# Huff v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · March 31, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10835894

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 31, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Monday, 21 Marcn, 2UL9 □□□
Clerk, U.S. District Court, IL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
BRESHAUNA HUFF, )
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. ) Case No. 23-cv-2290
)
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE )
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS d/b/a _+)
THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT)
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, )
Defendant. )
OPINION
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 6). For the following reasons, Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Breshauna Huff filed a thirteen-count complaint against Defendant The
Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois d/b/a The University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign (“Defendant” or “the University”). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff began working for the
University in the Building Services Department in August of 2016. (Doc. 1 at 2). She
claims she worked for Defendant for about five years before Defendant began retaliating
against her to due to her health issues. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that, based on guidelines she had received, she believed she would
have access to intermittent and maternity leave for her high risk pregnancy. (Id.) Upon
requesting the time, however, Plaintiff was denied leave and subsequently disciplined.
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(Id.) Plaintiff contends she was discriminated against and harassed throughout her
pregnancy including at least up until the time she filed her complaint. (Id.)
While Plaintiff alleges she worked enough hours to qualify under the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., she was denied leave which led to
the loss of seniority for having unexcused, unpaid time. (Id. at 3). Thus, Plaintiff was
required to use sick time and vacation time to attend doctors’ appointments. ([d.) Plaintiff
claims she was micromanaged and questioned about “non-authorized breaks,” even
though she was permitted to take breaks as needed. (Id.)
Plaintiff informed the University she was taking off work early due to pregnancy
complications and provided Defendant’s agents with her doctor’s note. (Id.) Defendant
knew that, while Plaintiff had not yet given birth to her child, she still began receiving
parental pay from August 23, 2021, to October 3, 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff contends she was
disciplined because she did not have FMLA or parental leave for the last two weeks after
giving birth. ([d.) Specifically, Plaintiff was written up for being out on maternity leave
during the time frame that her child was born. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges she received an “informal corrective action in the form of a
Constructive Contract” on November 1, 2021. (Id.) She received a “Performance
Improvement Discussion” in January 2022 due to unexcused absences. (Id. at 4).
Defendant admits that Plaintiff's “ pending disciplinary action due to unexcused absences
in May 2022 was held in abeyance at the time Ms. Huff filed this action.” (Id.) Throughout
this period and continuing to the present time, Plaintiff felt targeted, harassed, and
discriminated against by the University. (Id.)
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Plaintiff now seeks damages and requests that the University restore her seniority
for the time she lost. Counts I, III, and V of Plaintiff's Complaint are claims pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seg. (“ADA”). Counts II,
IV, and VI are corresponding state law claims under the Illinois Human Rights Act
(“THRA”). Count VII includes claims for interference/retaliation and discrimination in
violation of the FMLA. Counts VIII and IX are claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for retaliation
and gender/pregnancy discrimination. Counts X and XII are claims for
gender/ pregnancy discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.. Counts XI and XIII are corresponding claims under the
THRA. Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims except for the FMLA
interference/ retaliation claim asserted in Count VII.
Il. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends Plaintiff's claims under the IHRA should be dismissed under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity based on Defendant's status as a state university.
Defendant also asserts Plaintiff's claims under § 1981 should be dismissed for multiple
reasons, including that the claims are based solely on disability and gender and not race.
Furthermore, Defendant alleges Plaintiff's ADA and Title VII claims should be dismissed
because the allegations in the complaint are not encompassed within Plaintiff's EEOC
charge of discrimination.
In her response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff moves to voluntarily dismiss her
§ 1981 claim. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to Counts VIII and
IX.
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A. Legal Standard
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. See
Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). When considering a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and construing all
reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Id. To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need
only provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing she is entitled to relief and
giving defendants fair notice of the claims. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir.
2011). However, the complaint must set forth facts that plausibly demonstrate a claim for
relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that
alleges factual content from which the court can reasonably infer that defendants are
liable for the misconduct alleged. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Merely
reciting the elements of a cause of action or supporting claims with conclusory statements
is insufficient to state a claim. See id. The complaint must do more than assert a right to
relief that is “speculative.” See Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011).
B. THRA Claims and Sovereign Immunity
Defendant moves to dismiss Counts II, IV, VI, XI, and XIII, each of which is
brought under the IHRA, on the basis of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides, “The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI. Subject to certain exceptions, the Eleventh Amendment
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has been interpreted to prohibit “suits against a state, whether by its own citizens or
citizens of another state.” Gerlach v. Rokita, 95 F.4th 493, 499 (7th Cir. 2024). For claims
where plaintiff seeks a monetary judgment, “only congressional abrogation or waiver by
the state itself can over a state’s sovereign immunity.” Id. “Congress’ intent to abrogate
the States’ immunity from suit must be obvious from a clear legislative statement.”
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). This immunity extends to the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.
Carmody v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 893 F.3d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 2018).
Under the IIlinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act, “the State of Illinois shall not be
made a defendant or party in any court,” except as provided in certain statutes. 745 ILCS
§ 5/1. The IHRA is not mentioned as an exception to the State Lawsuit Immunity Act.
745 ILCS § 5/1.5; see also Harris v. Illinois, 753 F. Supp.2d 734, 740-41 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(dismissing IHRA claim against state agency as barred by sovereign immunity); Sanders
v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 2023 WL 3285605, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 5, 2023) (“Illinois has not
consented to lawsuits brought against it under the IHRA thereby barring Plaintiff's
claims.”) .
In arguing against dismissal, Plaintiff makes a policy argument that institutional
interests should not be prioritized over the rights and welfare of individuals and her
THRA claims should be permitted to proceed. Regardless of the merits of sovereign
immunity as a policy in these circumstances, Congress has not abrogated and the State
has not waived its immunity from suit under the IHRA. Therefore, the Court grants

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II, IV, VI, XI, and XIII based on sovereign
immunity.
C. Title VII/ADA Claims and Exhaustion of Remedies
Defendant contends Plaintiff's ADA claims in Counts I, III, and V and her Title VII
claims in Counts X and XII should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Specifically, Defendant alleges Plaintiff’s Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) Charge of Discrimination does not match the allegations in her
complaint. Plaintiff’s charge, which is attached to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,!
indicates that the discrimination began taking place on November 12, 2021, and
concluded on May 2, 2022. (Doc. 6-1). In describing her claim, Plaintiff stated:
I began my employment with Respondent in or around August 2016. My
current position is Building Service Worker. Respondent was aware of my
high-risk pregnancy. I requested an intermittent and maternity leave,
which were denied. Subsequently, I was disciplined. I believe I have been
discriminated against because of my sex, female (pregnancy), in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. I also believe I have
been discriminated against because of my disability, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.
Id.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges she was on parental leave from August 23, 2021, to
October 3, 2021. Defendant alleges Plaintiff's claims in the complaint are based on: (1)
Defendant's actions prior to Plaintiff going on parental leave; (2) Defendant’s actions
before/during Plaintiffs parental leave; and (3) Plaintiff receiving discipline on

‘In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court can consider the charge, which is central to
Plaintiff's complaint and mentioned within it. See O’Brien v. Village of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616,
621 (7th Cir. 2020).
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November 1, 2021. Defendant contends these claims fall outside the allegations of the
charge as to both the timeline and substantive nature of the discrimination. Given that
the charge only alleges discrimination that occurred after Plaintiff returned from parental
leave, Defendant argues any allegations of discrimination occurring prior to November
12, 2021, and prior to Plaintiff's return from leave are not reasonably related to the charge
on its face.
Upon receiving a right to sue letter, a plaintiff in federal court “may bring only
those claims that were included in her EEOC charge, or that are like or reasonably related
to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.” Chaidez v. Ford Motor
Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
This requirement affords the EEOC and employee an opportunity to settle the matter
while also ensuring that the employer has adequate notice of the challenged conduct. Id.
at 1004.
“Claims are like or reasonably related when (1) there is a reasonable relationship
between the allegations in the charge and the claims in the complaint and (2) the claim in
the complaint can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the
allegations in the charge.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The charge
and complaint must at least describe the same conduct and involve the same individuals.
Id. at 1004. A plaintiff cannot bring new claims that are inconsistent with the claim in her
charge, even if the same parties and facts are involved. Id. at 1004-05. The determination
of whether the complaint and EEOC charge include claims that are “like or reasonably
related to” one another “requires a careful examination and comparison of the charges
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and the complaint.” Id. at 1005. When, as here, the charge was initiated by a nonlawyer,
courts should construe the claims in the EEOC charge liberally. Id. at 1005 n.3.
Plaintiff cites Thomas v. Chicago Teachers’ Pension Fund, 2022 WL 17543703 (7th Cir.
Dec. 6, 2022), a discrimination case wherein Thomas listed October 26, 2020, as both the
earliest and latest date of discrimination and claimed it was a “continuing action.” Id. at
“1. The only other date mentioned in the charge was Thomas’s beginning date of
employment on March 9, 2015. Id. The defendant in Thomas sought dismissal of Thomas’s
claim in the complaint that he was denied a promotion in February 2020 because that date
was not referenced in the charge. Id. at *3. The Seventh Circuit determined that the
absence of the February 2020 date in the charge was not fatal and the charge did not need
to include “every fact that, individually or in combination, forms the basis” of the suit.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court further noted that the
charge referenced “a failure to promote, and February 2020 falls within 300 days of the
charge.” Id. The charge and complaint “describe the same conduct (failure to promote)
and implicate the same company.” /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held
the allegations were sufficient to establish Thomas exhausted his administrative remedies
under a liberal reading of his charge, because Thomas had provided the “minimum”
allegation about the same conduct and same employer. Id. at *4.
As in Thomas, the dates on which Plaintiff alleges she was discriminated against,
including the disciplinary action on November 1, 2021, appear to have occurred within
300 days of the filing of her EEOC charge on June 3, 2022. While some of the dates of
actions referenced in the complaint are uncertain and others relate to her FMLA-related
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claims which need not be exhausted, Plaintiff alleges in her response that the acts of
discrimination occurred within 300 days of filing her charge. Furthermore, the allegations
in Plaintiff's charge are reasonably related to the allegations in her complaint, particularly
when the charge is interpreted liberally. Both documents address the primary issue of
discrimination arising from Plaintiff's pregnancy and reference the same individuals,
thereby establishing the requisite nexus between the administrative charge and
complaint. At the very least, the claims in the complaint could be expected to grow out
of the EEOC’s investigation of the charge. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to as to Counts I, III, V, X, and XII is denied.
lil. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's IHRA
claims and her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is GRANTED Counts II, IV, VI, VIII, IX, XI,
and XIII are hereby dismissed. Defendant’s Motion is DENIED as to Counts I, IIL, V, X,
and XII. Defendant shall file an answer or other responsive pleading within 14 days of
the entry of this Order.
ENTER: March 31, 2025 eA
(ZOLLEIGAR. LAWLESS
fp N ITED SHA ES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10835894. Public record. Not legal advice.