# Rodriguez v. Carbon County

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · March 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830695

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRETT RODRIGUEZ, : No. 3:20cv258
Plaintiff :
: (Judge Munley)
Vv. :
CARBON COUNTY; JOSEPH HAGER; :
KIRK F. SCHWARTZ; AGENT :
BODDEN; JIM THORPE BOROUGH; :
and MATTHEW SCHWARTZ, :
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM
Before the court are two motions for summary judgment, one filed by
Defendants Carbon County and Joseph Hager (collectively “County
Defendants”), and one filed by Defendants Kirk F. Schwartz, Crystal Adames,
Jim Thorpe Borough, and Matthew Schwarz (collectively “Commonwealth
Defendants”) in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”). Having been extensively briefed, these motions are ripe for disposition.

1 Defendant “Agent Bodden” has been identified in this litigation as Crystal Adames, a
narcotics agent with fhe Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General, Bureau of Narcotics
Investigation (‘OAG BNI”). When referring to this defendant, the parties have used “Adames”
and “Bodden” interchangeably. The court will refer to this defendant as “Agent Adames.”
Additionally, two defendants in this action have similar last names. Although the spelling
differs in the caption, the court will use the correct spelling of Defendant Matthew Schwarz's
last name to avoid confusion with Defendant Kirk F. Schwartz. Defendant Kirk F. Schwartz is
also an OAG BNI narcotics agent and will thus be referred to as “Agent Schwartz’ in this
|memorandum. Defendant Matthew Schwarz will be referred to as “Officer Schwarz” based on
| his position with the Jim Thorpe Borough police department at the time of his interaction with
the plaintiff.

Background
This matter stems from law enforcement activity at a home in Summit Hill,
Carbon County, Pennsylvania on February 13, 2018. On that date, Plaintiff Brett
Rodriguez resided at the home with several other individuals. (Doc. 81, Cnty.
Defs. Statement of Facts, JJ 2—-3).2
Eight (8) members of law enforcement were involved in the operation:
e Defendant Hager, as the Chief Deputy of the Carbon
County Sheriff's Office, accompanied by sheriff's deputies
Kristy Cummins, Mitchell Kramer, and Allen Strohl, (Doc.
94-9, Cnty. Defs. Ans. to PI. Interrogs. at 2);

e Defendants Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames, the state
narcotics agents from OAG BNI, (Doc. 94-4, PI. Ex. D, K.
Schwartz Dep. 11:22-12:3, 7-24);
e Defendant Officer Schwarz, who participated as part of the
multi-agency Carbon County Drug Task Force Program,
(Doc. 94-3, Pl. Ex. C, M. Schwarz Dep. 16:6-13, 20:16-23);
and

e Chief Joseph Fittos of the Borough of Summit Hill Police
Department, (Doc. 94-6, Pl. Ex. F, J. Fittos Dep. 11:24—
13:1).

2 When possible, the court references the defendants’ statements of facts ("SOF"), (see Doc.
81, Cnty. Defs. SOF; Doc. 89, Commw. Defs. SOF), for facts that are not disputed in the
plaintiffs counterstatements, (see Docs. 94, 100). Otherwise, this memorandum cites to
portions of the summary judgment record supplied by the parties. All facts from the record are
construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party. See Daniels v. Sch.
| Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2015)(citation omitted).

| Of the above law enforcement personnel, the actions of Defendants Hager,
Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz are at issue for the
| purposes of the pending motions for summary judgment.*
1. Bench Warrants for Residents, Ostensible Prior Drug Activity, and a
Suspected Meth Lab
According to Defendant Hager, Carbon County’s chief deputy sheriff, he
sought to serve a bench warrant upon James Fredericks at the residence in
Summit Hill. (Doc. 94-1, Pl Ex. A., J. Hager Dep., 23:10-13). The sheriff's office
also sought to arrest another reputed occupant, Chad Himelberger, based on a
transferred warrant from Berks County. (ld., 23:10-13, 44:10-24). Per Defendant
Hager, a Berks County sheriff's deputy relayed information about Himelberger’s
previous flight from authorities along with suspicions that there could be a meth
lab at the residence in Summit Hill. (Id., 23:18-24:10, 34:10-22).
The court, for simplicity, has referred to the sheriff's deputies, state
narcotics agents, and a borough police officer using the broader term “law
enforcement.” Under Pennsylvania law, however, this may be somewhat of a
misnomer as to Defendant Hager and the Carbon County sheriff's deputies. See
Commmonwealth v, Marconi, 64 A.3d 1036, 1037 (Pa. 2013). Important to the

3 Chief Fittos and the Borough of Summit Hil! were previously dismissed from this action. (Doc.
108). nus the court will only refer to Chief Fittos’s testimony where it fits into the present
|

background of this case, “absent specific statutory authorization, sheriffs lack
authority to conduct independent investigations under the [Pennsylvania]
Controlled Substances Act, including the seeking of search warrants where no
breach of the peace or felony has occurred in their presence.” Commonwealth v.
Dobbins, 934 A.2d 1170, 1181 (Pa. 2007); see also Marconi, 64 A.3d at 1043-44
(Pa. 2013)(reiterating that sheriffs and their deputies “are not police officers” and

are not “invested with general police powers beyond the authority to arrest for in-

presence breaches of the peace and feionies|] in the absence of express
legislative designation.”).
Based on suspected drug activity, Defendant Hager contacted Agent
Schwartz, a state narcotics agent with OAG BNI and the administrator of the
Carbon County Drug Task Force. (Doc. 94-1, Pl. Ex. A., J. Hager Dep., □□□□□□
28:1; Doc. 94-4, Pl. Ex. D., K. Schwartz Dep., 11:12-12:7). Hager asked Agent
Schwartz and other Drug Task Force officers to accompany the Carbon County
Sheriffs Department in their attempt to execute the warrants. (Doc. 94-4, Pl. Ex.
D., Dep. K. Schwartz Dep., 25:15-26:6). Agent Schwartz agreed and brought
Agent Adames and Officer Schwarz into the mission. (Id., 27:23-28:11, 32:2-7,
33:10-34:11). Hager also called Chief Fittos from the Summit Hill Police
Department to advise him of the activities within his jurisdiction. (Doc, 94-1, PI.
A., J. Hager Dep., 32:7-16).

At his deposition, Defednant Hager agreed that the operation had two

purposes: 1) the Carbon County Sheriffs Department sought to execute the
warrants regarding Fredericks and Himelberger: and 2) the Drug Task Force
agents and officers “wanted to get in there fo...confirm whether or not there was
drug activity or meth lab activity in the house[.]” (Id., 28:15—-29:8).
Hager also testified that he had not previously asked for the assistance of
the Carbon County Drug Task Force in serving bench warrants. (Id. 13:4-7).
Similarly, Agent Schwartz testified that the operation was “unique.” (Doc. 94-4,
Pl. Ex. D., K. Schwartz Dep., 16:23-18:14).
According to several defendants, they had some prior working knowledge
about the residence. At a suppression hearing in the plaintiff's criminal matter
related to this incident, Agent Schwartz testified that he had spoken with Hager
about the residence and that his office “had numerous complaints about drug
activity at that location.” (Doc. 94-2, Pl. Ex. B., Suppression Hearing Trans.
(“H,T.”) 05/14/2019, 21:11-16). Officer Schwarz from the Drug Task Force
testified in his deposition that he was familiar with a different resident, Paul Zuzo.
(Doc. 94-3, Pl. Ex. C, M. Schwarz Dep., 21:4-22:13). Per his testimony, Officer
Schwarz previously arrested Zuzo for driving under the influence after an incident
where Zuzo fled from police on a motorcycle and Officer Schwarz then pursued
Zuzo on foot through a wooded area. (Id., 23:8-26:5). According to Officer

Schwarz, Zuzo was “a biker dude[,]” “known to be difficult[,]” and “known to be
involved in...drug activity.” (id., 21:4-22:13, 34:25~36:15). Officer Schwarz also
testified that he told other law enforcement in preparation for the operation that, if
they encountered Zuzo and “he doesn't comply, just get a little bit louder with him
and give him a direct order and...he’ll calm down.” (Id., 35:23-36:15).
2. Law Enforcement Enter the Residence
After a briefing at the Carbon County Courthouse, law enforcement officers
proceeded to the Summit Hill property in five separate vehicles. (Doc. 94-1, PI.
Ex. A., J. Hager Dep. 37:14-38:20). Hager went to the front door with another
sheriff's deputy, Kristy Cummins, while other law enforcement personnel secured
the perimeter of the house. (Doc. 81, Cnty. Defs. SOF J 11). Hager knocked on
the door for several minutes. (Id. {J 12).
Eventually, a subject of one of the warrants, James Fredericks, opened the
door to the split-level residence. (Id. 12-13). According to Chief Deputy
Hager’s testimony, he placed Fredericks under arrest and followed him into the
| home after Fredericks requested an opportunity to put on his shoes. (Doc. 94-1,
Pl. Ex. A., J. Hager Dep. 21:2-9). Once inside the home, Chief Deputy Hager
asked Fredericks if he knew Chad Himelberger, the other individual subject to a
warrant. (Id., 21:10-19). According to Hager’s testimony, Fredericks stated that

he did not know Himelberger. (Id.) Fredericks also relayed to Hager that there

were also other people in the house that he did not know. (Id.) Hager testified:
i said, Well, would you mind if we looked around? And he
| said, Sure. Go ahead. Then he proceeded downstairs to
| get his shoes with Deputy Cummins and |. And the other
agents came in behind me.
(Id. 21:15-19; see also Doc. 94-2, PI. Ex. B, H.T., 05/14/2019, 18:6-19:25
(questioning by the court)).
Rodriguez, the plaintiff, disputes whether Fredericks provided legally
sufficient consent to search the premises. In Rodriguez’s criminal case,
Fredericks testified that he did not have a conversation with Hager about other
officers looking around the home. (Id. 49:10-17).
Other members of law enforcement entered the residence after Defendant
Hager interacted with Fredericks. Authorities, however, did not locate Chad
Himelberger. (Id. 8:1-9). They did not confront Paul Zuzo. (Doc. 94-3, Pl. Ex. C,
M. Schwarz Dep., 40:21-41:6). They did not discover a clandestine meth lab or

any crystal methamphetamine. (See Doc. 94-4, Pl. Ex. D., K. Schwartz Dep.,
38:9-22, 119:21-121:4).
Instead, Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames encountered Plaintiff Brett
Rodriguez emerging from a room in an upstairs hallway. From there, the facts
diverge based on the differing accounts from the plaintiff and the law
enforcement defendants.

3. Rodriguez’s Testimony
According to the plaintiff, he moved into the residence nine days earlier
after his release from prison. (Doc. 94-7, Pl. Ex. G, Pl. Dep. 6:14-15, 14:11-13).
Rodriguez testified that he knew Fredericks and that both were living at the
residence with the permission of the plaintiffs grandfather. (Id., 5:17-6:15, 7:19-
10:5). Rodriguez indicated that he tried to avoid the other occupants. (id. 10:6-
11, 12:2-24, 15:2-24). In his criminal trial, Rodriguez explained that there were
unspecified issues in the home before he moved in. (Doc. 94-8, Trial Trans.
09/09/2021, ECF p. 4, 10:10-74).
Rodriguez testified that he was using a second-floor bathroom when he
heard knocking on the door. (Doc. 94-7, Pl. Ex. G, Pl. Dep. 16:4-19). According
to the plaintiff, he walked out and encountered a woman in a grey sweatshirt
holding a pistol. (Id. 16:20-22). Rodriguez also observed a man with a “long 22
Top-like beard.” (id. 17:13-21). Rodriguez thought the woman was “a biker” and
that he was being robbed. (Id. 16:23—17:5). Rodriguez testified that he told these
individuals to “[gjet the fuck out of [his] house.” (Id. 17:24-18:16). Per
Rodriguez, he subsequently observed an officer in uniform and realized that “the
biker” and “the beard” were the police. (See id. 17:16~—18:16).
According to Rodriguez, he then put his hands up and moved against the
wall. (id.) As the narcotics agents placed Rodriguez in handcuffs, he turned and

asked why he was being placed under arrest, using an expletive. (Id.) Officer
Schwarz then delivered a “sucker punch.” (Id.) According to Rodriguez, he lost
consciousness and fell to the ground. (Id., 17:16-18:23, 20:8-23). Rodriguez
then recalled “being straddled and punched repetitively in [the] face and the side
of [the] head and being choked|]” by Officer Schwarz. (Id., 20:24-21:11).
Rodriguez estimates that Officer Schwarz punched him in the face between
thirteen (13) and sixteen (16) times. (Id., 22:22-23:1).
4. Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames’s Testimony
From the side of law enforcement, Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames
testified that they entered the residence from the outside perimeter several
minutes after sheriff's deputies went into the house. (Doc. 94-4, PI. Ex. D., K.
Schwartz Dep., 60:10-64:22, 67:23-25). Agent Schwartz testified that he
entered the home through the open front door to speak with a sheriff's deputy,
presumably Kristy Cummins. (id., 67:18-22, 68:19:23). Per Agent Schwartz, he
asked Cummins if the other sheriff's deputies located the wanted subjects. □□□□□
68:24—69:9). Upon hearing people on the second floor of the split-level,
| Schwartz also asked if the other deputies were up there and questioned whether
individuals on the second floor were secured. (Id., 68:24—69:9). Cummins
answered that she did not Know to each of Agent Schwartz’s questions, per his
testimony. (id.)

Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames then went upstairs. As Agent
Schwartz testified, the agents did so to determine whether sheriff's deputies
needed assistance and to otherwise secure the home. (Id., 73:24—-74:6, 80:14—
81:1, 81:24-82:19). Per Agent Schwartz, as he proceeded down the second-
floor hallway, Rodriguez emerged from a room holding an object (later
determined to be an iPad), and an altercation ensued. (Id., 82:11:19, 83:9-20).
Agent Adames testified that she immediately said, “let me see your hands,”
because she did not know what the object was. (Doc. 94-5, Pl. Ex. E, C. Adames
Dep., 42:22-43:6). According to Agent Schwartz, Rodriguez hurled profanities,
and told the narcotics agents to get out of his house. (Doc. 94-4, Pl. Ex. D., K.
Schwartz Dep., 93:3-9). Per Agent Schwartz, Rodriguez "wasn’t interested in
dialogue[,]” and postured his body as if a physical confrontation was about to

occur. (Id., 88:12-89:12). According to Agent Schwartz, Rodriguez momentarily
‘complied with a directive about being placed in handcuffs. (Id., 91:5-8, 92:19-
93:2, 93:10-22). Per Agent Schwartz, Rodriguez then “kind of exploded” once
the left handcuff was on. (Id. 93:23-95:24), Agent Schwartz testified that
Rodriguez swung his left elbow, striking the narcotics agent in his left shoulder.
(Id.)
With Rodriguez facing the wall, Agent Adames tried to get control of
Rodriguez’s right hand, per her testimony. (Doc. 94-5, Pl. Ex. E, C. Adames

10

Dep., 48:9-19, 52:24-53:20). Agent Schwartz continued to hold Rodriguez’s left
wrist. (Id., 55:4-8), As Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames tried to place
Rodriguez in both handcuffs, Officer Schwarz came up the steps. (Id., 49:9-19).
According to Agent Adames, Officer Schwarz grabbed Rodriguez and caused

everyone involved to fall to the floor. (Id., 52:8-15, 55:18-23).
Agent Adames then left the fray to secure the rest of the second-floor
hallway, encountering two other individuals in a nearby bedroom. (Id., 56:2-19).
Agent Adames testified that she focused on those individuals and only heard the
ensuing struggle. (Id., 58:8-19).
Agent Schwartz testified:
And from there, it was just — | was kind of holding onto the
handcuffs, and we were trying to get Rodriguez into
custody. And it just -- it kind of -- it kind of went back and
forth in that hallway. We were rolling around in the hallway,
like up the hallway, down the hallway. He was on -- at the
bottom. He was on his back. | was on my back. | was on
top. Schwarz was on his back. Schwarz was on top. It was
just -- it was kind of just -- it was really, truly just a fight at
that point.
(Doc. 94-4, Pl. Ex. D., K. Schwartz Dep., 99:9-19).
Agent Schwartz estimated that the struggle lasted for approximately one to
two minutes. (Id., 100:7-14). According to Agent Schwartz, Rodriguez was
swinging his hands and feet in resistance. (Id., 102:10-20).
In his deposition in this case, Agent Schwartz testified:

11

Q. Did you actually see Officer Schwarz hitting Mr.
Rodriguez?
A. There was fists flying in every direction, his and
Rodriguez's -- fists, elbows, feet, knees. Like, | couldn't tell
you what | saw, as far as what punches landed from who.
[sic]
(ld. 101:7-12).
On the other hand, Agent Schwartz testified in Rodriguez's criminal case
that Officer Schwarz used open-hand strikes to get Rodriguez to comply with
their commands. (Doc. 94-2, Pl. Ex. B., H.T. 05/14/2019, 24:20-25:2).
5, Officer Schwarz’s Testimony
| As for Officer Schwarz, he testified that he could hear screaming coming
from inside the residence. (Doc. 94-3, Pl. Ex. C., M. Schwarz Dep., 70:14—
71:15). He entered the home, heard Rodriguez yelling, and observed Agent
Schwartz attempting to place the plaintiff into handcuffs. (Id.) Per Officer
Schwarz, he came up from behind the parties and used a take-down move,
which brought everyone to the floor. (id., 74:15—-75:3, 99:16-104:4). Officer
Schwarz testified that he then used three (3) to five (5) closed-fist strikes to
Rodriguez’s forehead before the plaintiff could be handcuffed. (ld. 110:7-18).
Authorities then walked the plaintiff to the first floor living room and placed
him in a position facing the wall. (Id. 173:5-114:9). The parties dispute whether
Rodriguez then slammed his own head and face against that wall. The parties

12

also dispute whether Rodriguez slammed his own head and face against the
interior of a police vehicle while in custody.
6. The Aftermath
Chief Fittos later transported Rodriguez to the Summit Hill Police
Department headquarters for processing and the filing of criminal charges. (Doc.
81, Cnty. Defs. SOF 35). Authorities charged Rodriguez with the following
crimes in the Carbon County Court of Common Pleas: two counts of aggravated
assauit in violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a}(3); and two counts of simple
assault in violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2701(a)(1). (Id. J 36).
Through his criminal defense counsel, Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress
in state court. (Id. | 37). After a hearing, Common Pleas Judge Joseph J. Matika
denied the suppression motion. Per the state trial court’s memorandum, the
Commonwealth demonstrated both that “no ‘search’ occurred upon entry of the
premises and that consent existed for a warrantless search[.]” (Doc. 81-1, Cnty.
Defs. Ex. A, Memo. Op. & Order 12/30/2019, ECF p. 44). Moreover, the state
court determined that James Fredericks, the subject of one of the bench
warrants, provided law enforcement with implicit permission to enter the
premises to execute his arrest. (id., ECF p. 47). Per the trial court’s opinion,
Fredericks expanded his initial consent to enter the premises to include
conducting a premises-wide search for the other subject of a warrant, Chad

13

Himelberger. (Id., ECF p. 48). Despite this adverse ruling, however, a jury
acquitted Rodriguez of all charges on September 9, 2021. (Doc. 94-8, Pl. Ex. H.
Trial Trans. 204:10-205:7). Rodriguez did not appeal the ruling. In opposing
summary judgment, he emphasizes that he could not appeal and thus the
circumstances prevented review of Judge Matika's decision.
Based on the above, Rodriguez maintains several causes of action against
the defendants in the amended complaint. In his first claim for relief, Rodriguez
asserts claims against all defendants under Section 1983 for the following
deprivations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights: 1) the right to be
free from the state’s unreasonable use of force; 2) the right to not be subjected to
unreasonable searches or seizures, 3) the right to not be subjected to malicious
prosecution; and 4) the right to not be deprived life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. (Doc. 29, Am. Compl. 37). Rodriguez's amended
complaint also contends that all law enforcement personnel on scene failed to
intervene in the use of unreasonable force. (Id. § 29). Furthermore, Rodriguez's
first cause of action asserts municipal liability claims against Defendants Carbon
County and Jim Thorpe Borough.
In his second claim for relief, plaintiff raises the following causes of action
-against Defendants Hager, Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz

14

under Pennsylvania law: 1) assault and battery; 2) false arrest; 3) malicious
prosecution: 4) false imprisonment; and 5) willful misconduct. (Id. {] 55).
At the close of discovery, the County Defendants (Hager and Carbon
County) moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them.
(Doc. 80). The Commonwealth Defendants (Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames,
Officer Schwarz, and Jim Thorpe Borough) followed suit with a motion for partial
summary judgment.’ (Doc. 88). Having been fully briefed and argued, both
motions for summary judgment are ripe for disposition.
Jurisdiction

| Because this case proceeds pursuant to Section 1983, the court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.”). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state-
law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (“In any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within

4 Initially, it appeared as if the Commonwealth Defendants were not seeking summary
judgment on some of the Section 1983 and state law claims asserted against Officer Schwarz.
(Doc. 90, Commw. Defs. Br. in Supp. at 12-15). Their reply brief muddies the waters by
invoking qualified immunity on behalf of this defendant. (See Doc. 104 at 5-10).
15

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article Ill of the United States Constitution.”).
Legal Standard
The defendants have filed motions for summary judgment. Granting
summary judgment is proper “ ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” See Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d
A07, 410 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Feb. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[T]his standard
provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in
original).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine the
facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Int'l Raw
| Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir.1990). The
burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248. A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit

16

under the governing law. Id. Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of
proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by
showing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible
evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial.
Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party
satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must go
beyond its pleadings, and designate specific facts by the use of affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Analysis
1. Determining Plaintiff's Claims, Construing the Parties’ Arguments,
and Resolving Uncontested Matters
In conjunction with the defendants’ two motions for summary judgment,
there are several preliminary matters to resolve. First, the Commonwealth
Defendants initially pursued their motion for summary judgment as if Rodriguez
did not assert Section 1983 claims against Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and
Officer Schwarz. (See Doc. 90. Commw. Defs. Br. in Supp. at 3, 8 (arguing that
| Rodriguez’s first claim for relief for federal civil rights violations only names
Defendant Jim Thorpe Borough)). Rodriguez filed a brief in opposition indicating
that the Commonwealth Defendants were incorrect in their reading of the
amended complaint. (Doc. 101 at 4, n. 1.). This prompted extensive argument in
17

the Commonwealth Defendants’ reply brief regarding the form of Rodriguez's
pleading and disputes over which claims applied to which defendants. (Doc. 104
at 1-4). Subsequently, the court permitted sur-reply briefing for Rodriguez to
address this and other issues, including a belated assertion of qualified immunity
by the Commonwealth Defendants. (Doc. 110),
As noted above, Rodriguez asserts several Section 1983 causes of action
in his amended complaint. In addition, Rodriguez advances state law claims
against Defendants Hager, Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz
for: 1) assault and battery; 2) false arrest; 3) false imprisonment; and 4) malicious
prosecution.
Regarding his Section 1983 claims, Rodriguez's amended complaint clearly
references all defendants’ collective conduct in causing the deprivation of his
constitutional rights. (Doc. 29, Am. Compl. Jf] 7-8, 11, 17, 27, 24-29, 32, 33, 37).
Reading the amended complaint as a whole, the court thus construes plaintiff's
allegations to assert Section 1983 claims for: 1) unreasonable search; 2)
excessive force; 4) failure to intervene in the use of excessive force; 4) false
arrest; and 5) malicious prosecution against Defendants Hager, Agent Schwartz,
Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz. The County Defendants, who filed their
motion for summary judgment first, appear to have construed the amended
complaint in the same manner. Otherwise, those defendants would not have

18

raised qualified immunity on behalf of Defendant Hager in their initial brief. In
light of the above, the amended complaint provides sufficient notice to the
Commonwealth Defendants regarding Rodriguez's Section 1983 claims against
Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz.
For his part, Rodriguez has narrowed his claims through his opposition
papers. First, Rodriguez concedes that his Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process claims should be dismissed because his federal constitutional
claims are covered by the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 101, PI. Br. in Opp. to
Commw. Defs. MSJ, p. 7). The court will thus dismiss Rodriguez’s Fourteenth
Amendment claims as to all defendants without additional discussion. Second, in

response to the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion, Rodriguez agrees that

summary judgment should be granted on all claims against Defendant Jim
Thorpe Borough. (Doc. 101, Pl. Br. in Opp., p. 7). Summary judgment will thus
| be granted in favor of Jim Thorpe Borough and that municipality will be dismissed
from this action. Consequently, the only municipal liability claim asserted by the
plaintiff remains pending against Carbon County and will be discussed in Section
5 below.
Next, Rodriguez failed to argue against the entry of summary judgment on
his malicious prosecution claims as to certain defendants. For example, the
Commonwealth Defendants contend that summary judgment is warranted on the

| 19

malicious prosecution claims as asserted against Agent Schwartz, Agent
Adames, and Officer Schwarz. (Doc. 90, Commw. Defs. Br. in Supp at 9-10).
Rodriguez opposes with arguments only relative to Officer Schwarz’s conduct.
(Doc. 101, Pl. Br. in Opp. at 7-10). Similarly, the County Defendants argue that
plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Hager fails. (Doc. 82,
Cnty. Defs. Br. in Supp. at 10-11). Rodriguez appears to agree that these claims
should be dismissed because he did not respond to this argument in his
opposition brief. (See Doc. 95). Thus, summary judgment will be granted in favor
of Defendants Hager, Agent Schwartz, and Agent Adames on Rodriguez’s
malicious prosecution claims without additional discussion. Only Rodriguez's
malicious prosecution claim against Officer Schwarz remains pending for
consideration in Section 3c below.
The court thus turns to the remaining matters. Both the County Defendants
and Commonwealth Defendants contend that the court does not have jurisdiction
over Rodriguez’s Section 1983 claims related to the entry into the plaintiffs home
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. After oral argument, these arguments
have been rehashed by the defendants with some reference to the principles of
preclusion law. Defendants Hager, Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer
Schwarz also seek summary judgment on the plaintiff's illegal entry claims based

upon the principles of qualified immunity. As for the federal and state claims

20

related to Rodriguez's detention, arrest, and prosecution, Defendants Hager,
Agent Schwariz, Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz also attack these claims in
different manners relative to their overall roles in the incident.
It is helpful to consider this a case in two parts, the first related to law
enforcement’s entry into the plaintiff's home and the second related to plaintiff's
detention, arrest, and prosecution. For ease of disposition, the court will address
the plaintiffs illegal entry and illegal search claims first, since the arguments
challenging such claims are more overarching and less nuanced as to the
individual law enforcement defendants.
2. Plaintiff's Claims Related to Entry into the Residence
Each defendant asserts that the illegal entry and illegal search portion of
this action runs afoul of the Rooker—Feldman doctrine.® (Doc. 82 at 6-9). As
discussed above, Rodriguez challenged the legality of law enforcement entry into
the residence with a suppression motion in his criminal case. Per the
defendants, the denial of Rodriguez's suppression motion in state court prevents
‘the court, under Rooker-Feidman principles, from considering his similar illegal
search claims in this civil action.

5 Although named after two Supreme Court decisions, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S,
413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), this
doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which vests the authority to review state court
judgments solely with the United States Supreme Court. Vuyanich v. Smithton Borough, 5
F.4th 379, 384 (3d Cir. 2027)(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic industries Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 292 (2005)(quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
21

After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments raised in two rounds of
briefs, the defendants blend application of the Rooker—Feidman doctrine with the
principles of claim and issue preciusion.® This situation is not uncommon. See
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006)(per curiam)“The District Court
erroneously conflated preclusion law with Rooker—Feldman.”); Arnold v, KJD
Real Est., LLC, 752 F.3d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 2014)(“Courts often confuse Rooker—
Feldman cases with cases involving ordinary claim or issue preclusion.”).
Under the law, “[t]he Rooker—Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’
challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced.’ Lance, 546 U.S. at 460 (2006)(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544
U.S. at 284 (2005)). Preclusion, on the other hand, does not implicate the court's
jurisdiction. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293. (“In parallel litigation, a
federal court may be bound to recognize the claim- and issue-preclusive effects
of a state-court judgment, but federal jurisdiction over an action does not
terminate automatically on the entry of judgment in the state court.”).

6 The term res judicata is regularly invoked to refer to the principles of claim preclusion, while
the term collateral estoppel is customarily used to refer to principles of issue preclusion. See E.
Pilots Merger Comm. v. Cont! Airlines, Inc. (dn re Cont'l Airlines, Inc.), 279 F.3d 226, 232 (3d
Cir. 2002).
22

Four conditions must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: “(1)
the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries
caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered
before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to
review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp.,
544 U.S. at 284). When all four requirements are satisfied, a claim must be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Merritts v. Richards, 62
F.4th 764, 774 (3d Cir. 2023)(citations omitted). But, overall, “Rooker-Feldman is

a limited doctrine that must not be applied outside of a precise, narrow set of
circumstances.” Vuyanich, 5 F.4th at 390.
The court agrees with Rodriguez that the Rooker-Feidman doctrine does
not apply to this civil action. Although: 1) Rodriguez lost the suppression motion

as a criminal defendant in state court; 2) the state court judge decided the motion
prior to this lawsuit; and 3) the plaintiff seeks review and rejection of the trial
court's ruling, the second Rooker-Feldman requirement has not been met, that is,
Rodriguez must be complaining of injuries caused by a state-court judgment.
“[WIhen the source of the injury is the defendant's actions (and not the state court
judgments), the federal suit is independent, even if it asks the federal court to
deny a legal conclusion reached by the state court[.]” Great W. Mining & Min.

23

Co., 615 F.3d at 167. Here, Rodriguez's constitutional injuries allegedly came
from the conduct of the defendants, not the decision by the state trial court judge
in ruling upon his suppression motion. Based on that fact alone, Rooker—
Feldman is inapplicable, See id. at 173. Summary judgment on Rodriguez’s
illegal entry and illegal search claims will thus be denied based on the
defendants’ invocation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Nonetheless, since Rodriguez's state-court adjudication is complete,
disposition of this portion of his Section 1983 case is governed by state
preclusion law. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293. Under the Full Faith
and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, “federal courts give the same preclusive effect
to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the
State from which the judgments emerged.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 466 (cleaned up).
“Congress has directed federal courts to look principally to state law in deciding
what effect to give state-court judgments.” Id.
Following oral argument, the court directed the parties to file supplemental
briefs regarding the issues of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and/or
exhaustion of state court remedies as they relate to determinations made by the
Carbon County Court of Common Pleas in the plaintiff's criminal case.
Following such briefing, summary judgment will be granted in favor of the

24

defendants on Rodriguez’s Section 1983 claims related to law enforcement’s
entry into the residence based upon the principles of issue preclusion.
Under the law, defendants in a Section 1983 suit may assert issue
preclusion where a plaintiff attempts to relitigate issues decided against them in
state criminal proceedings. See Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1068
(3d Cir. 1986)(citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980)). “The federal
court, in determining the collateral estoppel effect of a state court proceeding,
should apply the law of the state where the criminal proceeding took place and
also ascertain whether the party against whom the estoppel is asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the state court.” Id. (citing
Bower v, O'Hara, 759 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1985)).
Under Pennsylvania law, “[t]he phrase...‘issue preclusion,’ simply means
‘that when an issue of law, evidentiary fact, or ultimate fact has been determined
by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be litigated again between the

same parties in any future lawsuit.” Commonwealth v. Brockington-Winchester,
205 A.3d 1279, 1283 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019); see also In re Coatesville Area Sch.
Dist., 244 A.3d 373, 379 (Pa. 2021)(issue preclusion “bars re-litigation of an
issue that was decided in a prior action, although it does not require that the
claim as such be the same.”). Issue preclusion “is based upon the policy that ‘a
losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial

25

proceedings, on an issue identical in substance to the one he subsequentiy
seeks to raise.’ ” McGill v. Southwark Realty Co., 828 A.2d 430, 434 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003)(quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 □□□□
104, 107 (1991)).
Issue preclusion applies if: 1) the issue is the same as in the prior litigation;
2) the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; 3) the party against
whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
action; and 4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. See In re Coatesville Area Sch.
Dist, 244 A. 3d at 379. “In some renditions, courts add a fifth element, namely,
that resolution of the issue in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment.”
Id. (citing Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (Pa.
2005)).
The summary judgment record demonstrates that: 1) the Fourth
| Amendment issues decided by Judge Matika in Rodriguez’s state criminal court

case are analogous to the illegal entry and illegal search claims raised by plaintiff
in this Section 1983 action; 2) the criminal charges resulted in a final judgment by
a jury; 3) Rodriguez is a party to both actions; and 4) Rodriguez had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate his contentions at a suppression hearing where he was
represented by counsel. On the fourth element, Rodriguez's criminal defense

26

counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine the Commonweaith’s witnesses
(Defendants Hager, Agent Schwartz, and Officer Schwarz) and call witnesses on
Rodriguez's behalf (Fredericks). (Doc. 94-2, PI. Ex. B, H.T. 05/14/2019).
Ostensibly, Judge Matika found Defendant Hager’s testimony to be more credible
than that of Rodriguez’s housemate, Fredericks.’ Issues of fact regarding

? In Section 1983 actions, “federal courts could step in where the state courts [are] unable or
unwilling to protect federal rights.” Allen, 449 U.S. at 101. In opposing Commonwealth
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Rodriguez specificaliy argued that Judge Matika
did not “consider, evaluate, or even acknowledge” Fredericks’s suppression hearing testimony.
(Doc. 101 at ECF p. 4). Although it is not explicitly indicated, it appears that the state trial court
simply rejected Fredericks’s testimony. (See Doc. 81-1, Cnty. Defs. Ex. A, Memo. Op. & Order
12/30/2019, ECF p. 47-48).
Moreover, “[t]he Supreme Court has ‘long approved consensual searches because it is no
doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do □□□□ □
United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 277 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51
(1991)). A warrantless search is lawful when done pursuant to valid, voluntary consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). “[T]he consent of one who possesses
common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting
person with whom that authority is shared,” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170
(1974),
“TVjoluntariness ‘is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all of the
circumstances.’ ” United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d at 459 (quoting Schneckioth, 412 U.S. at
227). Additionally, “a person may ‘delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he
consents.’ ” United States v. Williams, 898 F.3d 323, 329 (3d Cir. 2018)(quoting Jimeno, 500
U.S. at 252). “[T]he standard for measuring the limitations placed on a consensual search “is
that of objective reasonableness[,|’” and a determination of the legal bounds of a consensual
search comes down to “what...the typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect.’ ” Id. (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251).
By the nature of its conclusions, the state trial court heard the witnesses, weighed credibility,
! and resolved disputed facts against Rodriguez on the issue of Fredericks’s consent for law
enforcement to look around the residence for Chad Himelberger. It cannot be said that the
Pennsylvania court was unable or unwilling to protect Rodriguez's federal rights.
at

Rodriguez's search-related Fourth Amendment claims were thus subjected to a
full and fair adversarial contest.
Additionally, as for the fifth element of issue preclusion, that is, “resolution
of the issue in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgmentt[,}” Rodriguez’s
defense counsel summarized the prior issue in state court: "Whether Deputy
Hager and the other officers performed an unreasonable search under the
Pennsylvania and Federal Constitution when they entered a home without a
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.” (Doc. 81-1, Cnty. Defs. Ex.
A, Memo. Op. & Order 12/30/2019, ECF p. 38). Judge Matika resolved that
issue against Rodriguez. After denial of Rodriguez's suppression motion, a
Carbon County jury heard evidence related to law enforcement’s entry into
residence and their encounter with the plaintiff.2 (Doc. 94-8, Pl. Ex. H Trial Tr.
09/09/2021, 128:9-140:17). Although a jury acquitted Rodriguez on charges of
assaulting the officers, the resolution of his Fourth Amendment search issues by
the court was essential to that judgment. Otherwise, Rodriguez’s criminal case
would not have proceeded to trial.
All of the elements of issue preclusion are present in this case and
Rodriguez’s search-related Fourth Amendment claims are subject to summary
judgment. In the latest round of briefing, however, Rodriguez requests that the

® The parties did not include the full trial transcript with the summary judgment record.
28

| court apply an equitable exception to the general rules of issue preclusion based
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1). (Doc. 119 at 5-6).
Specifically, that section provides:

| Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a
| valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential
to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent
action between the parties is not precluded in the following
circumstances:
(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not,
as a matter of law, have obtained review of the
judgment in the initial action;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowledges that the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments provides exceptions to the general rules of issue
preclusion. Clark v. Troutman, 502 A.2d 137, 139 (Pa. 1985)(applying
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2)). Rodriguez’s opposition brief,
however, does not reference a case from Pennsylvania specifically adopting
Section 28(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. The court’s research
has uncovered none.
Rather, Rodriguez's argument relies upon footnoted dicta in a non-

precedential decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for the proposition
that “[w]hen an acquittal prevents a criminal defendant from appealing a ruling,
| the ruling has no preclusive force.” (Doc. 119 at 5-6)(citing Efunnuga v. Farley,

29

No. 23-2405, 2024 WL 3042381, at *4, n. 6 (3d Cir. June 18, 2024)). The □□□□□ □□
not bound by that decision.®
Moreover, cases from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals applying Section
28(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments are not factually on point. For
example, in Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co., 750 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1984),
employees of a corporation had filed a separate class action on behalf of all
black employees, alleging a company-wide pattern or practice of race
discrimination. Id. at 14. The district court dismissed the class action and ruled on
the merits of non-named plaintiff's claims. ld. The Third Circuit affirmed but
determined it could not address the merits of the individual claim raised by the
non-named plaintiff. Id. (citing Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 582 F.2d
827 (3d Cir.1978)). The non-named plaintiff was unable to appeal the district
court’s determination that his individual claim lacked merit. In the subsequent

9 In Efunnuga, the district court did not address the defendants’ collateral estoppel arguments,
which they raised in a motion for summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff challenged
whether he provided officers with consent to search a basement. Efunnuga v. Farley, No. CV
18-924, 2023 WL 11820536, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2023). Although it appeared to the district
court that the plaintiff was seeking to relitigate a suppression claim, which the state court
rejected in the plaintiff's criminal matter, the district court sidestepped issue preclusion and
analyzed the legality of the search. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit determined that the district
court did not view the record, i.e., the totality of the circumstances, in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff when evaluating the legality of the search. 2024 WL 3042381, at *4. In the
footnote from Efunnuga referenced by plaintiff in this case, the Third Circuit instructed the
district court not to revisit the defendants’ collateral estoppel arguments on remand. Id. at “4,
n. 6 (citing Bradley v. Reno, 749 F.3d 553, 558-59 (6th Cir. 2014); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. a (1982); Commonwealth v. Thevenin, 948 A.2d 859, 863 (Pa. Super. Ct.
| 2008)).
| 30

case, Edwards, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff could not be collaterally
estopped from litigating the merits of his employment discrimination claim if he

was unable to appeal a previous determination. Id. at 15.
Additionally, in Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third
Circuit determined that a victim of child pornographers could proceed with a suit
for civil damages against those pornographers under Masha’s Law although the
victim had previously received criminal restitution. Analyzing the elements of
collateral estoppel, the appellate court determined that the plaintiff was not in
privity with the government and did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the question of her damages. Id. at 177-73. Additionally, the Third Circuit
applied Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1) because the civil plaintiff
was unable to appeal the sentencing court’s award of criminal restitution. Id. at
174.
Thus, courts typically apply Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1)
“to the narrow set of judgments where a party has no right to appeal at any time
because such appeals are wholly unavailable ‘as a matter of law.’ ” Greenieaf v.
Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 361, n. 6 (3d Cir. 1999). In arguing for the exception
to be applied here, Rodriguez contends that he could not appeal the adverse
suppression ruling in state court because of his acquittal. Under Pennsylvania
law, “[t]he general rule in criminal cases is that a defendant may appeal only from

| 31

a final judgment of sentence, and an appeal from any prior order or judgment will
be quashed.” Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 255 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). A
criminal defendant, however, may petition for permission to appeal an
interlocutory order. See 42 PA, CONS. STAT. § 702(b); PA. R. APP. P. 312, 1311.
In theory, Rodriguez could have pursued this route.
From the court’s research, Pennsylvania courts have not expressly
forbidden criminal defendants from petitioning for permission to appeal adverse
suppression rulings as a matter of law. See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 648 A.2d
1172, 1175 (Pa. 1994); see also id. at 630 (Montemuro, J., concurring op. □□□□□□□□
by designation and joined by three justices)(discussing the availability of
interlocutory appeals by permission); Commonwealth v. Strong, 825 A.2d 658,
667-68 (2003); Thevenin, 948 A.2d at 863 ("Procedurally, an appeal by a
defendant from an adverse suppression ruling is not heard until after sentencing.
Thus, the issue is interlocutory. While it might be sensible to address all
euppression issues at one time, this issue was not placed before the trial court
and was not addressed in the trial court's Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) opinion. Further, the
issue was not certified for interlocutory appellate review.”).
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has thus, on occasion, addressed the
merits of criminal defendants’ petitions for appeal by permission where those
defendants received adverse rulings on their motions to suppress. See e.g.

32

| Commonweaith v. Shepard, No. 238 MDA 2018, 2018 WL 3946394, at*1 &n.1
| (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2018); Commonwealth v. Ranger, No. 618 WDA 2017,
WL 3079702, at *1 &n. 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 22, 2018), Commonwealth

v. Gibson, No. 1153 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 2016101, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 14,
2018); see also Commonwealth v. Dennis, No. 3286 EDA 2016, 2018 WL
1322174, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2018)(quashing a defendant's appeal of

a motion to suppress where the defendant did not appropriately seek certification
of the order or file a petition for permission to appeal).
Rodriguez asks for an equitable exception to issue preclusion to be applied
here. However, in the absence of applicable Pennsylvania precedent or clear
guidance from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the Section 1983 context, the

court will decline to do so. In this matter, Rodriguez enjoyed a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the entry and search portions of his Section 1983 claims in
his state criminal proceedings. The ruling denying his motion to suppress is final.
| Consequently, Rodriguez's contentions cannot be raised again here in this
Section 1983 action. Summary judgment will thus be entered in favor of all
defendants on all of Rodriguez's claims related to law enforcement’s entry into
his residence.

33

3. Plaintiff's Claims Related to His Arrest and Prosecution
In addition to claims related to entry into the home, Rodriguez asserts
several claims related to his detention, arrest, and prosecution. Here, the court
must again resolve contentions between the parties regarding the Rodriguez's
claims and construe their summary judgment arguments broadly to address all of
the claims raised in the plaintiff's amended complaint.
To clarify, the plaintiff's averments include specific references to a Section
1983 excessive force claim and a state law claim for assault and battery. (Doc.
29, Am. Compl. Jf] 26, 35(b), 37). In conjunction with those allegations, plaintiff
also advances that “[ajt no point...did law enforcement personnel present in and
about the residence... intervene to prevent or stop the assault and beating of Mr.
Rodriguez.” (Id. § 27). Such allegations are sufficient to advance claims against
the individual law enforcement defendants that they failed to intervene in the use
of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Rodriguez's averments also include specific reference to Section 1983 and

common law malicious prosecution claims. (Id. Ff] 29-33, 35(c), 37, 55). Those

same averments can also be construed as a claim for false arrest in violation of

| Section 1983, particularly because Rodriguez also asserts state law claims for
false arrest and false imprisonment. (Id. 55). Under the law, a claim for false
arrest or false imprisonment covers the time from arrest until formal legal process

34

is initiated when a claim for malicious prosecution then accrues. Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 387-92 (2007): see also Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg,
124 F.4th 295, 303 (3d Cir. 2024)(citations omitted)(discussing the differences in
the substance and duration of false arrest and malicious prosecution claims).
Where appropriate, the court will address Rodriguez's Section 1983 claims
relative to his arrest and prosecution with their state law counterparts.
Those issues aside, Defendants Hager, Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames,
and Officer Schwarz all seek summary judgment on the claims related to the
plaintiff's detention, arrest, and prosecution in various manners and for specific
reasons tailored to their involvement in the incident. The court first addresses
these claims as raised against Defendant Hager along with his arguments in
support of summary judgment.
a. Defendant Hager
Defendant Hager specifically moves for summary judgment on the
excessive force claim. (Doc. 82, Cnty. Defs. Br. in Supp. at 10). The court will
also construe Defendant Hager’s arguments fo cover any Section 1983 claim for
failure to intervene in the use of excessive force. (id.) Since Rodriguez’s claims
ail arise from the same operative facts, the court also construes Defendant
Hager’s arguments to reach the plaintiff's state law claim for assault and battery
as well.

35

The right to be free from the use of excessive force has been recognized
under the Fourth Amendment. Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 188 (3d
Cir. 2024)(citations omitted). “The question in excessive force cases is whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, ‘the officers’ actions are objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without
regard to their underlying intent or motivation.’ ” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Additionally, “‘a police officer has a duty to take
reasonable steps to protect a victim from another officer's use of excessive
force,’ but only ‘if there is a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene.’ ” El
v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 335 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Smith v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650-51 (3d Cir. 2002)(formatting modified).
As for the state law claim for assault and battery, an “[a]ssault is an
intentional attempt by force to do an injury to the person of another, and a battery
is committed whenever the violence menaced in an assault is actually done,
though in ever so small a degree, upon the person.” Renk v. City of Pittsburgh,
641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994)(citing Cohen v. Lit Brothers, 70 A.2d 419, 421 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1950})). “It is conceivable that a jury could find a police officer liable”
for assault and battery “under circumstances which demonstrate that the officer
did not intentionally use unnecessary and excessive force, or did not deliberately
arrest a person knowing that he lacked probable cause to do so.” Id. at 293-94.

36

Regarding Defendant Hager, Rodriguez does not dispute the following: 1)
Defendant Hager was not involved in Rodriguez's physical altercation with law
enforcement, 2) Defendant Hager did not otherwise strike or injure the plaintiff;
and 3) Defendant Hager did not see Rodriguez until he was handcuffed and
seated in the living room. (Doc. 81, Cnty. Defs. SOF Ff 30-31, 34; Doc. 94, Pi.
Resp to SOF 30-31, 34). These concessions wouid generally warrant

summary judgment in favor of Defendant Hager.
Rodriguez further argues, however, that Defendant Hager “carries
supervisory liability for the actions of Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer
Schwarz” because Hager was “the organizer, leader, and on-site supervisor of
the law enforcement operation” leading to the detention and arrest of the plaintiff
under physically violent circumstances. (Doc. 95, Pi. Br. in Opp at 712).
By law, “[glovernment officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). But several species of
supervisory liability exist, which are not predicated on respondeat superior.
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 2010). Applicable here,
“a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in
| violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in

37

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” A.M.
ex rel. J. M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).

_ When looking at the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
Defendant Hager supervised the operation at Rodriguez’s premises. That is, he
called for assistance from the Carbon County Drug Task Force and coordinated

a planning meeting at the Carbon County Courthouse on the date of the
operation. Rodriguez admits that Defendant Hager did not directly participate in
the actions that occurred on the second floor of the plaintiff's home.’® The
questions thus remaining for resolution are whether Rodriguez can demonstrate
that: 1) Defendant Hager directed others to violate the plaintiff's rights, or 2) as
the person in charge, Defendant Hager had knowledge of and acquiesced in
Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz’s alleged violations.
In response to summary judgment, however, Rodriguez has not
contradicted Defendant Hager’s testimony that he was in the basement of the
home with James Fredericks when Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer
Schwarz encountered Rodriguez on the second floor. Additionally, per the

summary judgment record, law enforcement discussed the individuals that might

0 [n his brief, Rodriguez couples the allegedly illegal entry into the home with his seizure by
Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz. (Doc, 95, Pl. Br. in Opp at 12). For the
| purposes of Rodriguez's excessive force, failure to intervene, and false arrest claims, the
search component of the case must be set Se this analysis based on issue preclusion.

be residing in the home at a planning meeting. Rodriguez, however, was not on
their radar. They were looking for James Fredericks and Chad Himelberger and -

| anticipated encountering Paul Zuzo. And even if law enforcement expected a
| challenging morning at the residence, the record does not reflect that Defendant
| Hager told Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz to “sucker
punch” an occupant and punch him repeatedly in the head once he was on the
ground if Rodriguez's side of the story is believed. From this record, no
reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Hager knew of and acquiesced to
| the alleged use of excessive force from two floors below.
| And to the extent that Rodriguez also asserts other claims such as assault
and battery (under state law) and false arrest/false imprisonment (under Section
1983 and state law) against Defendant Hager, those claims also fall short since
Defendant Hager was not involved in Rodriguez's detention and arrest.
Summary judgment is thus appropriate in favor of Defendant Hager on all of
Rodriguez's Section 1983 and state law claims. Consequently, Defendant Hager
will be dismissed as a party to this action.
b. Defendants Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames
Defendants Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames also specifically move for

summary judgment on Rodriguez's excessive force, false arrest/false
imprisonment, and assault and battery claims. (Doc. 90, Commw. Br. in Supp. at

39

11-14). Like the ruling applicable to Defendant Hager, the court will also extend
the Commonwealth Defendants’ arguments against the excessive force claim to

any claim regarding Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames's alleged failure to
intervene in the use of excessive force. "

As for the excessive force claim, Rodriguez identified Officer Schwarz as
the member of law enforcement that punched him initially and then again
repeatedly while he was on the floor. (Doc. 94-1, Pl. Ex. G., Pl. Dep. 18:18-23,
20:25-21:3). Plaintiff also testified that two officers were holding his legs while
he was being punched. (Id., 21:25-22:9). Although plaintiff could not identify
who was holding his legs, reasonable inferences may be made through the
testimony of Rodriguez, Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz
‘that Agent Schwartz was one of the individuals doing so. A reasonable jury,
believing Rodriguez, thus may conclude from the totality of the circumstances

11 Building upon other portions of this memorandum, the Commonwealth Defendants
specifically challenge whether Rodriguez appropriately pled a failure to intervene claim. (Doc.
Commw. Defs. Reply Br at 2). The court concludes that he has. “[Ujnder the Federal
| Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need not pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a precise legal
theory.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011). Rather, Rule 8(a)(2) “generally
requires only a plausible ‘short and plain’ statement of the plaintiff's claim, not an exposition of
his legal argument.” Id. (citation omitted). In support of his failure to intervene claim, plaintiff
alleges that “[ajt no point...did law enforcement personnel present in and about the residence
| (including Chief Deputy Hager, Agent [Adames], and Chief Fittos) intervene to prevent or stop
| the assault and beating of Mr. Rodriguez.” (Doc. 29, Am. Compl. 27). Such an allegation is
| sufficient to place the Commonwealth Defendants on notice of claims for the failure to
| intervene in the use of excessive force against Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames.
| 40

that Agent Schwartz held Rodriguez down while Officer Schwarz punched the
plaintiff in the face repeatedly.
Such a possible outcome precludes the entry of summary judgment on the
Section 1983 excessive force claim as raised against Agent Schwartz. Summary
judgment will also be denied as to Rodriguez's state law claim for assault and
battery against Agent Schwartz. See Renk, 537 Pa. at 76 (“A police officer may
use reasonable force to prevent interference with the exercise of his authority or
the performance of his duty. In making a lawful arrest, a police officer may use
such force as is necessary under the circumstances to effectuate the arrest. The
reasonableness of the force used in making the arrest determines whether the
police officer's conduct constitutes an assault and battery.”).
Similarly, the facts of record also preclude the entry of summary Judgment
in favor of Agent Schwartz on the failure to intervene claim. A reasonable jury
may hear all accounts of this incident and determine that Agent Schwartz himself
used appropriate force but otherwise hac a reasonable and realistic opportunity
to stop any excessive force used by Officer Schwarz.
Rodriguez, however, has not demonstrated that Agent Adames was
involved in the incident after Officer Schwarz pulled Rodriguez and both state
narcotics agents to the ground. Rodriguez also does not dispute the fact that
Agent Adames did not strike him during the incident. (Doc. 100, ff] 20-21).

41

Summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant Agent Adames on
Rodriguez's Section 1983 excessive force claim and on his state jaw assault and
battery claim.
On the other hand, summary judgment will not be granted in favor of Agent
Adames on the failure to intervene claim. Per Agent Adames, she left the fray
after Officer Schwarz pulled everyone to the ground and then turned her attention
to other individuals in two bedrooms at the end of the hallway. (Doc. 94-5, PI.
Ex, E, C. Adames Dep. 55:24-57:19). She testified that she did not see Agent
Schwartz and Officer Schwarz strike Rodriguez because “she was focused on
the rest of the hallway.” (Id. 58:8-19). Notwithstanding such testimony, she also
testified as follows:
Q. At some point while Mr. Rodriguez was still on the
second floor, did you see Chief Fittos up there?
A. | did not. Not in the hallway. | did see a Sheriff's
Deputy, who ended up coming to assist the security of the
| hallway.
| Q. Was that a male or a female Sheriff's Deputy?
A. It was a male.
Q. And at what point during the sequence of events did
you see that Sheriff's Deputy on the second floor?
A. While the guys were still struggling on the floor.
Q. | see.

42

A. | remember him stepping over them to try to get to the
back of the hallway. And | remember that because | was
outnumbered in that hallway.
Q. | see. Did that Sheriff's Deputy participate at all in the
struggle with Mr. Rodriguez?
A. No.
Q. Did you see that struggle end?
A. Yes. Eventually, it ended.
(Id., 58:20—59: 18}.
Consequently, a jury may disbelieve Agent Adames’s account about what
she observed. They may conclude that she witnessed the entire event, whatever
that looked like. If Rodriguez’s account is believed and the jury makes certain
inferences from the testimony in the plaintiff's favor, Agent Adames watched
Officer Schwarz strike the plaintiff in the face as many as sixteen (16) times while
Agent Schwartz pinned down his legs. That precludes the entry of summary
judgment in favor of Agent Adames on Rodriguez’s Section 1983 claim for her
failure to intervene in the use of excessive force.

12 The Commonwealth Defendants’ brief in support of summary judgment includes a minimal
reference to Rodriguez’s false arrest claims. (Doc. 90 at 10-11). The evidence of record
indicates that Agent Schwartz and Officer Schwarz handcuffed Rodriguez and Agent Adames
assisted with the transport of the plaintiff with Chief Fittos. At this juncture, there are genuine
issues of material fact regarding Rodriguez's state and federal false arrest claims precluding
the entry of summary judgment in favor of Agent Schwartz and Agent Adames on those
claims.
43

c. Officer Schwarz
As for Rodriguez's Section 1983 claims against Officer Schwarz related to
| his arrest and prosecution, the only dispute discernible from the parties’ briefing
| is whether summary judgment is warranted on Rodriguez's Section 1983 and
state law malicious prosecution claims.'® A malicious prosecution claim requires
Rodriguez to demonstrate that: “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal
proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendants
initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) he
suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a

| consequence of a legal proceeding.” Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir.
| 2018)(quoting Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 2017)).
The crux of the Commonwealth Defendants’ argument as to this claim Is
that Officer Schwarz did not institute the criminal charges against Rodriguez,
Chief Fittos from the Summit Hill Police Department did. (Doc. 90 at 10-12).
| However, if “officers influenced or participated in the decision to institute
| criminal proceedings, they can be liable for malicious prosecution.” Halsey v.

13 As noted earlier in this memorandum, Rodriguez only appears to contest Officer Schwarz’s
liability for malicious prosecution. His counterarguments do not reference the conduct of Agent
| Schwartz or Agent Adames in advancing those claims. (Doc. 101, Pl. Br. in Opp. to Commw.
Dets. MSJ at 7-10).
44

Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 297 (3d Cir. 2014). In a related footnote in Halsey, the
Third Circuit declined to prescribe “how strong the connection must be between a
police officer's misconduct and the defendant's eventual prosecution for the
officer to be liable in a malicious prosecution action[.]’ Id. at 297, n. 22.
The summary judgment record includes a Jim Thorpe Borough police
| report completed by Officer Schwarz indicating that he “assisted in charges at
Summit Hill PD.” (Doc. 100-3, PI. Ex. B, ECF p. 42-44). Officer Schwarz also
testified in his deposition as follows:
Q. Okay. Once you enter the house and you make your
way up the stairs on the left side there, do you know where
Chief Fittos is at that point?
A. No.
Q. Okay. After you take down Mr. Rodriguez, and you are
able to place him in handcuffs and you -- you transport him
to the living room, do you know where Chief Fittos is at that
point?
A. No.

Q. Okay. Did you provide any information to Chief Fittos as
-- in order for him to prepare his affidavit of probable
cause?
A. Yeah. | would assume that | -- | verbally gave him the
idea of what happened.
(Id. 146:13-147:15).

45

It is unclear from the record whether Chief Fittos from the Summit Hill
Police Department actually observed the incident involving the plaintiff. For
example, Agent Schwartz testified (like Officer Schwarz) that he did not recall
Chief Fittos being present on the second floor during the encounter with
Redriguez. (Doc. 94-4, Pl. Ex. C. Dep. of K. Schwartz 90:6-15, 105:18-106:1).
The first time he recalled seeing Chief Fittos was after Rodriguez was already in
custody. (Id. 128:18-129:12). Agent Adames also testified that she did not see
Chief Fittos near the altercation. (Doc. 94-4, Pl. Ex. D, Dep. of C. Adames, 58:20-
25). She also recalled seeing him for the first time after the fact. (id., 71:16-
72:3). Chief Fittos’s testimony, however, places him in the middle of the
encounter with Roariguez. (Doc. 94-6, J. Fittos Dep., 30:6—36:13).
Based on these conflicts in the testimony of law enforcement, there are
genuine issues of material fact regarding Officer Schwarz’s level of involvement
in initiating the criminal charges. The record could lead reasonable jurors to the
conclusion that Officer Schwarz was deeply involved in the decision to institute
criminal charges and that Chief Fittos only acted as a proxy. Thus, summary
judgment will be denied regarding the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims
asserted against Officer Schwarz.

46

4, Qualified Immunity
In addition to their other arguments, Defendants Hager, Agent Schwartz,
Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz also assert qualified immunity from
Rodriguez's Section 1983 claims. As discussed above, summary judgment will
be granted in Defendant Hager’s favor on Rodriguez's claims related to the entry
into the premises and for claims related to the plaintiff's arrest and prosecution.
Thus, the court need not address his arguments that he enjoys qualified
immunity on those claims.
As for the Commonwealth Defendants (Agent Schwartz, Agent Adames,
and Officer Schwarz), they did not assert qualified immunity until the middle of
their reply brief.'4 (Doc. 104 at 5). Even then, the Commonwealth Defendants
only discuss qualified immunity as it relates to Rodriguez's claims stemming from
the entry into his residence. (Id. at 5-10). Consequently, the qualified immunity
analysis in this matter would be limited to Rodriguez's illegal search claims,
which have been resolved in the Commonwealth Defendants’ favor. The court

14 Generally, issues raised for the first time in reply briefs are deemed waived. See Williams v.
City of Pittsburgh Pub. Sch. Dist., 742 F. Supp. 3d 464, 468, n. 4 (W.D. Pa. 2024); Javitz v.
Luzerne Cnty., 616 F. Supp. 3d 394, 407 (M.D. Pa. 2022), affid sub nom. Davis v. Luzerne
Cnty., No. 22-2519, 2023 WL 5842299 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 2023): Brand Design Co., Inc. v. Rite
Aid Corp., 623 F. Supp. 3d 526, 537, n. 3 (E.D. Pa. 2022). Because sur-reply briefing was
permitted in this matter to address qualified immunity, the court will thus briefly address such
arguments.
47

will thus not undertake a qualified immunity analysis regarding Agent Schwartz,
Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz. '

5, Municipal Liability Claim Against Carbon County
The last matter to address is whether summary judgment is warranted on
Rodriguez's claim for municipal liability against Carbon County. Such cases are
analyzed pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New_York, 436 U.S.
658 (1978) and its progeny.
To survive summary judgment, Rodriguez must either demonstrate that: 1)
an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his injuries; or 2)
that his injuries were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that
reflects a deliberate or conscious choice. See Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105
(3d Cir, 2019)(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Est. of Roman v. City of Newark,
914 F.3d 789, 798-99 (3d Cir. 2019); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205,
215 (3d Cir. 2001}). In opposition to the County Defendants’ motion for summary

15 As for plaintiff's Section 1983 claims arising from his arrest and prosecution that remain
pending against Agent Schwartz. Agent Adames, and Officer Schwarz, the facts surrounding
these claims remain in dispute with divergent testimony from the plaintiff and the defendants
and various conflicts among the testimony of the law enforcement officers. “Although qualified
immunity is a question of law determined by the [clourt, when qualified immunity depends on
disputed issues of fact, those issues must be determined by the jury.” Monteiro v. City of
Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006)(citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995)); see
also Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002)(“Just as the granting of summary
judgment is inappropriate when a genuine issue exists as to any material fact, a decision on
qualified immunity will be premature when there are unresolved disputes of historical fact
relevant to the immunity analysis.”).
48

judgment, Rodriguez argues that his constitutional injuries were “caused in part
by the County’s lack of appropriate policies and procedures regarding the legal
requirements for law enforcement obtaining valid consent to legally enter a
private home for a warrantless search.” (Doc. 95, Pl. Br. in Opp to Cnty. Defs.
MSJ at 14-15). Rodriguez’s claims for unreasonable search are barred by the
principles of issue preclusion. Even if they were not barred, summary judgment
in still warranted in favor of Carbon County on municipal liability claims
associated with that claim.
Rodriguez does not argue that Defendant Hager was an individual with
policymaking authority on behalf of the Carbon County Sheriff's Department.
Rather, the plaintiff essentially proceeds with a “failure to adopt a policy” Monell
claim. Such claims require a showing that the injuries were caused by inaction
that manifests a deliberate indifference like the showing required in the failure-to-
train context. See Semerod v. Siko, No. 4:24-CV-1165, 2024 WL 4374973, at *3
37 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2024\(Brann, J.\(citing Forrest, 930 F.3d at 105-06
(additional citations omitted).
“In limited circumstances, a local government's decision not to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the
level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 67 (2011). To satisfy Section 1983, a municipality's

49

failure to train its police officers must amount “to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio
Vv. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)(footnote omitted).
A plaintiff demonstrates deliberate indifference “by showing that ‘(1)
municipal policy makers know that employees will confront a particular situation,
(2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling,
and (3) the wrong choice by an empioyee will frequently cause deprivation of
constitutional rights.’” Est. of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (brackets omitted)(quoting
Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011); Carter v. City of Phila.,
181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)). Rodriguez has not responded to summary
judgment with any evidence showing deliberate indifference by Carbon County
policymakers from past situations. Instead, he refers only to his own incident.
To find deliberate indifference from a single-incident violation, “the risk of...
injury must be a ‘highly predictable consequence’ ” of Carbon County’s failure to
adopt a policy or failure to train its sheriff's deputies. See Thomas v. Cumberland
Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2014). Rodriguez has not demonstrated that
Carbon County's alleged failures were highly predictable at all. Even in the best
light, plaintiff has demonstrated only that state narcotics agents bypassed a
sheriff's deputy at the entry of his residence apparently dissatisfied with how
Carbon County sheriff's deputies were handling things inside and that a Drug

50

Task Force officer from another municipality rushed in to back up the agents.
(Doc. 94-3, Pl. Ex. B, M. Schwarz Dep. 70:14—-71:15:; Doc. 94-4, PI. Ex. C, K.
Schwartz Dep, 68:1-—70:9, 96:6—97:3). Accordingly, summary judgment will be
entered in favor of Carbon County on Rodriguez’s municipal liability claim and
Carbon County will be dismissed as a party to this action.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the County Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 80) will be granted. The Clerk of Court will be directed
to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Hager on Rodriguez’s first and second
claims for relief in the amended complaint and dismiss him as a party to this
litigation. The Clerk of Court will also be directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant Carbon County on Rodriguez's first claim for relief and dismiss that
municipality from this action.
Additionally, the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment (Doc. 88) will be granted in part and denied in part. Regarding
Defendant Agent Schwartz, summary judgment will be granted in favor of this
defendant regarding plaintiff's Section 1983 claims for unreasonable search and
malicious prosecution and plaintiff's state law claim for malicious prosecution.
The motion for summary judgment will otherwise be denied as to this defendant.

51

Regarding Defendant Agent Adames, summary judgment will be granted in
favor of this defendant regarding piaintiff's Section 1983 claims for: 1)
unreasonable search; 2) excessive force; and 3) malicious prosecution and
regarding plaintiff's state law claims for: 1) assault and battery; and 2) malicious
prosecution. The motion for summary judgment will otherwise be denied as to
this defendant.
Regarding Defendant Officer Schwarz, summary judgment will be granted
in favor of this defendant regarding plaintiff's Section 1983 claim for
unreasonable search. The motion for summary judgment will otherwise be
denied as to this defendant.
Regarding Defendant Jim Thorpe Borough, the motion for summary
judgment wili be granted. The Clerk of Court will also be directed to enter
judgment in favor of Jim Thorpe Borough on Rodriguez's first claim for relief and
dismiss that municipality from this action.
An appropriate order follows.

Date: ADA f NS \ AUK | ae
i JUDGE JULIA K. MUNLEY \--..
United States District Cou rt

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830695. Public record. Not legal advice.