# Peled v. Peled

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · March 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10836546

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10836546

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding “the significant limitation on the waiver of immunity is the [FTCA]’s exception for ‘[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ITZIK PELED, :
: Case No. 2:23-cv-2224
Plaintiff, :
: Judge Algenon L. Marbley
v. :
: Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
YAEL PELED, et al., :
:
Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before this Court on Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Anthony
Blinken and Thomas R. Nides (ECF Nos. 29; 33) and Defendants Shlomo Shtasman, Anat Baron,
Naftali Shilo, Yariv Levin, and the State of Israel (ECF No. 35). For the reasons set forth below,
the motions are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2023, Plaintiff (pro se) filed a Complaint against his wife, Yael Peled; four Israeli
officials; the State of Israel; Antony Blinken, the former United States Secretary of State; and
Thomas R. Nides, the former United States Ambassador to Israel. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s
allegations stem from Defendant Yael Peled’s disappearance with the couple’s children at the end
of a roughly two-week vacation in Israel. (Id.).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff explains he and Defendant Yael were married and lived in Ohio
with their three children. (Id. ¶ 1). In December 2020, Plaintiff and his wife visited Israel with their
children, when she disappeared with the children and obtained a “no exit order” that forbade
Plaintiff from leaving Israel for 22 months. (Id.) Plaintiff claims his parental rights were revoked
and he is now “completely alienated from his children and being threatened with several lawsuits
in the Rabbinical court and family court of Tel Aviv, Israel.” (Id. ¶ 2).
Due to his time in Israel, Plaintiff accuses Israel Officials of a “radical feminist ideology”
and claim they are involved in a “gender apartheid against men” (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9–11). He further alleges
wrongdoing of United States Officials by failing to act. (Id. ¶¶ 123–35). He brings claims for

abduction, tort compensation, “anti-suit,” loss of filial consortium, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, illegal confinement, racketeering, and a Bivens claim. (Id. ¶ 9-31). Plaintiff
seeks remedies in connection with these events including full custody of his children and rights to
collect child support, sanctions against Defendant Yael and the State of Israel, damages from
defendants supporting Defendant Yael, declaratory judgment that the Israeli rulings on this matter
are not to be recognized in the United States, and declaration that Defendant Yael is an abductor.
(Id. ¶ 16).
Defendants Anthony Blinken and Thomas R. Nides (“Federal Defendants”) in their official
capacities filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (ECF No. 29). They

separately filed a motion to dismiss claims against them in their individual capacity for lack of
personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim (ECF No. 33). Defendants Shlomo Shtasman, Anat
Baron, Naftali Shilo, Yariv Levin (Israeli Officials), and Defendant the State of Israel (together
with the Israeli Officials, the “Israel Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss for immunity, lack of
personal jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and insufficient service of process. (ECF No. 34).
Plaintiff responded to the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 49).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where a defendant challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction to
avoid dismissal. Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990).
Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction fall into two general categories: facial
attacks and factual attacks. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). A facial
attack is a challenge to the sufficiency of a complaint, and, when considering the motion, the court
must view the material allegations of that complaint as true and construe them in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. A factual attack is a challenge to the factual existence of
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. No presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations. Moir,
895 F.2d at 269 (6th Cir. 1990). The district court is free to weigh the evidence to assure itself of
its ability to hear the suit. Golden v. Gorno Bros., Inc., 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2005).
Like its 12(b)(1) counterpart, Rule 12(b)(2) allows a defendant to challenge the court's
jurisdiction over the person. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). When a court does not conduct
an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff “need only make
a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.” Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883,
887 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). Making such a showing nonetheless requires the

plaintiff to “establish[ ] with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between [defendant] and
the forum state.” Id. (citation omitted). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
“the court will not consider facts proffered by the defendant that conflict with those by the plaintiff,
and will construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (citation
omitted).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s allegations towards the Federal Defendants are under a Bivens claim and include
a request for $5,000,000 in damages from the United States. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 123–38). “Under
the Bivens line of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action against federal
officials for certain constitutional violations when there are no alternative processes to protect the
interests of the plaintiff and no special factors counseling against recognizing the cause of
action.” Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Federal Defendants, in their official capacity, invoke sovereign immunity and move

to dismiss this claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No.
29). The Sixth Circuit “treat[s] sovereign immunity as a ‘jurisdictional bar’ that, ‘once raised as a
jurisdictional defect, must be decided before the merits.’” Does v. Whitmer, 69 F.4th 300, 305 (6th
Cir. 2023) (quoting Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015)). “‘It is
axiomatic that absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its
agencies from suit.’” Gaetano v. United States, 994 F.3d 501, 506 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting FDIC
v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)).; see also Nuclear Transp. & Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Through
Dep't of Energy, 703 F. Supp. 660, 665 (E.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Nuclear Transp. &
Storage, Inc. v. United States, 890 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Since plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States with respect to its claims for
injunctive or declaratory relief against the United States, those claims must also be dismissed.”).
The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to
Bivens actions. See Nuclear Transport & Storage, Inc. v. United States, 890 F.2d 1348, 1351-52
(6th Cir.1989). While the United States is not a named party here, suits against United States
officials in their official capacity, like this one, are no different than suits against the United States.
T.M., Next Friend of H.C. v. DeWine, 49 F.4th 1082, 1087 (6th Cir. 2022). Thus, sovereign
immunity does not permit Bivens claims against the Federal Defendants in their official capacities.
Fagan v. Luttrell, 225 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff asserts that the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”) is a waiver of sovereign immunity. (ECF No. 49 at 5). As Federal Defendants indicated,
the United States is the proper party for the cause of action under the FTCA. Hui v. Castaneda,
559 U.S. 799, 801 (2010) (“When federal employees are sued for damages for harms caused in the
course of their employment, the [FTCA], generally authorizes substitution of the United States as
the defendant.”). Even so, the "foreign country exception" would likely apply to Plaintiff’s claims

as they all arise in Israel. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (finding
“the significant limitation on the waiver of immunity is the [FTCA]’s exception for ‘[a]ny claim
arising in a foreign country.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)).
As such, Plaintiff’s Bivens claim against the Federal Defendants in their official capacities
is barred by sovereign immunity.
B. Individual Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
In their individual capacities, the Federal Defendants move to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). (ECF No. 33 at 3–7). Plaintiff’s allegations against the
Federal Defendants in their individual capacity are no different from the allegations in their official

capacity. Plaintiff only includes a Bivens claim and seeks damages. In a damages action against
federal officials in their individual capacity, the normal requirements for exercise of personal
jurisdiction apply. Edkins v. Higham, No. 13-CV-11364, 2014 WL 3664071, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
July 23, 2014), aff'd sub nom. Edkins v. Shartle, No. 14-1972, 2015 WL 13928989 (6th Cir. Sept.
8, 2015) (citing Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am, Inc. v. Chasin, 845 F.2d 113, 116 (6th
Cir.1988)).
Personal jurisdiction over a defendant may be general or specific, depending on the nature
of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Bird v. Parson, 289 F. 3d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 2002).
“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s
domicile.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). On the
other hand, specific personal jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state defendant who has “certain
minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 564 U.S. at 923 (quoting
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The plaintiff must show the defendant

“purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum” and “the litigation results from
alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff does not allege any facts establishing personal jurisdiction, nor does he address
personal jurisdiction in his response to the motions to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 1, 49). As to general
personal jurisdiction, the Federal Defendants’ domiciles are not alleged to be in Ohio. In fact, the
addresses provided for defendants listed in the Complaint are all in Washington D.C. or Israel. .
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7–15). Additionally, with respect to specific personal jurisdiction, the allegations
are that “[t]his Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because the Plaintiff resides in

Ohio, defendant Yael Peled and the children resided in Ohio before the abduction and Ohio was
the situs of the marital life” along with other facts connecting Plaintiff to Ohio. (ECF No. 1). An
analysis of personal jurisdiction, however, “focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation.’” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014).
While Plaintiff alleges that venue is proper here because defendants directed their actions
to Columbus, Ohio, this alone is insufficient for personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff has failed to allege
any facts of the contacts made by the Federal Defendants and “the mere fact that [a defendant’s]
conduct affected plaintiffs with connections to the forum State does not suffice to authorize
jurisdiction.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 291.
As such, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction. This
Court does not find it has personal jurisdiction over the Federal Defendants in their individual
capacities; thus, the claims are dismissed.
C. Israel Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff additionally brings claims against the State of Israel and Israeli Officials. Israeli

Defendants urge dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF
No. 34 at 10-18).
Turning first to the State of Israel, the Israel Defendants invoked the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), Pub.L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.). The FSIA provides that “[f]oreign states are generally immune from suit in
United States courts.” Triple A Int'l, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 721 F.3d 415, 416 (6th
Cir. 2013). If the FSIA applies, it “‘is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state
in federal court.’” Glob. Tech., Inc. v. Yubei (XinXiang) Power Steering Sys. Co., 807 F.3d 806,
811 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 314, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 176 L.Ed.2d

1047 (2010).
Generally, if a state is a “foreign state,” there is a presumption of immunity unless a specific
exception applies. Id. Here, the State of Israel is a “foreign state” under the FSIA. See, e.g., Doe
I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 101 (D.D.C. 2005). Thus, unless a specified exception
applies, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against the State of
Israel. Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 145 S. Ct. 480, 488 (2025) (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,
507 U.S. 349, 355, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993)); see also Glob. Tech., Inc., 807 F.3d
at 811 (finding the defendant foreign state “is therefore presumed to be immune from suit, and the
burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to rebut this presumption by showing that an enumerated
exception applies. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to [the plaintiff] to demonstrate that
its actions do not satisfy the claimed exception.”).
Plaintiff failed to respond to the Israel Defendants Motion to Dismiss and assertion of
immunity. Nonetheless, there is one exception worth addressing with respect to Plaintiff’s
allegations: the tortious activity exception. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a). The tortious activity

exception applies to a tortious act:
(1) “occurring in the United States”; (2) “caused by [a] tortious act or omission”;
(3) where the alleged acts or omissions were those of a “foreign state or of any
official or employee of that foreign state”; and (4) those acts or omissions were
done within the scope of tortfeasor's employment.

Qandah v. Johor Corp., 799 F. App'x 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556
F.3d 361, 378 (6th Cir. 2009)). The Sixth Circuit interprets the first requirement as “mandating
that the entire tort occur in the United States. Id. Here, however, Plaintiff’s claim arises from
conduct in Israel. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 115). This Court thus finds the State of Israel immune.
As to the Israeli Officials, they are entitled to immunity governed by common-law
principles of foreign sovereign immunity Qandah, 799 F. App'x at 360 (citing Samantar v. Yousuf,
560 U.S. 305, 324-25 (2010)). Similar to the analysis of acts by United States officials in their
official capacity, the Supreme Court finds that “actions against foreign officials in their official
capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself because the state is the real
party in interest.” Id. (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010)). As the Israel
Defendants explained in their Motion, the Israeli Officials are current or former officials of a
foreign government alleged to have committed wrongful acts in their official capacities. (ECF No.
34 at 16). This includes judges on the Israeli Court of Appeals, Israel Supreme court, the civil
family court, and in the in the Tel Aviv Rabbinical Court. . (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27–32).
Based on Plaintiff's limited pro se Complaint, foreign sovereign immunity applies to the
State of Israel, and common-law immunity applies to the Israeli Officials. Claims against the
Israeli Defendants are thus dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, The Federal Defendants’ motions to dismiss in their
individual and official capacities (ECF Nos. 29, 33) are GRANTED. Israel Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss is also GRANTED (ECF No. 34). Accordingly, the following defendants are
DISMISSED:
e Shlomo Shtasman,
e Anat Baron,
e Naftali Shilo,
e Yariv Levin
e State of Israel
e Antony Blinken
e Thomas Nides
IT ISSO ORDERED.
4é MARTY “| ale
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: March 31, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10836546. Public record. Not legal advice.