# DEVON v. PHILADELPHIA INDUSTRIAL CORRECTIONAL CENTER (PICC)

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 2, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10838491

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 2, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10838491

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that probation officers “are entitled to absolute immunity when they are engaged in adjudicatory duties [while] [i]n their executive or administrative capacity, probation and parole officers are entitled only to a qualified, good faith immunity.”
- concluding that “both PASSHE and [West Chester University] are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and are thus not subject to suits for damages in federal court.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DEVON NEWTON, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-0913
:
PHILADELPHIA INDUSTRIAL :
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
Marston, J. April 2, 2025

Pro se Plaintiff Devon Newton brings this civil action against several individuals, private
entities, and city and state agencies.1 (Doc. No. 2.) Newton also seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court grants Newton’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his Complaint in part with prejudice and in part without
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

1 The named Defendants are: (1) Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center (“PICC”),
(2) Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (“CFCF”) (spelling corrected), (3) Riverside Correctional
Facility (“RCF”); (4) Detention Center (“DC”), (5) Family Courthouse of Philadelphia, Domestic
Relations Division, (6) the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (7) the New Jersey Superior Court, (8) the
New Jersey Supreme Court, (9) Jefferson Abington Hospital, (10) Adult Probation and Parole, (11) the
Philadelphia Marriage License Center, (12) the Commonwealth University of Pennsylvania,
(13) Philadelphia District Attorney, (14) Judge Charles Hayden, (15) Judge Robert P. Coleman,
(16) Judge Wendy L. Pew, (17) Judge Francis Shields, (18) Philadelphia Office of Judicial Records,
(19) Agent Andrea Guse, and (20) Special Agent James Owens. (Doc. No. 2 at 1–3.)
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
Newton’s allegations are difficult to follow and frequently incoherent. He states that the
events giving rise to his claims occurred on July 6, 2020, July 6, 2022, and August 9, 2025.3
(Doc. No. 2 at 4.) He alleges in part that:
My soul mate was nearly divided away from my vessel my life via
law school police academy class student, . . . and Philadelphia
parking authority Traffic Division. And my child also. Resulting
from Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Family Courthouse
Government officials and all Parties cooperatively cooperating to
seize my life away.

(Id.) Newton asserts that various law enforcement and legal actors “tried to keep [his] son and
son mom indirectly in their inconverted [sic] full custody,” which the Court liberally construes as
a reference to a custody proceeding in the Family Division of the Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas. (Id.) Newton also makes a cryptic reference to a “cooperative State Road operation or
Muslim medical staff of law [that] got [him] locked up.” (Id.) He appears to allege that
unspecified parties copied the “identity, identification, ID & DNA” of the mother of his child,
creating an “imposter replica imitator actress” in violation of her constitutional rights. (Id. at 8.)
In addition, he claims he was subjected to the use of pepper spray that affected his skin and eyes,
and he mentions “short term birth defects of shaken baby syndrome and being born blind.” (Id.
at 7.) Liberally construed, this appears to reference an excessive use of force incident involving
pepper spray, but Newton fails to identify any named Defendant as involved in the incident.

2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from the Complaint (Doc.
No. 2), which consists of the Court’s preprinted form available for prisoners to file civil rights claims as
well as handwritten pages. The Court adopts the sequential pagination supplied by the CM/ECF
docketing system to the entire submission. Punctuation, spelling, and capitalization errors in the
Complaint have been cleaned up.
3 Part of the incoherence of Newton’s allegations are his use of dates. As of the date of this
Order, August 9, 2025 remains several months in the future. It is also unclear whether the two July 6th
dates represent events that occurred in different years.
Finally, Newton’s Complaint includes other seemingly disjointed references to video
surveillance, Miranda rights, the Department of Corrections, and the Bible. (Id. at 4–6.)
As relief for his claims, Newton seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief including:
(1) expungement of his criminal records, (2) abolishment of “The Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania Muslim Co-operative Operation of Incarcerating Non-Muslims,” (3) termination of
his probation in Commonwealth vs. Newton, No. CP-51-CR-0005064-2022, (4) placement of the
“Criminal Justice Center Courthouse and Family Court in Foreclosure,” (5) an award of $18
million; and (6) other forms of relief the Court is unable to decipher. (Id.)
II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Because Newton is unable to pay the filing fee in this matter, the Court grants him leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (stating that the Court may authorize the
commencement of a lawsuit “without prepayment of fees or security” upon a showing that a
litigant is “unable to pay such fees or give security therefor”).
III. SCREENING UNDER § 1915(E)
Because the Court grants Newton leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state “a claim on
which relief may be granted.” See id. (“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof,
that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that—the action or appeal fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”).
A. Legal Standard
In analyzing a complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court uses the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher
v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). So, the Court must determine whether
Newton’s Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks
omitted). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Id. However, because Newton is proceeding
pro se, the Court liberally construes the allegations in his Complaint. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655
F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings is

well-established.”).
B. Analysis
The exact nature of Newton’s claims is unclear, but he names governmental officials and
entities as Defendants and appears to allege his civil rights were violated. Accordingly, the
Court understands him to be asserting constitutional violations. The vehicle by which federal
constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
see also Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F .3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The color of
state law element is a threshold issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under

color of law.”). For clarity, the Court groups Newton’s claims—which are largely incoherent
and brought against 20 defendants—into related categories and addresses each category in turn.
1. Claims Asserted on Behalf of Others
First, Newton appears to allege claims on behalf of his son and the son’s mother. Under
28 U.S.C. § 1654, parties “may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel” in
the federal courts. Section 1654 thus ensures that a person may conduct his or her own case pro
se or retain counsel to do so. See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir.
1991) (“The statutory right to proceed pro se reflects a respect for the choice of an individual
citizen to plead his or her own cause.” (quoting Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo,
Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990)). Although an individual may represent himself pro se, a
non-attorney may not represent other parties in federal court. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of
Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The rule that a non-lawyer may not represent another
person in court is a venerable common law rule.”), abrogated on other grounds by Winkelman ex

rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). Thus, to the extent Newton is
asserting claims on behalf of his son and his son’s mother, those claims cannot proceed and are
dismissed. These claims are, however, dismissed without prejudice to the rights of those
individuals to bring these claims in their own right.
2. Claims for Injunctive Relief
Newton brings claims for injunctive relief, seeking an order for: (1) expungement of his criminal
records, (2) abolishment of “The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Muslim Co-operative Operation of
Incarcerating Non-Muslims,” (3) termination of his probation in Commonwealth vs. Newton, No. CP-51-
CR-0005064-2022, and (4) placement of the “Criminal Justice Center Courthouse and Family Court in
Foreclosure.” (Doc. No. 2 at 4–6.) Through these requests, Newton appears to seek an order that
terminates or otherwise effects his state criminal and domestic actions. This type of relief is not available
through a § 1983 action. See, e.g., Glavin v. Pennsylvania, 2024 WL 4338660, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,
2024) (“Glavin seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order terminating her supervised probation . . .
and the expungement of her convictions. . . . This is not the type of relief that can be granted on a § 1983
claim.”); see also Johnson v. Valdez, No. 13-2173, 2013 WL 5489957, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2013)
(“Expungement is not the type of relief available under § 1983, because the right to expunge state records
is not a federal constitutional right.”). Accordingly, Newton’s claims for injunctive relief are dismissed
with prejudice.
3. Claims Against Prisons
Next, Newton names four prisons—PICC, RCF, CFCF, and DC—as Defendants. (Doc.
No. 2 at 1.) The § 1983 claims against these Defendants are dismissed with prejudice because a
prison is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983. Cephas v. George W. Hill Corr.
Facility, No. 09-6014, 2010 WL 2854149, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010); Miller v. Curran-
Fromhold Corr. Facility, No. 13-7680, 2014 WL 4055846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (citing
Mitchell v. Chester Cnty. Farms Prison, 426 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).

4. Claims Against the Commonwealth, Its Entities, and New Jersey State
Courts
Newton also names as Defendants the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the “Family
Courthouse of Philadelphia Domestic Relations Division” (which the Court construes as a
reference to the Family Division of the Court of Common Pleas),4 “Adult Probation and Parole”
(which the Court construes as a reference to the Philadelphia County Adult Probation and Parole
Department (“PAPPD”)),5 the Philadelphia Office of Judicial Records (“OJR”),6 the
Commonwealth University of Pennsylvania (“CUP”),7 the New Jersey Superior Court, and the
New Jersey Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 2 at 1.) Newton’s § 1983 claims against these entities

4 Alternatively, to the extent Newton intended to sue the courthouse itself, it is well-established
that federal civil rights claims against a courthouse are not cognizable under § 1983, which permits suit
only against a “person.”. See Elansari v. United States, No. 15-01461, 2016 WL 4415012, at *5 n.9
(M.D. Pa. July 11, 2016); Devenshire v. Kwidis, No. 15-1026, 2016 WL 4032881, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June
28, 2016); Robinson v. Mercer Cnty. Courthouse, No. 12-4114, 2012 WL 4662967, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 1,
2012); Bucano v. Sibum, No. 12-0606, 2012 WL 2395553, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2012).
5 The PAPPD is a department of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia
County, which is in turn part of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. See
https://www.courts.phila.gov/common-pleas/trial/criminal/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2025).
6 The OJR is a Department of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. See
http://courts.phila.gov/departments/ojr/ (last viewed: March 13, 2025.)
7 According to its website, “Commonwealth University of Pennsylvania was officially formed on
July 1, 2022 when Bloomsburg University, Lock Haven University, and Mansfield University integrated
as a single, comprehensive university with multiple campuses to expand high-quality, affordable
academic opportunities to support the needs of all learners.” See
http://www.commonwealthu.edu/about/history (last viewed: March 13, 2025). CUP now also includes
Clearfield University. All four campuses are entities within the Pennsylvania State System of Higher
Education, sometimes referred to as “PASSHE.” See https://www.passhe.edu/universities/index.html
(last viewed: March 13, 2025.) The address of CUP’s Bloomsburg campus matches the address provided
by Newton.
fail because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court
that seek monetary damages. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99–
100 (1984); A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003).
The Family Division, OJR, and PAPPD—as subdivisions of the Philadelphia Court of

Common Pleas—are all arms of the Commonwealth and share in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).
CUP, as a multicampus university within the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education, is
likewise an arm of the Commonwealth. See, e.g., Bradley v. W. Chester Univ. of Pa. State Sys.
of Higher Educ., 880 F.3d 643, 654 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding that “both PASSHE and [West
Chester University] are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and are thus not subject to
suits for damages in federal court.”); Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 955 F. Supp. 2d 390, 399
(M.D. Pa. 2013) (“Bloomsburg, as a state university organized under the Pennsylvania State
System of Higher Education . . . is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). As the
Commonwealth has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and because states are not

“persons” as that term is used in § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-
66 (1989), Newton’s claims for monetary damages against the Commonwealth and its entities
are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Newton’s claims against the New Jersey Superior Court and New Jersey Supreme Court
are also barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Like Pennsylvania, in New Jersey, “the state
judiciary is an integral part of the state and, consequently, all claims against [courts within that
system] are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Gencarelli v. Superior Ct. of New Jersey, No.
04-3332, 2005 WL 1490590, at *3 (D.N.J. June 22, 2005) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, Newton’s claims against the two New Jersey courts are also dismissed
with prejudice.
5. Claims Against Individual Judges, the District Attorney, Agent Guse,
and Special Agent Owens
Newton names as Defendants numerous individuals who are not discussed anywhere in
the Complaint, nor does the Complaint describe actions that could reasonably be attributed to
those Defendants. These include Judges Charles Hayden, Robert P. Coleman, Wendy L. Pew,
and Francis Shields; the Philadelphia District Attorney; Agent Andrea Guse; and Special Agent
James Owens. (Doc. No. 2 at 2–3.) “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207

(3d Cir. 1988); see also Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal
involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)). Because Newton does not allege any actions
by these individuals that violated his rights, his claims against them are not plausible.
In addition, Newton’s claims as to each of these individuals seem poised to fail as they
are all likely entitled to immunity. First, as to his claims against Judges Hayden, Coleman, Pew
and Shields, to the extent Newton’s claims are based on these Defendants exercising their
judicial functions, those claims are barred by judicial immunity. Judges are entitled to absolute
immunity from civil rights claims that are based on acts or omissions taken in their judicial
capacity, so long as they do not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012);
Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006). An act is taken in a judge’s judicial
capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211
F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). And “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a court has some subject matter
jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208
F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir.
1997)). Thus, to the extent Newton’s claims against Judges Hayden, Coleman, Pew, and Shields
are based on actions they took in their judicial capacities, those claims are subject to dismissal

with prejudice.
Second, and similarly, prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under
§ 1983 for acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”
such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). Thus, to the extent Newton seeks to assert a claim against the
Philadelphia District Attorney based on actions involving his prosecution of a criminal case
against Newton, the claim is barred by absolute immunity and also is not plausible.
Third, the address that Newton lists for Agent Guse and Special Agent Owens
corresponds to the Philadelphia District Office of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole (“PBPP”). (Doc. No. 2 at 3.) The Court thus presumes that they are PBPP employees.

Like judges and prosecutors, probation and parole officers are generally entitled to some degree
of immunity when carrying out their adjudicatory or administrative duties. See Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that probation officers “are entitled to
absolute immunity when they are engaged in adjudicatory duties [while] [i]n their executive or
administrative capacity, probation and parole officers are entitled only to a qualified, good faith
immunity.”). Thus, to the extent Newton alleges claims against Guse and Owens based on acts
taken in performance of their duties as probation or parole officers, those claims may also be
barred by immunity.
In sum, Newton’s claims against Judges Charles Hayden, Robert P. Coleman, Wendy L.
Pew, and Francis Shields; the Philadelphia District Attorney; Agent Andrea Guse; and Special
Agent James Owens are dismissed. This dismissal is without prejudice to Newton’s right to file
an amended complaint that explains how each Defendant purportedly violated Newton’s

constitutional rights. If Newton files an amended complaint, he should ensure his claims do not
trigger the immunities discussed above.
6. Claim Against City of Philadelphia Marriage License Center
Next, Newton names as a Defendant the “Philadelphia Marriage License Center,” which
the Court construes as stating claims against the City’s Marriage License Department. City
agencies are not suable entities under § 1983 because they do not have a separate legal existence
from the City of Philadelphia. See Vurimindi v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-88, 2010 WL
3169610, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2010) (holding that under 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 16257, “no such
department shall be taken to have had . . . a separate corporate existence, and hereafter all suits
growing out of their transaction . . . shall be in the name of the City of Philadelphia”); Vangjeli v.
City of Philadelphia, No. 15-1566, 2015 WL 5793926, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2015), aff’d, 655

F. App’x 132 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding the Free Library is not an entity subject to suit since no
department or agency of the City of Philadelphia has a separate corporate existence (citing 53 Pa.
C.S.A. § 16257)). Accordingly, Newton’s claims against the Philadelphia Marriage License
Department are not plausible and are dismissed.
7. Claims Against Jefferson Abington Hospital
Last, Newton sues Jefferson Abington Hospital (“JAH”). (Doc. No. 2 at 1.) Newton
does not allege how JAH violated his civil rights. Further, JAH appears to be a private entity
rather than a “state actor” subject to liability under § 1983.8 Whether a defendant is acting under
color of state law—i.e., whether the defendant is a state actor—depends on whether there is
“such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir.

2005) (internal quotations omitted). “To answer that question, [the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has] outlined three broad tests generated by Supreme Court
jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists: (1) whether the private entity has
exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the
private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state
has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646
(3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). “Action taken by private entities with
the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999). Rather, to support a finding of state action, “the government

must be ‘responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’” Borrell v.
Bloomsburg Univ., 870 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1004 (1982)).
Courts in this Circuit and other circuits consistently hold that private health care
companies, like JAH, are generally not state actors. See Pa. Informed Consent Advocs. Inc. v.

8 According to the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s website, JAH is a fictitious name under
which Abington Memorial Hospital operates. See https://file.dos.pa.gov/search/business (last visited Mar.
19, 2025). Abington Memorial Hospital is a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation. See
https://file.dos.pa.gov/search/business (last viewed March 13, 2025). The Court may consider matters of
public record when conducting a screening under § 1915. Castro-Mota v. Smithson, No. 20-940, 2020
WL 3104775, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2020) (citing Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260
(3d Cir. 2006)).
Univ. of Pa. Health Sys., No. 21-4415, 2022 WL 2316648, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2022)
(“Private hospitals, no matter how much federal funding they may receive, are generally not state
actors for purposes of constitutional questions.” (quoting Beckerich v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr.,
2021 WL 4398027, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 24, 2021))); see also Hall v. Horizon House, 414 F.

Supp. 3d 720, 722 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (collecting cases showing medical facilities are not made state
actors by receipt of government funding or imposition of government licensing and regulation).
And here, the Complaint does not allege any facts pertaining to the conduct of JAH that would
indicate it was a state actor under the three tests outlined by the Third Circuit. Accordingly, the
claims against JAH are also dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court dismisses Newton’s Complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Any claims brought by Newton on behalf of
others are dismissed without prejudice in light of Newton’s pro se status. The claims brought
against Judges Charles Hayden, Robert P. Coleman, Wendy L. Pew, and Francis Shields; the
Philadelphia District Attorney; Agent Andrea Guse; Special Agent James Owens; and JAH are

dismissed without prejudice. The claims brought against the remaining Defendants, along with
Newton’s request for injunctive relief, are dismissed with prejudice. Having dismissed the
Complaint at this stage, Newton’s “Motion to Quash” will be denied as moot. An appropriate
Order follows.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10838491. Public record. Not legal advice.