# DH v. Scranton School District

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10836622

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10836622

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[t]he [PSTCA] waives governmental immunity only for certain negligent acts of the agency or its employees; where the employee's conduct is intentional in nature, the local agency retains its governmental immunity”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DH, et al.,

Plaintiffs CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-334

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

SCRANTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Scranton School District
(“the District”), Teacher Erica Stolan (“Stolan”), Principal of South Scranton Intermediate
School Daniel Gilroy (“Gilroy”), Vice Principal of South Scranton Intermediate School
Joseph Lalli (“Lalli”), and Director of Special Education Services Ann Genett (“Genett”)
(collectively, with Stolan, Gilroy, and Lalli, “Individual Defendants”) (Individual Defendants
collectively with the School District, “Defendants”) on April 26, 2024. (Doc. 7). On February
27, 2024, Plaintiffs Courtny Roberts (“Roberts”), Matthew Hartzell (“Hartzell”), as parents
and natural guardians of D.H. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), initiated this action by filing a
complaint pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and various state law claims. (Doc. 1). For the
following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss shall be DENIED in part and GRANTED
in part. (Doc. 7).
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following background is taken from the complaint (Doc. 1). On February 27,
2024, Plaintiffs filed the complaint against Defendants. (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Plaintiffs
allege that D.H. is a thirteen-year-old disabled child with special needs who has been
diagnosed with autism, disruptive behavior disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), emotional disturbance, speech and language impairment, and a secondary other
health impairment (OHI). (Doc. 1, ¶ 8). D.H. began attending South Scranton Intermediate
School within the District during the 2021-2022 school year as a fifth grader. (Doc. 1, ¶ 20).

D.H. was placed in a special education classroom with Stolan as his teacher, where he was
meant to receive special education services as provided by the IDEA. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2, 10, 20).
The events giving rise to this action are as follows: Plaintiffs allege that between August
2021 and January 2023, various District personnel and employees of outside agencies
employed by the District witnessed Stolan’s abusive conduct towards D.H. and other special
education students in her class. (Doc. 1, ¶ 22). During this time period, D.H.’s mother
repeatedly spoke to Gilroy and Lalli to complain about the abusive behavior of Stolan and
request that D.H. be removed from her classroom due to Stolan’s behavior. (Doc. 1, ¶ 23).
D.H.’s mother also spoke with Stolan, who stated that she was not equipped for her job. (Doc.

1, ¶ 24). On December 6, 2022, D.H.’s mother attended an Individualized Education Plan
(“IEP”) meeting and again “pleaded with those in attendance,” which included Stolan,
Gilroy, and Genett, to move D.H. out of Stolan’s classroom “due to Stolan’s abusive behavior
in the past.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 26). Despite these conversations and the December 6, 2022 IEP
meeting request, the District did not remove D.H. from Stolan’s classroom until January 4,
2023, after two particularly abusive episodes that occurred on January 2, 2023 and January
3, 2023. (Doc. 1, ¶ 25).
On January 2, 2023, D.H. was sitting in a chair in his class in Stolan’s special
education classroom when Stolan began intentionally spraying a liquid foreign substance into
D.H.’s face. (Doc. 1, ¶ 28). This occurred in front of D.H.’s behavior support professional,
Ciara Fulton (“Fulton”). (Doc. 1, ¶ 28). As Stolan sprayed the liquid substance into D.H.’s
face, she stated “. . .This should wake him up” and “. . .This worked before in waking him
up,” implying that she had done this before. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 28-29). The following day, on January
3, 2023, Stolan approached the seat where D.H. was sitting in a chair with other special

education students and “intentionally shoved him with her body out of his chair causing him
to fall to the floor.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 32). After D.H. fell, Stolan began “directing and encouraging
other special education students in her classroom to forcibly remove [D.H.] from the
classroom and, in the process, directing and allowing the classmates of [D.H.] to forcibly
strike and hit him as he was dragged feet first out of the classroom.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 32). D.H.’s
mother learned about the incident from Fulton, and when she asked to speak with Gilroy, he
refused. (Doc. 1, ¶ 42). Plaintiffs contend that this type of behavior by Stolan directed at D.H.
and other special education students was “open, widespread and known by the staff and
administrators of the [] District as well as the staff and administrators of other outside agencies

serving students within the [] District.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 33-34). Plaintiffs allege a number of
abusive behaviors that Stolen engaged in, including but not limited to “using abusive
language,” “yelling and screaming in [D.H.’s] face with the intent of initiating inappropriate
behavior from [D.H.],” “spraying liquid solution into [D.H.’s] face,” “pushing [D.H.] out of
his classroom chair,” “allowing other students to strike [D.H.],” “aggressively grabbing the
desk of [D.H.],” and “placing a shield/curtain up and around [D.H.].” (Doc. 1, ¶ 35).
Fulton ultimately reported Stolan’s behavior to the District and provided a
handwritten note to Gilroy detailing the incident. (Doc. 1, ¶ 36). On January 4, 2023, a Child
Line Report that originated from the District reported two incidents of assaults on D.H. and
identified Stolan as “becoming more aggressive with the children.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 37-38). That
day, the District removed Stolan from D.H.’s classroom. (Doc. 1, ¶ 39). On January 13, 2023,
a Report of Suspected Child Abuse was made to law enforcement, and the Scranton Police
Department initiated an investigation. (Doc. 1, ¶ 40). According to the complaint, the District
provided no communication, outreach, or support to Plaintiffs or other special education

students or parents/guardians, and instead allowed Stolan to return to work at South
Scranton Intermediate School in the Spring of 2023. (Doc. 1, ¶ 41). After these incidents,
Gilroy was removed from his position as Principal at South Scranton Intermediate School
and was placed in another administrative position with the District. (Doc. 1, ¶ 43). Lalli
remains Vice-Principal, Genett remains Director of Special Education, and Stolan remains a
special education teacher at Charles Sumner School in the District. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 44-46).
Plaintiffs contend that the District had a policy or custom of ignoring signs of abuse, failing
to investigate inappropriate conduct by teachers, discouraging reporting abuse, and retaliating
against those who did. (Doc. 1, ¶ 49). Plaintiffs aver that the District thus acted with deliberate

indifference towards D.H.’s disability. (Doc. 1, ¶ 47). As a result, Plaintiffs contend that D.H.
was injured. (Doc. 1, ¶ 31).
Plaintiffs’ complaint raises thirteen state and federal claims related to alleged
constitutional violations by Defendants: (1) Count I – 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Violation of IDEA,
20 U.S.C. § 1440, et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment against all Defendants; (2) Count
II – 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Violation of Fourteenth Amendment against all Defendants; (3) Count
III – Violation of IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1440, et seq., against all Defendants; (4) Count IV –
Violation of ADA against the District; (5) Count V – Violation of Section 504 of the RA
against the District; (6) Count VI – Monell claim for failure to train/supervise under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the District; (7) Count VII – Vicarious Liability against all Defendants; (8)
Count VIII – Assault and Battery against Stolan; (9) Count IX – Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress (“IIED”) against Stolan; (10) Count X – Breach of Fiduciary Duty against
Stolan; (11) Count XI – Negligence against all Defendants; (12) Count XII – Punitive
Damages against all Defendants; (13) Count XIII – Demand for Attorney’s Fees.1 (Doc. 1, at

18-50). As relief, Plaintiffs request compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s
fees. (Doc. 1, at 50-51).
On April 26, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, and on May 10,
2024, they filed a brief in support. (Doc. 7; Doc. 8). Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition on
May 23, 2024. (Doc. 9). No reply brief was timely filed. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss
has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 7; Doc. 8; Doc. 9).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 12(B)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “When a party
moves to dismiss under more than one Rule 12 ground, the Court must first consider the Rule
12(b)(1) challenge, ‘because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter

1 Defendants argue that Count XIII of the complaint, titled “Demand for Attorney’s
Fees” should be dismissed, as claims for attorney’s fees “do not constitute independence [sic]
causes of action.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 168-171; Doc. 8, at 14). 42 U.S.C. § 1988 governs attorney’s
fees awards. Section 1988 does not confer an independent cause of action but rather
authorizes the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in cases brought under sections
1981, 1983, and 1985. See Carpenter v. Ashby, 351 F. App'x 684, 687 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus, such
a demand for attorney’s fees must not be asserted as an individual cause of action, but instead
as a demand for relief. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count XIII is thus GRANTED. (Doc.
7). Count XIII is DISMISSED. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs may include their demand for attorney’s
fees outside of an independent count in the complaint.
jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot.’” A.D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of
Educ., 90 F.Supp.3d 326, 334 (D.N.J. 2015), aff'd, 833 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation
omitted). “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the jurisdiction of the court to
address the merits of the plaintiff's complaint.” Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537

(M.D. Pa. 2002). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional issue and
the appropriate device to raise this issue is a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). See
Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2014). A Rule 12(b)(1)
dismissal is not a judgment on the merits, but only a determination that the court lacks the
authority to hear the case. Swope v. Central York Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (M.D. Pa.
2011).
Rule 12(b)(1) challenges may be “facial” or “factual.” See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial attack challenges whether jurisdiction
has been properly pled and requires the court to “only consider the allegations of the

complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.) Conversely, when a defendant sets forth a factual attack on
subject-matter jurisdiction, “the Court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself whether
it has power to hear the case ... ‘no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations,
and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating
for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.’” Carpet Group Int'l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass'n,
Inc., 227 F.3d 62, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).
In this case, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to exhaust administrative

remedies and, thus, present a factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction. See Rohrbaugh by &
through Rohrbaugh v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit, 255 F.Supp.3d 589, 592 (M.D. Pa. 2017). As a
result, the Court will weigh the allegations in the complaint without presuming truthfulness
in order to determine the merits of the jurisdictional claim.
B. 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first
take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions
that are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint’s
factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch
v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents
incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements that make up the legal claim, a court should
“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff
must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’. . . ”
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need a court assume that a
plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals
Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in
the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d
1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for
which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading
requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
C. 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983
Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for violations of
federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute
states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means through
which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” See Pappas v. City of
Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 284-85 (2002)). To state a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and
(2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005)

(quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss the claims raised in Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) and (6). (Doc. 7; Doc. 8). Specifically, Defendants argue that (1) the Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over Counts I and III; (2) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the
ADA or RA in Counts IV and V; (3) Plaintiffs fail to establish Monell liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in Counts I and VI; (4) Counts VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI are barred by the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act; (5) Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages; and (6)
Individual Defendants are shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Doc. 8).

A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER COUNTS I AND III
In Counts I and III of the complaint, Plaintiffs allege a claim for “Violation of Civil
Rights” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the IDEA and “Individuals With Disability Education
Act 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq.” respectively. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 50-69, 77-70). The parties do not
dispute that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA for
Counts I and III of the complaint. According to Section 1415, “[B]efore the filing of a civil
action under [other] laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA’s
administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had
the action been brought under [the IDEA].” Defendants argue that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs failed
to exhaust their administrative remedies available for a failure to provide a free appropriate
public education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for

Counts I and III.” (Doc. 8, at 5). In response, Plaintiffs contend that they were not required
to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA because “the gravamen of the complaint
involves claims that the plaintiff does not relate to plaintiff student’s FAPE,” and further
because the complaint seeks damages, which are not available under the IDEA, and as such,
“recourse to the IDEA’s administrative remedies is effectively futile.” (Doc. 9, at 6-8).
The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., ensures that all children with disabilities receive a
FAPE. Section 1415(l) of the IDEA provides that “[n]othing in [the IDEA] shall be construed
to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the
[ADA], Title V of the Rehabilitation Act, or other Federal laws.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).

However, Section 1415(l) also requires plaintiffs to first exhaust the IDEA's administrative
procedures before suing under the ADA or Section 504. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).
In the seminal case Fry v. Napolean Community Schools, the Supreme Court stated that
“exhaustion is not necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff's suit is something other than
the denial of the IDEA's core guarantee—what the [IDEA] calls a ‘free appropriate public
education.’” 580 U.S. 154 (2017). The Third Circuit has interpreted “gravamen” to mean that
“a court must review both the entire complaint and each claim to determine if the plaintiff
seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE.” Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 133 (3d
Cir. 2017) (dismissing case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the student’s claims
were subject to exhaustion). Whether a complaint uses particular terms or labels, such as
FAPE or IEP, is not material. Fry, 580 U.S. at 169. Rather, Section 1415(l) “requires
exhaustion when the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress for a school's failure to provide a
FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely that way.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 169.

The Supreme Court provided two instructive hypothetical questions to guide the
inquiry into whether the gravamen of the complaint concerns the denial of a FAPE or a
disability-based discrimination claim:
First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged
conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school—say, a public
theater or library? And second, could an adult at the school—say, an employee
or visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance? When the answer to
those questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of
a FAPE is also unlikely to be truly about that subject; after all, in those other
situations there is no FAPE obligation and yet the same basic suit could go
forward. But when the answer is no, then the complaint probably does concern
a FAPE, even if it does not explicitly say so; for the FAPE requirement is all
that explains why only a child in the school setting (not an adult in that setting
or child in some other) has a viable claim.

Fry, 580 U.S. at 176.
The Supreme Court illustrated a situation that is instructive in this case: a teacher, “acting out
of animus or frustration, strikes a student with a disability.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 176 n.9. While
a lawsuit under a statute other than the IDEA could relate to the student's education, “the
substance of the plaintiff's claim is unlikely to involve the adequacy of special education—
and thus is unlikely to require exhaustion.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 176 n.9. In that situation, a child
or adult could file the same type of suit if the action took place in a different public facility.
Fry, 580 U.S. at 176 n.9
In this case, Counts I and III of the complaint assert that Defendants’ failure to provide
accommodations tailored to D.H.’s needs, such as a proper behavior management plan,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the IDEA.2 (Doc. 1, at 18-22, 24). Thus, Counts I
and III “comprise [of claims] that [seek] relief under the IDEA, as opposed to the sort of
claim[s] that a student could bring against a public facility that was not a school or that a
nonstudent could bring for alleged wrongs in a school setting.” S.D. by A.D. v. Haddon Heights

Bd. of Educ., 722 F. App'x 119, 126 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding exhaustion is required in cases
where the substance of plaintiffs’ discrimination claims concerns the denial of a FAPE to
students and where Defendants allegedly failed to provide instruction tailored to meet
student’s special needs resulting from his disability); see also Doe v. Austin, No. CV 23-3287,
2024 WL 871336 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2024) (explaining that that under Third Circuit precedent,
individuals cannot subvert the demands of the IDEA by bringing related claims under
different statutes). Here, Plaintiffs would be unable to bring the claims asserted in Count I and
Count III against a non-educational public facility because such facility would not be
obligated to provide D.H. with the education-related accommodations he seeks. Thus, for the

claims asserted in Counts I and III, Plaintiffs are subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion
requirement. See Wellman, 877 F.3d at 133.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that if the Court finds that the IDEA exhaustion
requirements do apply, an exception should be applied because exhaustion would be futile in
this case. (Doc. 9, at 7). The Third Circuit found a party may be exempt from the IDEA’s
exhaustion requirement where “exhaustion would be futile or inadequate.” D.E. v. Cent.
Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 275 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778).

2 In Counts II, IV, and V, Plaintiffs also make allegations regarding Defendants’ failure
to provide D.H. and other special needs students with a FAPE, potentially implicating
exhaustion requirements. (Doc. 1, at 18-30). Because Defendants do not move to dismiss
Counts II, IV, and V on the basis of exhaustion, the Court will only analyze Counts I and III
in this section. (Doc. 8, at 5-6).
Exhaustion is understood to be futile when a plaintiff “‘allege[s] systemic legal deficiencies
and, correspondingly, request[s] system-wide relief that cannot be provided (or even
addressed) through the administrative process.’” D.A. v. Pleasantville Sch. Dist., No. 07-CV-
4341, 2009 WL 972605, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2009) (quoting Beth V. by Yvonne V. v. Carroll,

87 F.3d 80, 89 (3d Cir. 1996)). In determining that the exhaustion requirement is futile, courts
must consider whether enforcing the exhaustion requirement would serve the requirement’s
purpose, namely “developing the record for review on appeal, encouraging parents and the
local school district to work together . . . , and allowing the education agencies to apply their
expertise and correct their own errors.” Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 275 (internal citations omitted).
Despite Plaintiffs’ assertions otherwise, the fact that they seek compensatory and
punitive damages -- which are not available under the IDEA -- for IDEA-related claims does
not permit Plaintiffs to circumvent administrative exhaustion requirements and is not a basis
for deeming exhaustion futile. In an unreported case addressing this exact argument, the

Third Circuit has explained:
[T]he inability of a hearing officer to award monetary damages does not render
the administrative process futile. We realize, of course, that a claimant may
avoid the IDEA's exhaustion requirement when “exhaustion would be futile or
inadequate.” However, we have held that the mere inclusion of monetary
damages in a claim for relief does not necessarily establish the futility that
would avoid the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. Moreover, a contrary
holding would allow any plaintiff seeking relief pursuant to the IDEA to avoid
the statute's exhaustion requirement merely by adding a claim for monetary
relief, thus creating an exception that would eliminate the exhaustion rule.

F. S. by & through Scarano v. Crestwood Sch. Dist., No. 20-3321, 2021 WL
6101356, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2021) (citations omitted).

This considered, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ inclusion of a claim for damages does not
render exhaustion “futile” in this case such that they are absolved from the demands of
Section 1415. Count I and III will therefore be DISMISSED without prejudice on the basis
of exhaustion. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 50-69, 77-79).
B. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE ADA OR RA FOR COUNT IV AND V
In Count IV and V of the complaint, Plaintiffs allege violations of ADA and Section
504 of the RA. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 80-104). Defendants next argue these claims must be dismissed for
failure to state a claim “[b]ecause Plaintiffs fail to establish that Student’s disability was the

cause of the denial of benefits[.]” (Doc. 8, at 7). According to Defendants, Plaintiffs’ claims
provide “no support that the denial of services is directly related to [D.H.’s] disability”
because allegations that Defendants failed to provide him with an appropriate placement and
education services “function as a standard IDEA violation – not an ADA or Section 504
violation.”3 (Doc. 8, at 8-9). Plaintiffs do not directly respond to Defendants’ ADA and RA
arguments in their brief in opposition. (Doc. 9).
The ADA provides, in relevant part, that “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by

3 As a preliminary matter, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims
function as IDEA claims because they deal with FAPE violations is unfounded. It is well-
established that plaintiffs may bring ADA and RA suits based upon a denial of FAPE. Courts
have acknowledged that FAPE requirements under the ADA and RA are identical to those
under the IDEA. See P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d
Cir. 2009) (Section 504 “protects the rights of disabled children by prohibiting discrimination
against students on the basis of disability, and it has child find, evaluation, and FAPE
requirements, like the IDEA.”); see also Gwendolynne, S. Through Judy S. v. W. Chester Area Sch.
Dist., No. 19-CV-3844-JMY, 2021 WL 949483, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2021) (“under
Section 504, recipients of federal funds must ‘provide a [FAPE] to each qualified handicapped
person who is in the recipient's jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person's
handicap.’”), aff'd sub nom. G. S. through Judy S. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., No. 21-1680, 2022
WL 2233909 (3d Cir. June 22, 2022) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)). FAPE requirements
under Section 504 and the ADA are materially the same as those under the IDEA, while not
superfluous of one another. See Richard S. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., 334 F. App'x 508, 509 n.1
(3d Cir. 2009) (“Appellants’ § 504 and IDEA claims are factually indistinguishable, and the
resolution of the IDEA claim is therefore also dispositive of the § 504 claim.”).
any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the RA similarly states that “[n]o
otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “The ‘substantive standards for determining liability [under

the ADA and Rehabilitation Act] are the same.’” Gibbs v. City of Pittsburgh, 989 F.3d 226, 229
(3d Cir. 2021) (quoting McDonald v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, Polk Ctr., 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir.
1995)). Thus, the Court “address[es] both claims in the same breath.” Chambers ex rel.
Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Strickland
v. Delaware Cty., No. CV 21-4141, 2022 WL 1157485, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2022).
Additionally, a plaintiff can advance a discriminatory theory under the ADA or RA based on
a failure to accommodate. See McPherson v. Cty. of Dauphin, No. 1:19-CV-01865, 2020 WL
1558206, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2020) (citing Muhammad v. Court of Common Pleas, 483 Fed.

Appx. 759, 763 (3d Cir. 2012)).
To state a claim under either the ADA or the RA, Plaintiffs must allege that D.H. was
a qualified individual with a disability who was precluded from participating in a program,
service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to discrimination, by reason of his disability.
Furgess v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 933 F.3d 285, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2019); see also
Haas v. Wyoming Valley Health Care Sys., 553 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (quotations
omitted); see also Pierce v. Pitkins, 520 F. App'x 64, 67 (3d Cir. 2013). In the specific context of
special education ADA and RA claims, Plaintiffs must allege that “‘(1) [D.H.] is disabled as
defined by the [RA]; (2) [D.H.] is otherwise qualified to participate in school activities; (3) the

school or the board of education receives federal financial assistance; and (4) [D.H.] was
excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subject to discrimination at, the
school.’” A.C. v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 191 F. Supp. 3d 375, 388–89 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting
Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir.1999) (citing W.B. v.
Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub.

Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803–04 (3d Cir.2007))). Under § 504, Plaintiffs must also plead “‘that the
school district knew or should have reasonably known of the plaintiff's disability.’” A.C., 191
F. Supp. 3d at 389 (quoting Coleman, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 568). Similarly, for compensatory
monetary damages under either the ADA or the RA, Plaintiffs must allege deliberate
indifference, or “(1) knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially likely to be
violated..., and (2) failure to act despite that knowledge.” A.C., 191 F. Supp. 3d at 389; see also
S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 261 (3d Cir.2013) (“a showing of
deliberate indifference may satisfy a claim for compensatory damages under § 504 of the RA
[and the ADA].”).

Despite Defendants’ averments otherwise, the Court finds that Plaintiffs properly
plead their claims under the ADA and Section 504 of the RA. Plaintiffs allege that “because
of [D.H.’s] disabilities,” the District “fail[ed] to provide him with the same protections and
opportunities that other students were provided” and more specifically that “[d]ue to his
disabilities and need for special education instruction, the [] District failed to provide [D.H.]
with any education that was required by the IDEA, and [his] IEP and thus discriminated
against him due to his disabilities, as non-disabled students were not left to languish with no
educational benefit.” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 87, 92). Plaintiffs additionally allege that the District “was
aware that as a child with disabilities, [D.H.] had the right to be free of discrimination [. . . ]

and despite that knowledge the [] District failed to ensure that improper verbal and physical
abuse would not be perpetrated upon [D.H. by the District].” (Doc. 1, ¶ 89). Plaintiffs
emphasize that D.H.’s mother complained repeatedly to the District about Stolan’s “cruel
and abusive treatment” and allowed “the improper verbal and physical abuse to continue for
a substantial period of time after the [] District was made aware of the situation,” thus
demonstrating deliberate indifference. (Doc. 1, ¶ 89). Further, Plaintiffs allege that the District

knew or should have known that D.H.’s rights were likely to be violated by allowing D.H. to
remain in a classroom with Stolan and her allegedly abusive teaching tactics. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 89-
96). These allegations are sufficient to provide that Defendants’ denial of benefits to D.H. was
directly related to his disability. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have stated claims for violations of the
ADA and RA and have properly alleged deliberate indifference to support requests for
damages. See S.H., 729 F.3d at 261; (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 80-104). Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts
IV and V of the complaint is therefore DENIED. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 80-104; Doc. 7).
C. MONELL LIABILITY
Defendants argue that Counts I and VI of the complaint, 4 which are brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, must be dismissed because those claims “fail to identify a policy or custom”
and thus “fail to establish Monell liability.” (Doc. 9, at 14). In Count VI, Plaintiffs allege a
failure to supervise and train claim against the District. (Doc. 1, at 18-22, 31-33). Plaintiffs
allege that the District “had and ha[s] unconstitutional customs, policies and practices of
failing to investigate evidence of School District employees [sic] misconduct, abuse and or
harassment[. . .] and failing to adequately supervise and train School District employees with

4 Because the Court dismissed Count I of the complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, the Court declines to address Defendants’ secondary argument that Count I must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted due to a failure to
establish Monell liability. The Court will address Defendants’ arguments as they relate to
Count VI.
regard to mandatory reporting obligations and maintaining, preserving and protecting
students from violation of their right to personal security and bodily integrity.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 61).
Plaintiffs continue, “School District knew about Stolan’s proclivity to engage in improper
verbal and physical abuse of minor special education students. Nonetheless, no appropriate,
effective, or adequate steps were taken”. (Doc. 1, ¶ 108).

A § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways: the plaintiff may
allege that an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom led to his injuries or that his
injuries were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that reflects a deliberate
or conscious choice. Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Estate of Roman v.
City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798-99 (3d Cir. 2019)). A plaintiff alleging an unconstitutional
policy must point to “an official proclamation, policy or edict by a decisionmaker possessing
final authority to establish municipal policy on the relevant subject.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105.
A plaintiff alleging an unconstitutional custom “must evince a given course of conduct so

well-settled and permanent as to virtually constitute law.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105 (citing
Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798). The plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was
the proximate cause of his injuries by demonstrating an “affirmative link” between the policy
or custom and the constitutional violation. Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (citing Kneipp v.
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d
Cir. 1990))). A plaintiff alleging that his injuries were caused by a failure or inadequacy by
the municipality must demonstrate “(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will
confront a particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of
employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause

deprivation of constitutional rights.” Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106 (citing Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d
at 798; Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)).
“Generally, Monell claims are brought against employees or officials that are
subordinate to the policymakers of a particular government entity. . . .” Michalesko v. Freeland
Borough, 18 F.Supp.3d 609, 623 (M.D. Pa. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Michalesko v. Borough, 658 F.

App'x 105 (3d Cir. 2016). Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but rather allows a
plaintiff to vindicate violations of rights created by the Constitution or federal law. Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979); Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.
2006). Thus, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants, acting
under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-
50 (1999); Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 423. In this case, the School District is considered to be a
municipality. See B.W. v. Career Tech. Ctr. of Lackawanna Cty., 422 F.Supp.3d 859, 889 (M.D.
Pa. 2019); Highhouse v. Wayne Highlands Sch. Dist., 205 F.Supp.3d 639 (M.D. Pa. 2016).

It is well established that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983
on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002). Municipalities, such
as the District, “are not liable under § 1983 merely for employing someone who violates a
person's civil rights; rather, a municipality that does not directly violate a person's civil rights
is liable only where it has in place a policy or custom that led to the violation.” B.W., 422
F.Supp.3d at 890; see Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a “direct causal link” between
the municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of Canton, Ohio v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). “Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not
sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it
was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed
to a municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985).
“Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must be separately

proved.” Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24.
The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying the “policy” or “custom.” Beck v. City of
Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 972 (3d Cir. 1996). A court may find that a municipal policy exists
when a “‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect
to the action’ issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Andrews v. City of Phila., 895
F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481
(1986)). It is also possible for a court to find the existence of a municipal policy in “the isolated
decision of an executive municipal policymaker.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
139 (1988). “A course of conduct is considered to be a ‘custom’ when, though not authorized

by law, ‘such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled’ as to virtually
constitute law.” Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citations omitted). A plaintiff can show a custom
by “evidence of knowledge and acquiescence,” Beck, 89 F.3d at 971, and must “demonstrate
that, through its deliberate conduct, [defendant school] was the ‘moving force’ behind [his
alleged constitutional violation].” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1997).
Here, with respect to the first method of establishing municipal liability, the Court
finds that the complaint does not sufficiently allege that a municipal policy or custom caused
D.H.’s injuries. Plaintiffs fail to allege that District had a policy, regulation, and/or custom

to improperly train and supervise its employees or that a Stolan was executing a District
policy, regulation, and/or custom when she allegedly violated D.H.’s rights. See Monell, 436
U.S. at 690. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that other individual Defendants acted pursuant to a
policy, regulation, and/or custom of constitutional violations so well-settled as to constitute
the “standard operating procedure” of the District. Tucker v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 19-CV-

889, 2019 WL 3802066, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2019) (quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850);
see Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). “Vague assertions of policy or
custom” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Buoniconti v. City of Phila., 148
F.Supp.3d 425, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637
(3d Cir. 1995)); see Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims do not survive under this
theory of Monell liability.
However, Plaintiffs meet their burden to establish a Monell claim by alleging that the
District failed to train, supervise, and/or discipline its employees such that it was deliberately
indifferent to students’ rights. “[T]here are limited circumstances in which an allegation of

‘failure to train’ can be the basis for liability under § 1983.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 387. “Where
the policy ‘concerns a failure to train or supervise municipal employees, liability under section
1983 requires a showing that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of
persons with whom those employees will come into contact.’” Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749
F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Carter, 181 F.3d at 357). A failure-to-train claim does
not require a plaintiff to allege an unconstitutional policy. See Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at
798. Instead, Plaintiff must just allege that “‘the identified deficiency in a city's training
program must be closely related to the ultimate injury;’ or in other words, ‘the deficiency in
training [must have] actually caused’ the constitutional violation.” Thomas, 749 F.3d at 222

(quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 391).
Plaintiffs allege that the District and District officials “became aware that Stolan was
using very vulgar and inappropriate language in the classroom, constantly engaging in
inappropriate and unwanted contact and behavior with minor special education students,
however, no proper inquiries were made, and no corrective action was taken.” (Doc. 1, ¶
109). They further allege that the District failed to take proper precautions to prevent the

constitutional violations because it did not properly instruct its faculty and staff members on
how to handle reported misconduct or abuse, like that of Stolan, which thus resulted in
continued abuse. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 109-113). The complaint also provides that the District was
aware of Stolan’s abusive tendencies, as both D.H.’s mother and Fulton reported Stolan’s
behavior to Gilroy and other District administrators. (Doc, 1, ¶¶ 23-41). Taken together, these
allegations sufficiently support Plaintiffs’ failure to train and supervise claim. Defendants'
motion to dismiss Count VI is thus DENIED. (Doc.¶¶ 105-113; Doc. 7).
D. STATE LAW CLAIMS IN COUNTS VII THROUGH XI
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims as asserted in Counts VII – XI

are barred by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the “PSTCA”), 42 Pa.
C.S.A. § 8541. (Doc. 8, at 11-13). The PSTCA provides that “no local agency shall be liable
for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the
local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8541. There are
certain limited exceptions set forth in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8542, which provide that local agencies
and their employees are liable only for negligent acts falling into one of the following
categories: (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody, or control of personal property; (3) care,
custody, or control of real property; (4) dangerous conditions of trees, traffic controls, or street
lights; (5) dangerous conditions of utility services facilities; (6) dangerous conditions of streets;
(7) dangerous conditions of sidewalks; (8) care, custody, or control of animals; and (9) sexual
abuse. See Pa.C.S. § 8542.
“Municipal employees, including school district employees, are generally immune
from liability to the same extent as their employing agency, so long as the act committed was

within the scope of the employee's employment.” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir.
2006) (citing 42 Pa. C.S. § 8545). However, the statute provides that the employee will not be
entitled to this immunity if “it is judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the
injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful
misconduct.” See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8550. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized
willful misconduct as requiring a demanding level of fault. Sanford, 456 F.3d at 315. “Willful
misconduct has been defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as ‘conduct whereby the
actor desired to bring about the result that followed or at least was aware that it was
substantially certain to follow, so that such desire can be implied.’” Sanford, 456 F.3d at 315

(quoting Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994)). “[E]ven where a public
employee acts with a degree of culpability equivalent to ‘recklessness,’ Pennsylvania law
nevertheless affords him immunity.” Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir.
2006) (finding that an allegation of deliberate indifference is not sufficient to avoid PSTCA
immunity).
Arguing against dismissal of their state law claims, Plaintiffs, without citing any
caselaw, contend that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the violation of D.H.’s
constitutional rights and thus the “State Law claims must remain as logically flowing from
the Section 1983 Civil Rights Claim.” (Doc. 9, at 13-14). However, as noted above, deliberate

indifference is not sufficient to withstand PSTCA liability. See Bright, 443 F.3d at 287. If the
Court were to construe Plaintiffs’ argument as an attempt to take advantage of the “willful
misconduct” exception to PSTCA immunity, their argument would still fail, as “‘[w]illful
misconduct, however, does not provide an exception to the local agency's immunity.’” B.D.
by & through B.D. v. Cornwall Lebanon Sch. Dist., No. 1:20-CV-01944, 2021 WL 1253522, at

*19 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2021) (citing M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. East, 103 F.Supp.3d 612,
630 (E.D. Pa. 2015)) (emphasis added); see also Palmer v. Bartosh, 959 A.2d 508, 512 n.3 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2008) (stating that “[t]he [PSTCA] waives governmental immunity only for
certain negligent acts of the agency or its employees; where the employee's conduct is
intentional in nature, the local agency retains its governmental immunity”). Therefore,
finding Plaintiffs’ arguments unpersuasive, the Court finds that the PSTCA bars their state
law claims against the District. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss the state law
claims of the complaint is GRANTED against the District and Counts VII – XI against the
District are DISMISSED with prejudice. (Doc. 1; Doc. 7).

Regarding Plaintiffs’ state law claims in Counts VII – XI against individual
Defendants, to satisfy their burden, Plaintiffs must allege willful misconduct. See Bright, 443
F.3d at 287. Aside from Stolan, Plaintiffs fail to allege willful misconduct by other Individual
Defendants in Counts VII or XI beyond mere deliberate indifference. See Bright, 443 F.3d at
287 (holding that deliberate indifference does not suffice as an allegation of willful misconduct
for immunity purposes). However, in Counts VIII – X, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Stolan
engaged in willful misconduct by alleging she acted in an abusive manner towards D.H. and
that her actions were “extreme and outrageous,” “exceeds the bounds of decency and
tolerability in a civilized society,” and were committed “willful[ly.]” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 131, 134-139,

146). This considered, Counts VII and XI against are DISMISSED without prejudice against
all Individual Defendants aside from Stolan. (Doc. 1). Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts
VIII – X against Stolan is DENIED. (Doc. 7).
E. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS APPLIED TO COUNT II
In Count II of their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the District, Stolan, Gilroy, Genett,
and Alli are liable to them for Fourteenth Amendment violations (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 70-76).

Defendants assert that Count II must be dismissed against the individual because they are
entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 8, at 6-7). Plaintiffs respond that qualified immunity
does not apply because they have alleged that the Individual Defendants knew that their
actions violated D.H.’s rights. (Doc. 9, at 9).
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is the defendants' burden to
establish that they are entitled to such immunity.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142

n.15 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir.
1989)). As noted, Defendants mention that Individual Defendants are shielded by the doctrine
of qualified immunity regarding Count II, but do not elaborate on the factual basis for this
contention. (Doc. 8, at 6-7). Considering Defendants' assertion without sufficient factual
support, the Court finds that at the pleading stage, it is premature to determine whether
Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F.
App'x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“it is generally unwise to venture into a
qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual
record in the vast majority of cases.”). Therefore, the Court declines to address Defendants'
claim of qualified immunity at this time and will DENY their motion to dismiss on this basis
without prejudice. (Doc. 7).
F. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages at this time. Whether
an award of punitive damages is warranted requires “a fact-intensive issue inappropriate for

resolution at the motion to dismiss stage, where no factual record has yet been developed.”
Miller v. Helm, No. 17-CV-1590, 2017 WL 6405738, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2017). Indeed,
“this Court has consistently held that it is premature to dismiss demands for punitive damages
prior to discovery.” Campbell v. Balon, No. 16-CV-779, 2017 WL 2880856, at *19 (M.D. Pa.
July 6, 2017); Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc. v. Scranton Prods., Inc., No. 14-CV-853, 2017 WL
2126320, at *11 n.15 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2017). Here, Plaintiffs do not seem to contest that
punitive damages cannot be alleged against the District and Individual Defendants in their
official capacities. (Doc. 9, at 14). Instead, Plaintiffs state that they seek punitive damages
against Individual Defendants in their individual capacities. (Doc. 9, at 14). Thus, at this

preliminary stage of litigation, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages against
Individual Defendants in their individual capacities is not appropriate. (Doc. 7).
G. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure
to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.
2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave
to amend.’” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App'x 672, 673 (3d
Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). In
this case, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint in an attempt to
cure the deficiencies outlined herein as they relate to the claims dismissed without prejudice.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. (Doc. 7). Counts I and III are DISMISSED without prejudice. Counts VII
– XI as asserted against the District are DISMISSED with prejudice. Counts VII and XI as
asserted against Gilroy, Lalli, and Genett are DISMISSED without prejudice. Count XIII is
DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendants’ motion to dismiss all other claims is DENIED.
(Doc. 7).
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:
Dated: March 31, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10836622. Public record. Not legal advice.