# Coleman v. Illinois Department of Corrections

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · April 1, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10837615

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** April 1, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10837615

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding warden is proper defendant for injunctive relief claim as he would be responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TYRECE D. COLEMAN, #R55084, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-00066-RJD
)
ILLINOIS DEPT. of CORRECTIONS, )
LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, )
LATOYA HUGHES, )
JEREMIAH BROWN, )
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., )
MR. BABICH, )
LORIE CUNNINGHAM, )
KATIE BICE, P. MYERS, )
CARISSA LUKING, )
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD, )
and MR. EWRING, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Tyrece D. Coleman, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)
currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights and violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.1 (Doc. 1). He claims defendants failed
to treat his pain from several medical conditions and failed to provide accommodations for his
hearing impairment and mobility impairments. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and
injunctive relief. (Doc. 1, p. 8).

1 Although Plaintiff mentions only the ADA, “the [Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.] is
available to him, and courts are supposed to analyze a litigant's claims and not just the legal theories that
he propounds, especially when he is litigating pro se.” Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2012)
(internal citations omitted).
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A,2 which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious
claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff was
transferred to Lawrence on November 1, 2023 (Doc. 1, p. 10). He has a hearing impairment and
has received accommodations in the past including hearing aids (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 30-32). He also
has mobility impairments due to having a rod and screws in his lower back and chronic pain in
that area, nerve damage in his left leg and foot, a bad right knee, carpal tunnel syndrome in his
right hand and wrist, and arthritis and a bulging disc in his neck. Plaintiff was issued hand, wrist,
and knee braces for these conditions in previous institutions (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 55, 62). Plaintiff is a
non-reader and has an educational learning disability. He takes psychiatric medication for PTSD,

stress, depression, and bipolar disorder (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 131).
After arriving at Lawrence, Plaintiff made numerous requests for assistance with his
hearing impairment. He was specifically seeking the accommodations of a CL-20 headphone and
a vibrating watch (Doc. 1, pp. 11, 66-70, 74, 78-83). Without those devices, Plaintiff missed calls
for meals, commissary, health care passes, and law library. Plaintiff sought an audiological
evaluation as well as medical attention for his mobility issues. A year passed without adequate
responses to Plaintiff’s requests (Doc. 1, pp. 11, 15).

2 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint due to Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of a
Magistrate Judge (Doc. 9), and the limited consent to the exercise of Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set
forth in the Memoranda of Understanding between this Court, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and the IDOC.
Plaintiff sent numerous letters, request forms, and grievances to Defendant Cunningham
(Lawrence Health Care Unit Administrator and ADA Coordinator) between January and July
2024, seeking care for his hearing and mobility impairments (Doc. 1, p. 14). Plaintiff showed his
documents from Stateville Correctional Center, stating that he had received the CL-20 headphone

while there, and requested a vibrating watch, however, Cunningham refused to provide those
devices. Plaintiff had an audiological evaluation on July 24, 2024, which showed he needed a
hearing aid (Doc. 1, p. 14). On that date, Plaintiff’s hand and knee braces were confiscated, even
though he had not been allowed to see an outside specialist regarding his need for those devices
(Doc. 1, p. 15). As a result, Plaintiff’s pain increased. Plaintiff’s mother and fiancé personally
spoke to Cunningham regarding his medical and ADA needs, to no avail (Doc. 1, p. 19).
Plaintiff similarly requested hearing accommodations from Katie Bice (Lawrence
Assistant ADA Coordinator) between November 2023 and August 2024. Bice failed to provide
any assistance and ignored his attempts to speak to her in person about his needs (Doc. 1, pp. 15-
16). Bice thus caused Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress including anguish, anxiety,

embarrassment, and humiliation.
Plaintiff saw Dr. P. Myers on June 19, 2024 regarding his need for mobility
accommodation and pain relief (Doc. 1, p. 16). Myers refused to increase Plaintiff’s pain
medication and refused to renew the medical permits for his hand, wrist, and knee braces. Myers
said Plaintiff’s medical records from Stateville and Cook County Jail regarding his medical and
ADA issues had not been forwarded to Lawrence; Plaintiff insisted those records should have
followed him. Myers refused to provide Plaintiff with any accommodations until an outside
specialist evaluated him. Myers put in a referral, but did not follow up, so Plaintiff’s needs were
not addressed for a year. Myers allowed prison security officers to confiscate Plaintiff’s braces on
July 24, 2024, and Plaintiff received a disciplinary infraction for that incident. Plaintiff wrote to
the IDOC and other officials seeking copies of his medical records (Doc. 1, pp. 19, 61).
Plaintiff had a call pass on December 13, 2024, to see Lawrence Nurse Practitioner Carissa
Luking (Doc. 1, p. 18). However, the pass was cancelled and Luking failed to come to the cell

house to see him, assess his pain level, or refer him to an outside provider. Many of Plaintiff’s
medical passes had been cancelled over the previous year. Plaintiff states he does not know who
was responsible for cancelling and delaying his requests to be seen by a specialist (Doc. 1, p. 18).
Plaintiff’s Counselor, Mr. Ewring, responded to Plaintiff’s grievances over the above
issues, but failed to obtain any relief for the cancellation of Plaintiff’s medical passes or the delay
in receiving accommodations for his hearing and mobility impairments or his ongoing pain (Doc.
1, pp. 18-19, 92-99).
IDOC Director Latoya Hughes failed to require her subordinates at Lawrence to comply
with the ADA or to take action when Plaintiff filed grievances and wrote letters seeking help with
his impairments and medical needs (Doc. 1, pp. 11-12). Lawrence Warden of Programs Jeremiah

Brown failed to remedy Plaintiff’s issues or require compliance with the ADA, despite Plaintiff’s
many complaints and grievances dating back to February 2024, as well as contacts from Plaintiff’s
family and friends (Doc. 1, p. 12-13). Regional Medical Director Babich likewise allowed his
medical staff to deny Plaintiff his ADA accommodations and referrals to outside specialists (Doc.
1, pp. 12-13). Babich also allowed his staff to let Plaintiff’s permits for hand, wrist, and knee
braces expire, leading to the confiscation of those devices. The IDOC Administrative Review
Board (“ARB”) refused to address any of the issues Plaintiff raised in his grievances over the lack
of accommodations and medical care, responding that the matters had been appropriately
addressed at Lawrence (Doc. 1, p. 17).
Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) failed to ensure its medical staff
would comply with the ADA, and Wexford employees failed to respond to Plaintiff’s requests for
adequate pain medication or mobility accommodations (Doc. 1, p. 12). The IDOC and the ARB
failed to properly train and supervise their medical staff (Doc. 1, p. 20). These entities have

policies, customs, and practices that deprive inmates at Lawrence due process in handling their
grievances, hinder and delay the provision of ADA accommodations, allow deliberate indifference
to inmates’ medical needs, as well as allow other misconduct to occur. Id.
Plaintiff attaches numerous documents relating to his medical and disability-related needs
(Doc. 1, pp. 30-158). Years ago, on July 27, 2021, a hearing test showed Plaintiff needed a hearing
aid for his right ear (Doc. 1, p. 30-32). His left ear had no measurable hearing, so would not be
improved with a hearing aid. Correspondence from Defendant Brown indicated as of October 1,
2024, Plaintiff had seen an audiologist and a referral was pending to an outside ear-nose-throat
provider (Doc. 1, p. 59). Plaintiff had been issued a six-month permit at Stateville for right wrist
support on October 16, 2023, before his transfer to Lawrence (Doc. 1, p. 62).

Plaintiff was issued a permit at Lawrence on November 22, 2023, for wrist and knee braces,
valid to May 22, 2024 pending an evaluation (Doc. 1, p. 99). On October 15, 2024, he got a medical
permit for hearing aids, a right knee brace, and for a low bunk and low gallery (Doc. 1, p. 157).
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in
this pro se action:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim against all defendants for delaying and failing to provide
necessary devices to accommodate Plaintiff’s hearing impairment
after his transfer to Lawrence on November 1, 2023.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim against all defendants for delaying and failing to provide
assistance and/or devices to assist Plaintiff with his mobility
impairments after his transfer to Lawrence on November 1, 2023.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants Myers, Cunningham, and Luking for delaying and
denying treatment for Plaintiff’s chronic pain after his transfer to
Lawrence on November 1, 2023.

Count 4: Americans with Disabilities Act and/or Rehabilitation Act claim
against defendants for failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s hearing
and mobility disabilities after his transfer to Lawrence on November
1, 2023.

Count 5: Illinois state law medical negligence claim against Defendant Myers
for breaching his duty of care to treat Plaintiff for his mobility
impairments and ongoing pain.

Count 6: Illinois state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against Defendant Bice for ignoring Plaintiff’s requests for
assistance with his hearing impairment.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be
considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading
standard.3
Discussion
Count 1
Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical
needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a prisoner must
plead facts and allegations suggesting that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical
condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id. An
objectively serious condition includes a condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily
activities, or which involves chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373

3 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).
(7th Cir. 1997). “Deliberate indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official knows
of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in disregard of that risk.”
Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The allegations in the Complaint are sufficient for Plaintiff to proceed on the deliberate

indifference claim in Count 1 against medical providers Cunningham and Bice. Plaintiff’s hearing
impairment significantly affected his daily activities. He claims he requested these individuals to
provide him with hearing accommodations, yet they failed to do so over many months.
However, Plaintiff does not allege that he requested Myers or Luking to address his hearing
impairment. As such, he fails to state a claim against them for deliberate indifference to that
condition. Myers and Luking will be dismissed from Count 1 without prejudice.
Wexford is a corporation that employs Lawrence medical providers and provides medical
care at the prison, but it cannot be held liable solely on that basis. A corporation can be held liable
for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a
constitutional right. Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004).

See also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private corporation
is treated as though it were a municipal entity in a § 1983 action). While Plaintiff alleges generally
that Wexford failed to require its staff to comply with the ADA, had policies or practices that
resulted in deliberate indifference to inmates, and had other improper policies/practices, he
includes no factual allegations describing how Cunningham, Bice, or other providers acted or
failed to act because of a Wexford policy, practice, or custom. For these reasons, Wexford will be
dismissed from Count 1.
Plaintiff cannot maintain an Eighth Amendment claim for damages against the Illinois
Department of Corrections, because it is a state government agency. The same is true for Lawrence
Correctional Center and the Administrative Review Board, which are divisions of the IDOC.
“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr.,
56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (state Department of Corrections is immune from suit by virtue

of Eleventh Amendment). The IDOC, Lawrence Correctional Center, and the Administrative
Review Board will also be dismissed from Count 1.
Finally, the Complaint fails to state a deliberate indifference claim against Hughes, Brown,
Babich, or Ewring. Each of these officials reviewed Plaintiff’s grievances and/or complaints, but
that is not enough for liability in a civil rights case. To be liable under § 1983, a defendant must
be personally responsible for the violation of a constitutional right. Taylor v. Ways, 999 F.3d 478,
493 (7th Cir. 2021). A prisoner cannot maintain a claim against an official who merely reviewed
the prisoner’s grievance or appeal, but did not cause or participate in the alleged deprivation that
gave rise to the grievance. Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017). Further, because
there is no supervisory liability in § 1983 cases, supervisors cannot be held responsible for the

misconduct of their subordinates or for failing to ensure that subordinates properly carry out their
jobs. Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 2018); Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266
F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001).
To summarize, the deliberate indifference claim in Count 1 will proceed only against
Cunningham and Bice. Defendant Warden Brown, in his official capacity only, will remain as a
party for the purpose of implementing any injunctive relief that may be ordered. The claims against
Brown in his individual capacity will be dismissed. Defendants IDOC, Lawrence Correctional
Center, Hughes, Wexford, Babich, Myers, Luking, the Administrative Review Board, and Ewring
will be dismissed from Count 1.
Count 2
Under the Eighth Amendment standards outlined in Count 1, Plaintiff describes mobility
impairments involving his back, neck, right knee, left leg and foot, and right hand and wrist, which
constitute objectively serious medical conditions. He asserts that he requested assistance for these

conditions from medical providers Cunningham and Myers, but they delayed or failed to provide
Plaintiff with medical care or accommodations including the hand, wrist, and knee braces which
had given Plaintiff some relief. Myers allegedly delayed his referral to an outside specialist, which
Myers indicated was necessary before the braces could be approved. These allegations support the
deliberate indifference claim in Count 2 against Cunningham and Myers.
The Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff asked Bice or Luking to address these
mobility-related conditions, therefore he fails to state a deliberate indifference claim against them.
For the reasons discussed above in Count 1, Plaintiff fails to state a deliberate indifference
claim against the IDOC, Lawrence Correctional Center, Hughes, Brown, Wexford, Babich, the
Administrative Review Board, or Ewring, thus they will be dismissed from Count 2. Warden

Brown will remain as a defendant, in his official capacity only, with reference to Plaintiff’s request
for injunctive relief.
Count 2 will proceed only against Cunningham and Myers.
Count 3
Chronic and substantial pain constitutes an objectively serious medical condition.
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). A delay in treating a painful condition
can amount to deliberate indifference, if the delay exacerbated the injury or prolonged the inmate’s
pain. See Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 661 (7th Cir. 2021); Petties v.
Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 730-31 (7th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases); Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859,
865 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff alleges that Cunningham and Myers were aware of his severe pain from his
various physical ailments, but failed to provide him with the hand, wrist, and knee braces to
alleviate his pain. Plaintiff also claims that he asked Myers to provide him with pain medication,

but Myers failed to do so. These allegations support the deliberate indifference claim in Count 3.
However, Plaintiff includes only one allegation against Luking – that she failed to visit him
to assess his pain or refer him to an outside provider when his December 13, 2024 medical call
pass was cancelled. It is not clear from that single incident whether Luking was aware of Plaintiff’s
pain yet denied him treatment or a referral, thus the Complaint fails to state a deliberate
indifference claim against Luking.
Count 3 will proceed only against Cunningham and Myers. Luking will be dismissed
without prejudice from Count 3.
Count 4
Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allow him to proceed on an ADA and/or RA claim.

However, this claim cannot proceed against individual defendants because individual employees
of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA or the RA. Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corrs, 684 F.3d 667,
670 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead, the proper defendant is the relevant state department or agency. See
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n. 2 (individual capacity claims are not available;
the proper defendant is the agency or its director (in his official capacity)). Plaintiff has correctly
named the IDOC as a defendant and Count 4 will proceed only against the agency. The remaining
defendants will be dismissed from this claim.
Count 5
In addition to Plaintiff’s claim that Myers was deliberately indifferent to his medical
conditions and pain, he asserts that Myers’ failure to provide adequate medical care or pain relief
for his back condition, nerve damage, weak knee, carpal tunnel, arthritis, and bulging disc
amounted to medical negligence (Doc. 1, p. 16). This state law claim derives from the same facts
as Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim in Count 2 and will proceed.4 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a);

Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008).
Count 6
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress must
demonstrate that the defendant(s) intentionally or recklessly engaged in “extreme and outrageous
conduct” that resulted in severe emotional distress. Somberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d
1006, 1030 (7th Cir. 2006); see Lopez v. City of Chi., 464 F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 2006). The tort
has three components: (1) the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous; (2) the actor
must either intend that her conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least
a high probability that her conduct will cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the conduct must
in fact cause severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988).

Plaintiff asserts that Bice ignored his attempts to talk to her about his hearing
accommodations as she walked through his housing area, apparently on more than one occasion.
Bice had been a mental health provider, so Plaintiff claims she was aware that ignoring him when
he was talking to her would cause him emotional distress. These allegations indicate that Plaintiff
did suffer emotional distress, and might satisfy the second requirement above that Bice intended
or knew that her conduct would be severely distressing. However, Bice’s alleged conduct does not
rise to the level of truly “extreme and outrageous.” Accordingly, Count 6 will be dismissed without

4 Plaintiff must comply with the statutory requirement for an affidavit stating that “there is a reasonable and
meritorious cause” for litigation against Myers and a physician’s report to support the assertions in the
affidavit, pursuant to 735 ILCS § 5/2-622. See Young v. United States, 942 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2019).
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Injunctive Relief
Because the Complaint includes a request for injunctive relief, Lawrence Correctional
Center Warden Jeremiah Brown, in his official capacity only, will remain as a defendant with

regard to the request for injunctive relief. See Gonzales v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding warden is proper defendant for injunctive relief claim as he would be responsible
for ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out).
Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff raises claims against each defendant in his or her individual and official capacities.
The ADA and RA claims are properly brought against the IDOC, and the claims for injunctive
relief are proper against Lawrence Warden Brown in his official capacity. However, Plaintiff’s
claims for monetary damages may only be pursued against state officials in their individual
capacities. Brown v. Budz, 904 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068,
1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the official capacity claims against the other individual

defendants are dismissed without prejudice.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s renewed Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 14) is DENIED without
prejudice. There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal civil cases. Romanelli
v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010). In determining whether to recruit counsel, the Court
considers whether the pro se party has made reasonable efforts to secure counsel on his own and
his ability to litigate the case on his own. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007).
When Plaintiff’s first counsel motion was denied, the Court instructed him to provide one
additional rejection letter from an attorney, to demonstrate his efforts to find counsel on his own
(Doc. 12). Plaintiff failed to do so; instead, he submitted the same letter, from July 2024, that he
submitted with his earlier motion (Doc. 3, p. 10). He therefore has not met this initial requirement.
While Plaintiff’s motion indicates he may have difficulty litigating this case on his own as
it proceeds, due to his educational and literacy deficiencies, this Order reflects that his Complaint

survives the initial merits review in large part. In addition, recruitment of counsel at this early stage
is premature. See Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[U]ntil the defendants
respond to the complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel...cannot be gauged.”). If
Plaintiff encounters difficulties in self-representation in the future, he may refile his motion
seeking recruitment of counsel. Any renewed motion must include at least one new rejection letter
from an attorney.
Disposition
The Complaint states colorable claims in Count 1 against Cunningham and Bice; in Counts
2 and 3 against Cunningham and Myers; in Count 4 against the Illinois Department of Corrections;
and in Count 5 against Myers. Count 6 and the claims against Defendant Jeremiah Brown in his

individual capacity are DISMISSED without prejudice. Defendants Lawrence Correctional
Center, Latoya Hughes, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Mr. Babich, Carissa Luking, the
Administrative Review Board, and Mr. Ewring are DISMISSED without prejudice.
The Clerk shall prepare for the Illinois Department of Corrections, Lorie Cunningham,
Katie Bice, P. Myers, and Warden Jeremiah Brown of Lawrence Correctional Center (official
capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons),
and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms,
a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service
of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk
shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require
the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer
shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 244 and Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues
stated in this Merit Review Order.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes

the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the
costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 1, 2025
s/ Reona J. Daly _____
REONA J. DALY
United States Magistrate Judge

Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit and serve
them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, Defendants will enter an
appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date
of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days
or more. When Defendants have filed their Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order
containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to
wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel
has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any
evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10837615. Public record. Not legal advice.