# DUDLEY v. COUNSELOR SMICK

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · March 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10831709

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10831709

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding pretrial detainee’s conditions of confinement claim must be analyzed under the Fourteenth not Eighth Amendment
- explaining “we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHNSTOWN DIVISION
CLINTON DEONARD DUDLEY, ) Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-00170-CBB
)
)
Plaintiff, )
) United States Magistrate Judge
vs. ) Christopher B. Brown
)

COUNSELOR SMICK, COUNSELOR )
)
FOX, LIEUTENANT FOX, WARDEN
)
CHRISTIAN M. SMITH, OFFICER )
LEAVERNIGHT, OFFICER TURK, )
LIEUTENANT ANDERSON, )
)
LIEUTENANT APPLY, DELOZIER, )
ACCOUNTING; 1ST DEPUTY )
WARDEN PATTERSON, 2ND )
)
DEPUTY WARDEN DESCAVISH,
)
2ND DEPUTY WARDEN ROZUM, )
)

Defendants,

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF No. 51

I. Introduction
Plaintiff Clinton Deonard Dudley, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
initiated this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action against Defendants Jeremy Smick,
Rebecca Fox, Corey Fox, Christian M. Smith, David Levernight, Erin Turek,2 Mark
Anderson, Brandon Appley, Katie Delozier, William Patterson, Craig Descavish,

1 All parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge; therefore
the Court has the authority to decide dispositive motions, and to eventually enter final judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq.

2 Defendants clarify that the correct spelling is Turek not Turk, as she was referred to in the
Amended Complaint. ECF No. 52 at n.1. This Opinion will refer to her as Defendant Turek.
and George Rozum. Three claims survived motions to dismiss. The first was for
excessive force related to an alleged altercation where Dudley refused to return to
his cell and was tackled and cuffed by corrections officers. The second was for

conditions of confinement by his being placed in a cell for six days that was cold.
The third was related to access to the courts as jail staff allegedly forced him to
choose between calling his family or a lawyer referral service about a civil forfeiture
case. This court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.3
ECF No. 51. Notably, Dudley filed a Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment but did not file either an Affirmative or Responsive Statement of Facts.
This Motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. ECF Nos. 57, 59.
For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. ECF No. 51.
II. Dudley’s Violation of Local Rule 56.C.1
Before addressing the factual background underlying this action, the Court
notes that Dudley has failed to properly respond to Defendants’ Statement of
Material Facts (ECF No. 53), as required by Local Rule 56.C.1. Local Rule 56.C.1

requires non-moving parties to a motion for summary judgment to file a responsive

3 At ECF No. 51, Defendants filed a pleading titled “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint.” It is clear from the record that this is in fact a Motion for Summary Judgment, not a
Motion to Dismiss. The failure to call it a Motion for Summary Judgement is nothing more than a
clerical error as, most notably, Defendants filed a pleading titled “Brief in Support of the Motion for
Summary Judgment” the same day. ECF No. 52. Additionally, a Motion to Dismiss was previously
filed at ECF No. 24 and resolved by Memorandum Opinion at ECF No. 32. Given this, it is evident
at this stage of the litigation that what was filed at ECF No. 51 was a Motion for Summary
Judgment and it will be treated as such.
concise statement. LCvR 56.C.1. A plaintiff must: respond to each numbered
paragraph in the movant’s concise statement; admit or deny the facts contained in
the movant’s concise statement; set forth the basis for denial if any fact within the

movant’s concise statement is not entirely admitted by the non-moving party, with
appropriate citation to the record; and set forth, in separately numbered
paragraphs, any other material facts at issue. See LCvR 56.C.1. Courts in this
district require strict compliance with the provisions of Local Rule 56. See, e.g.,
Byron v. Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, No. 2:21-CV-01365-CCW, 2022 WL
17406052, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-3408, 2023 WL 8663876 (3d

Cir. Dec. 15, 2023); Angelopoulos v. HDR Eng'g, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-01578-CCW, 2021
WL 3056205, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 20, 2021); First Guard Ins. Co. v. Bloom Services,
Inc., 2018 WL 949224, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2018); Hughes v. Allegheny County
Airport Auth., 2017 WL 2880875, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2017).
A non-moving party “faces severe consequences for not properly responding
to a moving party’s concise statement.” Hughes, 2017 WL 2880875, at *1. Any
alleged material facts “set forth in the moving party’s Concise Statement of

Material Facts . . . which are claimed to be undisputed, will for the purpose of
deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically
denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing
party.” LCvR 56.E. While courts provide some leniency to pro se litigants when
applying procedural rules, the Court “is under no duty to provide personal
instruction on courtroom procedure or to perform any legal chores for the [pro se
litigant] that counsel would normally carry out.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)).
Nor may pro se litigants ignore procedural rules that apply to parties assisted by

counsel. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (explaining “we have
never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”).
Dudley had actual knowledge of these requirements and was informed by
Court Order that statements of material fact “will for the purpose of deciding the
motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or

otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party.” ECF
No. 49 at 3.
Consequently, the Court will treat Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts
(ECF Nos. 53) as undisputed but will nonetheless consider any contradictory facts
Dudley asserts if they are properly supported by the record. Whetstone v. Fraley &
Schilling Trucking Co., No. 22-cv-1018, 2022 WL 4533847, at *2 (3d Cir. Sep. 28,
2022). See also Boyd v. Citizens Bank of Pa., Inc., 2014 WL 2154902, at *3 (W.D.

Pa. May 22, 2014) (“To the extent Plaintiff's statement of ‘fact’ specifically
controverts Defendant’s, the Court will consider these facts in determining”
summary judgment).
III. Factual Background
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. At all relevant
times, Dudley was a pretrial detainee at the Cambria County Prison. ECF No. 53
at ¶¶ 1-2.
On February 11, 2022, Dudley was using a prison phone when a staff
member asked him to get off and go back to his cell in order to mitigate a security
issue on the floor. Id. at ¶ 4. Dudley refused multiple requests to go back to his

cell. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. He was then ordered to “cuff up,” which he refused and tied a
towel around his face to avoid the Corrections Officer. Id. at ¶ 7. Dudley refused
multiple follow-up requests from Defendants to comply. Id. at ¶ 8. He was then
“taken to the ground to be cuffed” by staff. Id. at ¶ 9. He told staff: “[If] I catch you
guys on the street, I am going to get you guys on the street.” Id. at ¶ 14. In his
Amended Complaint, Dudley also alleges he was maced, and Defendants Anderson,

Appley, Leavernight, and Turek participated in this encounter. ECF No. 17 at 8.
Dudley was then escorted to the medical clinic for an evaluation on February
11, 2022. ECF No. 53 at ¶ 10. While he was being escorted, he threated the
escorting officers and told them he was going to “kill the responding officers” once
he was released. Id. at ¶ 11. At medical, Dudley refused medical treatment and
told the nurse to “get out of my face, bitch.” Id. at ¶ 10.
That same day he was taken to DHU West and classified as a security risk

due to his refusal of medical treatment. Id. at ¶ 12. He was placed in DHU West
Cell 25, strip searched, and given a paper gown due to his security risk status. Id.
at ¶¶ 13, 15. From February 11, 2022, until Dudley was taken off security risk
status on February 18, 2022, he was given a mattress and blanket at night. Id. at ¶
17. In addition to the mattress and blanket, he was given prison-issued shoes, three
pairs of underwear, and three pairs of socks on February 14, 2022. Id. at ¶ 16. In
his Brief in Opposition, Dudley alleges the particular DHU cell he was placed in for
during those six days had “trouble heating” and was “extremely cold.” ECF No. 57
at 1. Defendants noted the heating system is run by computer software and is not

specific to a single cell but heats an entire unit and staff were not made aware of
any “temperature issues” with the cell. ECF 51-3 at 2-3.
Dudley received a misconduct on February 12, 2022 for these events, and was
sanctioned 60 days. Id. at ¶ 19. On February 16, 2022, he filed a grievance saying
he “was taken to the hole by use of force” and he had a “busted lip,” his head was
pushed into the ground, and felt a knee on his head. ECF No. 51-1 at 38. In the

grievance, he requested the staff members be suspended and investigated, and that
he be given monetary damages for the use of force and for being placed in a cold cell
without heat. Id. Defendant Corey Fox responded on March 9 that “[d]uring the
investigation into this matter, it was found that you were not compliant with your
move to lock up and resisted the team. Therefore you had to be physically move[d]
to the DHU.” ECF No. 51-1 at 37.
Separately, on April 27, 2022, Dudley filed a grievance alleging he received a

forfeiture and condemnation petition from the Attorney General of Allentown, PA
on February 24, 2022, seeking to enforce a $13,780 civil forfeiture, but Defendant
Smick, a counselor at the Cambria County Prison, told him he could either call his
family or a lawyer referral service (not both). ECF No. 51-1 at 39. In the grievance,
he said he had not been able to call the lawyer referral service despite his request
slips and conversation with “Counselors” to do so. Id. Defendant Smick denied that
Dudley made such a request saying that Dudley had “never mentioned this issue to
[him].” ECF No. 53 at ¶ 18 (citing ECF No. 51-1 at 39-42).
Throughout this time, Dudley had an approved list of people he could make

telephone calls to and was able to update that list. Id. at ¶ 24. He could make
telephone calls and could receive and send mail outside of the Cambria County
Prison. Id. at ¶¶ 25-26. He did not attempt to add either the lawyer referral service
or the Allentown Attorney General’s Office number to his approved call list, nor
were those numbers blocked on his approved call list. ECF No. 51-1 at 4; ECF No.
57 at 2. Dudley did not send any outgoing mail to either the lawyer referral service

or to the Allentown Attorney General’s Office, though he did receive mail from the
Attorney General’s Office months later in June and August of 2022. ECF No. 51-1
at 30-36; ECF 57-1.
IV. Standard of Review
The standard for assessing motions for summary judgment is well-settled.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must ask whether the evidence presents “a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
In making this determination, “all reasonable inferences from the record
must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party and the court may not weigh the
evidence or assess credibility.” Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146
(3d Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S at 247-48. An issue is “genuine” if a reasonable jury

could hold in the nonmovant’s favor with respect to that issue. Id.
This standard is somewhat relaxed with respect to pro se litigants. Simmons
v. Gilmore, No. 2:17-CV-00996, 2021 WL 1215773, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2021)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). Where a party is representing himself pro se,
the complaint is to be construed liberally. Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315,
337 (3d Cir. 2010). A pro se plaintiff may not, however, rely solely on his complaint

to defeat a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 (“Rule
56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”). At the
summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the Court need not credit bald
assertions or legal conclusions unaccompanied by evidentiary support. Jones, 214
F.3d at 407. “[A] pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of
refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.
Supp. 3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).
V. Discussion
In their motion, Defendants first seek summary judgment for Defendants
Rebecca Fox, Corey Fox, Delozier, Patterson, Descavish, and Rozum because Dudley
stated he has “nothing” to support any civil rights claim against them. ECF No. 52
at 2.
Defendants next move for summary judgment on the grounds that Dudley

has failed to establish Constitutional Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for:
i. Excessive force as to Defendants Anderson, Appley, Levernight, and
Turek;
ii. Conditions of confinement as to Smith, Turek, Anderson, and Appley;
and
iii. Failure to access counsel as to Smick.
Id. Alternatively, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
These arguments are addressed in turn.
a. Defendants Rebecca Fox, Corey Fox, Delozier, Patterson,
Descavish, and Rozum
Defendants first move to have Defendants Rebecca Fox, Corey Fox, Delozier,
Patterson, Descavish, and Rozum dismissed from the case because Dudley himself
stated he has “nothing” to support his claims against them. ECF No. 53 at ¶ 3; ECF
No. 52 at 2. Dudley listed these Defendants in his Amended Complaint but did not
specifically connect them to his allegations of excessive force, conditions of
confinement, or access to the courts. See generally, ECF No. 17. In his Opposition,
Dudley did not address the excessive force claim at all – as to the remaining claims
he made no reference or clarification as to what claims he was bringing against
these specific Defendants nor addressed their arguments for summary judgment.
See generally, ECF No. 57.
During discovery, Defendants requested information from Dudley in an
attempt to clarify what claims he was bringing against them. They asked Dudley
via interrogatory: “As to each of the individuals listed below, state in great detail all
the facts . . . that you believe support a violation of your constitutional rights.” ECF
No. 51-2 at ¶ 42. While Dudley responded with details about some Defendants, as

to Defendants Rebecca Fox, Corey Fox, Delozier, Patterson, Descavish, and Rozum,
Dudley wrote the word “Nothing” under their names in the list. Id.4 Dudley makes
no further reference to this nor does he dispute Defendants characterization of his
“nothing” in his Opposition brief. ECF No. 57.
As it is undisputed that Defendants Rebecca Fox, Corey Fox, Delozier,
Patterson, Descavish, and Rozum were not involved in Dudley’s claims of excessive

force, conditions of confinement, and access to courts, summary judgment is granted
as to these Defendants. See Chruby v. Bearjar, No. 24-1200, 2025 WL 325751, at *2
(3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2025) (upholding District Court’s granting of summary judgment
as to two defendants who were “not involved” in prisoner-plaintiff’s allegations).
b. Constitutional Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal
court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

4 Defendants further support their argument with Affidavits from each of these Defendants
except Defendant Delozier. See ECF No. 51-3 at 4 (Descavish); Id. at 5 (Corey Fox); Id. at 6 (Rebecca
Fox); Id. at 7 (Patterson); Id. at 8 (Rozum). Additionally, an affidavit from Defendant Wolford
indicates that only Levernight, Anderson, Turk, and Appley were present during the “use of force
incident” and not Delozier or any of the other named Defendants. ECF 51-3 at 12-13. Indeed,
Dudley’s reference to Delozier is contained in the case caption of the Amended Complaint which
suggests he/she is a staff person in Cambria County Prison that works in accounting. ECF No. 17 at
1. The only foreseeable claim related to accounting, deductions from inmate account, was previously
dismissed by the Court at ECF No. 32.
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted).
Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States
Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 145 n.3 (1979). Three such claims survived Defendants’ motion to dismiss –
excessive force, conditions of confinement, and access to courts. ECF No. 32. Now
Defendants move for summary judgement on each.
i. Excessive Force

Dudley brings an excessive force claim against Defendants Anderson, Appley,
Levernight, and Turek, alleging they used excessive force when they “took him to
the ground,” maced him, and handcuffed him to take him to his cell. ECF No. 17 at
8.5 Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing they needed to use force
because he refused multiple orders to go back to his cell and be “cuffed up,” and the
use of force was minimal. ECF No. 52 at 6-8. Dudley does not address his excessive
force claim in his Opposition brief. ECF No. 57.

A pretrial detainee excessive force claim is governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which “protects a pretrial detainee from the use
of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.
389, 397-98 (2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)).

5 It is unclear from the record what specific roles Defendants Anderson, Appley, Levernight,
and Turek played in the use of force. This analysis assumes all four Defendants were involved and
participating at each step in the altercation with Dudley.
Under the Due Process Clause, pretrial detainees must prove law enforcement had
an express intent to punish the detainee and must not have had an “alternative
purpose” for the force or that the force “appears excessive in relation to the

alternative purpose assigned to it.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
In considering the reasonableness of the force used against a pretrial
detainee, considerations such as “the relationship between the need for the use of
force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort
made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the
security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and

whether the plaintiff was actively resisting” bear weight. Kingsley, 576 U.S. 389,
387 (applying an objective standard for the use of force).
With this standard in mind, a prison's internal security is left to the
discretion of prison administrators. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
Prison administrators should be afforded “wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. at

321-22 (citations omitted). Decisions made by prison officials facing disturbances or
emergencies affecting prison security should not be second-guessed by courts. Id.
“The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure . . . does not
amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in
retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was
unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.” Id. at 319.
The undisputed facts show Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
Dudley’s excessive force claim. Those facts show:
• Dudley refused Defendants’ multiple orders to get off the phone and go
back to his cell. ECF No. 53 at ¶¶ 4-6.
• Dudley refused Defendants’ order to “cuff up.” Id. at 7.
• Dudley tied a towel around his face to avoid Defendants. Id. at ¶ 7.
• He refused additional orders by Defendants to comply with the order to
“cuff up.” Id. at ¶ 8.
• He was then “taken to the ground to be cuffed.” Id. at ¶ 9.
• During the encounter, he told Defendants: “[If] I catch you guys on the
street, I am going to get you guys on the street.” Id. at ¶ 14.
• He refused medical treatment. ECF No. 53 at ¶ 10.
• In a grievance, Dudley said he had a “busted lip,” and that his head was
pushed into the ground, and that he felt a knee on his head. ECF No. 51-1
at 38. Dudley offered no evidence to corroborate this. ECF No. 57.
Based on the undisputed material facts presented here – as well as Dudley’s
allegation from the Amended Complaint that he was maced – the Court finds that
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Dudley’s excessive force claim.
The undisputed facts show that the force Defendants used was objectively
reasonable and not excessive under the circumstances. Fitzgerald v. Russell, No.
2:22-CV-853, 2025 WL 406032, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2025) (finding no excessive
force on summary judgment where defendants used pepper spray on inmate who
refused to return to cell); Brown v. Lardin, No. CV 21-1407, 2023 WL 6847349, at *7
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-3115, 2024 WL 2813343 (3d Cir.
Feb. 28, 2024) (finding no excessive force on summary judgment where plaintiff
received minor injuries because force was minimal and necessary to restore order).
First, Defendants needed Dudley to return to his cell to mitigate a security
issue on the floor, but Dudley refused multiple orders to go back to his cell and
multiple orders to “cuff up.” Second, Dudley’s injuries are not known because he

refused medical treatment, but at most he alleges he had a “busted lip” (which he
offers no evidence to support). Third, Defendants tried to temper the situation by
giving him multiple chances to comply, and only used the force to handcuff Dudley
and did not continue force once he had been cuffed. Fourth, Dudley threatened
Defendants with violence. Finally, Dudley actively resisted multiple sets of orders
to comply, and evaded Defendants by tying a towel around himself.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Dudley, no reasonable jury
could conclude that Defendants used excessive force against Dudley. Dudley does
not dispute that the actions occurred as Defendants describe. ECF No. 57.
Therefore, summary judgment is granted to Defendants on the excessive force
claim.
ii. Conditions of Confinement
Defendants next move for summary judgment on Dudley’s Conditions of

Confinement claim against Defendants Smith, Turek, Anderson, and Appley. ECF
No. 52 at 8. In the Amended Complaint, Dudley alleges he “was in [a] cold cell for 6
days. The vents blew out cold air.” ECF No. 17 at 8.
Defendants argue this does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment. ECF No. 52 at 8. However, as pretrial detainee,
Dudley’s claims are best analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hubbard v.
Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding pretrial detainee’s conditions of
confinement claim must be analyzed under the Fourteenth not Eighth Amendment);
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 222 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment provides pre-trial detainees at least as much protection
. . . as the level guaranteed to prisoners by the Eighth Amendment.”).
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees
against “punishment.” Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 157-58 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535).
Under the Due Process Clause, “a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. To determine whether a condition of

confinement amounts to punishment, the Court “determines whether a condition of
confinement is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective; if it is not,
we may infer ‘that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may
not be constitutionally inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.’” E. D. v. Sharkey,
928 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 232) (emphasis in
original). The court must “consider the totality of the circumstances of confinement,
including any genuine privations or hardship over an extended period of time, and

whether conditions are (1) rationally related to their legitimate purpose or (2)
excessive in relation to that purpose.” Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d
310, 326 (3d Cir. 2020).
Here, the undisputed facts show Dudley was in this cell for a “legitimate
purpose” – security risk status – and not for punishment. Dudley was originally
placed in DHU West Cell 25 on February 11, 2022 after he was put on security risk
for refusing medical treatment. ECF No. 53 at 12-13. See also Mestre v. Wagner,
No. CIV.A. 11-2480, 2012 WL 300724, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2012), aff'd, 488 F.
App'x 648 (3d Cir. 2012) (special housing for plaintiff designated as security risk

was for security purposes and therefore did not amount to conditions of confinement
claim). Defendants Appley, Turek, and Patterson submitted sworn statements
saying that “DHU West Cell 25 cell in which Dudley was placed . . . was the
available cell at the time” and that he was placed in it for no “specific reasons other
than it was [an] available cell for an inmate who was designated a security risk.”
ECF No. 53-1 at 3, 7, 11. See also Pierre v. Richards, No. 4:23-CV-02044, 2024 WL

643294, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2024) (dismissing conditions of confinement claim
for unsanitary cell at motion to dismiss stage, in part because plaintiff did not
allege alternative cells were available, so it was not for illegitimate purpose).
Dudley does not show that Defendants’ treatment was “excessive in relation”
to his security risk status. Hope, 972 at 326. First, Dudley does not show his cell
was colder than anyone else’s on the block or that they were singling him out. The
Cambria County Maintenance Department Supervisor, Brian Risko, explained in an

affidavit that the prison heating system is controlled by software, which “does not
have the ability to control temperature in a single cell, only an entire housing unit
or zone within the facility.” ECF No. 51-3 at 2.
Second, Defendants provided Dudley with clothing and blankets appropriate
for his security classification. While Dudley argues that “[d]eprivation of clothing
and bedding bear no relationship to security measure[s],” ECF No. 57 at 2-3, he
does not show he was deprived of adequate clothing or bedding. It is undisputed
Dudley was given a paper security risk gown because of his security classification,
that Dudley was given a mattress and blanket night, and that after three days he

was given prison-issued shoes, three pairs of underwear, and three pairs of socks.
ECF No. 51-3. at 13-16. “While ‘prison officials must ensure that inmates receive
adequate . . . clothing’ . . . correctional staff retain broad discretion in determining
what garb is appropriate for inmates.” Ball v. Cooper, No. 1:11-CV-1833, 2012 WL
2389763, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 1, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:11-CV-1833, 2012 WL 2389760 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2012) (citing Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994)). See also Meastre, 2012 WL 300724, at *6
(“[Plaintiff] may disagree that the dietary and mattress restrictions were necessary
to protect him from himself and other detainees, but ‘[s]uch considerations are . . .
within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials’”) (quoting
Bell, 441 U.S. at 547).
Accordingly, since it is undisputed Defendants placed Dudley in Cell DHU
West 25 for a legitimate, non-pecuniary purpose for a total of six days, provided him

with clothing and bedding appropriate for his security risk classification, and could
only control the heating on the entire unit, Dudley’s Fourteenth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim fails. Therefore, summary judgment is granted for
Defendants on this claim as well.
iii. Access to Courts
Defendants next move for summary judgment on Dudley’s failure to access
courts claim against Defendant Smick. ECF No. 52 at 10. In his Amended

Complaint, Dudley alleges he was served with a forfeiture and condemnation
petition from the Attorney General of Allentown, PA, seeking to enforce a $13,780
civil forfeiture. ECF No. 17 at 8. He alleges Defendant Smick violated his access to
the courts because Smick told him he could use the phone either to contact his
family or a lawyer referral service, not both. Id. At the Motion to Dismiss stage,
this Court interpreted this claim as an access-to-courts claim. ECF No. 32 at 3.

Defendants argue summary judgment should be granted in their favor as Dudley
did not establish he was denied access to counsel. ECF No. 52 at 10-11.6
Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees retain a right of access to
the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); see also Prater v. City of Phila.,
542 F. App’x 135, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). To state a claim for denial of
access to courts, a pretrial detainee “must show that he ‘suffered an actual injury.’”

Hernandez v. Delaware Cnty. Of Pennsylvania, No. 22-CV-4187, 2023 WL 349254,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2023) (quoting Prater, 542 F. App’x at 137). “A detainee
states an actual injury by alleging ‘that a nonfrivolous and arguable claim was lost

6 Defendants also argue Dudley’s claim fails because a civil forfeiture action is not one of the
two types of cases the Supreme Court has outlined for access to court claims under the Eighth
Amendment. ECF No. 52 at 10 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1996)). However, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not extended Lewis’ categorization to pretrial detainee’s claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Prater, 542 F. App’x at 138 (“[B]ecause [plaintiff] had not been
convicted, we do not believe such a limitation is applicable”).
because of the denial of access to the courts.’” Id. (quoting Tinsley v. Giorla, 369 F.
App’x 378, 381 (3d Cir. 2010)). See also Sanders v. Rose, 576 F. App’x 91, 94 (3d Cir.
2014) (“[T]o sufficiently plead an access-to-courts claim … a non-prisoner must

plead that ‘official acts … may allegedly have caused the loss … of a meritorious
case.’”) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002)).
Dudley filed a grievance on April 27, 2022, saying Defendant Smick told him
he could either call his family or a lawyer referral service regarding the forfeiture
notice, not both. In the grievance, he noted his inability to call the lawyer referral
service despite his request slips and conversation with “Counselors.” ECF No. 51-1

at 39. In the grievance, he says the initial discussion took place on February 24,
2022, and has remained an issue since (as of the date of the grievance April 27,
2022). Id.7 Dudley, however, does not provide any additional information in his
Opposition Brief, for example how often he asked to make this call, whether he
asked again after he received a response to the grievance, or whether he asked
anyone besides Defendant Smick to make this call. It is undisputed that Dudley did
not file any additional grievances on this matter.

Even if Defendant Smick did tell Dudley on February 24, 2022 that he could
choose between calling his family and the lawyer referral service, Dudley’s access-

7 The Parties also do not dispute Defendant Corey Fox, as the Grievance Coordinator,
requested Smick respond to Dudley’s grievance, Defendant Smick responded saying that Dudley had
“never mentioned this issue to [him]” and Smick’s response was relayed to Dudley. ECF No. 53 at
18 (citing ECF No. 51-1 at 39-42). Defendant Corey Fox further added that the grievance was
discussed with Counselor Smick and that he “would address it with [Dudley] when he comes back to
the block.” ECF 51-1 at 42. The issue was marked “resolved” and no further grievances were
received from Dudley on this issue thereafter. Id.
to-court claim still fails because he does not show Defendant Smick’s actions caused
him an actual injury. Dudley had a myriad of other ways to contact the lawyer
referral service and the Allentown Attorney General’s Office. Hernandez, 2023 WL

349254, at *6 (“A detainee states an actual injury by alleging . . . [a] claim was lost
because of the denial of access to the courts”) (emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Dudley had an approved list of people he could call and
that he was free to update that list. See ECF No. 53 at ¶ 24. Dudley specifically
says in his Opposition brief: “I could have added the [lawyer referral service]
number to my phone list.” ECF No. 57 at 2.8 Dudley also does not dispute that:
• Dudley could make telephone calls during this time. ECF No. 53 at ¶ 25.
• Dudley did not attempt to add either the lawyer referral service or the
Allentown Attorney General’s Office number to his approved call list.
ECF No. 57 at 2.
• Neither the lawyer referral service nor the Allentown Attorney General’s
Office was blocked at any time from his call list. ECF No. 51-1 at 4.
• Dudley could receive and send mail. ECF No. 53 at ¶ 26.
• Dudley did not send any mail to either the lawyer referral service or to the
Allentown Attorney General’s Office. ECF No. 51-1 at 30-36.
• Dudley did not send the forfeiture documents to anyone, including his
family. ECF No. 53 at ¶ 27.
Dudley had alternative methods of handling his forfeiture action – beginning
with adding the telephone number of the Allentown Attorney General’s Office and
the lawyer referral service to his approved call list and calling them – but he did not
do so. Burns v. Cole, No. CIV A 08-4807(RMB), 2008 WL 5136958, at *10 (D.N.J.
Dec. 4, 2008) (dismissing access to court claim about ability to call lawyer because

8 Instead, he argues that “[i]f it was that easy, Counselor Smick should have stated this in his
response to [his] grievance.” ECF No. 57 at 2.
plaintiff did not show “lack of alternative means of communications”); Randall v.
Cnty. Of Berks, Pennsylvania, No. CV 14-5091, 2015 WL 5027542, at *17 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 24, 2015) (“[A] pretrial detainee does not have unfettered telephone access,

even to communicate with legal counsel”). Granted, those agencies may or may not
have accepted a collect call from an inmate, yet Dudley did not even attempt to add
their numbers to his list to make such calls so whether such calls would be accepted
is unknown. Nor did he send them mail, have a family member or friend contact
them on his behalf, or request another staff member provide him access to call those
agencies. Lastly, he sought no further grievances about his alleged inability to

make such a call after the initial grievance was marked “resolved.”
Accordingly, Dudley has failed to show Defendant Smick’s statement(s) was
the actual cause of his injuries. Wilkins v. Rozum, No. CIV.A.06-203J, 2008 WL
3833418, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2008) (dismissing access to court claim because
did “offer[ed] no proof” that denial of access to library impaired his ability to meet
deadline). Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Dudley’s access to court
claim is granted.9

VI. Conclusion
Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that no genuine
issues of material fact exist, and Defendants’ Motion shall be GRANTED. An
appropriate Order will be issued.

9 Because the undisputed facts do not support a constitutional violation, the Court need not
address Defendants’ argument about qualified immunity and whether the right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 600
(3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]f no constitutional violation is found, a court need not address whether a
reasonable officer would have known he or she was violating a clearly established right.”).
DATED this 26th day of March, 2025.
BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge

CC: CLINTON DEONARD DUDLEY
70247-509
FCI ALLENWOOD MEDIUM
FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
P.O. BOX 2000
WHITE DEER, PA 17887

All counsel of record, via ECF

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10831709. Public record. Not legal advice.