# Zvolensky v. City of Scranton

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830769

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830769

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that pre-trial proceedings, including attendance at hearings, are not seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
- finding claims and arguments to be abandoned due to a failure to respond to those made in opposition

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMBER ZVOLENSKY,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-01722

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

JUSTIN BUTLER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
This is a federal civil rights action. In her second amended
complaint (Doc. 25), the plaintiff, Amber Zvolensky, alleges that Justin
Butler of Scranton’s Police Department violated her civil rights in
connection with an allegedly unlawful seizure of her person and her
subsequent arrest for recklessly endangering the welfare of a child. The
matter is now before the court on a motion to dismiss by the defendant.
(Doc. 26). The parties have fully briefed the matter (Doc. 29; Doc. 30; Doc.
31).
I. Background1

In her second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that on
February 17, 2022, she was visiting her husband, Mark Zvolenksy, at his
residence located at 2132 Dorothy Street, in Scranton, Pennsylvania. The

plaintiff alleges she did not reside at the location. The plaintiff and Mr.
Zvolensky attempted to move their vehicle while their two-year-old child
sat on the porch of the residence. At some point, Mr. Zvolensky started

his car and began to back it up. The child, however, unbeknownst to the
plaintiff or Mr. Zvolensky, had left the porch and wandered behind the
vehicle. The child was then struck by the car. The Scranton Police

Department arrived on the scene and followed the plaintiff and Mr.
Zvolensky to the hospital where the child was treated. Unfortunately, the
child died only a few hours later.

The Lackawanna County Office of Youth and Family Services (CYS)
investigated the plaintiff for wrongdoing in the death of her child, but
closed its case on May 10, 2022. However, on June 22, 2022, the defendant

arrested the plaintiff for recklessly endangering the welfare of her child.

1 All facts are taken from the plaintiff’s second amended complaint.
(Doc. 25).
Mr. Zvolensky was subsequently arrested on that same date for the

child’s death.
The plaintiff alleges that she was arrested without probable cause,
contending she was arrested to force Mr. Zvolensky to plead guilty to two

separate charges: (1) charges from his June 22, 2022, arrest; and (2)
charges arising from a previous arrest on February 18, 2022, for
furnishing drug free urine and obstruction of administration of law.2 The

plaintiff further contends that she was told throughout a multitude of
preliminary hearings that her arrest, and subsequent prosecution,
stemmed from keeping pressure on Mr. Zvolensky. For example, she

alleges that she was advised “the Scranton Police Department would
withdraw the criminal charges against the Plaintiff if [her] husband pled
guilty to the charges of killing his minor child.” (Doc. 25, ¶ 19). Her

preliminary hearing was continued from July 19, 2022, to November 1,
2022, to “keep pressure on Mark Zvolensky to finish his treatment.” ( ,
¶ 18). The plaintiff alleges that the Scranton Police Department and

Lackawanna County District Attorney’s Office conspired and agreed not

2 These charges stemmed from the Scranton Police Department’s
request for a urine sample after being informed Mr. Zvolensky used
illegal drugs.
to dismiss the charges against the plaintiff.3 The criminal charges were

ultimately dismissed against the plaintiff, however, on April 25, 2023.
Mr. Zvolensky was then sentenced on April 26, 2023.
The plaintiff alleges she suffered extreme trauma, emotional stress,

and depression from the loss of her child. She further alleges that her
arrest by the defendant “amplified and aggravated” “the extreme loss of
life of her child.” (¶ 28). Moreover, she alleges that she was subjected to

numerous harassment measures by CYS because of her arrest. The
plaintiff has thus sued the defendant on four counts under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 in this action: (1) malicious prosecution; (2) malicious use and abuse

of process; (3) false arrest; and (4) false imprisonment. (Doc. 25). The
defendant has subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
second amended complaint in its entirety. (Doc. 26).

II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
defendant to move to dismiss “for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Moreover, “a motion to

3 Neither the Scranton Police Department nor the Office of the
District Attorney of Lackawanna County are parties to the second
amended complaint.
dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in

the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”
643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing

, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). Courts may
consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint in addition to
“documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of

which a court may take judicial notice.”
, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). While it must accept all allegations
in the complaint as true, the Court does not have to accept “unsupported

conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.” , 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).

III. Discussion
The plaintiff has asserted four different claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the defendant: (1) malicious prosecution; (2) malicious use

and abuse of process; (3) false arrest; and (4) false imprisonment. (Doc.
25). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress….

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but
instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere.
, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To establish a § 1983 claim,
the plaintiff must establish that the defendants, acting under color of
state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States
Constitution. , 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.
1995). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a civil rights
complaint must state the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible
for the alleged civil rights violations. , 423 F.3d 347, 353

(3d Cir. 2005).
The defendant has moved to dismiss each count for a failure to state
a claim. (Doc. 26). We shall analyze each of the plaintiff’s claims

individually. We must note, however, that the plaintiff has asserted all
claims in violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. As set forth below, many of these claims are incorrectly pled, and
thus, we must dismiss those claims with prejudice.4

A. Malicious Prosecution
The plaintiff alleges malicious prosecution claims under § 1983 in
violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Before

we look at the merits of each party’s contention, however, we must briefly
note that the plaintiff has failed to provide any support that the Fifth
Amendment provides a claim for malicious prosecution. Therefore, we

will dismiss the claim with prejudice without further analysis.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff additionally alleges a malicious
prosecution claim under § 1983 in violation of her Fourth Amendment

rights. To prove malicious prosecution under § 1983 for a Fourth
Amendment violation, a party must show that:
(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)
the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s favor; (3) the
proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the
defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff

4 The plaintiff’s complaint makes difficult our ability to ascertain
exactly which of the plaintiff’s facts pertain to each of the plaintiff’s
claims. When read broadly, the complaint makes plausible some of the
plaintiff’s claims at the pleading stage. Nonetheless, we must
additionally note that the factual support relied upon for those claims at
this stage is tenuous at best, and thus, the plaintiff must provide
significantly more support for her claims to survive at the summary
judgment stage.
suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the
concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).
, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005). The
defendant argues that the Court should dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for
failure to allege a deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure. (Doc.

29). Moreover, the defendant argues that even if the plaintiff has
adequately alleged a deprivation of liberty consistent with a seizure, the
defendant is protected by qualified immunity and thus, the plaintiff’s

claim should be dismissed.
The plaintiff has alleged various deprivations of liberty throughout
her complaint, many of which do not constitute a deprivation for purposes

of her malicious prosecution claim. (Doc. 25). For example,
the plaintiff argues that she “was falsely held against her will” and “also
deprived of her liberty.” (Doc. 25, ¶¶ 38, 39). These allegations, however,

constitute “threadbare recitals of a cause of action” that fail to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” , 556 U.S.
662, 663 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)).

Without any additionally supporting facts, we cannot discern the
plaintiff’s alleged seizure and her alleged liberty deprivation. Moreover,
it appears that the plaintiff argues her participation in preliminary

hearings consists of a valid deprivation of liberty. (Doc. 25, ¶¶ 17, 24,
25, 30). Nonetheless, courts have held that attendance at preliminary
hearings does not qualify as a seizure for purposes of malicious

prosecution claims. , 752 F. Supp. 2d 643, 659
(W.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that pre-trial proceedings, including attendance
at hearings, are not seizures within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment); , 353 F. Supp. 3d 357, 368 (M.D.
Pa. 2018) (reiterating that appearances at court proceedings do not
amount to a deprivation of liberty under the Fourth Amendment).

In turn, the plaintiff’s only viable contention of a seizure lies in her
arrest allegation, as the Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that
“the arrest of a person is quintessentially a seizure.” ,

592 U.S. 306, 312 (2021) (quoting , 445 U.S. 573, 585
(1980)). The defendant has moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim on the
basis that the “[p]laintiff has failed to show that she suffered a

deprivation of liberty for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim”
because “she has failed to allege that she was taken into custody at any
point prior to the time that charges were lodged against her.” (Doc. 29, at
28). The plaintiff alleges that she was arrested on June 22, 2022, (Doc.

25, ¶ 15), and at some point she “was falsely held against her will.” (
¶ 34). Indeed, while the defendant may disagree with the plaintiff’s
allegations,5 at the pleading stage we must simply determine whether

the plaintiff’s allegations can “raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of” the plaintiff’s claims.
, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting

, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). We find here that plaintiff’s
allegations have raised that reasonable expectation and thus, the
plaintiff has provided sufficient information to sustain her malicious

prosecution claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment at the pleading
stage.
Even so, the defendant additionally maintains that he is entitled to

qualified immunity for the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims based
on probable cause. (Doc. 29, at 31, 46). We acknowledge that a police
officer who “reasonably but mistakenly conclude[s] that probable cause

is present” is entitled to qualified immunity. , 502

5 The defendant maintains that the plaintiff was never subjected to
any custodial detention for purposes of her claims. (Doc. 31, at 3).
U.S. 224, 227 (1991). Nonetheless, the Third Circuit has cautioned, “it is

generally unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the
pleading stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast
majority of cases.” , 328 F. App’x 788, 791 n.3 (3d Cir.

2009) (per curiam). For that reason, taking the allegations of the
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, we find that dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim is inappropriate

at this time.
The plaintiff, however, additionally pleads malicious prosecution
under § 1983 in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim

requires an independent analysis. “[T]he status of a Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution is murky.”
, 676 F. Supp. 3d 364, 375 (E.D. Pa. 2023).

The Supreme Court ruled in , 510 U.S. 266 (1994), that
malicious prosecution claims could not fall within substantive due
process. at 272. It reasoned that because “[t]he protections of

substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters
relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily
integrity,” they did not fit neatly for a “claim to be free from prosecution
except on the basis of probable cause.” , 676 F. Supp. 3d at 375

(quoting , 510 U.S. at 272). However, it “did not address whether
such a claim could fall under the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural
due process protections because ‘the only deprivation of life, liberty or

property [in the case], if any, consisted of petitioner’s pretrial arrest.’”
(quoting , 510 U.S. at 272 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
Since the decision, the Third Circuit has yet to definitively

provide an answer on whether malicious prosecution claims can find
support under the Fourteenth Amendment. Some cases within the Third
Circuit have implied a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim can be found

in the Fourteenth Amendment. , 163 F.3d 169,
172 (3d Cir. 1998) (“ stands for the broader proposition that a
section 1983 claim may be based on a constitutional provision other than

the Fourth Amendment. However, we note that commands that
claims governed by explicit constitutional text may not be grounded in
substantive due process.”); , 552 F. App’x

169, 174 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Our cases interpreting have
suggested that § 1983 malicious prosecution claims may be predicated on
constitutional provisions other than the Fourth Amendment, such as
procedural due process.”). Other cases, however, have rejected that

notion. 750 F.3d 273, 290 n.14 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998)) (identifying
that “Supreme Court case law leaves only the Fourth Amendment as [a]

potential source of malicious prosecution claims.”).6
Nevertheless, regardless of the uncertainty surrounding whether
malicious prosecution claims can be grounded in procedural due process,

courts have ruled that qualified immunity applies in similar situations
as procedural due process rights against malicious prosecution are not
clearly established; government officials are only immune from personal

liability under qualified immunity for conduct concerning clearly

6 Many courts have acknowledged that the Third Circuit appears to
support a potential Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claim
based on its ruling in , where it draws a line between the Fourth
Amendment’s protections and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection.
, 750 F.3d at 291 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment forbids a detention
without probable cause … But this protection against unlawful seizures
extends only until trial … The guarantee of due process of law, by
contrast, is not so limited as it protects defendants during an entire
criminal proceeding through and after trial.”);
, 290 F. Supp. 3d 371, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (stating that the
Third Circuit’s distinction “suggests that a procedural due process right
against malicious prosecution may exist”); , 676 F. Supp. 3d at
376 (noting that “there is significant theoretical support for [a procedural
due process right against malicious prosecution]”).
established constitutional rights. , 598

F. Supp. 3d 253, 266 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (holding that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity as “between 1992 and 1996 … it was not
clearly established that the Fourteenth Amendment provided for

procedural due process rights against malicious prosecution.”); ,
290 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (“[A]ny procedural due process right is not (and
was not at the relevant time) clearly established, meaning that the

officers are entitled to qualified immunity….”); , 353 F. Supp.
3d at 364 (ruling that the defendant officer was “entitled to qualified
immunity with respect to [the] plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process clause.”). In
short, even if a procedural due process right against malicious
prosecution exists, the defendant is still entitled to qualified immunity

because this right is not clearly established. For this reason, we shall
dismiss the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim based upon the
Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Malicious Abuse of Process
The plaintiff next alleges malicious abuse of process under § 1983
in violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. A
malicious abuse of process claim, however, is founded in the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. No. CV 24-0431, 2024
WL 3460112, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2024) (citing ,
567 F.2d 1213, 1220 (3d Cir. 1977)) (“An abuse of process is by definition

a denial of procedural due process.”). Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims
concerning violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment will be
dismissed with prejudice. “[A] section 1983 claim for malicious abuse of

process lies where prosecution is initiated legitimately and thereafter is
used for a purpose other than intended by law.” (citing ,
871 F.2d 331, 350 n.17 (3d Cir. 1989)). Courts have held “[w]hen process

is used to effect an extortionate demand, or to cause the surrender of a
legal right, or is used in any way not so intended by proper use of the
process, a cause for abuse of process can be maintained.”

, 80 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing
, 675 F. Supp. 287, 290 (W.D. Pa. 1987)).
We first note that the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and

malicious abuse of process claims appear contradictory. An abuse of
process claim arises when a prosecution is initiated while a
malicious prosecution claim arises with the of the
legal process. No. 06-1368, 2007 WL

1965296, at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 3, 2007), , 407 F. App’x 578 (3d Cir.
2010) (“[A] claim for abuse of process differs from a malicious prosecution
claim in that a malicious prosecution claim has to do with the wrongful

initiation of the legal process, i.e., without probable cause and with a bad
motive, whereas an abuse of process arises when a prosecution is
initiated legitimately but thereafter is used for a purpose other than

intended by law.”). Nonetheless, when a party alleges both claims, courts
have viewed them as alternative counts rather than dismissing them for
their contradictory nature. 2024 WL 3460112, at *10 (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)) (“A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim
or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or
defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the

pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.”); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). We shall
therefore view the plaintiff’s abuse of process claim as an alternative

count.
The plaintiff, assuming her prosecution was initiated legitimately
for purposes of her claim, alleges that her proceedings were used solely
to “put pressure” on her husband, Mark Zvolensky, and force him to plead

guilty to his charges. (Doc. 25, ¶ 18). She alleges at various points that
unidentified representatives of the Scranton Police Department conveyed
to her that they would withdraw the charges against her if her husband

pled guilty to the charges of killing his minor child. ( , ¶ 19).
Her charges would officially be dismissed, she contends, when Mr.
Zvolensky was sentenced. ( , ¶ 21). While “[i]ncidental motive[s] or

spite[s] or ulterior purpose[s]” are not conclusive in showing a misuse or
process, , 407 F. App’x at 582 (citations and quotations omitted),
“[c]ourts have held that when process is used to effect an extortionate

demand … or is used in any other way not so intended by proper use of
the process, a cause of action for abuse of process can be maintained.”
, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 431. We find that the plaintiff’s allegations

sufficiently make plausible the existence of actions used for a purpose
other than intended by law. Indeed, “[t]he usual case of abuse of process
is one of some form of extortion, using the process to put pressure upon

[the accused] to … take some other action or refrain from it.” 2024
WL 3460112, at *9 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 (1977)).
We hold that this rationale additionally applies to those abusing process
to put pressure upon an additional party to take or refrain from any

action, as the plaintiff has alleged in her complaint. For this reason, we
find that the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an abuse of process claim
under § 1983 in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Nonetheless, the defendant contests that even if the plaintiff can
successfully plead an abuse of process claim, he is still protected by
qualified immunity. (Doc. 29). We have already found that the plaintiff

has sufficiently alleged a violation of her rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment for purposes of her abuse of process claim. For qualified
immunity to apply to the defendant, we must find that this right was

“clearly established.” , 598 F. Supp. 3d at 266. In other words, that
right must have been one that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting , 566
U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). Nonetheless, as we noted above, an analysis of
qualified immunity at the pleading stage is often “in tension with the

reality that factual disputes often need to be resolved before determining
whether [a] defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established right.”
, 299 F. Supp. 3d 658, 669 (E.D.
Pa. 2017) (citing , 298 F.3d 271, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Therefore, the resolution of the issue of qualified immunity is premature
at this stage. (citing , 298 F.3d at 278) (noting that a decision
on qualified immunity is “premature when there are unresolved disputes

of historical facts relevant to the immunity analysis.”). Thus, we must
dismiss the defendant’s motion on this claim.
C. False Arrest

The plaintiff alleges false arrest claims under § 1983 in violation of
her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. False arrest claims
under § 1983 are grounded in the Fourth Amendment guarantee against

unreasonable searches, not the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
, 155 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(citing , 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995));

, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“The Fourth Amendment prohibits arrest without probable cause.”). We
will thus dismiss the plaintiff’s alleged-false arrest claims in violation of

her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights with prejudice. To
maintain a false arrest claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment, “a
plaintiff must show that he or she was arrested and the arresting officer
‘lacked probable cause to make the arrest.’” , No. CV

3:20-1911, 2021 WL 2784817, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 2, 2021) (quoting
, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 265). Indeed, we need not undertake a
significant analysis on the plaintiff’s false arrest claim. We have held

above that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make plausible that
she was arrested without probable cause. (Doc. 25, ¶ 15) (alleging
that the plaintiff was arrested on June 22, 2022, without probable cause).

Moreover, we have additionally articulated that while the defendant may
disagree on those facts, we must only analyze whether the plaintiff’s
allegations “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of” those claims.” , 515 F.3d at 234. Here, we have found
that the plaintiff has done so and has therefore pled sufficient facts for
her false arrest claim in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

We must briefly address the defendant’s contention that he is
entitled to qualified immunity under this claim based on probable cause.
(Doc. 29, at 31, 46). As we held in the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution

claim, while we acknowledge that a police officer who “reasonably but
mistakenly conclude[s] that probable cause is present” is entitled to
qualified immunity, , 502 U.S. at 227 (1991), we must reiterate
that Third Circuit has cautioned, “it is generally unwise to venture into

a qualified immunity analysis at the pleading stage as it is necessary to
develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases.” , 328 F.
App’x at 791 n.3. Therefore, taking the allegations of the complaint as

true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find
that dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim under qualified immunity is
inappropriate.

D. False Imprisonment
The plaintiff alleges false imprisonment claims under § 1983 in
violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Similar to a false arrest claim, a false imprisonment claim is additionally
grounded in the Fourth Amendment. , 155 F. Supp. 2d at 265
(citing , 47 F.3d at 636). We will thus dismiss the plaintiff’s

alleged-false imprisonment claims with prejudice in violation of her Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. To state a false imprisonment claim under
the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that she was

detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful.”
, 700 F.3d 675, 682–83 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing ,
549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007)). The defendant has moved to dismiss the
plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim on the same basis as the plaintiff’s

malicious prosecution and false arrest claims by arguing that the plaintiff
was never subjected to any custodial detention for purposes of her claims.
(Doc. 31, at 3). Nonetheless, as we have held in those same contested

claims, we find that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make
plausible that she was unlawfully detained. Indeed, the plaintiff has
alleged that she was “confined against her will,” “imprisoned,” and

“incarcerated” at some point in time. (Doc. 25, ¶¶ 56, 57). Although the
plaintiff has not provided all the details of the alleged imprisonment at
the pleading stage, the plaintiff only needs to allege facts to make

plausible her false imprisonment claim. We find that she has done so
here. Moreover, the defendant’s request for dismissal on the basis of
qualified immunity proves premature for the same reasons that we have

previously articulated. We will deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss on
qualified immunity grounds because it is premature at this stage.
E. Declaratory Judgment

The defendant moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s requested
declaratory judgment that defendant Butler violated her rights under the
United States Constitution. We will grant the defendant’s request for two
reasons. First, as the defendant notes, a declaratory judgment is

unavailable “solely to adjudicate past conduct” or to “proclaim that one
party is liable to another.” , 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir.
2006). Here, the plaintiff has attempted to seek a declaration concerning

defendant Butler’s past actions. Second, the plaintiff has failed to address
the defendant’s contention concerning her request for a declaratory
judgment and thus, the plaintiff has waived these claims.

., 301 F. Supp. 3d 486, 511–12 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (finding
claims and arguments to be abandoned due to a failure to respond to
those made in opposition).

IV. Conclusion7
For these reasons, the defendant’s motion will be granted in part
and denied in part.

The plaintiff’s following claims will be dismissed with prejudice as
leave to amend would be futile: (1) malicious prosecution in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) malicious use and abuse of

7 The defendant additionally argues that the plaintiff’s claim for
injunctive relief is moot. (Doc. 29, at 23); (Doc. 31, at 2). A review of the
operative complaint reflects that the plaintiff has not requested
injunctive relief. (Doc. 25).
process in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; (3) false arrest

in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) false
imprisonment in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and
(5) the plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment.

We will allow the following claims to proceed: (1) malicious
prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) malicious use and
abuse of process in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment; (3) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
and (4) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: March 25, 2025
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830769. Public record. Not legal advice.
