# OWENS v. PROPST

> District Court, S.D. Indiana · March 26, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10831452

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** March 26, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

MICHAEL T. OWENS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:21-cv-02241-JPH-KMB
)
NEIL D. PROPST Dr., )
TERRANCE DICKERSON Warden, )
WILLIAMS Chief, )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, )
)
Interested Party. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Michael Owens alleges that he was denied medical care related to a
COVID-19 infection and held in a dirty cell at the Marion County Jail in 2020.
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. [95]. For the
reasons below, that motion is GRANTED.
I.
Facts and Background
Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule
56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In early April 2020, while Mr. Owens was a pretrial detainee at Marion
County Jail, he and a few other detainees tested positive for COVID-19. Dkt.
96-1 at 3; see dkt. 26 at 2–3; dkt. 111 at 4. Around this time, Dr. Neil Propst,
the jail's medical director, had been involved in developing the jail's COVID-19
response plan under CDC Guidelines. Dkt. 96-1 at 1, 3-4. As part of this

plan, detainees who tested positive for COVID-19 were quarantined together as
a group—a policy known as "cohorting"—which the CDC recommended for
environments like the jail where individual isolation was not practical. Id.; dkt.
96-2. Under this policy, Mr. Owens was relocated to the 2-F housing unit to
quarantine on April 5. Dkt. 96-1 at 4.
While in 2-F, Mr. Owens was offered medical visits at least once daily by
Dr. Propst or other medical staff. Id.; dkt. 96-3. During these visits, staff
checked Mr. Owens's vitals and oxygen levels and performed respiratory

assessments. See dkt. 96-3. Dr. Propst also ordered an x-ray in April 2020
and an EKG in May 2020. Dkt. 96-1 at 5, 8; dkt. 96-3 at 13, 22. At that point
in the pandemic, medical-grade masks were in extremely short supply, but
Marion County staff including Dr. Propst continually tried to obtain masks for
patients in the jail. Dkt. 96-1 at 6.
On April 22, Dr. Propst noted that Mr. Owens was asymptomatic, and
that if he remained symptom-free for 72 hours, he could be released from
quarantine. Dkt. 96-1 at 6; dkt. 96-2 at 17 (CDC guidance on patient

isolation). However, Mr. Owens then reported shortness of breath, meaning he
was no longer asymptomatic or eligible to leave quarantine. Id.
By early May, there were too many COVID-positive patients to fit in the
2-F dorm unit. Dkt. 96-1 at 7. Jail officials moved the patients who had been
in quarantine the longest to two-person cells in the 4-South unit. Id. Mr.
Owens was among the patients reassigned from 2-F to 4-South. Id. During
this transfer, Chief Williams had officers escort Mr. Owens and others to the 4-

South cells after they complained about conditions in the jail. Dkt. 111 at 12–
13. The 4-South cells were "dirty" and Mr. Owens had "no running water [and]
nothing to clean with for four days." Id. at 13 (Owens complaint), 19 (Owens
aff.).1
Mr. Owens continued to receive daily medical assessments while in 4-
South. Dkt. 96-1 at 7–8. On May 14, Mr. Owens was released from
quarantine after meeting the criteria to leave isolation. Id. at 9.
Mr. Owens filed this case in August 2021, dkt. 1, and is proceeding on a

Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Chief Williams
and Warden Dickerson, and a Fourteenth Amendment denial of medical care
claim against Dr. Propst. Dkt. 26 (amended complaint); dkt. 31 (screening
order). Defendants moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 95.
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must
inform the court "of the basis for its motion" and specify evidence
demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp.

1 Dr. Propst testified that he never witnessed dirty conditions in the cells, and that the
unit had running water. Dkt. 96-1 at 9.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this
burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and identify
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the
evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation
omitted).
III.
Analysis
The Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees' rights to receive
reasonable medical care and not be subject to deplorable conditions of
confinement. Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018)
(medical care); Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019)
(conditions of confinement). Both rights are "subject only to [an] objective
reasonableness inquiry." Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352; Hardeman, 933 F.3d at
823; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397–400 (2015). The inquiry has

two steps: first, whether "defendants acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps
even recklessly when they considered the consequences" of their conduct, and
second, "whether the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable." McCann
v. Ogle County, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018); see Gonzalez v. McHenry
County, 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022). "[O]bjective reasonableness turns
on the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Mays v. Dart, 974
F.3d 810, 819 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).
A. Denial of medical care claim against Dr. Propst
Dr. Propst argues that his response to Mr. Owens's COVID-19 infection
was objectively reasonable in the context of the jail's facing a developing public

health emergency. Dkt. 97 at 17. Mr. Owens responds that Dr. Propst falsified
his first positive COVID test and that Mr. Owens contracted COVID-19 from
being placed in the 2-F quarantine dorm. Dkt. 113 at 8–9. He further argues
that he was not provided masks, cleaning supplies, or medication and was
continually re-infected with COVID-19 from being housed with other COVID-
positive patients.2 Id.
Whether Dr. Propst's medical care was objectively reasonable under "the
totality of the facts and circumstances" requires a "broad[ ] look" at the

evidence designated in the summary-judgment record. McCann, 909 F.3d at
885–7. In support of summary judgment, Mr. Owens has filed a verified
response brief, dkt. 113, and designated his ten-page amended complaint, dkt.
26, an affidavit, dkt. 111 at 18–19, grievances, and portions of his medical
records. See dkt. 111.
As to his medical care while quarantined, Mr. Owens states that he got
pneumonia and strep throat, either while he was still in the 2-F dorm, dkt. 26
at 8–9, or after he was moved to 4-South, dkt. 113 at 11. When Dr. Propst

came to 4-South, Mr. Owens "pleaded to [him] . . . for medical help but he said

2 Mr. Owens also argues in his response that Defendants are not entitled to immunity
under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, dkt. 113 at 2,
but Defendants did not raise PREP Act immunity in their motion for summary
judgment.
I have to 'suck it up and wait it out.' [Dr. Propst] would not help me at all."
Dkt. 26 at 8; see dkt. 113 at 9.3 Mr. Owens states that he received "[n]o
medication" and "no kind of treatment for Covid or [pneumonia]" when he

"notified all the Defendants a second time" about his conditions and symptoms.
Dkt. 113 at 8–9; dkt. 111 at 19. Mr. Owens also testified that, while at Marion
County Jail, he "was never [given any] face masks" and there was no "social
distancing." Dkt. 113 at 8, dkt. 111 at 9.
However, Dr. Propst testified that he prescribed Mr. Owens cough syrup
and antibiotics, though at times Mr. Owens refused treatment or medications.
Dkt. 96-1 at 4–6, 9; see dkt. 96-7 (medication administration record including
acetaminophen and antibiotics). And in response to that, Mr. Owens

acknowledges that he received at least some treatment, stating that the
evidence "clearly shows that he never refused any treatment to covid-19" but
instead "stop[ped] treatment . . . because he was feeling fine." Dkt. 113 at 16.
In fact, Mr. Owens cites his medical "orders" at dkt. 96-6, saying that they
"clearly show[ ] that from April 4, 2020 until July 29, 2020 Plaintiff completed
all his treatments [given] by medical staff" and that the "only treatment for
covid-19 was the taking of plaintiff's temperature, blood pressure reading and
vitals." Dkt. 113 at 16. Mr. Owens adds "that his medications were taken as

needed, inconsist[ent] with Defendants' evidence." Dkt. 113 at 17.
The upshot of this evidence is that Mr. Owens does not dispute that he
received many temperature, pulse, blood pressure, and oxygen level checks—

3 Dr. Propst denies making this statement. Dkt. 96-1 at 10.
sometimes more than once per day—as Dr. Propst testified and as reflected in
Mr. Owens's medical records. Dkt. 96-6; see dkt. 96-1 at 4–5. Mr. Owens also
does not appear to dispute that Dr. Propst ordered and reviewed the results of

an x-ray and EKG. Dkt. 96-1 at 5, 8. And Mr. Owens contradicted his own
testimony that he received no medication and no treatment by testifying that
"his medications were taken as needed" and that he was compliant with the
care he received and stopped treatment once he was feeling better.
Mr. Owens also does not appear to dispute the evidence of specific care
that Dr. Propst provided during Mr. Owens's COVID-19 infection. On April 6,
Mr. Owens reported sharp chest pain, so Dr. Propst checked Mr. Owens's blood
oxygen levels and conducted a lung exam, finding that Mr. Owens's lungs were

clear. Id. at 4–5. A few days later, Mr. Owens reported chest pain and
decrease in smell. Id. at 5. He received another lung check shortly after that,
which revealed "coarseness" in one lung, so Dr. Propst ordered an x-ray. Id. at
5–6. Mr. Owens reported shortness of breath at the end of April, though he
"did not appear in distress upon examination." Id. at 7. Mr. Owens continued
to report shortness of breath, and Dr. Propst ordered an EKG, which showed
normal results requiring no further treatment. Id. at 8.
This undisputed evidence and Mr. Owens's testimony about the medical

care he received shows that Dr. Propst's treatment "was not obviously
ineffective" but represented care provided "in a manner calculated to treat
him." Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 682 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming
summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim);
accord Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014) (Under the Eighth
Amendment, "[t]he federal courts will not interfere with a doctor's decision to
pursue a particular course of treatment unless that decision represents so

significant a departure from accepted professional standards or practices that
it calls into question whether the doctor actually was exercising his
professional judgment.").
As for Mr. Owens's allegation that Dr. Propst faked Mr. Owens's COVID
test result, so that Mr. Owens did not contract COVID until he was
quarantined in 2-F, Dr. Propst testified that he did not do so. Dkt. 96-1 at 10.
Mr. Owens identifies no basis for personal knowledge to support his
speculation about a faked COVID test, so he cannot raise a dispute about this

fact issue. See Simpson v. Franciscan All., 827 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2016)
(testimony containing "only vague, conclusory assertions about incidents
outside [plaintiff's] personal knowledge" not sufficient to survive summary
judgment). Similarly, Mr. Owens has not disputed that the jail's quarantine
protocols were established under the CDC's recommended "cohorting" practice,
and that Dr. Propst based Mr. Owens's placements on his medical judgment.
Dkt. 96-1 at 6–8. Finally, even accepting that Dr. Propst once dismissed Mr.
Owens's request for help in 4-South, no designated evidence suggests that Mr.

Owens told Dr. Propst at that time that he was suffering severe symptoms
requiring immediate care. See dkt. 26 at 8; dkt. 96-1; Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't of Fin.
& Prof. Reg., 988 F.3d 948, 956 (7th Cir. 2021) (speculation or conclusory
allegations alone are insufficient to survive summary judgment).
Under this "totality of the facts and circumstances," no reasonable jury
could find that Dr. Propst provided objectively unreasonable medical care.
McCann, 909 F.3d at 887 (nurse did not act in an objectively unreasonable way

when she "attended diligently and conscientiously" to patient's medical needs).
Instead, the undisputed evidence is that Dr. Propst and jail officials followed
CDC recommendations as best they could in providing medical care in the
early days of a global health emergency. See Mays, 974 F.3d at 823 (noting
that while CDC guidelines on COVID-19 "do not themselves set a constitutional
standard" they "are certainly relevant to an objective reasonableness
determination"). Dr. Propst is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Mr.
Owens's medical claim. See McCann, 909 F.3d at 886; Mays, 974 F.3d at 815–

21, 823.
B. Conditions of confinement claim against Warden Dickerson and
Chief Williams
Mr. Owens argues that Warden Dickerson and Chief Williams subjected
him to objectively unreasonable conditions of confinement when they assigned
him to a "nasty dirty lock up cell" in 4-South with "no running water" and no
social distancing, and nothing to clean with for four days. Dkt. 113 at 8.
Defendants respond that the designated evidence does not support Mr.
Owens's description and that instead the cell was not dirty, that cleaning
products were available, and that the unit had running water. Dkt. 97 at 20.
Here, the only designated evidence supporting Mr. Owens's conditions-of-
confinement allegations are his general assertions. See dkt. 111 at 19; dkt.
113 at 8. He does not explain what he means by "dirty" and, despite his vague
allegation of no running water, designates no evidence that he lacked drinking
water or the ability to wash himself. Cf. Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 315 (7th
Cir. 2015) ("It is the jail's constitutional obligation to provide . . . drinking

water."). He also designates no evidence that he spoke to Chief Williams or
Warden Dickerson about the conditions in his cell, made them or anyone else
aware of any issues with the water, or requested cleaning supplies. And the
grievances Mr. Owens submitted as evidence did not put them on notice of his
cell-condition allegations because he raised concerns about being exposed to
COVID-19 and quarantine policies generally, without mentioning water,
cleaning supplies, or dirty cells. Dkt. 111 at 2–8.4
Taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Owens, his bare-bones

evidentiary designations about his cell conditions do not allow a reasonable
jury to conclude that Chief Williams or Warden Dickerson knew about the
conditions Mr. Owens alleges he experienced in his cell. See Colbert v. City of
Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) ("Individual liability under § 1983 .
. . requires personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation");
Allen v. Hasemeyer, 673 Fed. App'x 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2017) ("Allen vaguely
asked Whitthoft to remove him from a 'condemned' cell, but Allen did not
explain what conditions led him to call it 'condemned.'").

4 Some of these grievances do appear to raise general concerns about social distancing
policies in the jail. But the designated evidence shows that jail officials tried to
implement social distancing policies when feasible. See dkt. 96-1; Mays, 974 F.3d at
815–21 (discussing possible feasibility limitations on social distancing jail policies in
reversing a preliminary injunction grant).
But even if Chief Williams or Warden Dickerson had been personally
involved, no reasonable jury could find that they acted "purposefully,
knowingly" or "recklessly" with respect to the situation, or that they acted in an

objectively unreasonable manner. See Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 824–24 (three-
day water shutoff which resulted in accumulated waste in toilets and attracted
insects, and where detainees lacked sufficient water to drink, was objectively
unreasonable); cf. Gray v. Hardy 826 F.3d 1000, 1005–06 (7th Cir. 2016) (only
instances when "prisoners are deprived of cleaning supplies and running water
. . . in extreme circumstances" are considered constitutional violations under
the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment). Indeed, Mr. Owens does not
contest that the medical evidence includes no indication that he suffered

dehydration or any health issues that could have been caused by an unclean
environment. See dkt. 97 at 20; Gray, 826 F.3d at 1006 (Gray "must also show
that he suffered some cognizable harm from the overall lack of a sanitary
environment, and that the warden's deliberate indifference caused that harm");
Mays v. Emanuele, 853 F. App'x 25, 27 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that plaintiff
"needed to furnish evidence that the conditions in his cell posed an objectively
serious threat to his health" and that officers had to have acted purposefully,
knowingly, or recklessly and responded in an objectively unreasonable way for

claim to succeed).
"It is well established that in order to withstand summary judgment, the
non-movant must allege specific facts creating a genuine issue for trial and
may not rely on vague, conclusory allegations." Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest–Chi.
Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2003). Mr. Owens has
not done so for his conditions of confinement claim. Chief Williams and
Warden Dickerson are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Owens's
conditions-of-confinement claim.
IV.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. Dkt. [95].
Final judgment will issue in a separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Date: 3/26/2025 SJamu Patrick Hanley
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
MICHAEL T. OWENS
104328
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