# SPATOLA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10831797

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10831797

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the Court “need[s] from the ALJ not only an expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but also some indication of the evidence which was rejected”’
- finding it “unnecessary” to emphasize contrary evaluations of the plaintiff because “the issue is whether the evidence and contentions presented by the Commissioner met the substantial evidence test’’
- finding ALI’s analysis sufficient when “read as a whole”

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SPENCER S.,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Civil Action No, 24-3932 (RK)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, OPINION
Defendant.

KIRSCH, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Spencer S.’s | (“Spencer” or “Plaintiff’)
appeal from the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (the “Commissioner”) final
decision, which denied Spencer’s request for Supplemental Security Income benefits. (ECF No.
1.) The Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and reaches its
decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, the Court
AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision. .
I. BACKGROUND
In this appeal, the Court must answer the following question: does substantial evidence □
support Administrative Law Judge Donna Krappa’s (“Judge Krappa’’) determination that Spencer
was not disabled?

' The Court identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial only. See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.

A. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Spencer filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits on January
8, 2019. (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 300-06).” The Social Security Administration (the
“Administration”) denied the request initially (7d. at 161-65) and after reconsideration (id. at 171-
73). Spencer requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Ud. at 174.)
Spencer’s first telephonic hearing took place on April 30, 2020, wherein Judge Krappa heard
testimony from Spencer, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert, Tanya Edghill.
(Id. at 84-110.) On October 28, 2020, Judge Krappa issued a written decision finding that Spencer
was not disabled. Ud. at 134-54.) Spencer requested review of the decision by the Appeal’s
Council, and, on May 13, 2021, the Appeals Council remanded the case. (Id. 155-60.) Spencer’s
second telephonic hearing took place on December 9, 2021, and Judge Krappa again heard
testimony from Spencer, represented by an attorney, and a vocational expert, Elaine Cogliano
(“VE”), Ud, at 42-83.) On December 7, 2022, Judge Krappa again determined that Spencer was
not disabled. (Id. at 15-41.) Spencer then requested review of the decision by the Appeals Council,
and this time, the Appeals Council determined that the reasons asserted by Spencer for appeal “do
not provide a basis for changing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.” (/d. at 1.)
This appeal followed. (ECF No. 1.) The Administrative Record was filed on May 17, 2024.
(ECF No. 5.) On June 14, 2024, Spencer filed a moving brief (ECF No. 6, “Pl. Br.”), the
Commissioner responded (ECF No. 8, “Def. Br.”), and Spencer filed a reply (ECF No. 9, “PI.
Rep.”). The appeal is now ready for review by this Court.

2 The Administrative Record (“Record” or “AR”’) is available at ECF Nos. 5-1 through 5-7. This Opinion
will reference only page numbers in the Record without the corresponding ECF numbers.

B. JUDGE KRAPPA’S DECISION
On December 7, 2022, ? Judge Krappa issued a comprehensive 19-paged, single-spaced
decision, which set forth in detail her factual findings and citations to the record evidence,
ultimately substantiating her conclusion that Spencer was not disabled under the prevailing
Administration regulations. (See generally AR at 15-41.) As Judge Krappa explained, Spencer was
born on October 24, 1999, which made her 18 years old on the date of the onset of her alleged
disability, May 4, 2018. (See id. at 19.) Among other things, Spencer is a high school graduate with
significant college credits who worked a number of jobs out of the home, had a driver’s license,
and had long-term interpersonal and romantic relationships. (/d. at 35.)
In reaching her decision, Judge Krappa applied the five-step process for determining
whether an individual is disabled as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). Ud. at 20-21.) At Step
One, Judge Krappa found that Spencer had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
application date, January 8, 2019. (Id. at 21 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.971 et seq.).)* At Step Two,
Judge Krappa found that Spencer suffered from three severe impairments: (1) borderline
personality disorder, (2) depressive disorder, and (3) anxiety disorder. (/d. (citing 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(c)).) At Step Three, Judge Krappa determined that Spencer did not have “an impairment
or combination of impairments” that qualified under the Administration’s listed impairments. (Jd.
at 22-23 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926).) As part of the “Step Three”
determination, Judge Krappa reviewed whether Spencer had extreme or marked limitations that

3 This appeal concerns only Judge Krappa’s December 7, 2022 decision, not her October 28, 2020 decision,
which was remanded by the Appeals Council. (See AR at 134-54, 155-60.) Therefore, the Court need only
review the December 7, 2022 decision herein.
4 Although Spencer did work for pay after January 8, 2019, it is uncontested that “this work activity did not
rise to the level of substantial gainful activity.” Ud. at 21.)

might seriously limit her ability to function independently, appropriately, or effectively on a
sustained basis. (/d. at 22.) In particular, Judge Krappa observed that Spencer, inter alia, “has been
able to perform basic daily living activities, such as performing self-care activities, and cleaning
her room. She also reported that she socialized with her family and her boyfriend; and was able to
attend appointments and online college with little difficulty.” Ud. at 23.) Spencer “attended two
different college programs online .. . [and] has been able to achieve 81 college credits.” Judge
Krappa further noted that “after losing or quitting jobs, [Spencer] applied again for new jobs.” (/d.)
Accordingly, Judge Krappa determined that Spencer’s mental impairments were not sufficiently
severe as to meet the “Paragraph B” threshold. Ud. at 22~23.)
Then, as a precursor to Step Four, Judge Krappa announced that Spencer had the following
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”):
The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the
physical demands of work at all exertional levels as defined under
the Regulations. However, as to the mental requirements of work, I
find that the claimant is only able to perform jobs: that are simple
and repetitive; and that are low stress (that is, the work requires only
an occasional change in work setting during the workday; only an
occasional change in decision-making required during the workday;
and if the work is production based, the production is monitored at
the end of the day instead of consistently throughout the workday).
The claimant is able to perform jobs; that require only occasional
contact with coworkers and supervisors, but that involve no contact
with the general public.
(Id. at 23, 34-35.)
In determining Spencer’s RFC, Judge Krappa accounted for medical opinions from five
doctors, detailing her analysis and findings of each across eight pages of the 19-paged decision?

> Neither party contests that Spencer has neither physical nor exertional limitations. Judge Krappa relied
only on mental health records and opinions in determining whether Spencer’s psychiatric impairments, like
depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder, precluded her from working.

(See id. at 27-34.) Three of these doctors—Christine Annibali, Marisol Valencia-Payne, and
Christopher Williamson—treated Spencer on at least one occasion and issued opinions about her
work limitations caused by her medical symptoms. (Ud. at 27-28, 29-33.) Two more doctors—
Jocelyn Fierstein and Fred Eisner—were state consultants who did not personally treat Spencer but
made medical determinations based on a review of Spencer’s records. (Id. at 32-33.) As required,
Judge Krappa evaluated the persuasiveness of each doctor. She found the opinions of Drs.
Annibali, Valencia-Payne, and Williamson each to be unpersuasive, largely because they
determined that Spencer had significant work-related limitations or could not work at all,
notwithstanding evidence that that Spencer had worked, completed and passed college courses,
maintained platonic and romantic relationships, and was capable of daily functioning. (/d. 33-34.)
Judge Krappa found the opinions of Drs. Fierstein and Eisner to be persuasive because they were
more consistent with the longitudinal record, and noted some limitations but did not opine that
Spencer was altogether incapable of working. Ud. at 33.) Ultimately, Judge Krappa noted that
Spencer’s issues did not stem from working, but rather “difficulty in dealing with others.” Ud. at
34 (emphasis added).) Accordingly, Judge Krappa’s RFC “limited [Spencer’s] contact with others
in the workplace.” Ud.)
At Step Four, Judge Krappa found that Spencer had no “past relevant work” as defined by
the administrative regulations,° and therefore she had no “past relevant work” to return to. (Id. at
35 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.965).) At Step Five, Judge Krappa heard testimony from the VE and

6 Although Spencer did work multiple jobs, Judge Krappa found that those jobs did not rise to the level of
“past relevant work” because she had not participated in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.965(a) (“We consider that your work experience applies when it was done within the last five years,
lasted long enough for you to learn to do it, and was substantial gainful activity.”) Of course, Spencer was
only thirteen years old—a middle school student—five years before her alleged onset date, and would not
have had any gainful employment at that time.

concluded that “there are jobs in significant numbers in the national economy” that Spencer could
perform. (/d. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.969, 416,969a).) In particular, the impartial expert testified
that representative jobs that Spencer could perform, consistent with Judge Krappa’s RFC, included
a night janitor, a packer, a ticketer, and a sorter. (/d. at 35-36, 75—76.) Since Judge Krappa found
that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy for an individual with Spencer’s
REC, Judge Krappa determined that Spencer has not been under disability since January 8, 2019.
(Ud. at 36.)
IL. LEGAL STANDARD
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether the
Commissioner’s findings are “supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the
Appeals Council denies a claimant’ s request for review, “the ALJ’s decision is the Commissioner’s
final decision.” Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Substantial
evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the
evidence.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart,
399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)). Put differently, “[iJt means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Morales y. Apfel, 225 F.3d
310, 316 (Gd Cir. 2000) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)), This
evidentiary threshold “is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
The scope of the Court’s review of the ALIJ’s decision is “quite limited.” Rutherford, 399
F.3d at 552. On review, the Court may not “re-weigh the evidence or impose [its] own factual
determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported

by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual
inquiry differently.” Fargnoli vy. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Hartranft v.
Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)).
B. ESTABLISHING ELIGIBILITY FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS
A claimant may establish disability under the Social Security Act by proving that they are
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(@)(1)(A).
The ALJ applies a well-established “five-step sequential evaluation process,” which requires
considering whether the claimant:

(1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) suffers from an
impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe”; (3)
suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to perform his or her
past relevant work; and (5) is able to perform work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.
McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R.
404.1520(a)—(f), 416.920(a)-(f)). The claimant bears the burden at the first four steps, at which
point it shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five. Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 Gd
Cir. 2019) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)).
DISCUSSION
Spencer appeals Judge Krappa’s decision of non-disability. (See ECF No. 1.) Spencer
raises two issues on appeal: first, Judge Krappa failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions in
the record, and second, Judge Krappa failed to properly evaluate Plaintiffs own testimony. (See
Pl. Br. at 1.) For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s findings
are supported by substantial evidence, and thus affirms Judge Krappa’s decision.

A. THE ALJ PROPERLY EVALUATED MEDICAL OPINIONS
In crafting Spencer’s RFC, Judge Krappa evaluated opinion evidence from five medical
professionals. Three of the professionals treated Spencer during her period of alleged disability:
(1) Dr. Christine Annibali, (2) Dr. Marisol Valencia-Payne, and (3) Dr. Christopher Williamson.
(See AR at 27-34.) Two more medical professionals, Dr. Jocelyn Fierstein and Dr. Fred Eisner,
were state agency experts who reviewed Spencer’s medical files but did not treat her personally.
(Id, at 33.) The thrust of Spencer’s argument is that Judge Krappa improperly found the opinions
of the three treating physicians to be unpersuasive, and improperly found that opinions of the two
non-treating state experts to be persuasive. (See Pl. Br. at 28 (“It is a hard swallow to say a doctor
who reviews 4 months of records is more persuasive than the treating physicians and examiners
who review not only those 4 months but have before them another 3 years of examinations and
records of those exams.”).)
It is not the Court’s function to second-guess or substitute its judgment for that of the
factfinder ALJ, but rather to ensure, consistent with its limited, circumscribed role, that the
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 38. The
Court finds that Judge Krappa properly applied the relevant legal framework when evaluating the
persuasiveness of each medical opinion, and appropriately incorporated the facts and opinions of
each medical professional into her RFC analysis.
When making a disability determination, an ALJ must review and evaluate all medical
opinions that are part of the record. See Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir.
2000). However, not all medical opinions are created equal, or assessed equally. It is the sole
province of the ALJ to consider medical opinions, decide how persuasive each medical opinion is,
and articulate the persuasiveness of each opinion as part of the written determination. See Cooper

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 563 F. App’x 904, 913 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927). Before
2017, opinions by treating physicians were automatically given more weight than those by non-
treating physicians, otherwise known as the “treating source rule.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)
(“Generally, we give more weight to medical opinions from your treating sources, since these

sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal
picture of your medical impairment(s).”). For claims filed after March 27, 2017, like those in the
instant matter, the regulations dictate that the Commissioner will consider the following factors
when evaluating all medical opinions: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with □□□
claimant, including the length of the treating examination, the frequency of examinations, and the

purpose of the treatment relationship; (4) the medical source’s specialization; and (5) other factors,
including, but not limited to, “evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other
evidence in the claim or an understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary
requirements.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c).
The regulations emphasize that “the most important factors [that the ALJ and
Commissioner] consider when [] evaluat[ing] the persuasiveness of medical opinions” are the
factors of supportability and consistency. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Accordingly, the
regulations require the ALJ to “discuss [the] supportability and consistency [factors]” when
articulating her “consideration of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings.” Lee
Ann M. v. O'Malley, No. 22-1104, 2024 WL 4184486 at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2024) (citations
omitted), “Supportability” is “the extent to which the medical source’s opinion is supported by
relevant objective medical evidence and explanations presented by the medical source.” Carolyn
N. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-4957, 2023 WL 8271767, at *5 (D.N.J. Noy. 30, 2023)

(quotation omitted). “Consistency” is “the extent to which the medical source’s opinion is
consistent with the record as a whole.” /d. (quotation omitted).
When an ALJ evaluates a medical opinion, the ALJ is not required “to use particular
language or adhere to a particular format in conducting [her] analysis.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364
F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20). Instead, the Court must “ensure
that there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful
review.” Id. This requirement governs the Court’s review of each step of the ALJ’s analysis,
including her RFC determination. An ALJ’s finding of a claimant’s RFC must “be accompanied
by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41
(quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that the Court “need[s]
from the ALJ not only an expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but
also some indication of the evidence which was rejected”’)). However, the Court “examine[s] the
ALJ’s conclusions as to a claimant’s RFC with ‘the deference required of the substantial evidence
standard of review.’” Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 547 F. App’x 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002)). Substantial evidence does not
require highly detailed explanations, “[t]o the contrary, a reviewing court must ‘uphold’ even ‘a
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Garland v.
Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 368 (2021) (cleaned up); see also Cotter, 650 F.2d at 482 (“[T]he ALJ is
not required to supply a comprehensive explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most cases, a
sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice.”’)
The Court addresses each medical opinion in turn.

10

1. Dr. Christina Annibali
Judge Krappa began her review of Dr. Annibali’s opinion and underlying evidence by
noting that Dr. Annibali treated Spencer for “a period of only five (5) months,” from October 3,
2018 to March 6, 2019, before writing her medical opinion. (AR at 27; see id. at 428.) Dr. Annibali
diagnosed Spencer with “recurrent major depressive disorder, moderate without psychosis;
generalized anxiety disorder; and borderline personality disorder.” Ud. at 27.) Per Dr. Annibali,
Spencer had never been hospitalized for any of her symptoms, which included feelings of guilt or
worthlessness, appetite disturbance, decreased energy, intense and unstable interpersonal
relationships, and suicidal ideation, among others. (/d.) In Dr. Annibali’s medical opinion
regarding Spencer’s specific impairments based on her medical expertise, she wrote that Spencer
had “moderate to marked” limitations in completing a workday without interruptions from
psychological symptoms, performing at a consistent pace without rest periods, getting along with
coworkers or peers without distracting them, and accepting instructions and responding
appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (See id, at 440-441.) It was Dr. Annibali’s opinion,
Judge Krappa stated, that Spencer “would be absent from work as a result of her impairments or
treatment more than three times per month.” (/d. at 27.)
Judge Krappa contrasted this medical opinion with Dr. Annibali’s longitudinal case notes,
which showed Spencer as having a period of “ups and downs.” (/d. at 27.) In March 2019, Spencer
was “doing well with only passive and fleeting thoughts of suicidal ideation.” (U/d.) April 2019 was
somewhat worse, with Spencer having a “bad week,” “difficulties with interpersonal issues,
school, and obtaining a job.” (/d.) Spencer “reported getting a job at Payless, but quitting the job
due to wanting to stay focused on school and her mental health.” (/d.) In May, Spencer was “able
to go to work and see her boyfriend despite her sad mood” and “asked to stop all antidepressants.”
11

(id.) She reported the ability to “use[] her coping skills at work and with her interpersonal
stressors.” (/d.)
Judge Krappa found Dr. Annibali’s medical opinion “to not be persuasive.” (/d. at 33.)
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Annibali’s opinions were internally consistent with her own case notes
and externally consistent with the overall longitudinal record, including the opinions of Drs.
Valencia-Payne and Williamson. (Pl. Br. at 21.) Plaintiff further argues that Dr. Annibali’s
opinions, which were based on months of treatment instead of a review of objective medical
records, are especially persuasive in the psychiatric context, where objective laboratory testing is
less useful. Ud. at 22 (citing Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1121 (6th Cir. 1989).)
Essentially, Plaintiff quarrels with Judge Krappa’s persuasiveness determination.
Plaintiff’s contentions are unavailing. “The presence of evidence in the record that
supports” a conclusion contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion “does not undermine the [ALJ's] decision

so long as the record provides substantial support for that decision.” Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 306 F. App’x 761, 764, 766 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding it “unnecessary” to emphasize contrary
evaluations of the plaintiff because “the issue is whether the evidence and contentions presented
by the Commissioner met the substantial evidence test’’). Instead, as required, Judge Krappa
evaluated Dr. Annibali’s based on supportability and consistency. As to supportability, Judge
Krappa assessed that despite Dr. Annibali’s conclusion that Plaintiff had a series of marked
limitations, Dr. Annibali’s own notes from just a few weeks prior stated that Spencer reported she

was doing “pretty good,” that her “mood and anxiety had been manageable,” that she had “go[ne]
on vacation with her boyfriend to Atlantic City,” and that “she had a job interview that went well.”
(AR at 33.) To the ALJ, an opinion of such marked limitations was not supportable based on the
other objective evidence that Spencer, despite her challenges, was making progress in both her
12

personal and professional life. (See id.) This conclusion has substantial evidentiary support in the
record.
In terms of consistency, Judge Krappa similarly determined that Dr. Annibali’s opinions
in March 2019 were not consistent with the overall record. (/d.) Throughout her opinion, Judge
Krappa cited to record evidence showing that Spencer had already earned 81 college credits
through online school— an accomplishment that required the ability to “maintain a school
schedule, watch lectures, complete assignments[,] and take tests within the parameters set by her
professors.” (Id. at 22.) Spencer had a boyfriend for seven months, who she reported she saw
regularly when she was dating. (Id. at 24.) She was also employed multiple times, both at Claire’s,
an accessories store, and Hanna Anderson, a clothing store, though she reported that she left
Claire’s because of difficulties with co-workers and supervisors. (/d.) Spencer was mobile and
social; Judge Krappa indicated that “she would go out a few times a week,” “was able to travel by
driving and riding in a car,” “had an active driver’s license,” and “spent time with others ‘just
hanging out and relaxing.’” (/d. at 25.) Spencer’s mother confirmed that Spencer was able to
perform personal care rituals, watch television, read, write, and draw. Ud.) Taken together, the
record evidence depicts Spencer, despite her challenges, as a young woman who travelled, sought
and earned job offers, went on dating apps, got back together with her previous boyfriend, spent
time with her best friend, and took care of herself. (/d. at 33-34 (citing Ex. 5F, AR at 538; Ex. 2F,
AR at 449; Ex. 6F, AR at 562; Ex. 7F, AR at 585, 591).) Additionally, although Judge Krappa
acknowledged that Plaintiff had not worked consistently and moved around to different jobs,
Plaintiff had only worked in roles that required her to interface with customers, which did not fit
well with her personal anxieties. (/d.) Of course, by virtue of her youthful age, it is understandable
that Spencer’s work history would be somewhat limited. Plaintiff expressed that “she wanted to
13

apply for jobs that were more tolerable like working with animals.” (/d. (citing Ex. 2F, AR at
468).)
Judge Krappa did not clearly delineate her analysis between supportability and consistency,
and did not use those terms or cite to the regulation—but she did not need to do so. Jones, 364
F.3d at 505. While a factfinder, on this record, may hypothetically have weighed the evidence
differently than Judge Krappa did, it is not the Court’s role to second-guess the ALJ’s factfinding
or to weigh Dr. Annibali’s opinions itself. Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359 (“Courts are not permitted
to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.”) Instead, the Court is
satisfied that Judge Krappa “fulfilled [her] duty in evaluating the evidence and explaining why
[she] chose to credit some evidence over other evidence.” Pelliccia v. Dudek, No. 24-428, 2025
WL 624262, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2025).
Plaintiff's additional contention that Dr. Annibali’s opinion should have been given more
weight because she treated Spencer is contrary to the Administration’s post-2017 regulations. (See
Pl. Br. at 29-30); 20 C.F.R. 416.927(c)(2). Although Dr. Annibali’s opinion likely would have
been subject to the old “treating source” rule, that rule no longer binds the Commissioner. A similar
factor, “relationship with the claimant” is now just one of five factors for the ALJ to consider, but
it is not one of the “most important factors.” Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(3) (considering
length, frequency, purpose, and extent of the treatment relationship), with id. § 416.920c(b)(2)
(“The factors of supportability . . . and consistency .. are the most important factors we
consider.”), Additionally, Judge Krappa was not obligated to explain how “relationship to the
claimant” impacted evaluation of Dr. Annibali’s medical opinion. See id. § 416.920c(b)(3) (“We
may, but are not required to, explain how we considered the factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through

14

(c)(5) of this section.’”). Accordingly, the Court finds no error in Judge Krappa’s decision not to
find Dr. Annibali’s opinion persuasive simply because she treated Spencer.
2. Dr. Marisol Valencia-Payne
Dr. Valencia-Payne examined Spencer only once—on April 14, 2020. (AR at 29 (citing
Ex. 4F); Id. at 524.) As Judge Krappa explained, Dr. Valencia-Payne diagnosed Spencer with
“posttraumatic stress disorder; bipolar II disorder; most recent episode depressed; social anxiety
disorder; and borderline personality disorder.” (/d. at 29.) Dr. Valencia-Payne also “indicated that
[Spencer’s] current psychiatric condition was significantly impairing her current level of
functioning” and that Spencer “would likely experience episodes of significant decompensation or
deterioration in a work or work-like setting, which would cause her to withdraw from the situation
and/or experience an exacerbation of symptoms,” and “be absent from work more than three times

per month.” (/d.) Dr. Valencia-Payne concluded that, “from a psychiatric and psychological point
of view,” Spencer “is not able to be gainfully employed, nor is expected to improve in the
foreseeable future without consistent psychiatric and psychological treatment.” Ud. at 528
(emphasis in original).)
In her written decision, Judge Krappa stated that she had “considered the opinions of Dr.
Valencia-Payne but [did] not find them entirely persuasive as they are not supported by the
claimant’s overall treatment record and the references to the progress notes and treatment records
supra.” (AR at 34.) Judge Krappa reasoned that, despite the limitations Dr. Valencia-Payne opined,
Spencer’s “daily living activities and history of treatment showed that she has been capable of
basic daily functioning.” (/d.) Judge Krappa also explained that although “the record established
some limitations, they are accounted for within the above residual functional capacity.” (/d.)

15

For substantially the same reasons described in Section IIT.A.1, supra, Plaintiff argues that
Judge Krappa erred in finding Dr. Valencia-Payne’s medical opinion persuasive. Broadly, Plaintiff
asserts that Dr. Valencia-Payne’s medical opinion—like Dr. Annibali’s—was consistent with a
record that contained ample evidence of Spencer’s “depressed mood, persistent or generalized
anxiety, [] flat affect, feelings of guilt or worthlessness, hostility or irritability” and more. (PL. Br.
at 21.) Defendant, in turn, again argues that Judge Krappa appropriately reviewed the
supportability and consistency of Dr. Valencia-Payne’s medical opinion. (Def. Br. at 15-16.)
Here, as with Dr. Annibali, the Court finds that Judge Krappa analyzed the supportability
and consistency of Dr. Valencia-Payne’s medical opinion before determining that it was not
persuasive. The supportability factor, in Judge Krappa’s analysis, weighed against the
persuasiveness of the opinion, because even though Dr. Valencia-Payne concluded that Spencer
could not be gainfully employed, she also noted that Spencer “did not exhibit any symptoms of
depression” and that she “was cooperative and compliant.” (/d. at 29.) Additionally, despite
identifying her mood as depressed and anxious, Spencer “exhibitfed] a euthymic affect.” Ud. at
526.) Judge Krappa also found that Dr. Valencia-Payne’s opinion was inconsistent with other
evidence in the record, including, for example, evidence that when Spencer was fully complying
with her medication regimen as prescribed, “her condition improved, and she stabilized her mood
and functioning.” (Id. at 34.) Despite Plaintiff’s contentions that Judge Krappa erred in her
analysis, Judge Krappa’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record. Pelliccia,
2025 WL 624462, at *10.
3. Dr. Christopher Williamson
Dr. Christopher Williamson, a psychiatrist who evaluated Spencer on March 14, 2022,
opined that Spencer had marked limitations in her ability to understand and remember complex
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instruction, interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, and coworkers, and to respond
appropriately to usual work situations. (AR at 713-14.) As Judge Krappa highlighted in her
analysis, Dr. Williamson referred to Spencer consistently as male in his report, which undermined
the credibility of his opinion. (Id. at 31; see id. at 711 (“Mr. [S.] presents for evaluation as a 22-
year-old male.”); id. at 712 (“Mr. [S.] presents for evaluation as a 22-year-old male with chronic
psychiatric illness positive for depression, anxiety, and panic disorder.”).)
Judge Krappa found Dr. Williamson’s opinion to “not be persuasive.” (AR at 34 (citing
Ex. 10F).) Judge Krappa reasoned that his opinions “are not supported by or consistent with the
medical evidence of the record in general, or with the one-time examination performed by Dr.
Williamson himself. It appears that the opinions were based on the self-reports of the claimant.”
(d.)
Plaintiff argues, as with Drs. Annibali and Valencia-Payne, that Dr. Williamson’s opinions
are internally consistent with his own findings, and consistent with the opinions of other physicians
and the overall treatment record. (Pl. Br. at 23.) Defendant argues that Judge Krappa explained
and supported her analysis, relying on the lack of supportability and consistency in Dr.
Williamson’s medical opinion. (Def. Br. at 17-18.)
Though the analysis of persuasiveness might well have been more clearly articulated, Judge
Krappa’s reasoning is supported by her broader recitation of Dr. Williamson’s findings, set forth
earlier in her lengthy, comprehensive decision. (See AR at 31); see also Jones, 364 F.3d at 505
(finding ALI’s analysis sufficient when “read as a whole”). Judge Krappa found Dr. Williamson’s
opinion to be unsupportable because, although he concluded that Spencer had a series of marked
limitations, all of his actual observations of Spencer were to the contrary. Indeed, Dr. Williamson
observed that Spencer “arrived on time,” “was casually dressed and groomed,” “was pleasant and
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cooperative,” showed “no evidence of a formal thought disorder,” noted “no compulsions of
thinking and/or behavior,” exhibited verbalizations that were “clear, coherent and goal-directed”
and had an affect that was “congruent throughout.” (AR at 711-12.) As Judge Krappa noted, the
only evidence that supported Dr. Williamson’s opinions were Spencer’s “self-reports,” not
anything that Dr. Williamson observed. See Gaiambrone v Kijakazi, No. 22-489, 2023 WL
6392737, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2023) (affirming ALJ’s decision to find unpersuasive a medical
opinion that relied primarily on self-reporting). For the same reasons provided above, Judge
Krappa also found that Dr. Williamson’s testimony was inconsistent with the longitudinal record.
(Id. at 34.) The Court finds that there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support
Judge Krappa’s evaluation of Dr. Williamson’s medical opinion.
4, State Examiners
Examiners from the New Jersey Division of Disability Services (“DDS”) reviewed
Spencer’s medical records, but did not examine her in person. (See id. at 115, 127.) The two
consultants, Dr. Fred Eisner and Dr. Jocelyn Fierstein, opined that Spencer “had the ability to
perform work at all exertional levels” and that Spencer had moderate restrictions in the areas of
“understanding and memory; sustained concentration and persistence; social interaction; and
adaption.” (/d. at 32.) Importantly, as Judge Krappa recounted, “it was opined that [Spencer] had
no significant restrictions in regard to her abilities to remember locations and work like procedures,
and understand, remember, and carry out very short and simple instructions.” (/d.) Drs. Eisner and
Fierstein opined that Spencer “had no significant limitation regard[ing] the ability to ask simple
questions or request assistance.” (/d.)
Judge Krappa found these opinions to be “persuasive because they are supported by and
consistent with the medical evidence of record.” Ud. at 33.) However, she concluded that “their
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persuasiveness is reduced because while these opinions were rendered by doctors with program
knowledge, any deference that might ordinarily be afforded these assessments . . . is diminished
by the fact that the consultants did not have the opportunity to examine the claimant or review the
evidence received after the file review was complete.” (/d.) Plaintiff argues that this evaluation of
persuasiveness—finding the medical opinions persuasive, but also that persuasiveness reduced—
is “confusing” and therefore inadequately articulated. (Pl. Br. at 27-29.)
The Court does not find this articulation or reasoning confusing. Judge Krappa determined
and articulated that she found the opinions to be supportable and consistent with the record, but
also evaluated the DDS opinions based on other factors. (AR at 33.) Although supportability and
consistency are the most important factors for an ALJ to consider, they are not the only factors.
See 20 C.F.R § 416.920c(c). The fifth factor, under the header “other factors,” allows the
Commissioner to “consider whether new evidence we receive after the medical source made his

or her medical opinion . . . makes the medical opinion [under review] . . . more or less persuasive.”
Id. § 416,.920c(c)(5). Judge Krappa undertook this “fifth factor” analysis and determined that other
evidence, which came into the record “after their file review was complete,” made their opinion
less persuasive. (AR at 33.) This analysis benefited Spencer in the ultimate RFC determination.
Judge Krappa incorporated more limitations into Spencer’s RFC than what Drs. Eisner and
Fierstein recommended. (/d.) As Judge Krappa explained, “the opinions of the DDS medical
consultants did not address the claimant being off task or absences. The [] residual functional
ability includes these restrictions.” (Id. (emphasis added).)
Aside from the ALJ’s articulation of persuasiveness, Plaintiff contends that “[a]ny heavy
reliance on the non-examining consultants is contrary to the rule of the Third Circuit.” (PI. Br. at
29 (citing Dorf v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 896, 901-02 (3d Cir. 1986)).) In fact, the controlling regulations
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indicate the opposite. State psychological consultants “‘are highly qualified and experts in Social
Security disability evaluation,’ ... whose ‘opinions merit significant consideration.’” Amaya v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 6336181, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2020) (quoting 20 C-F.R. §
416.913a(b)(1) and Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361); see also Becker v. Kijakazi, 2022. WL 1128994,
at *12-13 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2022) (affirming ALJ’s decision to find a “non-treating, non-
examining consultant{] who reviewed a limited record” more persuasive than the treating
physicians). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Judge Krappa’s evaluation of the state
examiner opinions was supported by substantial evidence, and finds no error in Judge Krappa’s
determination that the state examiner opinions were more persuasive than the treating physician
opinions.
B. THEALJ PROPERLY EVALUATED PLAINTIFE’S MEDICAL TESTIMONY
At her initial telephonic hearing, Spencer testified as to her own symptoms, i.e., her “own
description or statement of . . . her physical or mental impairment.” See SSR 16-3p. These
statements about symptoms “will not alone establish” disability, but might, in conjunction with
other medical evidence, lead to a finding of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a); Miller v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 719 F. App’x 130, 134 (Gd Cir. 2017). The administrative regulations
articulate a two-step process that the Commissioner must follow to determine whether a claimant’s
alleged symptoms limit a claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(d). Plaintiff contends
that Judge Krappa failed to follow this mandatory process, and therefore improperly evaluated
Spencer’s subjective testimony. (Pl. Br. at 31-34.)
The evaluation process begins once the claimant states her subjective symptoms. SSR 16-
3p (“We define a symptom as the individual’s own description or statement of his or her physical
or mental impairments.”). In the first step of the process, the ALJ must determine “whether there
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is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably
be expected to produce the individual’s symptoms, such as pain.” SSR 16-3p; see also Hartranft,
181 F.3d at 362. Second, “if the ALJ finds that such an impairment exists, the ALJ must ‘evaluate
the intensity and persistence’ of the symptoms and the effects that those symptoms have on the
individual’s ability to work.” Lori C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-4369, 2024 WL 4803787, at
*9 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2024) (citation omitted), An ALJ “has wide discretion to weigh the claimant’s
subjective complaints [] and may discount them when they are unsupported by other relevant
objective evidence.” Miller, 719 F. App’x at 134 (citations omitted). “Examples of objective
evidence include whether a claimant has sought treatment, or taken medication, to alleviate their
pain.” Id.
At the first step of this analysis, Judge Krappa found that “claimant’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (AR at
25.) She further identified these impairments as “borderline personality disorder, depressive
disorder, and anxiety disorder.” Ud.) No party contests these findings. At the second step, Judge
Krappa determined that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record.” (/d.) Here, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s brief evaluation of
[Spencer]’s subjective statements is insufficient.” (Pl. Br. at 33.)
As discussed at length above, Judge Krappa determined that Spencer’s symptoms did not
impair her ability to work because she had worked in the past, and had shown a willingness and
ability to do work in the future that did not implicate her various impairments. (AR at 33-34, 54.)
Specifically, at the time that she complained of her various symptoms, she also worked at multiple
different jobs (id. at 32-34), had a boyfriend who she saw regularly (id. at 34, 62), had a best friend
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who she saw regularly (id. at 34, 72), earned 81 credits in online college (id. at 34, 52, 430), and
was able to get herself to and from the places that she needed to go (id. at 34, 62). Many of
Spencer’s issues at work, Judge Krappa noted, stemmed from working with others and working
with members of the general public. (/d. at 34.) Indeed, Spencer conceded that most of her jobs
were in the retail sector, which required interacting with customers. (/d. at 54.) Judge Krappa
reasoned that a different job, which did not require public interaction, would reduce the limiting
effects of Spencer’s symptoms. (/d. at 34.) Judge Krappa noted these facts over the course of many
pages in her decision, and routinely referred to them. (See id. at 23-35.) “Read as a whole,” Judge
Krappa’s analysis was quite extensive and incorporated lots of objective evidence in the record to
determine that Spencer’s symptoms would not be sufficiently intense or persistent as to limit her
ability to work. Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
The parties disagree as to the sufficiency of Judge Krappa’s stated conclusion that the
effects of Spencer’s symptoms “are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record.” (See AR at 25.) Plaintiff contends that this is mere “boilerplate
language”—a “conclusory statement that [Spencer’s] allegations are not supported by other
unspecified evidence.” (Pl. Br. at 33.) Plaintiff cites to a series of cases rejecting “boilerplate
language,” but those cases are distinguishable. In Parker v. Astrue, for example, an ALJ wrote that
“claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistent, and limiting effects of [claimant’s]
symptoms are not entirely credible.” 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010). Judge Posner referred to
this line as “meaningless boilerplate,” and noted disapprovingly that other ALJs used the same
language in their opinions. /d. at 921-922. But a more fulsome read of Judge Posner’s objection
to the ALJ’s determination reveals it was not the “boilerplate language,” but rather the fact that
the ALJ concluded there was no medical evidence to support claimant’s allegations of extreme
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pain, without considering evidence in the record that supported the possibility that there were many
possible sources of pain or failed medical procedures. Id. at 922. The ALJ’s unsubstantiated
medical analysis—not the language itself—prompted the court’s reversal of the ALJ’s decision.
Id. Tn Spencer’s case, unlike in Parker, the ALJ undertook an exhaustive analysis of treatment
notes, and determined with sufficient specificity that there were jobs that could alleviate Spencer’s
symptoms.
Plaintiff similarly cites Gilchrist v. Berryhill, where the Honorable Jose Linares, U.S.D.J.
(ret.) remanded an ALJ’s determination because the ALJ “set[] forth that the reasons are explained
in her decision, however, the opinion fail[ed]to provide sufficient analysis to support the finding.”
No. 16-9209, 2017 WL 3592443, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2017). Here, too, the court’s issue was
not with the phraseology that the ALJ used, but with the lack of sufficient analysis. Id. In Spencer’s
case, Judge Krappa coupled her allegedly “boilerplate” language with substantial analysis. As
these cases demonstrate, it is not the language used in the ALJ’s opinion that is dispositive—it is
the analysis. See, e.g., Jones v. Kijakazi, No. 24-1074, 2022 WL 1016610, at *10 (D. Del. Apr. 5,
2022) (“Reliance on boilerplate language does not inevitably lead to a deficient administrative
analysis where, as here, the ALJ proceeds to consider the evidence in the record as a whole.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Spencer’s symptom
testimony did not establish disability was supported by substantial evidence.

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CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the record as a whole, the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

ROBERT KIRSCH"
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE...
Dated: March 26, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10831797. Public record. Not legal advice.