# Chung v. Honor Emergency Fund of the Fire Department of the City of New York

> District Court, E.D. New York · March 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10836662

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10836662

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
- noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
- noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHARON JONES CHUNG,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against- 23-cv-05716 (LDH) (CLP)

HONOR EMERGENCY FUND OF THE FIRE
DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant.

LASHANN DEARCY HALL, United States District Judge:
Sharon Jones Chung (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings the instant action against
Honor Emergency Fund of the Fire Department of the City of New York (“Defendant”) pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, alleging discrimination, wrongful termination, and retaliation.
Defendant moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims for failure to state a claim.
BACKGROUND1
Defendant Honor Emergency Fund of the Fire Department of the City of New York
(“HEF”) is a not-for-profit organization that provides grants for medical and counseling services
and financial aid to active and retired firefighters, active civilian employees of the Fire
Department of the City of New York (“FDNY”), members of the emergency medical service,

1 The following facts are taken from the Second Amended Complaint and are assumed to be true for the purpose of
this memorandum and order, unless otherwise indicated.
and their families. (Second Am. Compl. (“Compl.”) at 9, ¶ 262, ECF No. 25-1.) Plaintiff
worked for Defendant from September 2009 to February 2021. (Id. at 7, ¶ 15.) Initially,
Plaintiff was hired to work as an executive assistant. (Id. at 7, ¶ 14.) In October 2017, Plaintiff
attained the title of Program Coordinator. (Id. at 7–8, ¶ 19.) From September 2009 to February

2021, Defendant employed two other individuals: Stanley Reimer, Executive Director and
Plaintiff’s supervisor, and Honey Berk, who worked as an accountant for Defendant. (Id. at 7, ¶
15.) Plaintiff identifies as a Black woman. (Id.) According to the complaint, both Reimer and
Berk are white. (Id.)
In May 2019, a grant applicant asked Plaintiff to give Reimer an envelope that contained
cash. (Id. at 70, ¶ 2.) Because Plaintiff was not aware of any repayment arrangement with the
grant applicant, she reported the cash payment to the Treasurer of HEF’s Board of Trustees. (Id.
at 70, ¶¶ 2–3.) Plaintiff claims that after she reported the May 2019 incident, Reimer began
retaliating against her by micromanaging her work. (Id. at 27.) Plaintiff further alleges that an
unidentified trustee yelled at her when she tried to speak during a December 3, 2019 meeting,

having been “influenced by negative information . . . that [Reimer] reported [about her] to the
Board.” (Id. at 24–25, ¶ 6.)
On or around March 22, 2020, Defendant began to comply with the New York State on
Pause Executive Order, which directed non-essential businesses to suspend in-office personnel

2 Because the numbering of the paragraphs in the Second Amended Complaint restarts with each section, each
paragraph reference also includes a page number. The page numbers referred to are the ECF page numbers, rather
than the page numbers used in the document.
functions.3 (Id. at 3, ¶ 2.) On March 27, 2020, Reimer denied Plaintiff’s request for approval to
work remotely and remotely access Defendant’s shared drive. (Id. at 32–33, ¶ 4.) Reimer
subsequently approved the requests on March 30, 2020. (Id. at 34, ¶ 4.) On March 31, 2020,
Plaintiff emailed Berk explaining that Reimer’s delay in approving her remote access to the

shared drive delayed her ability to process vouchers. (Id.) In an April 3, 2020 email to Plaintiff,
Reimer stated that Plaintiff’s email to Berk was inappropriate and unprofessional. (Id. at 33, ¶
4.)
On May 27, 2020, Plaintiff emailed Fire Commission Chairperson Nigro, reporting
discrimination and retaliation. (Id. at 24, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s pension plan
was changed in 2014 for the sole benefit of Reimer, who served as the plan’s administrator. (Id.
at 26, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff also alleged that she received a different pension benefit than disbursed to
Reimer and the white employee she replaced, Terri B. (Id. at 90, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff further alleged
that her lump sum pension distribution was significantly lower than that distributed to Terri B.
(Id. at 91, ¶ 5.) As to health benefits, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant refused to increase her

health insurance benefit to include spousal coverage, although Reimer’s health insurance covered
his family. (Id. at 99, ¶¶ 1, 5.) Finally, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s vacation policy,
pursuant to which Reimer and two HEF board members had to approve Plaintiff’s vacation
schedule, constituted unreasonable micromanagement. (Id. at 103, ¶ 7.)
On June 22, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a complaint to Defendant’s Board Chairperson
William Norden alleging that Reimer had retaliated against her. (See id. at 32, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff

3 On March 22, 2020, Governor Cuomo issued a directive, the New York State on Pause Executive Order, that all
non-essential businesses statewide must close in-office personnel functions effective 8:00 p.m. on Sunday March 22,
2020, to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. See “Governor Cuomo Signs the ‘New York State on PAUSE’
Executive Order,” N.Y.S. Governor, https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-new-york-state-
pause-executive-order (last visited February 10, 2025).
attached to the complaint the March 27, 2020 correspondence in which Reimer declined
Plaintiff’s request for remote shared drive access, (id. at 32, ¶ 4); the April 3, 2020 email in
which Reimer stated that Plaintiff’s email to Berk regarding Reimer’s delay in approving remote
access was inappropriate, (id. at 33, ¶ 4); and a January 28, 2020 exchange in which Plaintiff

complained that Reimer had revised her earlier emails within a chain, (id. at 35). On August 17,
2020, Defendant’s counsel, Seyfarth Shaw LLC, notified Plaintiff that it had retained another law
firm, Pechman Law Group PLLC (“Pechman”), to investigate Plaintiff’s complaint. (Id. at 37,
¶¶ 9–10.) On November 17, 2020, Pechman issued a report detailing its investigation and
finding that there was no evidence to suggest that Reimer had retaliated against Plaintiff. (Id. at
47, ¶¶ 10–11.)
On January 6, 2021, Plaintiff received a disciplinary notice regarding purported
insubordination, resistance to supervision, unwillingness to compromise, and inappropriate
conduct. (Id. at 10, ¶ 2; 87, ¶¶ 6–12.) On January 25, 2021, Plaintiff wrote a letter of appeal to
the January 6, 2021 notice. (Id. at 88, ¶ 1.) Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment on

February 10, 2021. (Id. at 89, ¶ 1.)
On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a charge with the New York State Division of Human
Rights (“NYSDHR”), alleging that Defendant engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices
relating to employment, because of her race and because she opposed discrimination and
retaliation. (Decl. of Michelle L. Vizzi in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Vizzi Decl.”), Ex. B,
NYSDHR Determination and Order After Investigation (“NYSDHR Determination”) at 124,
ECF No. 44.) On March 27, 2023, the NYSDHR dismissed the charge, finding that “there is no
probable cause to believe that [Defendant] ha[d] engaged in or [wa]s engaging in the unlawful
discriminatory practice complained of.” (Id.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a complaint must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009). A court deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss must “draw all
reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor, assume all ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ to be
true, and ‘determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Faber v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth.,
584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009)) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept
a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s
elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, a court is
not obligated to accept a plaintiff’s “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
factual conclusions.” Faber, 648 F.3d at 104 (quoting Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149
(2d Cir. 2008)). In reviewing a pro se complaint, however, the court must be mindful that a

plaintiff’s pleadings should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104–105 (1976)); see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that
even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).
DISCUSSION
“The doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars the subsequent litigation of any
claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action.” Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Inv.
Auth., 776 F.3d 126, 128 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 398 (1981)). “In applying the doctrine of res judicata, [a court] must keep in mind that
a state court judgment has the same preclusive effect in federal court as the judgment would have
had in state court.” Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 32 F.3d 654, 657 (2d Cir. 1994)
(citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)). It is well settled
that a court may dismiss a claim, including one brought by a pro se plaintiff, for failure to state a

claim on res judicata grounds. See Thompson v. Cnty. of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir.
1994) (“Res judicata challenges may properly be raised via a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).)” (citations omitted)); see also MacKinnon v. City of New
York/Hum. Res. Admin., 580 F. App’x 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2014) (“We have regularly upheld a
district court’s authority to dismiss . . . a pro se complaint on res judicata grounds.”) (citation
omitted). That is, although pro se submissions are held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers, pro se status “does not exempt a party from compliance with
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Fogel v. Sec’y of Air Force, 351 F. Supp. 2d
47, 49 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 177 F. App’x 200 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710
F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hence, the doctrine of res

judicata is equally applicable to pro se plaintiffs. See id. (dismissing pro se complaint as barred
by res judicata). In this case, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine
of res judicata because the NYSDHR has already considered and issued a no probable cause
determination as to those claims. (Mem. L. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”)
at 150–52, ECF No. 44.) The Court agrees.
New York courts have adopted a “transactional analysis approach” to res judicata issues.
O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (N.Y. 1981). Under this approach, “a claim
will be barred by a determination in an earlier action if both causes of action are grounded on the
same gravamen or are part of the same ‘factual grouping,’ even if the later claim is brought under
a different legal theory of recovery.” Kirkland v. City of Peekskill, 828 F.2d 104, 110 (2d Cir.
1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, New York courts give
“conclusive effect to the quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies . . . when
rendered pursuant to the adjudicatory authority of an agency to decide cases brought before its

tribunals employing procedures substantially similar to those used in a court of law.” Ryan v.
New York Tel. Co., 467 N.E.2d 487, 489 (N.Y. 1984) (citations omitted). As relevant here, the
NYSDHR has the authority to adjudicate and issue binding determinations regarding
employment discrimination disputes. Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274
F.3d 706, 734 (2d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, federal courts have afforded a preclusive effect to
the NYSDHR’s no probable cause determinations when federal and state claims arise from the
same facts and involve the same parties. See Kirkland, 828 F.2d at 110 (dismissing plaintiff’s
federal claims alleging employment discrimination as precluded by the NYSDHR’s no probable
cause determination); Vargas v. City of New York, No. 01-CV-7093, 2008 WL 361090, at *2, 5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2008) (holding that employment discrimination claims were precluded by the

NYSDHR’s no probable cause determination).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims involve the same parties implicated in the February 7, 2022
charge that she filed with the NYSDHR—herself and HEF. See NYSDHR Determination at 124.
And Plaintiff’s claims in this action arise from the same facts that she presented to the
NYSDHR. (See Def.’s Mem at 151.) Indeed, there, as here, Plaintiff alleged that “Respondent
[HEF] discriminated against her by: 1) denying her pension funds in March 2019, 2)
implementing a vacation policy effective January 1, 2020, that gave improper discretion to the
Board, 3) denying health insurance benefits for her husband in December 2019, and 4)
terminating her on February 10, 2021, for alleged performance reasons.” Compare NYSDHR
Determination at 124–25 with Compl. at 90, ¶¶ 2–3 (alleging termination of pension benefits in
March 2019), 103, ¶ 7 (alleging vacation policy that constituted “unreasonable
micromanagement”); 99–100, ¶¶ 1–9 (alleging denial of spousal healthcare coverage); and 89, ¶¶
1–6 (alleging unlawful termination). On March 27, 2023, the NYSDHR issued a letter stating

that it had considered Plaintiff’s allegations and found “no probable cause to believe that
[Defendant] ha[d] engaged in . . . [the conduct] complained of.” (NYSDHR Determination at
124.) That determination must be given preclusive effect here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
in this action are barred. Kirkland, 828 F.2d at 110 (“[A] claim will be barred by a
determination in an earlier action if both causes of action are grounded on the same gravamen or
are part of the same ‘factual grouping.’” (citations omitted))
Notwithstanding the seemingly clear authority on this issue, Plaintiff presses that res
judicata does apply. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the NYSDHR’s determination does not
preclude her claims in this case because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) subsequently issued a Notice of Right to Sue. (Pl.’s Mem. L. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.

to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 27, ECF No. 45.) Not so. Plaintiff does not, nor could she, point
to a single case to support her notion that the issuance of a right to sue letter undermines the
preclusive effect of a no probable cause determination by the NYSDHR. Simply put, the
issuance of a right to sue letter has no bearing on the preclusive effect of an NYSDHR no
probable cause determination. See Johnson v. Cnty. of Nassau, 411 F. Supp. 2d 171, 183
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that an NYSDHR no probable cause determination barred the
plaintiff’s race discrimination and unlawful retaliation claims, even where the EEOC
subsequently issued a right to sue letter); Davis v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., No. 21-CV-387,
2022 WL 2223018 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2022) (same).
Plaintiff also argues that res judicata cannot apply to any claims that the agency
determined were time-barred and therefore declined to consider. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 26.) This
argument, too, is unavailing. “The doctrine of claim preclusion . . . bars the subsequent litigation
of any claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action.” Citigroup, 776 F.3d 126,

128 n.1 (citing Federated, 452 U.S. at 398). Plaintiff acknowledges that the allegations she
raises before this Court, including of conduct that occurred more than one year before she filed
her NYSDHR complaint on February 7, 2022, were raised before the NYSDHR. (See Pl.’s
Opp’n at 26–27.) That the NYSDHR determined that claims arising from alleged actions that
occurred before February 7, 2021, fell outside of the agency’s one-year limitation period does
nothing to undermine the application of res judicata in this case. Indeed, “[u]nder New York
law, a dismissal of an action as time-barred is considered to be on the merits for res judicata
purposes.” Baird v. Kingsboro Psychiatric Ctr., No. 11-CV-159, 2013 WL 5774288, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2013) (citing Nostrum v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 954 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (2d Dep’t
2012)). Thus, Plaintiff fails to undermine the preclusive effect of the NYSDHR’s no probable
cause determination as to all of her claims.4

4 Plaintiff also argues that NYSDHR’s no probable cause determination has no preclusive effect because
the agency’s determination was “unsupported by the evidence and arbitrary.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 26.)
Plaintiff seems to misapprehend the doctrine of res judicata, which “bars the subsequent litigation of any
claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action.” Citigroup, 776 F.3d at 128 n.1 (citing
Federated, 452 U.S. at 398). Whether Plaintiff believes that the agency’s determination was well-
supported is not germane to the Court’s analysis of the application of res judicata. And in any event, such
an argument is not properly before this court. After the NYSDHR decides the claim, a litigant may only
appeal that decision to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Moodie v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New
York, 58 F.3d 879, 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing N.Y. Exec. Law § 297). Accordingly, this argument,
too, fails to refute Defendant’s argument that the NYSDHR’s determination bars Plaintiff’s claims in the
instant case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York /s/ LDH
March 31, 2025 LASHANN DEARCY HALL
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10836662. Public record. Not legal advice.