# Williams v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · March 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10834831

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 28, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTINE WILLIAMS, as )
Administrator ad Litem for the Estate )
of Sylvainus Cole, III, Deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-01074-JDB-jay
)
CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE, LLC, )
CORECIVIC, INC., ALEXIE PRUITT, )
CHERTERICA NEAL and JOHN DOES, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT

Before the Court is the October 8, 2024, motion of the Defendants, CoreCivic of Tennessee,
LLC, CoreCivic, Inc., Alexie Pruitt, and Cherterica Neal, to dismiss the Plaintiff’s, Christine
Williams, as Administrator ad Litem for the Estate of Sylvanius Cole, III, Deceased, amended
complaint. (Docket Entry (“D.E.) 24.) Plaintiff has responded (D.E. 27) and Defendant replied
(D.E. 28). For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Sylvanius Cole, III was an inmate in the custody of Whiteville Correctional Facility (the
“WCF”) before he tragically passed away on April 3, 2023. (D.E. 20 at PageID 363, 365, 369–

1 The following facts are derived from Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (D.E. 20) and are
accepted as true for purposes of this motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); see also Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich.,
Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th
Cir. 2000)) (explaining that when a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the amended complaint
is the controlling pleading).
70.) The WCF is a private prison owned, operated, maintained, managed, and controlled by
Defendants CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC and CoreCivic, Inc. (collectively, “CoreCivic”). (Id. at
PageID 363.) CoreCivic has statutory authority to operate private prisons in the State of Tennessee
pursuant to the Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-24-101 through
41-24-119, and is required to operate the the WCF in compliance with Tennessee law and their

contractual obligations. (Id. at PageID 364.) Plaintiff alleges that CoreCivic acted under the color
of state law at all times relevant to this action. (Id.) Defendants Alexie Pruitt, correctional officer
at the WCF, Cherterica Neal, correctional officer at the WCF, and John Does were employed by
CoreCivic at the time of Cole’s death and were acting under the color of state law and in the course
and scope of their employment with the WCF. (Id.)
On April 3, 2023, at approximately 5:19 p.m., Defendant Pruitt escorted Roderickus Tate
to cell 206 in the KD pod and secured him there with Cole without Tate undergoing a proper search.
(Id. at PageID 369.) Consequently, Tate was able to bring fentanyl into the cell; fentanyl that
Plaintiff alleges “was brought into the prison by another person due to the lack of sufficient staffing

and searches at the WCF.” (Id.) For the next hour and a half no cell checks, security sweeps, or
head counts were conducted of KD pod. (Id.) At some point during that time, Cole ingested the
fentanyl “and began to have an adverse reaction cause by an overdose.” (Id.) Neal entered KD
Pod at approximately 6:50 p.m. and heard inmates yelling in the upper tier. (Id.) As Neal
approached cell 206, she saw Cole on the floor and Tate attempting to administer chest
compressions. (Id.) At 6:56 p.m. Neal called a medical code for a possible overdose. (Id. at
PageID 370.) After calling the code, she did not administer first aid or medical care to Cole. (Id.)
Medical staff arrived at the cell about three minutes later and immediately administered Naloxone
(“Narcan”) and began CPR. (Id. at PageID 368, 370.) Despite these efforts, Cole remained
unresponsive and was taken to the WCF medical clinic. (Id. at PageID 370.) At some point
thereafter, emergency medical services were contacted and Cole was transported to Bolivar
General where he died from fentanyl and tramadol toxicity. (Id. at PageID 365, 369.)
During his time at the WCF, Cole “was addicted to drugs and had essentially unfettered
access to illegal substances.” (Id. at PageID 365.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew of the

“wide availability and accessibility” that the WCF inmates had to these substances, and,
specifically, of Cole’s addiction and access to these illegal substances. (Id.) The deceased would
routinely refuse periodic drug tests, would test positive for illegal drugs when tests were
administered, and suffered a prior opioid drug overdose while in JE pod on March 18, 2023. (Id.
at PageID 365, 370.) After the March 18 overdose and following a denial of admittance into the
withdrawal management unit, Cole was moved to KD pod and placed on the waitlist for a
Therapeutic Community program. (Id. at PageID 368, 370.) Plaintiff submits that Corecivic did
not investigate the source of the drugs on which he overdosed. (Id. at PageID 381.)
Plaintiff attributes Cole’s death to CoreCivic engaging in a purposeful staffing shortage,

“inadequate supervision, inadequate medical care, and improper inmate segregation practices,” in
order to maximize profits. (D.E. 20 at PageID 376.) According to the complaint, CoreCivic’s
insufficient staffing led to an increased presence of illegal substances in the WCF, “because
existing staff was not sufficient to conduct proper security searches of individuals entering the
prison, including searches of corrections staff.” (Id. at PageID 366–67.) In the period immediately
preceding Cole’s death, March and April of 2023, the WCF was allegedly understaffed and
overcrowded, with “nearly 40% of critical corrections positions vacant,” while at “101% of its
operational capacity for inmates.” (Id. at PageID 367–68.) The staffing shortage contributed to a
lack of searches, sweeps, and inspections within the prison, a decrease in drug rehabilitation and
prevention programs within the facility, and the inability for staff to timely respond to and address
emergencies. (Id. at PageID 367–68.) The lack of searches and sweeps provided inmate Tate the
opportunity to bring fentanyl into his shared cell with Cole, which, combined with CoreCivic’s
failure to provide Narcan to corrections officers at the WCF, ultimately led to Cole’s overdose and
death. (Id. at PageID 371–72, 379.)

Plaintiff refers to three performance audit reports on the WCF in her complaint, issued in
2017, 2020, and 2023. (Id. at PageID 372.) These audits, conducted by the Tennessee Comptroller
of the Tennessee Department of Correction, detailed the WCF’s staffing shortages. (Id. at PageID
372, 375.) Specifically, the 2017 audit “found that 79 officers were required to cover 17 positions
during a shift, but on average the facility only provided 57 officers per shift.” (Id. at PageID 375.)
The 2020 audit report stated that “low staffing coupled with frequent overtime impacted
management’s ability to provide safe and secure facilities, especially in emergencies.” (Id. at
PageID 372.) The audit found that there were 26 vacant correctional officer positions and 75
overall vacant positions. (Id. at PageID 373.) Plaintiff maintains that these incidents of

understaffing demonstrate that CoreCivic “had a custom and practice of being deliberately
indifferent to the health and safety of inmates, including [Cole].” (Id. at PageID 376.)
Finally, Plaintiff brings claims against Pruitt and Neal in their individual capacities.
Plaintiff contends that Pruitt knew that because of the widespread availability of illegal substances
at the WCF, inmate Tate “was likely to possess drugs and bring them to [Cole]” if he was not
properly searched and that a failure to search put Cole at a serious risk of death from an overdose.
(Id. at PageID 381.) Pruitt was deliberately indifferent “to [Cole’s] rights by failing to search Mr.
Tate,” resulting in Tate bringing fentanyl into the shared cell and Cole’s death. (Id. at PageID 384.)
Likewise, Neal knew that due to the proliferation of drugs at the WCF, absent monitoring and
supervision through regular sweeps and cell checks, Cole was likely to obtain drugs, putting him
at serious risk of death. (Id. at PageID 382.) Neal also knew that in the event of an overdose,
calling medical would not be enough to save Cole’s life, rather he would need Narcan to be
administered immediately. (Id.) Neal was deliberately indifferent “to [Cole’s] rights by failing to
conduct timely cell checks, sweeps and/or head counts which allowed more than an hour and a

half to pass from the time Mr. Tate brought illegal drugs into [Cole’s] cell and . . . calling a medical
code without providing Narcan or any other medical care.” (Id. at PageID 384.)
In Plaintiff’s amended complaint, she asserts claims based on failure to protect, failure to
supervise, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and Monell liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, as well as negligence pursuant to Tennessee common law. (Id. at PageID 383–87.) Plaintiff
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at
PageID 388–89.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In determining if
dismissal is appropriate, the court “must accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as
true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Bassett
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). “However, ‘a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation’ need not be accepted as true.” Gavitt v. Born, 835 F.3d 623, 640
(6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To survive, “a complaint must state a claim to relief that rises ‘above the speculative level’
and is ‘plausible on its face.’” Luis, 833 F.3d at 625 (quoting Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579
F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Because it is “context-specific,” a court
must rely upon its experience and common sense to ascertain whether a claim is plausible.
Creative Bus., Inc. v. Covington Specialty Ins. Co., 559 F. Supp. 3d 660, 665 (W.D. Tenn. 2021)

(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “[I]f it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts . . . that would entitle [them] to relief, then . . . dismissal is proper.” Smith v. Lerner, Sampson
& Rothfuss, L.P.A., 658 F. App’x 268, 272 (6th Cir. 2016) (third alteration in original) (quoting
Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507, 515 (6th Cir. 1999)). Although a court typically
should not regard matters outside the pleadings, it “may consider exhibits attached to the
complaint, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to
defendant’s motion to dismiss, [if] they are referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims
contained therein.” Gavitt, 835 F.3d at 640 (first citing Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d
768, 774 (6th Cir. 2015); and then citing Bassett, 528 F.3d at 430). The amended complaint

references four exhibits. Although no exhibits are attached to the amended complaint, the original
complaint did include Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and a reading of the amended complaint makes clear
that its references are to those originally filed documents. Exhibit 4 is addressed in the next
section.
III. ANALYSIS
a. The 2023 Audit
Before evaluating Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the merits, the Court must determine
whether it can consider the December 2023 performance audit report as part of the pleadings. In
paragraph 5.70, Williams states that a copy of the “Department of Correction, December 2023,
Performance Audit Report” is attached to the amended complaint at Exhibit “4.” (D.E. 20 at
PageID 372.) However, Plaintiff failed to attach this exhibit. (See id.) She refers to this exhibit
explicitly at two other times, in paragraphs 5.77 and 5.80. (Id. at PageID 373–74.) In a footnote
in their motion to dismiss, Defendants state, “[t]hough referenced as ‘Exhibit 4’ in the Amended
Complaint, it does not appear that Plaintiff actually filed the 2023 Audit with the Amended

Complaint” and provide the Court with a link to a PDF of the 2023 audit that was published on the
State of Tennessee Comptroller’s website. (D.E. 24-1 at PageID 412.) Defendants also refer to
the audit in the body of their motion to dismiss. (Id.)
As explained above, at the motion to dismiss stage, a court should not consider matters
outside the pleadings, with certain exceptions. Gavitt, 835 F.3d at 640. If matters outside the
pleadings are considered, then the motion to dismiss must be converted into one for summary
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Sixth Circuit has adopted a “liberal view of what matters fall
within the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).” Armengau v. Cline, 7 F. App’x 336, 344 (6th
Cir. 2001). “If referred to in a complaint and central to the claim, documents attached to a motion

to dismiss form part of the pleadings . . . courts may also consider public records, matters of which
a court may take judicial notice, and letter decisions of governmental agencies.” Id. (citing
Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999)). Materials which “merely ‘fill in
the contours and details’ of a complaint . . . add nothing new and may be considered without
converting the motion to one for summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Year v. Goodwill Indus.-
Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997)).
The 2023 audit report is the type of document that courts have found to be appropriate for
judicial notice at the motion to dismiss stage. A court may “judicially notice a fact that is not
subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s jurisdiction;
or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201. A court “may take judicial notice on its own; or . . . must take
judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Id.
Additionally, “the Court may take judicial notice of public records and government documents
available from reliable sources on the Internet.” Roane Cnty v. Jacobs Eng. Grp., Inc., No. 3:19-

cv-206-TAV-HBG, 2020 WL 2025613, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2020) (quoting Mitchell v. Tenn.
Valley Auth.¸ No. 3:14-CV-360-TAV-HBG, 2015 WL 1962203, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 30,
2015)) (taking judicial notice of a memorandum published on the Tennessee Valley Authority’s
website); Grimes v. Navigant Consulting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 906, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“[A]
district court may take judicial notice of well-publicized stock prices.” (quoting Ganino v. Citizens
Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 n.8 (2d Cir. 2000)); Cali v. E. Cost Aviation Servs., Ltd., 178 F.
Supp. 2d 276, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (taking judicial notice of documents from Pennsylvania state
agencies and Federal Aviation Administration). Here, the 2023 audit report is cited in the amended
complaint to support Plaintiff’s contention that CoreCivic engaged in a practice of understaffing

that led to a proliferation of illegal substances within the WCF and ultimately led to the death of
Sylvanius Cole, III, making it central to her claim. Moreover, the report was published by the
Comptroller of the State of Tennessee, has been made available to the public on the State of
Tennessee’s government website, and the parties have not disputed its authenticity. (See D.E. 20
& 24-1.) Thus, the Court will take judicial notice of the 2023 audit report and will not convert the
motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. The parties are reminded that, under Local
Rule 7.1, “[a]ll documents referenced as exhibits or attachments to an electronically filed
document shall be submitted in electronic form, as electronic attachments to the main document.”
L.R. 7.1.
b. § 1983 Claims
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” To state a claim under that section, a
plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights “secured by the ‘Constitution and

laws’ of the United States,” and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting under color of state
law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). Plaintiff alleges violations of Cole’s
rights to be protected and to adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to
demonstrate that Cole suffered a constitutional deprivation.
i. CoreCivic Defendants
The Sixth Circuit has explained that “a private corporation that performs the traditional
state function of operating a prison acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” Thomas
v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Street v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810,
814 (6th Cir. 1996)). The standards for assessing municipal liability are applied to claims against
private corporations that operate prisons or provide medical care to prisoners. Id. at 748–49; Street,
102 F.3d at 817–18. CoreCivic “cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.”

Braswell v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978)). To prevail on a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic,
Plaintiff “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’
behind the alleged deprivation” of Cole’s rights. Id. (citing Miller v. Sanilac, 606 F.3d 240, 254–
55 (6th Cir. 2010)).
As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
[l]ocating a “policy” ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those
deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or
of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.
Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a “custom” that has not been formally
approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to
liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force
of law.
Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997) (citations omitted). Further, “[a]
custom can be one of action or inaction and need not be formally approved by the entity.” Schenk
ex rel. Ev M v. Thomas, NO. 22-cv-01268-STA-jay, 2023 WL 5108594, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 9,
2023) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 404 (1989)). A “causal connection”
between the custom or policy and the alleged constitutional violation must be established for
liability to attach. Id. (quoting Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985)). “Thus, a
plaintiff must ‘identify the policy, connect the policy to the [entity] itself, and show that the
particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.’” Id. (quoting Garner v.
Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
A. Failure to Protect
The threshold question is whether Plaintiff has alleged an underlying constitutional
violation. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a
duty on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)); see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII. An
Eighth Amendment violation consists of both objective and subjective components.
“The objective prong of a failure-to-protect claim requires an analysis of the risk to the
injured party before the alleged injury occurred. This analysis must consider the likelihood of harm
to the injured party in the context of the circumstances that led to the injury.” Zakora v. Chrisman,
44 F.4th 452, 469 (6th Cir. 2022) (first citing Reedy v. West, 988 F.3d 907, 909, 912–14 (6th Cir.
2021); and then citing Schack v. City of Taylor, 177 F. App’x 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2006)). Death
following an overdose does not “independently establish the objective prong.” Id. at 470; see also
Caraway v. CoreCivic of Tenn., LLC, 98 F.4th 679, 685 (6th Cir. 2024) (“The relevant

constitutional ‘injury’ is the exposure to an objectively excessive risk, not any physical harm that
befalls the inmate because of that risk.”) In Zakora, the Sixth Circuit held that
simple exposure to drugs, without more, does not violate contemporary standards
of decency and thus does not satisfy the objective prong. Prison officials are not
required to show that they have prevented all drugs from entering their facility in
order to be protected from liability. Instead, we hold that unfettered access to drugs
in a prison, as evidenced here by the officials’ failure to promptly investigate the
two prior overdoses in Zakora’s C-Unit, is sufficiently serious to satisfy the
objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim.
44 F.4th at 472. In Caraway, the circuit court explained that three alleged facts drove their
conclusion in Zakora:
First, the complaint contained detailed allegations about the “widespread presence
of drugs” at Zakora’s facility. Second, in the two days before Zakora’s overdose,
two other inmates in his twelve-to-sixteen-inmate unit had also overdosed. Third,
prison officials failed to investigate those overdoses. Taken together, those factual
allegations permitted the reasonable inference that Zakora had “unfettered access
to deadly drugs” in prison, creating an objectively excessive risk of overdose.
98 F.4th at 684 (citations omitted).
The first key fact present in Zakora is arguably present here. While Plaintiff’s claim of a
“widespread presence of drugs” in the WCF is not supported by the same type of “detailed
allegations” as were present in Zakora, see 44 F.4th at 461 (alleging basketballs containing illegal
drugs were being tossed over the fence of the facility and that a prisoner had informed an inspector
at the facility of a “drug-smuggling” ring and provided details “of how the drugs were coming in
and who was providing them”), she does contend that Cole “would routinely refuse periodic drug
tests, would test positive for illegal drugs when drug tests were administered, and suffered a prior
opioid drug overdose on March 18, 2023.” (D.E. 20 at PageID 365.) These allegations plausibly
allege a widespread presence of drugs at the WCF. However, she has not alleged the other two
key facts present in Zakora. She points to Cole’s prior overdose that was not investigated; but,
unlike in Zakora, where the prior overdoses and the failure to investigate the same took place in

the same small unit and in the two days prior to Zakora’s overdose, Cole’s prior overdose and the
alleged failure to investigate took place in a different unit, two weeks before. There are no
allegations of prior overdoses or access to drugs in the KD unit where Cole was housed at the time
of his fatal overdose. Importantly, analysis of the objective prong “must consider the likelihood
of harm to the injured party in the context of the circumstances that led to the injury.” Zakora, 44
F.4th at 472 (emphasis added) (first citing Reedy, 988 F.3d at 909, 912–914; and then citing Schack,
177 F. App’x at 472). The relevant context here is the KD unit in the time immediately preceding
Cole’s overdose and death and Plaintiff has not alleged a presence of illegal substances nor a failure
to investigate in this pod.

Plaintiff insists that CoreCivic engaged in deliberate understaffing, which led to the
deprivation of Cole’s constitutional rights. (D.E. 20 at PageID 385–86.) As explained in Caraway,
“the failure to adequately staff a prison—even a deliberate failure—is not itself a constitutional
violation.” 98 F.4th at 685 (citing Agramonte v. Shartle, 491 F. App’x 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Instead,
a § 1983 plaintiff must plausibly show a causal connection between the defendant’s
act or omission and his injury. In a failure-to-protect claim, the injury is deliberate
exposure to excessive risk of serious harm. Thus, the plaintiff must show that the
defendants’ unconstitutional act or omission failed to alleviate the excessive risk he
faced.
Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff avers that “[l]ack of sufficient staffing directly leads to the increase
of illegal substances, including fentanyl, within prisons because existing staff was not sufficient to
conduct proper security searches of individuals entering the prison, including searches of
corrections staff.” (D.E. 20 at PageID 366–67.) These allegations are similar to those found to be
insufficient in Caraway. 98 F.4th at 686 (“The complaint contains only generalized allegations that
Whiteville’s understaffing ‘led to’ rampant drug use, apparently in part because officials couldn’t
perform adequate head counts and inspections. That kind of conclusory statement, unaccompanied

by factual support, receives no presumption of truth.” (first citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; and then
citing Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986)). Plaintiff does claim that
understaffing “contributed to the lack of searches, sweeps, and inspections within the prison to
discover the presence of illegal contraband, including fentanyl and other drugs, which had already
been brought into the prison” and attempts to support this claim with the assertion that an hour and
a half went by without a head count or security sweep prior to Cole’s death, in violation of the set
requirement. (Id. at PageID 367, 371.) However, this assertion alone is insufficient to demonstrate
more than a “mere possibility” that understaffing is what led to the violation and Cole’s death.
Caraway, 98 F.4th at 686.

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of “sufficiently serious” to
satisfy the objective prong of the failure-to-protect claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Even if the objective prong were satisfied, Plaintiff fails to plead the subjective prong. To
be held liable under the deliberate-indifference standard, a prison official must “know[] of and
disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. The official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn and that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Zakora, 44 F.4th at 472 (citation omitted). “A factfinder may
conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was
obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (citation omitted). “[T]he correct inquiry is whether [the
defendant] had knowledge about the substantial risk of serious harm to a particular class of persons,
not whether he knew who the particular victim turned out to be.” Zakora, 44 F.4th at 472 (second
alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff contends that “Defendants, collectively and individually, had actual knowledge of

[Cole’s] drug addiction, prior overdose, and the serious risk that illegal drugs in the WCF would
pose to [him]” and that they disregarded this risk. (D.E. 20 at PageID 384.) While Plaintiff has
sufficiently pled that, based on Cole’s prior overdose and positive drug screens, Defendants had
knowledge of the risk that illegal substances in the prison posed to him; Plaintiff has not pled that
they disregarded this risk. She cites three performance audit reports for the Department of
Correction, issued in 2017, 2020, and 2023. As the Sixth Circuit recognized in Caraway, the 2017
and 2020 audits indicated that CoreCivic “responded reasonably” to its staffing problem. 98 F.4th
at 687 (noting that the 2017 audit showed increases in officers’ salaries and a reworked training
program and the 2020 audit showed improvement in staffing at “critical posts”); see also (D.E. 1-

7 at PageID 55; D.E. 1-8 at PageID 222.) Moreover, the 2023 report states that, while staffing
shortages remain a concern among CoreCivic facilities, the WCF “showed the most improvement
[in correctional officer vacancy rates] over the two-year period, with a decrease in vacancies of
10% from fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2023.” Division of State Audit, Tenn. Comptroller of the
Treasury, Performance Audit Report: Department of Correction 11, 178 (Dec. 2023). This
improvement occurred during the period of Cole’s incarceration at the WCF. Id.; (D.E. 20 at
PageID 364 (stating Cole began his incarceration at the WCF in 2018).) Finally, as to Cole himself,
after his overdose in the JE pod, he was moved to the KD pod and referred to the withdrawal
management unit. (D.E. 20 at PageID 370.) When that unit could not accept him, Cole was placed
on the waitlist for the therapeutic community program. (Id.) Thus, the complaint demonstrates
that the CoreCivic Defendants responded reasonably to the risk of harm to Cole.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy either component of her
failure-to-protect claim against the CoreCivic Defendants.
B. Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care
Plaintiff next alleges that CoreCivic’s custom or practice of understaffing deprived Cole of

the right to adequate medical care while incarcerated. (D.E. 20 at PageID 383.) Claims for failure
to provide adequate medical care are also reviewed under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
A plaintiff “must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Like claims for failure to
protect, claims for failure to provide adequate medical care consist of objective and subjective
components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson, 501
U.S. at 298. The objective component requires that a prisoner have a “‘sufficiently serious’
medical need.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty.¸ 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004) (first citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; and then cting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125,

127–28 (6th Cir. 1994). “[A] medical need is objectively serious if it is ‘one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 897
(quoting Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also Johnson v.
Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005). The Sixth Circuit has “held that ‘the objective prong
is usually met’ in overdose cases ‘where death results from a failure to provide medical services,
and there is evidence that lay persons, . . . recognized the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Burwell v. City of Lansing, 7 F.4th 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting
Hinneburg v. Miron, 676 F. App’x 483, 486–87 (6th Cir. 2017)). “[I]t is sufficient to show that
[the prisoner] actually experienced the need for medical treatment, and that the need was not
addressed within a reasonable time frame.” Id. at 463 (quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 900). In
cases where an inmate is experiencing symptoms of an overdose, the response time is critical. See,
e.g., id. at 465 (finding the objective component was met where video evidence showed inmate

laid unconscious in his own vomit for two hours without any movement).
Here, Plaintiff contends that there were no “cell checks, security sweeps, or head counts”
within KD pod between 5:19 p.m. and 6:50 p.m. and during that period Cole ingested the drugs
brought to him by Tate and “began to have an adverse reaction caused by an overdose.” (D.E. 20
at PageID 369.) At 6:50 p.m., Neal entered the pod, heard inmates yelling, then approached Cole’s
cell and saw him on the floor with Tate attempting chest compressions. (Id.) At 6:56 p.m., Neal
called a medical code for a possible overdose and medical staff arrived three minutes later. (Id. at
PageID 370.) Cole was administered Narcan, and, because he remained unresponsive, was then
taken to the onsite medical clinic. (Id.) Williams maintains that there was a delay in medical care

due to the failure to conduct a cell check, security sweep, or head count, in the hour and a half
before Neal entered the unit. (Id. at PageID 371.) Plaintiff attributes the alleged failure to timely
respond to CoreCivic’s understaffing. (Id. at PageID 384.) However, Plaintiff does not present
any facts that indicate what physical symptoms of an overdose Cole experienced prior to Neal’s
arrival at his cell or when he began to experience symptoms within the hour and a half without a
cell check. What is submitted is that when Neal heard yelling coming from the area of Cole’s cell,
he arrived at that location within six minutes, and, upon seeing Cole on the floor with Tate giving
chest compressions, called a medical code. (Id. at PageID 369–70.) Three minutes later, medical
staff arrived and administered Narcan. (Id. at PageID 370.) Plaintiff has established that
laypersons recognized the need for medical care; however, she has not proven the denial of the
same. Thus, the objective prong has not been satisfied.
Plaintiff also fails to satisfy the subjective prong. To establish this aspect, she must
demonstrate that the prison official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a “sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. For claims of failure to provide adequate medical

care, a plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a
substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (citing
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 550
(6th Cir. 2009); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997). Deliberate indifference
describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. A prison
official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment unless that person subjectively knows
of an excessive risk of harm to an inmate’s health or safety and disregards that risk. Id. at 837.
“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not”
does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 838.

Plaintiff alleges that the CoreCivic Defendants “were aware that use of Narcan . . . as soon
as possible after an overdose of an opioid, including fentanyl, was necessary to prevent death or
serious injury of inmates” and yet failed to provide Narcan to their corrections officers. (D.E. 20
at PageID 368, 379.) She contends that the “decision not to provide Narcan . . . at the WCF in
March and April of 2023 directly lead to the death of the Decedent by requiring medical staff to
come to [Cole’s] cell after it was too late for the Narcan to reverse the toxic effects of the fentanyl
and tramadol.” (Id. at PageID 379.) Finally, she maintains that the failure to supply officers with
Narcan and denial of timely medical treatment constituted deliberate indifference to Cole’s medical
needs. (Id. at PageID 384–86.)
Like with the failure-to-protect claim, Plaintiff attempts to link CoreCivic’s understaffing
to the denial of timely medical treatment. Despite the conclusory allegation that understaffing led
to a failure to timely respond, she presents no evidence to support this claim. Defendant rightly
notes that there are no facts in the complaint “to show when specifically [Cole] overdosed, how
long he had overdosed when discovered by staff, [or] how more staffing would have allowed staff

to discover [Cole’s] situation sooner.” (D.E. 24-1 at PageID 417.) Moreover, failure to conduct a
timely cell check may rise to the level of negligence but it does not demonstrate deliberate
indifference. See Burwell, 7 F.4th at 471 (“And failing to follow internal policies, without more,
does not constitute deliberate indifference.”) Plaintiff has thus failed to establish a causal link
between understaffing and an alleged denial of timely medical treatment.
Regarding the failure to provide officers with Narcan, the deliberate indifference standard
requires a showing that a prison official both knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to inmate
safety. When evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim, “the Court
must view the surrounding circumstances, including the extent of the injury, the realistic

possibilities of treatment, and the possible consequences to the prisoner of failing to provide
immediate medical attention.” Glen v. Apol, Case No. 1:17-cv-545, 2019 WL 3805476, at *6
(W.D. Mich. July 19, 2019) (citing Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.4 (6th Cir. 1976)). As
detailed above, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to indicate that the CoreCivic
Defendants subjectively knew of the excessive risk of harm to Cole created by the failure to
provide Narcan to prison officials or that this risk was disregarded.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has not satisfied either component of her failure
to provide adequate medical care claim against the CoreCivic Defendants.
C. Monell Liability
Because the Court has not found an underlying constitutional violation, it need not reach
the question of whether liability may be imposed pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).2 Caraway, 98 F.4th at 683 (“The estate
seeks to impose Monell liability on the corporate defendants. But because the complaint doesn’t
allege an underlying constitutional violation, those claims fail.” (citing Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d

600, 622 (6th Cir. 2015)); see also Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) (“There
can be no Monell municipal liability under § 1983 unless there is an underlying unconstitutional
act.”). Even if there were an underlying constitutional violation, as explained in the preceding
sections, Plaintiff has not established a causal connection between CoreCivic’s understaffing or
failure to equip prison officials with Narcan and the alleged violations.
ii. Defendant Pruitt
Plaintiff asserts a failure-to-protect claim against Pruitt. The subjective component for a
failure-to-protect claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that a prison official both “[knew] of
and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Williams
maintains that Pruitt “knew that due to the widespread availability of drugs at the WCF that Mr.
Tate was likely to possess drugs and bring them to [Cole] if he was not properly search[ed] before
being returned to his cell” and that Pruitt’s failure to search Mr. Tate constituted deliberate

indifference. (Id. at PageID 369, 371, 381, 384.) However, Plaintiff has not offered “any factual
details to support [this] conclusion—such as how [Pruitt] obtained that knowledge, when [he]
obtained it, or what that knowledge entailed.” Caraway, 98 F.4th at 686 (citing Zakora, 44 F.4th

2 Plaintiff states that staff were not properly supervised throughout the complaint but always in the context
of her claim that CoreCivic purposefully understaffed the WCF. (See D.E. 20 at PageID 377–78, 383.) It is not
separately pled under Count II of the amended complaint. (See id. at PageID 385–86.) Thus, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to assert Monell liability on a failure to supervise theory.
at 468.) For example, there are no allegations of how Pruitt came to know of the widespread
availability of drugs at WCF, much less how he knew Tate was likely to possess and bring drugs
to Cole. Plaintiff’s general statement does not demonstrate that Pruitt “subjectively knew [Cole]
faced an excessive risk of harm.” Id. (citing Zakora, 44 F.4th at 473.) Accordingly, Williams has
failed to state a failure-to-protect claim against Pruitt and such claim is DISMISSED.

iii. Defendant Neal
Plaintiff asserts claims for failure to protect and failure to provide adequate medical care
against Neal. First, Plaintiff asserts that Neal “knew that due to the widespread availability of
drugs at the WCF that [Cole] would likely obtain drugs if not monitored and supervised through
regular sweeps and cell checks,” that Cole was at risk of a drug overdose, and “that he would likely
be at serious risk of death if he was not monitored and supervised through regular sweeps and cell
checks to respond to any overdose that would occur.” (D.E. 20 at PageID 382.) She maintains
that Neal demonstrated deliberate indifference “by failing to conduct timely cell checks, sweeps
and/or head counts which allowed more than an hour and a half to pass from the time Mr. Tate
brought illegal drugs into [Cole’s] cell.” (Id. at PageID 384.) Again, these allegations fall short
of what is required for the subjective component of a failure-to-protect claim. Plaintiff presents

no facts as to when or how Neal obtained knowledge regarding the widespread presence of drugs
at the WCF, knowledge that Cole “would likely” obtain drugs absent regular sweeps and cell
checks, or knowledge that Cole would likely be at serious risk of death absent timely sweeps and
cell checks. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated Neal’s subjective knowledge of a risk of
serious harm to Cole, the failure-to-protect claim against him is DISMISSED.
Next, Plaintiff asserts that Neal demonstrated deliberate indifference by “calling a medical
code without providing Narcan or any other medical care.” (Id.) As explained above, the
deliberate indifference standard is that the Defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. When Neal heard commotion surrounding
Cole’s cell, he approached the cell, saw Cole on the floor with Tate conducting chest compressions,
then called a medical code for a possible overdose. (D.E. 20 at PageID 369–70.) Rather than
disregard an excessive risk to Cole’s health or safety, on recognizing the need for medical
intervention, Neal summoned the medical staff who then provided Narcan. This action cannot be

said to constitute deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff has thus failed to state a claim for failure to provide adequate medical care against
Neal and such claim is DISMISSED.
iv. John Does
Plaintiff sues Defendants John Does who “are individuals whose true identities are
currently unknown to the Plaintiff, but who are believed to have participated in, facilitated, or
otherwise contributed to the wrongful death and violations alleged.” (D.E. 20 at PageID 379.) She
claims these individuals failed to properly search Tate, were responsible for monitoring KD pod
and responding to emergencies, and ignored Cole’s emergency need for medical help. (Id. at
PageID 380.) The John Does are yet to be identified and the time for service has expired. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(m). The action against these Defendants is thus DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 4(m).
c. State Law Claim
Finally, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claim. Where “there is some basis for original jurisdiction, the default assumption is that the court
will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related claims.” Millinder v. Hudgins, 421 F. Supp.
3d 549, 564 (W.D. Tenn. 2019) (quoting Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705,
716 (6th Cir. 2012)). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides that “[t]he district courts may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.” Because the Court is dismissing all of Plaintiff’s federal claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it declines to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Tennessee common law
claim. See Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 74 (2018) (“When district courts dismiss all
claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, they ordinarily dismiss as
well as all related state claims.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). Therefore, that claim is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the motion of Defendants CoreCivic, Neal, and Pruitt, to dismiss
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of March 2025.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10834831. Public record. Not legal advice.