doctrine. What is meant by saying that
the officer must be acting within his power cannot be more
than that the occasion must be such as would have justified
the act, if he had been using his power for any of the
purposes on whose account it was vested in him.
Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 572 (1959) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)); see also Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 195 ("The
fact that Cassell's statement may be viewed as having an unworthy or
non-public purpose does not destroy the privilege." (first citing Barr, 360
U.S. at 575; and then citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 591 cmt. d
(Am. L. Inst. 1977))). Evidence that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey acted
with personal or political motives at most speaks only to the manner or
appropriateness of how they carried out their duties, not whether those
were among their duties in the first place.
The Kinnans further argue that while Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey
were "authorized to make legally sufficient complaints to the Department
of Education, [they were] not authorized to make false or misleading
complaints," so if they "knew the complaints were false or misleading or
otherwise legally insufficient, then [they] certainly w[ere] acting outside
the scope of [their] employment." (Emphasis in original.) But this
argument (a tacit admission that the task of submitting complaints of

13
employee misconduct to the Department of Education was in fact within
the scope of their duties) conflates whether their conduct was tortious
with whether their conduct was within the scope of their duties.
Evidence that a public official knowingly makes a false statement about
another person may support the conclusion that the statement is
defamatory or otherwise tortious, but it does not inform the question of
whether that defamatory statement was or was not made within the
scope of the official's duties. In fact, the doctrine of absolute immunity
itself presupposes that a public official can defame someone within the
scope of his or her duties, demonstrating that the falsity of the statement
does not impact whether the statement was made within the scope of the
official's duties. See Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 522, 525 (granting
certiorari because absolute immunity protected a public official from suit
based on statements from public officials that "supposedly
misrepresented the results of the shooting review board"); Harrison, 382
So. 3d at 698 (referring to absolute immunity's application no matter
how "false, malicious, or badly motivated the words may be" (emphasis
added) (quoting Gay, 358 So. 3d at 786–87)); Gay, 358 So. 3d at 788
("[T]he landowners' allegations that the public official falsely and
repeatedly stated she had not engaged in ex parte communications
regarding the landowners' construction applications is not relevant to
whether those actions occurred in the scope of her duties as an IRC
member and as its chair." (emphasis omitted) (first citing Hauser v.
Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1970); and then citing Fridovich v.
Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 68 (Fla. 1992))); Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 192, 195
(concluding absolute immunity applied to alleged "false statements to
several individuals suggesting that India was fraudulently obtaining
workers' compensation benefits" because whether "Cassell

14
misrepresented his belief or suspicion of fraud as a fact or reported
India's impending arrest without any foundation does not change the fact
that he was acting within the scope of his authority"). A necessary
implication of the Kinnans' argument that the alleged tortious nature of
the statements—that they were "false or misleading"—is what takes the
conduct beyond the scope of the defendants' duties is the manifestly
unreasonable corollary that every instance of defamation would be
outside the scope of a public official's duties, meaning the doctrine of
absolute immunity would never apply.
Likewise, Mr. Mills' and Mr. Pumphrey's obligation to submit
"legally sufficient" complaints to the Department of Education does not
mean that the submission of a "legally insufficient" complaint is conduct
outside the scope of their duties. The salient conduct subsumed within
the scope of their duties was the submission of complaints concerning
employee misconduct to the Department of Education. The contrary
argument that whether the submission of complaints fell within their
duties depends on whether the complaints satisfied a standard of legal
sufficiency is meritless for two reasons.
First, the contention that Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey acted
beyond their duties by submitting legally insufficient complaints is based
on a faulty premise that legal sufficiency is determined by the veracity of
the allegations. "A complaint is legally sufficient if it contains ultimate
facts that show a violation has occurred as provided in s. 1012.795 and
defined by rule of the State Board of Education." § 1012.796(1)(d). Like
the pleading standard in civil litigation, the legal sufficiency of a
complaint sent to the Department of Education is evaluated by a review
of the ultimate facts contained within the complaint itself. Cf. Reyes ex
rel. Barcenas v. Roush, 99 So. 3d 586, 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (providing

15
that in evaluating legal sufficiency the court "was not allowed to
determine the veracity" of the complaint's allegations but only whether
they were "properly pleaded"). Whether a public official submits a
complaint that includes false or misleading allegations certainly bears on
the ultimate success of the complaint—that is, whether the educator
committed a violation—but it has no bearing on the complaint's legal
sufficiency. Indeed, the very determination of legal sufficiency typically
requires a presumption that the allegations are true. Cf., e.g., Williams
Island Ventures, LLC v. de la Mora, 246 So. 3d 471, 475 (Fla. 3d DCA
2018) (explaining that when determining the legal sufficiency of a civil
complaint, "a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true" and
"construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader"); Van v.
Unifund CCR, LLC, 154 So. 3d 522, 522 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ("In
determining the legal sufficiency of the motion [to disqualify the trial
judge], we must presume the facts alleged to be true."). Therefore, the
falsity of the statements in the complaints would not even make the
complaints legally insufficient, much less bring the act of preparing and
submitting the complaints outside the "ambit" of the defendants' duties.
See Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 523.
Additionally, even the legal sufficiency of a particular complaint has
no bearing on whether the public official's submission of the complaint
was within the scope of his or her duties. How competently or poorly a
public official performs a certain task has no bearing on whether that
task is one that is within the scope of his or her duties. "Conduct is
within the scope of one's employment if it is the type of conduct which
the employee is hired to perform," Alfino, 676 So. 2d at 449 (emphasis
added)—not if the conduct satisfies applicable performance standards.
The Kinnans have pointed to no authority supporting the proposition

16
that if the conduct is of the type a public official was hired to perform, it
nonetheless falls outside of the scope of the official's duties if the quality
of the official's performance falls short of a standard—such as legal
sufficiency—governing the fulfillment of the official's obligations, whether
that standard be informal or formally established by rule or statute. In
fact, such a formulation of the concept of the scope of duties is
incongruous with the broad language used by courts of this state to
describe that scope. See, e.g., Stephens, 702 So. 2d at 523 ("While the
defendants' respective job descriptions may not have required
participation in these proceedings, the Florida Supreme Court has
decided that the scope of an official's duties extends beyond enumerated,
required tasks, and includes discretionary duties that are associated
with a given position." (citing Wardlow, 403 So. 2d at 416)); Cameron v.
Jastremski, 246 So. 3d 385, 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) ("The term 'duties'
is not confined to those things required of the officer, but rather extends
to all matters which he is authorized to perform." (quoting Cassell, 964
So. 2d at 194)). If, under established Florida law, "the scope of an
official's duties extends beyond enumerated, required tasks," Stephens,
702 So. 2d at 523, it cannot be that a task explicitly enumerated as an
assigned duty nonetheless falls outside of the scope of duties simply
because it was performed in a manner that fell short of a standard for
the quality of its performance. Thus, even if the Kinnans could establish
that the complaints at issue were not "legally sufficient"—as opposed to
sufficiently pled but based on untruthful allegations—this would not
bring the act of submitting a complaint outside the scope of the duties of
the public officials seeking absolute immunity.

17
III.
The record before the trial court conclusively demonstrated that
Mr. Mills and Mr. Pumphrey were entitled to absolute immunity from the
Kinnans' malicious prosecution claims, and the trial court departed from
the essential requirements of law by denying them the immunity. See id.
at 525. We therefore grant their petitions for writ of certiorari and quash
the portion of the trial court's order that denied their motions for
summary judgment.
Petitions granted; order quashed in part.

NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs.
KHOUZAM, J., Concurs specially.

KHOUZAM, Judge, Concurring specially.
I join fully in the majority opinion. I write only to address the rule
limiting certiorari relief to cases where there has been a violation of a
clearly established principle of law. See Allstate Ins. v. Kaklamanos, 843
So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003) ("A district court should exercise its
discretion to grant certiorari review only when there has been a violation
of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of
justice." (citing Ivey v. Allstate Ins., 774 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 2000);
Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 528 (Fla. 1995)).
Although the existence of a clearly established law is a prerequisite
to certiorari relief, the mere fact that a case involves a narrow issue of
first impression does not necessarily preclude such relief where the legal
principle at issue is sufficiently clear. See, e.g., Orthopedic Ctr. of S. Fla.
v. Sode, 274 So. 3d 1127, 1128-29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (granting
certiorari with respect to "a matter of first impression" by applying

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principles from decades-old precedent); see also Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d
at 889-90 (A court "too narrowly interpret[s] what constitutes 'clearly
established law' for purposes of certiorari review" by denying relief due to
the mere absence of appellate cases on the same policy endorsement.).
Here, no one has identified any appellate cases on the application
of absolute immunity to malicious prosecution claims in this context.
But, the majority illustrates in section II that Florida law is already well
settled on the mechanics and scope of such immunity. I therefore believe
that the law is sufficiently clearly established in this regard. Cf. Ill. Union
Ins. v. McGinley, 50 Fla. L. Weekly D119, 2025 WL 21587 at *2 (Fla. 2d
DCA Jan. 3, 2025) (granting prohibition despite the absence of any
Florida decisions on the same question because "the resolution here is
merely a straightforward application of longstanding legal principles").

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10839412. Public record. Not legal advice.