# Neal v. Western Regional Jail

> District Court, S.D. West Virginia · April 3, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10839117

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. West Virginia
- **Decided:** April 3, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

HUNTINGTON DIVISION

CHARLES LEE NEAL, II,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-00494

WESTERN REGIONAL JAIL,
ADMINISTRATOR CARL ALDRIDGE,
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, KYLE
MOORE, SERGEANT TYLER DEWEESE,
STEVE TARBETT, GOVERNOR JIM
JUSTICE,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Pending before the Court are the following documents: an Application by Plaintiff
to Proceed without Prepayment of Fess or Costs, (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff’s Complaint, (ECF
No. 3), and numerous letter-form motions to expedite, for a hearing, and for witnesses,
(ECF Nos. 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20). For the reasons that follow, these motions are
DENIED. Plaintiff is further ORDERED to file, within sixty (60) days, a correct and
complete Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs or pay the $405
filing fee and to amend his Complaint as further described herein.
I. Relevant History
Plaintiff, Charles Lee Neal, II, is currently an inmate at Western Regional Jail and
Correctional Facility in Barboursville, West Virginia. On September 11, 2024, Plaintiff
filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff has also drafted numerous
handwritten letters as additional documentation in support of his complaint, (ECF Nos.
5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), and various letter form motions, (ECF Nos. 8, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20),
in which he repeatedly regurgitates the same “facts” and allegations. The named
defendants include Western Regional Jail, Administrator Carl Aldridge, State of West
Virginia, Kyle Moore, Sergeant Tyler Deweese, Steve Tarbett, and Governor Jim Justice.
The undersigned notes that Plaintiff simultaneously filed a separate § 1983 action

against Officer C.A. Varien, Officer Toler, Magistrate Steve Tarbett, Magistrate Melanie
Sang, Western Regional Jail Transportation, and Judge Richard Tatterson. Neal v. Officer
C. A. Varien, et. al., Case No. 3:24-cv-00493 (hereinafter the “Officer Varien matter”).
Plaintiff includes allegations for both matters (the Officer Varien matter and the present
matter against WRJ) in the documents filed in this case.
Relevant here, Plaintiff was arrested after a December 9, 2023, incident in Point
Pleasant, Mason County, by Sergeant Tyler Deweese. (ECF No. 11-1). The Criminal
Complaint alleges that Plaintiff stabbed his father, Charles Lee Neal, Sr., with a kitchen
steak knife, and Plaintiff’s father later succumbed to his injuries. (Id.). Plaintiff was
charged with murder under West Virginia Code 61-2-1. (Id.).
From a cursory review of the numerous handwritten documents, it appears that

Plaintiff is complaining about the criminal complaint and temporary commitment order
from this December 2023 arrest. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff asserts that Magistrate Tarbett
and Sergeant Deweese used an incorrect name and West Virginia Code section in an
arraignment order and criminal complaint, respectively. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that “Charles L. Neal, Jr.” and “Charles Lee Neal, Jr.” were used on the temporary
commitment jail order and criminal complaint, but Plaintiff’s name is Charles Lee Neal,
II. (Id.; See also ECF No. 7). He further complains that one document lists the date as 12-
9-2023 and the other lists it as 12-10-2023. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff also takes issue with
there being no time of arrival listed on the commitment order. (Id.). Lastly, Plaintiff
alleges that the listed West Virginia Code contains nine crimes and is an incorrect Code
for his case. (ECF Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7). Plaintiff provides no further facts or allegations on
concerning what protected civil right of his has been violated or how any official deprived
Plaintiff of those rights while acting under color of State law.

Similarly, concerning the other named Defendants, aside from listing their names
on page one of his complaint, (ECF No. 3 at 1), and then again listing their names in a
letter filed as an additional document in support of his Complaint, (ECF No. 10), Plaintiff
makes no allegations against Western Regional Jail, Administrator Carl Aldridge, State of
West Virginia, Kyle Moore, and Governor Jim Justice.
This matter is assigned to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers, United States
District Judge, and is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for
submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having performed an initial review of the complaint and the
numerous motions filed by Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned
finds certain deficiencies in pleading that must be corrected by Plaintiff before this action

can proceed.
II. Deficiencies in the In Forma Pauperis Application
In this district, an in forma pauperis application (or Application to Proceed
Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs) is not complete until the institution of
incarceration has completed the certificate located at the bottom of page 2 of the
Application, or the prisoner has submitted a transaction record of his inmate account. By
obtaining this certification or transactional record, the court can verify whether the
prisoner is entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.
Here, although Plaintiff completed the first portion of the application, the
Certificate at the bottom of page 2 has been crossed out with the signature line being left
blank, and Plaintiff failed to provide a copy of his transaction record of his inmate
account. It appears Plaintiff was housed at William R. Sharpe, Jr. Hospital at the time of
filing, but he has since been transferred to Western Regional Jail and Correctional

Facility. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1).
Therefore, the court ORDERS Plaintiff to fully complete, sign, and submit to the
court within sixty (60) days an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and
Costs that includes the completed Certificate at the bottom of page two. The form will be
provided to Plaintiff by the Clerk of Court. In the alternative, Plaintiff may pay the filing
fee of $405.
III. Deficiencies in the Complaint
As previously stated, in keeping with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the undersigned
preliminarily reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint to determine if the action is frivolous, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. Although pro se complaints, such as the one filed in this

case, must be liberally construed to allow the development of potentially meritorious
claims, the court may not rewrite the pleading to include claims that were never
presented, Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), develop the
plaintiff’s legal theories for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993),
or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court. Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). At the same time, to achieve justice, the
court may allow a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint in order to
correct deficiencies in the pleading. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978).
Pleading Requirements
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 sets forth the general rules of pleading. According
to Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for a
court’s jurisdiction … a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief … and a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the

alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The operative words here are
“short” and “plain.” An unnecessarily detailed and repeated recitation of seemingly
unrelated events renders a complaint unintelligible.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 addresses the form of pleadings. Rule 10
requires the complaint to name all of the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, parties must be individuals, not units or entities. Perrin v. Nicholson, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 105121, at *4 (D.S.C. 2010); American Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 50-52 (1999). Therefore, groups like “Western Regional Jail” and “State of West
Virginia” are not properly named defendants. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant a
specific person who, while acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a
federally protected civil right, privilege, or immunity. Id.

In addition to naming persons as parties, Plaintiff is required to state his claims in
numbered paragraphs, “each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Along that line of thought, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20
discusses the parties that may be joined as defendants in the same action. According to
Rule 20(a)(2), individuals may be joined as defendants in one action if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with the respect to or arising out of the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and
(B) any questions of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Here, Plaintiff simultaneously filed another § 1983 action, and
Plaintiff includes the “facts” and allegations from both actions in each letter form motion
and handwritten documentation filed in support of his Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff
must determine which claims are related and share common issues of law or fact and then
join those claims and defendants in one action and include only the relevant facts and
allegations for that specific matter. Allegations concerning the other matter must be
drafted and filed separately for that case.
Failure to State a Claim
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy to parties who are deprived of federally
protected civil rights by persons acting under color of any state “law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage.” To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege facts showing that: (1) an official deprived the plaintiff of a federally protected civil
right, privilege or immunity and (2) that the official did so under color of State law. 42
U.S.C. § 1983; see also Perrin v. Nicholson, C/A No. 9:10-1111-HFF-BM, 2010 WL
3893792 (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 2010). If either of these elements is missing, the complaint fails
to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For an official to be liable under § 1983,
it must be “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the
deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no
application under this section.” Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)
(quoting Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Md. 1971)). Accordingly, Plaintiff

must ensure that the people he names as Defendants in his suit are not joined simply
because of their position at the Jail or with the government, because if that is the case,
then they should be summarily dismissed from the lawsuit. In light of this governing
principle, Plaintiff must amend his complaint to set forth factual allegations explaining
how each Defendant personally violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Immunity
Although it is unclear what constitutional rights violations claims Plaintiff is

bringing against Magistrate Tarbett and Governor Jim Justice, Plaintiff is advised that his
claims against these defendants may be barred by immunity pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment, judicial immunity, and/or qualified immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Although the Eleventh Amendment refers only to suits
by citizens of other states, the United States Supreme Court has construed the
Amendment to “establish that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in
federal court by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.” Port. Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (2009) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)) (markings omitted). The immunity created
by the Amendment protects both the State, itself, and its agencies, divisions, departments,
officials, and other “arms of the State.” Taylor v. Ozmint, Case No. 0:10–50–HMH–PJG,
2011 WL 286133, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2011) (citing Will 491 U.S. at 70); see also Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1977) (“[I]t has long been settled that the
reference [in the Eleventh Amendment] to actions ‘against one of the United States’
encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but
also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”).
“The question of whether an agency or a state official is properly considered an
arm of the state and, therefore, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, is a question
of federal law.” Coonts v. Randolph Cty. Circuit Court Judge, No. 2:15-CV-21, 2015 WL
12791398, at *2 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 18, 2015) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Calif, v. Doe,
519 U.S. 425 (1997)). To determine whether an official is an arm of the state, the Fourth

Circuit applies a four-factor test, which considers “whether the state treasury will be
responsible for paying any judgment that might be awarded ... [W]hether the entity
exercises a significant decree of autonomy from the state, whether it is involved with local
versus statewide concerns, and how it is treated as a matter of State law.” Id. The inquiry
necessarily begins with the first factor because “the most important consideration is
whether the state treasury will be affected.” Id. (citations omitted). Importantly, “[t]he
Eleventh Amendment protects the State from the risk of adverse judgments even though
the State may be indemnified by a third party.” Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Calif, v.
Doe, 519 U.S. at 431).
In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court addressed circumstances under which
a State official was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, finding that not

all State officials qualified. Id., 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) The Court made a distinction
between officials acting in their official capacities and officials acting in their personal
capacities under color of state law. Id.; see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). The
Court concluded that an official sued in his official capacity was entitled to sovereign
immunity, while an official sued in his personal capacity was not. As the Court explained,
the real party in interest in an “official-capacity” suit is the governmental entity, rather
than the named official, and the target of the claim is the entity’s “policy or custom,” not
the individual official. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 166). “Personal-
capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a government
officer for actions taken under color of state law.” Id.
The determination of whether a defendant has been named in his official or
individual capacity is generally made by examining “the face of the complaint.” Amos v.
Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 609 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated

on other grounds by 524 U.S. 935 (1998). “[A] plaintiff need not plead expressly the
capacity in which he is suing a defendant in order to state a cause of action under § 1983.”
Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995). However, “[w]hen a plaintiff does not
allege capacity specifically, the court must examine the nature of the plaintiff's claims, the
relief sought, and the course of proceedings to determine whether a state official is being
sued in a personal capacity.” Id. at 61. In Foreman v. Griffith, the Fourth Circuit discussed
the significance of the factors outlined in Biggs:
With respect to assessing the nature of a plaintiff’s claim or claims, the
Biggs court stated that the plaintiff’s failure to allege that the defendant
acted in accordance with a governmental policy or custom or the lack of
indicia of such a policy or custom on the face of the complaint indicates that
a state actor has been sued in his individual capacity. With respect to the
nature of the relief sought, the Biggs court also stated that the plaintiff's
request for compensatory or punitive damages indicates an individual
capacity suit since such relief is unavailable in official capacity suits. Finally,
with respect to the course of proceedings, the Biggs court stated that the
defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity as a defense indicates an
individual capacity suit, since such a defense is only available in individual
capacity suits.

81 F. App’x 432, 435 (4th Cir. 2003). Ultimately, “the underlying inquiry remains whether
the [p]laintiff’s intention to hold a defendant personally liable can be ascertained fairly.”
Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61.
Turning to quasi-judicial and judicial immunity, it is well-settled that “judges are
absolutely immune from suit for a deprivation of civil rights brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983” even if such acts were allegedly done maliciously, corruptly, or in bad faith and no
matter “how erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences
[the judicial act] may have proved to the plaintiff.” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th
Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); Plotzker v. Lamberth, No. 3:08-cv-00027, 2008 WL
4706255, at *4 (W.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2008) (citations omitted). This long-standing common

law doctrine is “for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be
at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of
consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Judicial immunity ensures that
while a judge’s actions are “subject to correction on appeal or other authorized review,”
they do “not expose him to a claim for damages in a private action, or put him to the
trouble and expense of defending such an action.” Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir.
1985). “Magistrates are judicial officers, and are thus entitled to absolute immunity under
the same conditions as are judges.” Id.
Further, the “doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity applies to non-judicial officers
‘performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons
are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.’” Ward v. Plymale, No. 3:12-

cv-06186, 2013 WL 6164277, at *16 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 25, 2013) (quoting Bush v. Rauch,
38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Jackson v. Houck, 181 Fed. Appx. 372, 373 (4th
Cir. 2006) (“Absolute immunity applies to all acts of auxiliary court personnel that are
basic and integral parts of the judicial function.”) (internal quotations omitted). “The
doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been adopted and made applicable to
court support personnel such as [court] clerks because of the danger that disappointed
litigants, blocked by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suing the judge directly, will
vent their wrath on clerks, court reporters, and other judicial adjuncts.” Boyd v. KLLM
Transp. Servs. Inc., No. 3:10-3208-JFA-PJG, 2011 WL 8318383, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 8,
2011) (internal quotations omitted).
There are only two conditions in which judicial immunity does not apply to bar a §
1983 claim for damages: (1) if the judge acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” or
(2) the judge’s action was not a “judicial act.” King, 973 F.2d at 356-57. Under the first

option, “[a] distinction is drawn between acts that are performed in ‘excess of jurisdiction’
and those performed in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter,’ with
the former type of act accorded immunity.” Id. Therefore, the question is “whether at the
time [the judge] took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter
before him, and, in answering that question, the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be
construed broadly.” Id. at 357 (internal quotations and markings omitted). In
determining whether the act at issue was a “judicial act,” the Court examines “whether
the function is one normally performed by a judge, and whether the parties dealt with the
judge in his or her judicial capacity.” Id. Notably, “the absolute immunity extended to a
judge performing a judicial action is not in any way diminished even if his or her exercise
of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Id. Such “errors do

not render the act any less judicial, nor permit a determination that the court acted in the
absence of all jurisdiction.” Id.
Lastly, claims against Governor Jim Justice may be shielded by qualified
immunity. Government officials performing discretionary functions may be protected
from monetary damages under the doctrine of qualified immunity when “their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified
immunity “is a judicially created doctrine that stems from the conclusion that few
individuals will enter public service if such service entails the risk of personal liability for
one’s official decisions.” Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 1994).
This doctrine protects law enforcement officers in the exercise of their official duties from
the risk of personal liability for making “bad guesses in gray areas,” ensuring that they are
only responsible for “transgressing bright lines.” Marciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295,

298 (4th Cir. 1992). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Pearson v.
Callahan:
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to
hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly
and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably. The protection of qualified
immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is “a
mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of
law and fact.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S.
551, 567 (2004)). Because qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability,” it is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial.” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). “Where the defendant
seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings
so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
In determining the applicability of qualified immunity, the court must consider
two questions: (1) whether a constitutional or statutory right would have been violated on
the facts alleged by plaintiff, and (2) whether the right asserted was clearly established at
the time of the alleged violation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. These questions may be
answered in any order that “[would] best facilitate a fair and efficient disposition of each
case.” Id. at 242. If a court finds that a claimed constitutional right was not clearly
established at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, the court may dispose of the case
without engaging in the pointless exercise of determining whether the facts alleged
actually establish a violation of that right. Id. Similarly, if a court determines that the facts
alleged by the plaintiff do not support a reasonable inference that a constitutional right
was violated, the analysis terminates, and the Complaint is subject to dismissal for failure

to state a claim.
One Single Document
Finally, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff has filed numerous letters in support
of his Complaint, some of which raise new allegations or provide additional explanation.
Plaintiff is advised that he should include all allegations and facts relevant to his claims
in one singular Amended Complaint and refrain from filing additional documents
afterwards.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is ORDERED, within sixty (60) days of the
date of this Order, to file an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the proper
form, which will be provided by the Clerk of Court. The amended complaint shall include

the names of the individual defendants who, acting under color of state law, violated
Plaintiff’s federal civil or constitutional rights. To the extent known to Plaintiff, the
amended complaint shall include the addresses of the defendants. The amended
complaint shall contain short and plain statements, arranged in numbered paragraphs,
setting forth the basic facts upon which Plaintiff’s claims are based, including what
constitutional right the named defendant has violated, the dates of these occurrence, and
the actions of the named defendant that caused the violation. The amended complaint
may include claims and defendants that are connected by an event or series of events or
transactions and that share common issues of fact or law. Plaintiff is further advised to
either type or ensure his handwriting is legible in all future filings and reminded to include
only the allegations relevant to the subject case.
Further, if Plaintiff wishes to file more than one complaint, he should bear in mind
that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 governs actions in which a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma

pauperis. Section 1915(g) of the statute includes a “three strikes” rule, stating as follows:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a
civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action
or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds
that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical
injury.

Consequently, Plaintiff may wish to carefully review his prospective cases before he files
them to decide if they all meet the requirements of a § 1983 action. The amended
complaint shall not contain extraneous or unnecessary information or attachments. It
shall clearly and simply state the relief requested. Should Plaintiff, after review, decide he
no longer wishes to pursue his claims, he should file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal.
Plaintiff is hereby given notice that a failure to file the Application to
Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs and amend his complaint as
ordered may result in a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed for
failure to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or for failure
to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and L. R. Civ. P. 41.1.
IV. Other Motions
Turning to Plaintiff’s other motions, Plaintiff has filed seven letter-form motions,
requesting a “speedy trial,” a hearing or court date, to expedite, and for “the State to get
witnesses.” Because these motions concern the originally filed Complaint, these motions
are DENIED as MOOT.
Moreover, concerning Plaintiff’s motion for a speedy trial or to expedite, (ECF Nos.
8, 20), to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial, Plaintiff is hereby advised that the constitutional right to a speedy trial is applicable

only in criminal cases, and thus, Plaintiff has no constitutional right to a speedy trial in
this civil action. Construing Plaintiff’s motions as a motion to expedite instead, Plaintiff
is advised that civil actions are reviewed in the order in which they are filed, and Plaintiff
has failed to show good cause for expedited review.
Further, a hearing is not appropriate at this stage of the proceedings, and his
motions for such should be denied. (ECF Nos. 12, 16, 17, 19). As ordered herein, Plaintiff
is to file an amended complaint that legibly, succinctly, and completely describes the
allegations concerning the violation of his civil rights. He is also to either pay the filing fee
or file a complete and correct application to proceed without prepayment of costs.
Plaintiff’s motion for witnesses, (ECF No. 18), is also premature and inappropriate.
In his motion, Plaintiff claims, “it is of the importance for the State Representative of this

case to get witnesses and there [sic] names because I do not have the ability to do so and
it is up to the State and you, your Honor to do so.” Discovery has not yet been initiated in
this case, and even if it had started, the Court cannot compel the State to secure witnesses
on Plaintiff’s behalf, nor does the Court perform discovery tasks for any party to a civil
action. Rather, each party is obligated to conduct its own discovery. Furthermore,
assuming Plaintiff is filing a motion to compel, this type of motion is only appropriate
after discovery requests have been correctly served on a party, have not been timely or
completely answered, and a meet-and-confer session has failed to resolve the outstanding
issues. At some point, if discovery opens in this matter, Plaintiff will have to request
subpoenas from the Clerk of Court and will have to serve the non-parties with the
subpoenas.
Plaintiff is reminded of his obligation to notify the Clerk of Court of any changes in
his address.
The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to Plaintiff, along with an
Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs, a § 1983 complaint form,
instructions for filing the complaint, an Authorization for the Release of Institutional
Account Information and to Pay Fee, and the Explanation of Filing Fees.
ENTERED: April 3, 2025

(ts) J Oey K. Reeder
mt LO y United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10839117. Public record. Not legal advice.