# Brown v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico Housing, LLC

> District Court, S.D. California · March 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830731

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** March 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830731

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting judicial notice is unnecessary for courts 4 to “take a case into account as non-binding precedent.”
- noting judicial notice is unnecessary for courts to “take a case 9 into account as non-binding precedent.”

## Opinion text

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9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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12 SAINT BROWN, et al., Case No.: 3:23-cv-00567-JES-DDL

13 Plaintiffs,
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
14 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
15 CAMP PENDLETON & QUANTICO
JUDGMENT
HOUSING LLC, et al.,
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Defendants.
17 [ECF No. 42]
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This case comes before the Court on a motion for partial summary judgment filed
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by Defendants/Counterclaimants San Diego Family Housing, LLC (“SDFH”) and Lincoln
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Military Property Management LP (“LMPM” collectively “Defendants”) on their motion
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for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims. ECF No. 42. Plaintiffs filed an opposition,
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and Defendants filed a reply brief. ECF Nos. 48, 51. On July 3, 2024, the Court heard oral
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argument on the matter. ECF No. 52. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS in
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part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
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1 I. BACKGROUND
2 On May 20, 2022, Plaintiffs entered into a Lease Agreement (“the Lease”) with
3 SDFH for a 4-bedroom, 2.5-bathroom two-story detached home with a fenced backyard at
4 1424 Orion Drive, San Diego, California 92126 (“Orion Property”) in the Capeharts West
5 neighborhood on base aboard Marine Corps Air Station Miramar (“MCAS Miramar”).
6 Declaration of Matt Ruane in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Ruane Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF
7 No. 42-3. Plaintiffs moved into the Orion Property on June 14, 2022. Id.
8 SDFH is the lessor of the Orion Property and LMPM is the property manager of the
9 Orion Property, which manages the property pursuant to its Property Management
10 Agreement (“PMA”) with SDFH and the Mold and Water Intrusion Operations &
11 Management Procedure, SOP 650, (“O&M Plan”) which was developed by SDFH with the
12 U.S. Navy. Id. ¶ 3. SDFH and Lincoln are required to follow the parameters and directives
13 of the PMA and the O&M Plan, specifically, with respect to reports of mold, moisture or
14 water intrusion at a property. Id. The O&M Plan was developed in consultation with the
15 U.S. Navy and is based in part on U.S. Navy documents and policies, and language
16 contained in the O&M Plan has been carried over from specific past and current housing
17 policies of the U.S. Navy. Id.
18 Plaintiffs’ complaint revolves around water intrusion related maintenance issues at
19 the Orion Property during the last five months of their tenancy, which first arose on or
20 about October 2022. Id. ¶ 4. During October 2022, Plaintiffs reported that their HVAC
21 vents and ducts were dirty, and “coated in a heavy layer of particles and dust,” that there
22 was water damage and an “intense mold smell” in the upstairs hallway bathroom, mold in
23 the master bathroom and a leak from the ceiling over the downstairs bedroom. Id. ¶¶ 8-12.
24 Plaintiffs were relocated while remediation and repair work was performed at the Orion
25 Property. Id. ¶¶ 12-14. Repair work to the Orion Property was completed on November 22,
26 2022, and the Plaintiffs were allowed to move back into the Orion Property as of that day.
27 Id. ¶ 18.
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1 On December 2, 2022, shortly after moving back into the Orion Property, the
2 Plaintiffs reported that there was elevated moisture at the base of the master bathroom
3 bathtub and work was performed to remedy the problem. Id. ¶ 19. On January 5, 2023, the
4 Plaintiffs requested another inspection of the Orion Property, and a subsequent inspection
5 did not find any mold, nor elevated moisture, but areas of the subfloor in the master closet
6 which had apparent old staining were replaced and the carpet replaced. Id. ¶ 20. On
7 February 13, 2023, the Plaintiffs reported a brown colored stain on the upstairs hallway
8 ceiling, mold in the attic, as well as holes in the HVAC ducting. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiffs were
9 given the option of being displaced while the items were repaired, but decided to move out
10 instead, and vacated the Orion Property by February 27, 2023. Id.
11 II. LEGAL STANDARD
12 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
13 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The
14 moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper
15 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party must identify
16 the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence that it “believes demonstrates the
17 absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
18 (1986). “A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires
19 a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677
20 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
21 The burden then shifts to the opposing party to show that summary judgment is not
22 appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The opposing party’s evidence is to be believed, and
23 all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
24 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot
25 rest solely on conclusory allegations. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986).
26 Instead, it must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. See
27 also Butler v. San Diego District Attorney’s Office, 370 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2004)
28 (stating if defendant produces enough evidence to require plaintiff to go beyond pleadings,
1 plaintiff must counter by producing evidence of his own). More than a “metaphysical
2 doubt” is required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
3 Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
4 III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
5 Before addressing the merits of the motion for summary judgment, the Court first
6 considers requests for judicial notice by both parties. Both parties raise various evidentiary
7 objections against the opposing party’s exhibits.
8 A. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice
9 Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of ten documents, each of which
10 were attached to the Declaration of Kristin Reyna DeHart (“DeHart Decl.”), including:
11 (1) Exhibit A-1, Excerpts from the Final Environmental Impact Statement for
12 Military Family Housing in the San Diego Region, by the Department of Navy
13 Southwest Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command (“NAVFAC
14 Southwest”), June 2004;
15 (2) Exhibit B-1, Excerpts from the Department of Defense (“DoD”) Manual, DoD
16 Housing Management, Number 4165.63-M, October 2010;
17 (3) Exhibit C-1, County Assessor/Recorder stamped maps and ownership
18 information relating to MCAS Miramar;
19 (4) Exhibit D-1, United States Marine Corps map of the “Main Station” of Marine
20 Corps Air Station Miramar obtained from the Marine Corps Community
21 Services Miramar website, www.mcasmiramar.com, which includes the
22 location of Plaintiffs’ home on Orion Drive within the military installation just
23 southwest of the North Gate;
24 (5) Exhibit E-1, Excerpts from the United States Marine Corps F-35B West Coast
25 Basing Final Environmental Impact Statement, v.1, by NAVFAC, 2010;
26 (6) Exhibit F-1, Order Denying Motion to Remand in Doe v. Camp Pendleton &
27 Quantico Housing, LLC, No.: 20-cv-224-GPC-AHG, 2020 WL 1890576 (S.D.
28 Cal. Apr. 16, 2020);
1 (7) Exhibit G-1, Court Order dated January 4, 2023, on Defendants’ Motion for
2 Summary Judgment in the matter of Daniels v. AETC II Privatized Housing,
3 LLC, 5-19-CV-01280-RBF, 2023 WL 2558135 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2023);
4 (8) Exhibit H-1, Court Order dated March 4, 2023, on Defendants’ Motion for
5 Summary Judgment in the matter of Clover v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico
6 Housing, LLC, No.: 20cv567-LAB (WVG), 2023 WL 2354807 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
7 4, 2023);
8 (9) Exhibit I-1, Court Order dated August 4, 2023, on Defendants’ Motion for
9 Summary Judgment in the matter of Phipps v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico
10 Housing, LLC, No.: 21cv1514 DMS(AHG), 2023 WL 5003571 (S.D. Cal. Aug.
11 4, 2023);
12 (10) Exhibit J-1, Court Order dated February 16, 2024, on Defendants’ Motion for
13 Summary Judgment in the matter of Fischer v. Fort Belvoir Residential
14 Communities, LLC, No. 1:22-cv-286 (RDA/LRV) (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 2024).
15 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides that “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact
16 that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial
17 court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources
18 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2).
19 Plaintiffs have not opposed Defendants’ request for judicial notice of any of the
20 requested items. Exhibits A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1 and E-1 appear to be appropriate items for
21 the Court to accept judicial notice. It appears that the accuracy of the sources cannot be
22 questioned, and the items can be accurately and readily determined from the sources. For
23 those reasons, the request for judicial notice is GRANTED regarding Exhibits A-1, B-1,
24 C-1, D-1 and E-1.
25 Exhibits F-1, G-1, H-1, I-1, and J-1 are all recent decisions relating to issues germane
26 to this case, each containing an opinion on federal enclave jurisdiction. “It is unnecessary
27 to request the court judicially notice … cases from California and federal courts …. [T]he
28 Court routinely considers such legal authorities in doing its legal analysis without a party
1 requesting they be judicially noticed.” Lucero v. Wong, No. C 10-1339 SI (pr), 2011 WL
2 5834963, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2001); see also BP West Coast Prods., LLC v. May,
3 347 F. Supp. 2d 898, 901 (D. Nev. 2004) (noting judicial notice is unnecessary for courts
4 to “take a case into account as non-binding precedent.”) Thus, the request for judicial notice
5 of these exhibits is DENIED as moot.
6 B. Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice
7 Plaintiffs request the Court take judicial notice of seven documents, each of which
8 were attached to the Declaration of Lenden Webb (“Webb Decl.”), including:
9 (1) Exhibit 1, Defendants’ Notice of Removal;
10 (2) Exhibit 2, Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller’s February 1, 2024, Order RE: Subject
11 Matter Jurisdiction in Childs v. San Diego Family Housing, LLC, 714 F. Supp.
12 3d 1262 (S.D. Cal. 2024);
13 (3) Exhibit 3, Plaintiffs’ Complaint;
14 (4) Exhibit 4, Lease Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants;
15 (5) Exhibit 5, Honorable Larry Burns’ Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to
16 Dismiss in Clover v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico Housing, LLC, No.:
17 20cv567-LAB (WVG), 2023 WL 2354807 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2023);
18 (6) Exhibit 6, Honorable Larry Burns’ Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to
19 Dismiss in Beck v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico Housing, LLC, No.: 20cv579-
20 LAB (WVG), 2021 WL 948793 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2021);
21 (7) Exhibit 7, Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller’s Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to
22 Dismiss in Childs v. San Diego Family Housing, LLC, No.: 19cv2329 JM
23 (MDD), 2020 WL 12689448 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2020).
24 Defendants have not opposed Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1, 3
25 and 4. These exhibits appear to be appropriate items for the Court to accept judicial notice.
26 It appears that the accuracy of the sources cannot be questioned, and the items can be
27 accurately and readily determined from the sources. For those reasons, the request for
28 judicial notice is GRANTED regarding Exhibits 1, 3 and 4.
1 Defendants object to the Court taking judicial notice of Exhibits 2, 5 (paragraph 13
2 of Webb Decl.), 6 (paragraph 14 of Webb Decl.) and 7 (paragraph 15 of Webb Decl.).
3 Exhibits 2 and 5-7 are all recent decisions relating to issues germane to this case, each
4 containing an opinion on federal enclave jurisdiction. “It is unnecessary to request the court
5 judicially notice … cases from California and federal courts …. [T]he Court routinely
6 considers such legal authorities in doing its legal analysis without a party requesting they
7 be judicially noticed.” Lucero, 2011 WL 5834963, at *5; see also BP West Coast Prods.,
8 LLC, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (noting judicial notice is unnecessary for courts to “take a case
9 into account as non-binding precedent.”). Thus, the request for judicial notice of Exhibits
10 2, 5-7 and paragraphs 12-15 of the Webb Decl. is DENIED as moot.
11 C. Objections to Evidence
12 1. Plaintiffs’ Objections
13 In support of its motion for summary or alternatively, partial summary judgment,
14 Defendants submit the declaration of Matt Ruane, the Director of Military Affairs for
15 SDFH. Plaintiffs object to various portions of the Ruane Decl. based on Federal Rule of
16 Evidence 602 for lack of foundation and personal knowledge. ECF No. 48-3. Specifically,
17 Plaintiffs object to paragraphs 7-13, 17-20 and 22.
18 Federal Rule of Evidence 602 states that “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if
19 evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
20 knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the
21 witness’s own testimony. This rule does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under
22 Rule 703.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. “Personal knowledge may be inferred from declarations that
23 concern areas within the declarant’s job responsibilities.” Silva v. AvalonBay Cmtys., Inc.,
24 No. LA CV15-04157 JAK (PLAx), 2015 WL 11422302, at *4 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2015).
25 Each of the paragraphs objected to detail the history of Plaintiffs’ complaints to their
26 lessor about water damage at the Orion Property and remediation work done at the Orion
27 Property by the lessor. In the first paragraph of the Ruane Decl., Mr. Ruane avers that he
28 currently serves as the Director of Military Affairs for SDFH and has held that title since
1 2019. Ruane Decl. ¶ 1. Further, Mr. Ruane avers that the “facts stated herein are of my own
2 personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify
3 thereto. Id. SDFH is the lessor, and it appears that sufficient foundation has been laid and
4 Mr. Ruane possesses personal knowledge to testify regarding the history of Plaintiffs’
5 complaints to the lessor regarding water damage at the Orion Property and remediation
6 work done at the Orion Property. Plaintiffs’ objections are therefore, OVERRULED.
7 2. Defendants’ Objections
8 In support of its opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or
9 alternatively, partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs submit the declaration of Plaintiff Saint
10 Brown (“Brown Decl.”) and the declaration of attorney Lenden Webb (“Webb Decl.”).
11 ECF Nos. 48-1, 48-2. Defendants object to various portions of the Brown Decl. and the
12 Webb Decl. based on Federal Rule of Evidence 602 for lack of foundation and personal
13 knowledge and Federal Rule of Evidence 901 for being speculative, conclusory, and stating
14 a legal conclusion. ECF No. 51-1. In particular, Defendants object to paragraphs 3-10 in
15 the Brown Decl. and paragraphs 2-9, 12-15 and Exhibits 2 and 5-7 in the Webb Decl.
16 a. Declaration of Plaintiff Saint Brown
17 Defendants object to the statements in paragraphs 3-9 based on a lack of foundation
18 and personal knowledge pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 602 and further objects to paragraphs 3-
19 4, 9-10 based on the grounds that the statements are speculative, conclusory, makes a legal
20 conclusion, and lacks foundation, as the declaration fails to submit any documents or
21 evidence in support of his conclusions pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 901.
22 Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires “authentication or identification as a
23 condition precedent to admissibility.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). Thus, before evidence may be
24 admitted, a foundation must be laid “by evidence to support a finding that the matter in
25 question is what its proponent claims.” Id. “Documents which have not had a proper
26 foundation laid to authenticate them cannot support a motion for summary judgment.”
27 Bryene v. Coleman So. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Canada
28 v. Blain’s Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987))
1 Paragraphs 3-8 of Mr. Brown’s declaration sets forth legal conclusions as to whether
2 the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction over MCAS Miramar. Defendants’
3 objections are SUSTAINED. “[A] lay witness cannot offer testimony to establish a legal
4 conclusion.” Lee v. City of Madera, No. CIV F 04-5607 AWI DLB, 2008 WL 5042856, at
5 *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2008); see also Roosevelt Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. CV-
6 15-00448-PHX-JJT, 2019 WL 1087939, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2019) (precluding a witness
7 from testifying as to the legal conclusion of whether the United States possessed a legal
8 interest in certain property).
9 Paragraph 9 lists documents that are not attached to the declaration that “will support
10 [Plaintiffs] claims and provide additional context regarding jurisdiction in the San Diego
11 region … [and] may strip this Court of jurisdiction to hear the instant matter.” Brown Decl.
12 ¶ 9. Mr. Brown then lists five documents, but once again does not attach them to the
13 declaration. Mr. Brown’s testimony regarding these unseen documents lack sufficient
14 foundation and for similar reasons as stated above regarding paragraphs 3-8, Defendants’
15 objection is SUSTAINED.
16 Paragraph 10 avers that Mr. Brown is in the process of securing the aforementioned
17 documents listed in paragraph 9 through a Freedom of Information Act request and would
18 promptly provide them to his attorneys to submit tot eh Court once they are in his
19 possession. Id. ¶ 10. It appears Mr. Brown is testifying to action he personally took in this
20 matter and this testimony is based on his personal knowledge. Therefore, Defendants’
21 objection to paragraph 10 is OVERRULED.
22 b. Declaration of Lenden Webb
23 Defendants object to the statements in paragraphs 2-4 based on the grounds that the
24 statements set forth a legal conclusion, paragraphs 5-9 and 12 as improper argument of
25 counsel, paragraphs 13-15 and Exhibits 2, 5-7 as irrelevant.
26 Similar to Mr. Brown’s declaration, paragraphs 2-4 of Mr. Webb’s declaration sets
27 forth legal conclusions as to whether the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
28 MCAS Miramar. Defendants’ objections are SUSTAINED as to paragraphs 2-4.
1 Paragraphs 5-9 and 12 offer no facts and is improper argument presented in an improper
2 format. These substantive arguments are properly included in a memorandum of points and
3 authorities in support of or opposition to a motion, not a declaration. See Oliver v. Hot
4 Topic, Inc., No. 10cv1111 BEN (AJB), 2010 WL 4261473, at *1 (S.D. Ca. July 27, 2010);
5 see also Roosevelt Irrigation District, 2019 WL 1087939, at *4 (precluding a witness from
6 testifying as to the legal conclusion of whether the United States possessed a legal interest
7 in certain property). Defendants’ objection is SUSTAINED.
8 IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
9 A. Federal Enclave Doctrine
10 Defendants first argue that many of Brown’s claims are barred by the federal enclave
11 doctrine. Specifically, Defendants attack Brown’s claims for negligent infliction of
12 emotional distress, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, rent abatement, breach
13 of the implied covenant of quit use and enjoyment, premises liability and negligent
14 misrepresentation. The parties disagree as to whether the Orion Property falls on a federal
15 enclave. The Court recently addressed this issue in its Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to
16 Remand. ECF No. 72. The Court found that the Orion Property on MCAS Miramar is on
17 a federal enclave and adopts the historical summary and analysis from that Order.
18 The federal enclave doctrine, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, provides that
19 when “the United States acquires with the ‘consent’ of the state legislature land within the
20 borders of that State[,] … the jurisdiction of the Federal Government becomes ‘exclusive.’”
21 Paul, 371 U.S. at 264. Importantly, “when an area in a State becomes a federal enclave,
22 only the state law in effect at the time of the transfer of jurisdiction continues in force”;
23 “[g]oing forward, state law presumptively does not apply to the enclave.” Parker Drilling
24 Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U.S. 601, 612 (2019) (internal citations, quotation marks,
25 and alterations omitted).
26 As to Defendants’ argument that many of the claims are barred by the federal enclave
27 doctrine, the Court addressed this argument in Clover v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico
28 Housing, LLC, No.: 20cv567-LAB (WVG), 2023 WL 2354807 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2023)
1 and Phipps v. Camp Pendleton & Quantico Housing, LLC, No.: 21cv1514 DMS(AHG),
2 2023 WL 5003571 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2023). Those cases involved facts similar to those at
3 issue here, and the same defendants and counsel for both parties as appear in this case. In
4 Clover, on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court found the federal
5 enclave doctrine applied, and barred the plaintiffs’ claims for negligent infliction of
6 emotional distress, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, rent abatement, and
7 premises liability.
8 In the present case, Plaintiffs raise the same arguments against application of the
9 federal enclave doctrine, but this Court is not persuaded that those arguments warrant an
10 outcome different from that in Phipps and Clover. Further, Plaintiffs do not dispute that
11 Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of the implied
12 warranty of habitability, rent abatement, and premises liability did not exist prior to 1939.
13 The Court finds the reasoning of Clover persuasive and adopts and applies it here to reach
14 the same result. For the reasons set out in Clover, the federal enclave doctrine bars
15 Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of the implied
16 warranty of habitability, rent abatement, and premises liability. As in Clover, Defendants
17 have not shown the federal enclave doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the implied
18 covenant of quiet use and enjoyment and negligent misrepresentation, as each of these
19 causes of action were enacted in 1872, prior to MCAS Miramar becoming a federal
20 enclave.
21 B. Choice of Law Provision
22 Next, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ remaining claims based on state law, i.e.,
23 negligence, nuisance, breach of the implied covenant of quiet use and enjoyment, and
24 negligent misrepresentation are barred by the choice of law provision in the Lease. That
25 provision states:
26 Owner and Resident agree that this Lease and the contractual relationship
between the parties shall be construed exclusively in accordance with, and
27
shall be exclusively governed by, federal substantive law, except that the
28 following state law shall apply: California Civil Code, Sections 1940 – 1954.1
1 (Leasing Land and Dwellings) and 1980 – 1991 (Disposition of Personal
Property Remaining on Premises at Termination of Tenancy), California Code
2
of Civil Procedure Sections, 1159 – 1179a (Summary Proceedings for
3 Obtaining Possession of Real Property in Certain Cases) and California state
common law interpreting these sections.
4

5 Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. For Summ. J.; ECF No. 42-2; Decl. of Daniel Turkin,
6 Ex. A ¶ 34.
7 This argument was addressed in Clover and Phipps. The Court finds both cases to
8 be persuasive and adopts and repeats the analysis here. The choice of law provision on its
9 face provides that the parties’ contractual relationship shall be governed exclusively by
10 federal law, save for California Civil Codes §§ 1940-1954.1, 1980-1991, and California
11 Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1159-1179a, which shall also apply. As in Phipps, Brown
12 argues first that his claims are based on the specific state statutes identified in the Lease,
13 therefore they are not barred. Brown’s claim for negligence does reference California Civil
14 Code §§ 1940 et seq. and 1941.1 et seq., therefore that claim is not barred by the choice of
15 law provision. Opp’n to Mot. For Summ. J.; ECF No. 48 at 14. However, none of Brown’s
16 other remaining claims reference or rely on any of the specific state statutes identified in
17 the choice of law provision.
18 Plaintiffs raise an additional argument in an attempt to avoid the choice of law
19 provision. Plaintiffs argue that enforcing federal law would violate public policy. Id.
20 Specifically, Plaintiffs argue there is a void in federal law covering the facts at issue here,
21 which would allow Defendants to evade liability. Id. As in Phipps, the Court disagrees.
22 Although the Lease is governed generally by federal law, it does allow for the application
23 of certain state statutes, and Plaintiffs rely on some of those statutes in support of their
24 negligence claim. In addition, Plaintiffs’ argument here relies on a faulty premise, and it
25 does not warrant disregard of the choice of law provision.
26 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
27 Plaintiffs’ claims for nuisance, negligent misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant
28
1 of quiet use and enjoyment, gross negligence, and fraud-concealment, and DENIES
2 Defendants’ motion on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim.
3 C. Supremacy Clause
4 Defendants next argument is that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Supremacy
5 Clause. Specifically, SDFH argue that “… the property at issue [is] on a federal enclave
6 under exclusive federal jurisdiction, limiting which state law claims can be brought at all
7 … [and] California law cannot and should not dictate how government owned and overseen
8 military housing is operated especially where the government itself has spoken through the
9 U.S. Navy as to how it is to be operated.” Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. For Summ. J.
10 at 28; ECF No. 42-1.
11 Defendants make the same argument and cite the same cases in support of this
12 argument as they made in Phipps. Specifically, Defendants cite Torres v. Texas Dept. of
13 Public Safety, 597 U.S. 580 (2022); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988);
14 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); McCulloch v.
15 Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Geo Group, Inc. v. Newsom, 50 F.4th 745 (9th Cir. 2022);
16 Boeing v. Movassaghi, 768 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2014); Laine v. Weinberger, 541 F. Supp.
17 599 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Burge v. Jones, No. B-92-022, 1992 WL 415263 (S.D. Tex. Nov.
18 18, 1992); United States v. Washington, 596 U.S. 832 (2022). However, as stated in Phipps,
19 none of those cases address the specific facts presented here, namely whether a resident of
20 military housing may bring a negligence claim for personal injuries arising from water and
21 mold damage in her home against the homeowners and property managers.
22 As stated in Phipps, the cases cited by Defendants deal with state taxes on federal
23 banks (McCulloch), state workers compensation laws (Goodyear), state laws prohibiting
24 the operation of private detention facilities within the state (Geo Group), state laws
25 governing cleanup of a federal nuclear site (Movassaghi), state public nuisance laws
26 (Laine), state products liability laws (Burge), whether states may invoke sovereign
27 immunity as a defense to claims specifically provided for by federal statute (Torres), and
28 whether state courts may award damages for union activity regulated by the National Labor
1 || Relations Act (Garmon). Absent a more precise argument as to how the Supremacy Clause
2 the particular claims at issue here, or specific authority to that affect, Defendants’
3 || Supremacy Clause argument does not entitle them to summary judgment.
4 D. Derivative Sovereign Immunity
5 Next, Defendants argue they are entitled to derivative sovereign immunity from
6 || Plaintiffs’ claims. As with many of the arguments raised here, Defendants raised the
7 derivative immunity argument in Clover and Phipps. In each of those cases, the Court
8 rejected the argument, saying, it did not warrant dismissal in a motion to dismiss and in a
9 motion for summary judgment in Clover and in a motion for summary judgment in Phipps.
10 || This Court finds that discussion of the issue persuasive and adopts that reasoning and
11 |}conclusion here. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on
12 || Plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of derivative sovereign immunity.
13 Vv. CONCLUSION
14 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on
15 || Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of the implied
16 || warranty of habitability, rent abatement, and premises liability is GRANTED. The Court
17 || DENIES summary judgment on Defendants’ arguments as to the remainder of Plaintiffs’
18 || claims.
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
20 || Dated: March 25, 2025
21 Sa— Sin,
22 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr.
3 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830731. Public record. Not legal advice.