# Goss v. Warden Greene

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · April 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10837680

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD GOSS, : No. 3:24-CV-1133
Petitioner :
: (Judge Munley)
V. :
WARDEN GREENE, :
Respondent :

MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Ronald Goss filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while confined at the Federal Correctional
Institution, Allenwood Low, in White Deer, Pennsylvania. He alleges that the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has failed to properly apply time credits he has
earned under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA), Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194
(2018), toward time in prerelease custody, in violation of the plain language of
the Act. After careful consideration, the court is constrained to hold that Goss’s
prerelease custody claim is not cognizable on habeas review, so his Section
2241 petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. Goss is currently serving a
156-month sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania for a controlled substance offense. (Doc. 10-2 □ 3). He

is also serving a concurrent state sentence of 7 to 14 years’ incarceration for
aggravated assault. (See Doc. 10-5 at 3 J 7; Doc. 10-8 at 2).
Goss’s projected statutory release date for his federal sentence, applying
only good conduct time, is August 12, 2026. (See Doc. 10-3 at 2, 3). Goss is no
eligible for prerelease benefits under the Second Chance Act of 2007 (SCA),
Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008), because of his existing state detainer
(See Doc. 10-8 at 2, 3).
Goss Is eligible, however, to earn and receive the benefit of FSA time
credits. (See Doc. 10-3 at 3). As of June 29, 2024 (the latest calculation
provided to the court), Goss had earned 365 FSA time credits toward early
release and an additional 610 FSA time credits toward time in prerelease custod\
either at a Residential Reentry Center (RRC) or on home confinement. (See
Doc. 10-7 at 2); 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2). The BOP has applied 365 FSA credits
toward early release, advancing Goss’s statutory release date one year and
creating a projected FSA release date of August 12, 2025. (See Doc. 10-3 at 3).
The dispute in the instant petition involves application toward time in
prerelease custody of Goss’s remaining 610 FSA credits, hereinafter referred to
as “excess” credits. Goss maintains that he is statutorily eligible for application o
these excess credits and that the plain language of the FSA requires the BOP to
apply all excess credits toward time in prerelease custody. According to Goss,

and as confirmed by the BOP, application of these credits would have resulted in

his transfer to prerelease custody at least as early as March 2024. (See Doc. 10:
5 J 6; Doc. 10-8 at 2).
Goss, however, was not transferred to prerelease custody at that time. It

appears that the BOP denied his placement in prerelease custody based on the
existence of his state detainer. (See Doc. 10 at 16; Doc. 10-5 8). Then, on
September 10, 2024, while the instant Section 2241 petition was pending, Goss

was transferred to the custody of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3623 to serve the remainder of his federal sentence in state
custody. (See Doc. 14-5 at 2-3 (citing BOP Program Statement 5140.35,
“Transfer of a Prisoner to State Custody Prior to Release from the Federal
Sentence”); Doc. 14-2 J 3). According to Respondent, “there are no plans for his
return to federal custody.” (Doc. 14 at 3 (quoting Doc. 14-2 {J 4)).
Following Goss’s transfer to state custody, Respondent initially asserted
that Goss was no longer “in custody” for federal habeas purposes. (See Doc. 14
at 4). When pressed on the accuracy of this position, Respondent conceded that
Goss was still serving the remainder of his federal sentence in state custody and
therefore was “in custody” for purposes of Section 2241. (See Doc 21 at 1).
Respondent, however, continues to oppose Goss’s habeas petition. After
supplemental briefing, that petition is ripe for review.

ll. DISCUSSION
Goss’s argument is straightforward. He maintains that (1) he is statutorily
eligible—under the prerequisites set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)—for application
of the FSA time credits that he has earned by successfully participating in FSA
programming; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C) requires the BOP to apply his

excess credits to time in prerelease custody; and (3) the agency’s failure to do sc
violates the First Step Act. Goss also correctly points out that the existence of a
state detainer does not preclude an inmate from earning FSA time credits or
having those credits applied toward time in prerelease custody. (See Doc. 11 at
2-3 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Change Notice to
Program Statement 5410.01, First Step Act of 2018 — Time Credits: Procedures
for Implementation of 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4) (Feb. 6, 2023 & Mar. 10, 2023),
https:/Awww.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5410.10_cn2.pdf) (last visited Apr. 1,
2025))).
Respondent first asserts that Goss’s petition should be dismissed because
he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent next argues that
Goss’s petition is not judicially reviewable—or alternatively should be denied on
the merits—because Goss has no right or entitlement to a particular amount of
time in prerelease custody and the BOP has exclusive discretion regarding
designation of place of confinement.

Because Goss’s petition involves an issue of purely statutory construction,
administrative exhaustion is excused. See Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431,
433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050,
1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). The court, however, cannot reach the merits of Goss's

FSA prerelease custody claim. That is because such a claim, which involves the

execution of his sentence, is not cognizable on habeas review in this circuit.

Thus, the court must dismiss his habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction.
The core of habeas corpus primarily involves a challenge to the fact or
duration of confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88, 500
(1973). In Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that—in addition to
the fact or duration of confinement—a prisoner may also challenge the
“execution” of their sentence via a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See id. at
241-44. In Woodall, the petitioner asserted a challenge to BOP regulations that
affected whether he served a portion of his sentence in a federal penal institutior

or in a “Community Corrections Center” (CCC).' See id. at 237.

The term “Community Corrections Center” is the precursor to what is now referred to by th
BOP as a “Residential Reentry Center,” sometimes colloquially called a halfway house. Se
Brown _v. Warden Fairton FCI, 617 F. App’x 117, 118 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam
(nonprecedential) (‘In 2006, the BOP began referring to ‘Community Corrections Centers’ a
‘Residential Reentry Centers’ (‘RRCs’)[.]”).

The Third Circuit agreed with the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits

and held that habeas jurisdiction lies for prisoners challenging the “manner of

their imprisonment,” including the place of confinement, when the differences in

custody reflect more than a “simple” or “garden variety” prison transfer. See
Woodall, 432 F.3d at 242-43. The panel highlighted the significant disparities
between carrying out a sentence in a CCC and carrying out a sentence in an
ordinary penal institution and concluded that the petitioner's claim was a “proper
challenge to the ‘execution’ of his sentence,” and thus “habeas jurisdiction lies.”
Id. at 243-44.
Following Woodall, confusion arose as to what exactly “execution of the
sentence” meant for a habeas petitioner. Even the Woodall panel conceded that
the precise meaning of this phrase is “hazy.” Id. at 242.
In Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012), the court of appeals
endeavored to clarify execution-of-sentence habeas challenges in the Third
Circuit. The Cardona panel first performed an in-depth review of Woodall and
McGee y. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 2010), precedential decisions that had
considered execution-of-sentence habeas claims and had determined that the
claims presented were cognizable under Section 2241. See Cardona, 681 F.3d
at 536-37.

From these decisions, the Cardona panel distilled that the linchpin for

habeas jurisdiction for an execution-of-sentence claim was whether the □□□□□□□□□□

was challenging the “carrying out” or “put[ting] into effect” of their sentencing
order. See id. The reason the petitioners in Woodall and McGee could seek
review of the execution of their sentences under Section 2241, the court of
appeals explained, was because their petitions “both challenged BOP conduct
that conflicted with express statements in the applicable sentencing judgment.”
Id. at 536. The Cardona panel thus held that “[i]n order to challenge the
execution of [a] sentence under § 2241, [a petitioner] would need to allege that
[the] BOP’s conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or
recommendation in the sentencing judgment.” Id. at 537. In that case, the
petitioner had not made such an allegation, so the panel found that he was not
properly challenging the “execution” of his sentence and therefore the district
court had no jurisdiction to consider his Section 2241 petition. See id. at 537,
538.
The same is true for Goss’s petition. Goss has not alleged, let alone
established, that the BOP’s conduct is somehow inconsistent with an express
command or recommendation in his sentencing judgment. Indeed, there is
nothing in Goss’s sentencing judgment discussing or even alluding to prerelease
custody. See United States v. Goss, No. 1:14-cr-00016, Doc. 57 (M.D. Pa. Apr.

27, 2015). Accordingly, his petition does not properly challenge the “execution”

of his sentence as defined by Cardona v. Bledsoe, so this court has no
jurisdiction to consider his habeas claim. See Cardona, 681 F.3d at 537, 538.
The court is aware that case law within this circuit undoubtedly creates
confusion as to jurisdiction for Section 2241 execution-of-sentence claims
challenging prerelease custody placement. Most notably, in Vasquez v. Strada,
684 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)—a precedential decision issued just 18
days before Cardona v. Bledsoe—the Third Circuit plainly stated that a prisoner
“may resort to federal habeas corpus to challenge a decision to limit his RRC
placement.” Vasquez, 684 F.3d at 433 (citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243-44). In
Vasquez, the petitioner was not asserting that a BOP action was inconsistent
with a command or recommendation in his sentencing judgment; rather, he
claimed that the BOP had failed to comply with the federal prisoner reentry
initiative with respect to RRC placement and that the BOP had improperly
amended 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) by adding a sixth factor. See id. Nevertheless,
the court of appeals did not find that the Section 2241 petition must be dismissec
for lack of jurisdiction based on the substance of the petitioner's habeas claim.

Instead, the panel perfunctorily found the petitioner's prerelease custody claim tc

be cognizable. See id. (citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243-44)?
Additionally, multiple nonprecedential Third Circuit decisions have stated

that challenges to the execution of a sentence involving placement in prerelease
custody are cognizable under Section 2241. See Brown v. Warden Fairton FCI,
617 F. App’x 117, 118 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (nonprecedential) (“Brown's
challenge to the BOP’s failure to transfer him to an RRC lies under § 2241[.]’
(citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243-44)); Wilson y. Strada, 474 F. App’x 46, 48 (3d
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (nonprecedential) (“Wilson may resort to federal habeas

corpus to challenge a decision to limit his RRC placement[.]"(citing Woodall, 432
F.3d at 243-44)): Guess v. Werlinger, 421 F. App’x 215, 217 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (nonprecedential) (finding that habeaas jurisdiction lies for challenge to
BOP policy involving prerelease custody placement, concluding that petitioner's
challenge “implicates the execution of his sentence” (citing Woodall, 432 F.3d at
243)). None of these cases involved an allegation that the BOP’s conduct was

2 Vasquez v. Strada was initially issued on June 1, 2012, as a nonprecedential decision. Se
Vasquez, No. 12-1114, Doc. 003110916790 (3d Cir. June 1, 2012). Four days later, th
government (appellee) moved to designate the decision as precedential under Third Circu
1.O.P. 5.2. See id., Doc. 003110919478 (3d Cir. June 5, 2012). That motion was granted o
June 20, 2012, when the opinion was designated as a precedential opinion by the circuit. Se
id., Doc. 003110933704 (3d Cir. June 20, 2012). It does not appear that the government eve
raised a jurisdictional challenge (other than failure to exhaust administrative remedies) t
Vasquez’s petition with the district court or the court of appeals. See generally Vasquez \
Strada, No. 3:11-cv-01710, Doc. 8 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2011).

inconsistent with a sentencing command or recommendation, even Brown v.
Warden Fairton FCI, which opinion issued three years after Cardona v. Bledsoe

was decided. See Brown, 617 F. App’x at 118 (claiming failure to transfer to
prerelease custody pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)); Wilson, 474 F. App’x at 47
| (raising challenge to BOP’s application of Second Chance Act with respect to
length of petitioner’s RRC placement); Guess, 421 F. App’x at 217 (challenging
validity of BOP policy regarding timing of prerelease custody review). Yet the
court of appeals did not find jurisdiction lacking for these petitions based on the
substance of the petitioners’ claims.
There are, on the other hand, numerous nonprecedential Third Circuit
decisions that rely on Cardona v. Bledsoe to find a lack of jurisdiction for certain
Section 2241 execution-of-sentence claims, although the court has been unable
to locate such a decision that specifically concerns transfer to prerelease
| custody. See, e.g., Morgan v. Warden of USP-Allenwood, No. 24-1508, 2025
WL 325753, at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2025) (nonprecedential); Reynolds v. Warden
| Schuylkill FCI, No. 24-1942, 2024 WL 4164271, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 12, 2024)
(nonprecedential); Moslem v. Warden, F.C.I. Fort Dix, No. 23-2819, 2024 WL
| 658976, at *1-2 (3d Cir. Feb. 16, 2024) (nonprecedential); Johnson v. Warden
Lewisburg USP, 694 F. App’x 59, 59-60 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential);
| Johnson v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 668 F. App’x 415, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2016)
10

(nonprecedential); Rinaldi v. Warden Allenwood FC!, 598 F. App’x 809, 809-10
(3d Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential); Gillette v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 563 F.
App’x 191, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential); Share v. Krueger, 553 F.
App’x 207, 209 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential); Cardona v. Thompson, 551 F.

App’x 630, 632 (3d Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential); Shelton v. Thomas, 537 F.
App’x 63, 63-64 (3d Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential); Shelton v. Samuels, 523 F.
App’x 177, 177 (3d Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential). In one case, the petitioner was
challenging his confinement on home detention, but the court of appeals
explained that a period of home detention was expressly ordered in his judgment
of sentence and therefore he was actually challenging the “validity of [his]
judgment, not its execution.” See Kaetz v. United States, No. 22-1286, 2022 WL
1486775, at *1-2 (3d Cir. May 11, 2022) (nonprecedential).
In light of the seemingly contradictory nature of the foregoing precedential
and nonprecedential decisions, it is understandable why a pro se petitioner like
Goss would attempt to seek relief through Section 2241 for his prerelease
custody claim. After all, neither Cardona v. Bledsoe nor its nonprecedential
progeny confronted the type of issue presented here: the right to be transferred
from a federal correctional institution to prerelease custody based on mandatory
language contained in a federal statute.

11

Nevertheless, this court is bound by Cardona’s jurisdictional requirements
or Section 2241 petitions. Cardona is the latest precedential decision to fully

| consider and delineate the jurisdictional boundaries of execution-of-sentence
claims raised in Section 2241 petitions in this circuit. Under Cardona’s rigid

boundaries, Goss’s habeas petition is simply not cognizable. The court offers nc
opinion regarding the availability of other potential avenues of review for Goss’s

| First Step Act claim involving prerelease custody, only that it cannot be pursued
through a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
CONCLUSION
Under Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012), execution-of-

| sentence habeas claims in the Third Circuit are tightly circumscribed. Goss’s
Section 2241 petition, which challenges the BOP’s failure to timely transfer him t
: prerelease custody based on the First Step Act—but does not allege that the
BOP’s conduct is somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in
| his sentencing judgment—fails to meet the stringent jurisdictional requirements
set forth ir Cardona. Accordingly, Goss’s Section 2241 petition must be
dismissed fof lack of jurisdiction. An appropriate Order follows.
Date: HY bs. C75 OURT:

JUDGEULIA K. MUNL
United States District Court

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10837680. Public record. Not legal advice.