# Watson v. Delaware North

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · March 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10831789

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** March 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
TERESA WATSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
) No. 4:24-cv-01021-SEP
DELAWARE NORTH, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is self-represented Plaintiff Teresa Watson’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. Doc. [3]. Having reviewed the motion and supporting financial information, the Court
finds that Plaintiff is unable to pay the costs associated with this action and will grant the motion
and waive the filing fee. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, this action is dismissed.
STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim
for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal
conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.
Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept
as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court
should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). But even pro se complaints must
“allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d
1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have
formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be
“interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” See McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff—a Christian African-American woman—brings this action against her former
employer, Delaware North. Doc. [1]. She asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
(Title VII), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) for wrongful termination, failure to promote, disparate treatment,
retaliation, and harassment. Id. She contends that Defendant discriminated against her based on
her race, religion, color, disability, age, and sex. Id.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, including attachments, spans over 200 pages and is difficult to
comprehend. Id. She was hired by Defendant as a Guest Service Attendant on September 20,
2022. Doc. [1-3] at 1. Plaintiff alleges that after expressing interest in other positions within the
company, she was told her only options were to remain in her current role or resign. Id. Despite
applying for multiple internal positions, Plaintiff was never selected and asserts that Defendant
provided incorrect and misleading information about these roles. Id. In October 2023,
Defendant terminated Plaintiff for “job abandonment.” Id. Plaintiff states that she did not
abandon her position but was unable to work due to an injury sustained in July 2023. Id.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on April 26, 2024. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter three days
later. Docs. [1-2], [1-3]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks “all that is just and proper (and or greater).”
Doc. [1].
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. The Court will address
each in turn.
I. Title VII
The purpose of Title VII is to ensure a workplace environment free of discrimination.
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009). The Act prohibits “employer discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in hiring, firing, salary structure,
promotion and the like.” Winfrey v. City of Forrest City, Ark., 882 F.3d 757, 758 (8th Cir. 2018)
(cleaned up). To establish a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show either direct
evidence of discrimination or sufficient evidence to create an inference of discrimination under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Blackwell v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 822
F.3d 431, 435 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Because the prima facie model is not a pleading
standard, a plaintiff need not set forth a detailed evidentiary proffer in a Title VII complaint.
Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minnesota, 998 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir. 2021) (cleaned
up). Nevertheless, the plaintiff must still plead sufficient factual allegations to allow the court to
reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff, as an African-American, is a member of a protected class. See Davis v. KARK-
TV, Inc., 421 F.3d 699, 704 (8th Cir. 2005). But Plaintiff makes no factual allegations that allow
the Court to infer that Defendant acted with discriminatory intent, and so she has not established
the necessary nexus between Defendant’s actions and her membership in a protected class. She
states only that she is an “African-American, Christian . . . Female” in a “Protected Age Group.”
Doc. [1-3] at 1. Without more, Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination are mere legal
conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While she need not plead a complete prima facie case
of discrimination, her allegations must rise above a speculative level. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). Because they do not, the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a plausible claim under Title VII.
II. The ADEA
“The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual on the basis
of age with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”
Jankovitz v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 421 F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 2005). As with
Title VII, to succeed on an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must show either direct evidence of
discrimination, or evidence that is sufficient to create an inference of discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. Blackwell, 822 F.3d at 435.
Plaintiff alleges only that she is a member of the protected age group. Doc. [1-3] at 1.
She provides no factual allegations showing that Defendant discriminated against her because of
her age. Without factual support, her ADEA claim relies entirely upon legal conclusions. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim under the ADEA.
III. The ADA
Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against qualified individuals
with disabilities in the private sector. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. To succeed on an ADA claim, an
employee must demonstrate: (1) a qualifying disability under the ADA, (2) the ability to
perform essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) an adverse
employment action due to the disability. McPherson v. O'Reilly Auto., Inc., 491 F.3d 726, 730
(8th Cir. 2007). The ADA defines the term “disability” as: “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1).
Plaintiff fails to allege that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. She
states that she suffered a burn injury while preparing hot dogs and that she sustained a serious
injury while riding her bicycle. Doc. [1-1] at 103, 118. She does not assert that these injuries
substantially limited her ability to engage in major life activities. Even liberally construed,
Plaintiff’s allegations do not warrant an inference that Defendant discriminated against her based
on a disability. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim to relief
under the ADA. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, Doc. [3], but will dismiss this action without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Doc.
[3], is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Doc.
[4], is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A
separate Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 26th day of March, 2025.

SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10831789. Public record. Not legal advice.