# Strickland v. City of Las Cruces

> District Court, D. New Mexico · March 27, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10832601

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Mexico
- **Decided:** March 27, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

JONATHAN STRICKLAND,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-cv-116 KG/KRS

CITY OF LAS CRUCES, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on City Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment No. I: Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Regarding Pursuit Intervention Techniques (Count I), (Doc. 63), filed March 3, 2024. Plaintiff
filed his corrected Response, (Doc. 136), on February 6, 2025, and Defendants filed their Reply,
(Doc. 142), on February 20, 2025. This matter is also before the Court on City Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. II: Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment Claims for Failure to Render Medical Care (Count II), (Doc. 65), filed
March 3, 2024. Plaintiff did not file a Response and Defendants filed their Reply, (Doc. 143), on
February 20, 2025. Having considered the briefing and relevant case law, the Court grants
Defendants’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Nos. I and II.
I. Background
This case arises out of an incident in which Las Cruces Police Department (LCPD)
officers, Joshua Savage, Manuel Frias, Nathan Krause, Daniel Benoit, and Anthony Lucero
(Defendant Officers), shot Plaintiff on March 11, 2021. Plaintiff brings claims under Title 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988; the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution; and state law claims of battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and negligence. (Doc. 1). Now, Defendants request the Court dismiss Count I of the Complaint
as it relates to Defendant Officers use of Pursuit Intervention Techniques (PIT) and Count II for
failure to render medical care. (Docs. 63, 65). The Court discusses each in turn.
A. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. I
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by unreasonably seizing Strickland and using excessive force by performing
the PIT maneuver. (Doc. 1) at 10–12. In their Motion, Defendants argue “Defendant Officers
are entitled to qualified immunity for this claim because their use of force against Strickland was
objectively reasonable and, therefore, did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.” (Doc. 63)
at 11.1 Alternatively, Defendants argue they are “entitled to qualified immunity, pursuant to
Wilson, 52 F.3d 1547, because the law was not clearly established at the time of the incident.”
Id. Additionally, Defendants argue, as a matter of law, Strickland’s Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process claim fails and must be dismissed. Id. at 19. Finally, Defendants argue
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Officers Krause, Frias, and Lucero as well as those against

Officer Does 1 through 25 fails because they were not personally involved in the PIT maneuver
and their involvement remains unknown. Id. at 23.
In Response, Plaintiff maintains Defendant Officers “acted unconstitutionally in violation
of the Fourth Amendment[] protections against unreasonable seizure and the use of excessive
force.” (Doc. 136) at 3. Plaintiff, however, agrees the appropriate avenue to pursue an excessive
force claim is through the Fourth Amendment and not the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 3 n.2.
Plaintiff argues Defendants Krause, Frias, and Lucero engaged in unlawful pursuit techniques

1 Defendants’ Motion is limited to claims regarding the PIT maneuver and does not seek
dismissal of claims regarding shots fired at Strickland. (Doc. 63) at 2.
and are not entitled to dismissal. Id. at 26. Plaintiff, however, is “amendable to dismissing
DOE-Defendants at this stage” without prejudice. Id.
In Reply, Defendants first argue Plaintiff’s Response should not be considered because it
continues to violate local rules. (Doc. 142) at 20. Defendants also maintain Defendant Officers
are entitled to summary judgment because there is no admissible evidence demonstrating the

officers violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 23.
Thus, there are two remaining issues: (1) whether Defendant Officers violated Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment rights when performing the PIT maneuver; and (2) whether Defendant
Officers Krause, Lucero, and Frias are entitled to dismissal.
B. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. II
In the Complaint, Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right
by denying Plaintiff medical care. (Doc. 1) at 12. In Defendants’ Motion, they argue Defendant
Officers rendered first aid services on the scene and called for an ambulance before Strickland
was secured. (Doc. 65) at 2. In Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion No. I, Plaintiff states

he “does not oppose Defendants’ motion on the Denial of Medical Care claim.” (Doc. 136) at 1
n.2. Because Plaintiff explicitly stated he does not oppose the motion and failed to file a
response, the Court determines this Motion is unopposed. Thus, the Court grants Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. II, (Doc. 65), and dismisses Count II of Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
II. Undisputed Material Facts
The facts in this section are either undisputed or stated in light most favorable to the
nonmovant, Plaintiff. To the extent proffered facts have been omitted, the Court deems them
immaterial to the Motion.
Plaintiff drove to the Las Cruces Police Department and parked in front of the station
after learning that his then-wife, Brandi Campbell (Brandi), was at the station making a report
against him. (Doc. 136-1) at 2, p. 6, Undisputed Material Fact (UMF) 1. Brandi told Las Cruces
police officers that Strickland: held her hostage using a handgun, held a gun in her mouth and to
her head, threatened to kill her if she went to the police, was involved in a domestic incident the

night before, and had attempted to run her car off the road. (Doc. 63-1) at 2–3; (Doc. 136-1) at
2, p. 6, UMF 2.
At approximately 9:04 a.m., about 30 minutes later, Strickland began to leave the police
station parking lot. (Doc. 63) at 5, ¶ 1; (Doc. 136) at 9–10, ¶ C, H, UMF 3. Defendant Sgt.
Savage directed officers to initiate a felony stop on Strickland. (Doc. 63) at 5, ¶ 2; (Doc. 136) at
10, ¶ I, UMF 4. Following his direction, three police vehicles drove up and stopped in front of
Strickland’s truck when he was driving out of the police station parking lot. (Doc. 63) at 5, ¶ 3;
(Doc. 136) at 11, ¶ J, UMF 5. Defendant Officers engaged their lights and sirens. (Doc. 63) at 6,
¶ 4; (Doc. 136) at 11, ¶ J, UMF 6. Strickland did not stop and instead fled from Defendant
Officers in his vehicle. (Doc. 63-2) at 2, ¶ 15–16, UMF 7.2 Defendant Officers followed

Plaintiff and shortly after, Officer Benoit attempted a PIT maneuver. (Doc. 63) at 6, ¶¶ 6–8;
(Doc. 136) at 9, ¶ K, UMF 8. Officer Benoit attempted three PIT maneuvers against Strickland’s
vehicle, successfully bringing Plaintiff’s vehicle to a stop on the third attempt. (Doc. 63) at 6–8,
¶¶ 8-13; (Doc. 136) at 11, ¶ L, UMF 9. At the time of the third PIT maneuver, Plaintiff’s vehicle
was traveling at 45 miles per hour. (Doc. 63) at 7, ¶ 12; (Doc. 136) at 11, ¶ L, UMF 10. Officers

2 Plaintiff states he disputes this fact but fails to provide any argument or evidence that suggests
it is disputed. It can also be inferred in Plaintiff’s statements of undisputed facts because
Defendant Officers would not need to perform a PIT maneuver had Plaintiff stopped his vehicle.
See (Doc. 136) at 9, ¶ K.
Sgt. Savage and Benoit testified they thought it was safe to perform a PIT maneuver on
Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Doc. 63-1) at 9, UMF 11. Officer Frias testified that a PIT maneuver
performed at over 45 miles per hour is considered deadly force. (Doc. 136-1) at 2, UMF 12.
III. Analysis
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “allows an injured person to

seek damages against an individual who has violated his or her federal rights while acting under
color of state law.” Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 459 (10th Cir. 2013).
“Section 1983 creates no substantive civil rights, only a procedural mechanism for enforcing
them.” Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds
by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). “In defending against § 1983 claims like the ones
at issue here, an official may plead an affirmative defense of qualified immunity.” Maresca v.
Bernalillo Cnty., 804 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2015).
In reviewing a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, the court views
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650,

657 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “Because of the underlying purposes of qualified
immunity, [the Tenth Circuit] review[s] summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity
questions differently from other summary judgment decisions.” Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124,
1128 (10th Cir. 2001). “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must clear two hurdles in order to defeat the defendant's
motion.” Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009). That burden requires a
plaintiff to show that the state official “(1) [] violated a federal statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) the unlawfulness of [the official’s] conduct was clearly established at the time.” District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“[The district court] may decide ‘which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case.’” Quinn v.
Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236,
(2009)). “[I]f the plaintiff fails to establish either prong of the two-pronged qualified-immunity
standard, the defendant prevails on the defense.” A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1134–35 (10th

Cir. 2016) (citing Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 877–78 (10th Cir.
2014) (“[T]he record must clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied his heavy two-part
burden; otherwise, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In considering whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the
district court “considers only the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers.” White v.
Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 77 (2017) (per curiam). A government official can claim qualified immunity
even if the official was mistaken about the facts or the law. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
A. Fourth Amendment Violation
To determine whether Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the Court must

first determine if Defendant Officers PIT maneuver was effectively a seizure. “To state a claim
under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiffs must show both that a ‘seizure’ occurred and that the
seizure was ‘unreasonable.’” Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F. 3d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir.
2000). “A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action
under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
terminates or restrains his freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied.”
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Here, however,
Defendants do not dispute whether Defendant Officers conduct constitutes a seizure, therefore
the inquiry continues to whether the seizure was unreasonable. (Doc. 63) at 12.
Claims of excessive force are analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–97 (1989). “In determining the
reasonableness of the manner in which a seizure is effected, ‘[w]e must balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383

(2007). Among the factors courts should consider in determining whether a police officer
applied excessive force are (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether he is actively resisting
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “The ‘reasonableness’
of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. “The calculus of reasonableness must
embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396–97.

“Deadly force is such force that create[s] a substantial risk of causing death or serious
bodily harm.” Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1313 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). The use of deadly force is considered reasonable “only if a reasonable officer in
Defendants’ position would have had probable cause to believe that there was a threat of serious
physical harm to themselves or to others.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court determines Defendant Officers acted reasonably in performing the PIT
maneuver. Plaintiff was a suspected felon based on the information Defendant Officers learned
from Brandi, alleging domestic violence and use of firearms. UMF 2. As far as Defendant
Officers were concerned, not only did Plaintiff pose a risk to the public by fleeing a traffic stop,
but he also posed an immediate threat to Brandi who had just made a police report against
Strickland. Defendant Officers were under the impression that Strickland was armed. Id.
Moreover, Defendant Officers only began trying to perform the PIT maneuver once Strickland
would not stop his vehicle and subsequently increased acceleration. UMF 7, 8. Thus, the factors
listed above weigh significantly in Defendant Officers’ favor.

Plaintiff argues Defendant Officers executing the PIT maneuver constitutes deadly force.
(Doc. 136) at 18. Plaintiff relies on Defendant Frias’ testimony in which he opines a PIT
maneuver at 45 miles per is considered deadly force. However, Plaintiff confuses Officer Frias’
opinion with a legal conclusion. While the Court acknowledges that it might be against
guideline procedures, Plaintiff does not point to case law or any law which states performing a
PIT maneuver at a speed of 45 miles per hour constitutes deadly force. Plaintiff also confuses
the issue in the present motion. See (Doc. 136) at 25. Here, we are discussing whether the PIT
maneuver alone was reasonable, not whether the PIT maneuver in combination with Defendant
Officers shooting was reasonable. While it is true Plaintiff did not try to flee after his vehicle

was stopped, it was only after the successful PIT maneuver when Plaintiff ended his own pursuit.
Even if the Court determined Defendant Officers’ PIT maneuver was objectively
unreasonable, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity because performing the PIT
maneuver did not violate clearly established law. “For a right to be clearly established there
must be Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent close enough on point to make the
unlawfulness of the officers’ actions apparent.” Mascorro v. Billings, 656 F.3d 1198, 1208 (10th
Cir. 2011). It is also worth noting, the Supreme Court has “‘never found the use of deadly force
in connection with a dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment, let alone to be a
basis for denying qualified immunity’ where an officer reasonably believed he or others were in
danger.” Johnson v. Peay, 704 F. Appx. 738, 743 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 15 (2015)).
Plaintiff states “the Defendant Officers testified to being on notice that engaging in a PIT
maneuver involving speeds of over 45 mph and with more than two police cars is
unconstitutional.” (Doc. 136) at 25. However, Plaintiff provides no citation for such assertion

and has not cited, nor has the Court found, caselaw establishing that an officer may not perform a
PIT maneuver to stop a suspected fleeing felon who they reasonably believed was armed. While
Plaintiff argues that there are guidelines for performing PIT maneuvers which Defendant
Officers did not follow, this does not equate to a violation of clearly established law.
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment on Count I only so far
as Plaintiff alleges the PIT maneuver alone violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
B. Defendant Officers Krause, Lucero, and Frias
Because the Court dismisses Count I as it relates to the PIT maneuver as to all Defendant
Officers, it does not address Defendants Krause, Lucero, and Frias’ involvement in the PIT

maneuver.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment No. I, (Doc. 63), as it relates to Defendant Officers execution of the PIT
maneuver and dismisses Count I only to the extent it alleges the PIT maneuver alone violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court also grants Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment No. II, (Doc. 65), and dismisses Count II.
IT IS SO ORDERED:
(1) Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. I is granted, and Count I is
dismissed only to the extent Plaintiff alleges the PIT maneuver alone violated his
constitutional rights.
(2) Plaintiff’s claims in Count I related to the Fourteenth Amendment are hereby

dismissed.
(3) Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. II is granted and Count II is
hereby dismissed.
(4) The Doe Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.

/s/ KENNETH J. GONZALES3
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3 Please note that this document has been electronically filed. To verify its authenticity, please
refer to the Digital File Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic Filing) accompanying this
document. Electronically filed documents can be found on the court’s PACER public access
system.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10832601. Public record. Not legal advice.