# Steve Bryant v. State > Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · April 24, 1997 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1083727 ## Case - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee - **Decided:** April 24, 1997 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1083727 ## Opinion text IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE FILED JANUARY SESSION, 1997 April 24, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson STEVE L. BRYANT, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9605-CR-00190 ) Appe llant, ) ) ) DAVIDSON COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. J. RANDALL WYATT, JR. STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Habeas Corpus) ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: PARRISH B. STANTON CHARLES W. BURSON 209 T enth Av enue S outh Attorney General and Reporter Nashville, TN 37203 LISA A. NAYLOR Assistant Attorney General 450 James Robertson Parkway Nashville, TN 37243 VICTOR S. JOHNSON District Attorney General KATRIN N. MILLER Assistant District Attorney General Washington Square, Suite 500 222 Se cond A venue N orth Nashville, TN 37209-1649 OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE OPINION This is an appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appe llate Procedure. The Defendant filed a petition seeking habeas corpus relief on the grounds that Tennessee’s sentencing law s violate the separa tion of powers clause of the Tenn essee C onstitution and tha t the sentence s authorized a re indeterm inate in nature and thus contrary to law. The trial court denied habeas corpus relief. W e affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court. The petition for writ of habeas corpus alleges that the Defe ndan t is in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction as a result of being convicted of burglary and larceny on Ja nuary 19, 19 89, in the Criminal Court of Davidson County, Tennessee. The petition alleges that the Defendant received a sente nce of eig hteen ye ars to be served a t thirty-five perce nt (35% ). W e first note that a p etition fo r writ of hab eas c orpus mus t conta in a copy of the “legal process” u pon which re straint is based, or a satisfactory reason for its absence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-107(b)(2). The petition in this case contains neither. This omission alone would warrant the trial court’s dismissal of the petition. State ex rel. Wood v. Johnson, 393 S.W.2d 135, 136 (T enn. 1965 ). In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden of showing the invalidity of the judgment of conviction is upon the petitioner, “and in the absence of a production of the judgment, or a copy thereof, we must presume it was and is valid in a ll respec ts.” State ex re l. George v. Bomar, 390 S.W .2d 232, 234 (Tenn. 196 5). It is the Appellant’s obligation to have pre pared a n adeq uate rec ord in ord er to -2- allow meaningful review on appea l. Tenn. R . App. P. 2 4(b); State v. Banes, 874 S.W.2d 73, 82 (Te nn. Crim . App. 19 93). The trial court did not err when it denied habea s corpu s relief. On appeal, the Defendant argues that our statutory scheme of sentencing violates the sep aration o f powers clause o f the State Constitu tion. See Tenn. Cons t. art. II, §§ 1 & 2. In sentencing a defendant, the trial judge must first determine the appropriate sentencing range which determines the release eligibility percentage. The Defendant argues that this judicial function encroaches upon the power of the executive branch to determine an inmate’s parole eligibility. The De fendant therefo re argues that we should strike down our entire sentencing code.1 W e reject the Defendant’s argument because we conclude that it has no merit. Some functions of the three departm ents of sta te government are nec essarily ove rlapping a nd interd epend ent. We believe this is particu larly true in our criminal justice system . See Lavon v. S tate, 586 S.W.2d 112, 115 (T enn. 19 79); Unde rwood v . State, 529 S.W .2d 45, 47 (T enn. 1975 ); Woods v. State, 130 Tenn . 100, 169 S.W. 558 (1914). Accordingly, we do not believe the judicial function of setting sentencing ranges is an unconstitutional encroachment on the powers of the excecutive branch. The Defendant further argues that the sentencing ranges along with the release eligibility percentages establish indeterminate sentences in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-211, which prohibits indetermin ate sentences. We also reject this argument because we conclude that it has no 1 Because the D efendant was convicted in 1989 , he was sentenced un der the Sentencing Reform Act of 1982. Therefore, his challenge would actually be to the 1982 Act. This distinction is not material to our analysis of the issues. -3- merit. The fact that the Board of Paroles may grant or deny parole does not convert a determinate sentence into an indeterminate sentence. Parole does not cause a senten ce to exp ire or term inate but is a con ditional release from more restrictive confinem ent. See Howell v. State; 569 S.W .2d 428, 433 (Tenn. 197 8); Doyle v. Hampton, 207 Tenn. 399, 403, 340 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1960). A parolee remains in con structive custo dy until the exp iration of the full term of his or her senten ce. How ell, 569 S.W.2d at 433. The writ of habeas corpus, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-21-101 to-130, is to be issued only in the case of a void judgment or to free a prisoner held after the term of imprisonment has expired. Tenn . Code Ann. § 29-21-101; Archer v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157 , 164 (T enn. 19 93); Flowers v. Traughber, 910 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The sole relief available under Tennessee’s habeas corpus statute is discharge from custody. Taylor v. Morgan, 909 S.W .2d 17, 20 (Tenn . Crim. A pp. 199 5). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we cannot conclude that the trial judge erred by denying the Defendant’s request that he be released. Therefore, we conclude that the petition for writ of habeas corpus was properly dismissed.2 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 2 This co urt has n ot been r eceptive to similar c hallenge s to our s entenc ing laws. See Frank Bell v. Ricky Bell, Warden, C.C.A. N o. 01-C -01-960 2-CR -00058 , Davidso n Cou nty (Tenn . Crim. A pp., Nash ville, Jan. 30, 19 97); Eric C. P endleton v. State , C.C.A. No. 01-C-01-9604-CR-00158, Davids on Co unty (Ten n. Crim . App., Na shville, Feb . 12, 1997 ); Joe T hom as Bak er, Jr. v. State , C.C.A. No. 01C01-9604-CR-00129, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 20, 1997); Terry M errell v. State , C.C .A. N o. 01 C01 -960 4-C R-0 014 7, Da vidso n Co unty (T enn . Crim . App., Nashville, Feb. 20, 1997). -4- ____________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE CONCUR: ___________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE ___________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE -5- --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1083727. Public record. Not legal advice.