# VICKERS v. O'MALLEY

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · March 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830681

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GINGER M. VICKERS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 24-78
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
)
Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 25th day of March, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits under
Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and her claim for
supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1381 et seq., finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence
and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,
1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d
114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)).
See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by
substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may
1
neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim
differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff contends the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) did not follow this
Court’s previous remand order directing him to resolve the conflict between Plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) limiting her to both unskilled work at the Specific
Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) 1 or 2 levels and one to two step instructions. (Doc. No.
8; R. 1048). In the decision on appeal, the ALJ removed the limitation to one to two step
instructions in Plaintiff’s RFC finding, but Plaintiff contends that this did not follow this
Court’s order and that the ALJ’s explanation for the removal of this limitation was not
adequate. (Doc. No. 8). As a result, Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s November 14, 2023
decision is not supported by substantial evidence and that this Court should reverse the
decision and order calculation for award of benefits. (Id.). After review, the Court
disagrees with Plaintiff and finds the ALJ’s November 14, 2023 decision should be
affirmed for the following reasons.

This Court previously remanded a prior ALJ decision in this case with instructions
that the ALJ reconsider the RFC determination as there were concerns that the record
triggered a conflict between the limitation to one to two step instructions and occupations
with a GED reasoning development level 2. Vickers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-1093,
2022 WL 1620076, at *6 (W.D. Pa. May 23, 2022). In that case, the ALJ arrived at an
RFC that limited Plaintiff to, inter alia, “unskilled work at the SVP 1 or two levels” and
“to one or two step instructions.” Id. at *2.

In the November 14, 2023 ALJ decision, now on appeal, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff had an RFC with the following mental limitations:

• She can apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but
uninvolved written or oral instructions;
• She can deal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from
standardized situations;
• Work duties and any changes must be explained, written, and/or
demonstrated, and could be learned in 30 days or less;
• Work must not be fast-paced and not have strict production rates such as
assembly line work or hourly time quotas; [and]
• She can have frequent interaction with others.

(R. 1819).

In determining this RFC and complying with this Court’s remand order, the ALJ
evaluated and gave partial weight to the opinions of Drs. Steven Pacella, Ph.D., and
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Timothy Ostrich, Psy.D. (R. 1826-27). Dr. Pacella opined that Plaintiff had marked
limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out complex instructions, in
making judgments on complex work-related decisions, and in interacting appropriately
with supervisors. (Ex. 24F/8-9). The ALJ found persuasive the limitation that Plaintiff
could not deal with complex instructions and decisions due to her memory deficits but
explained that Dr. Pacella’s clinical findings and the record showed that Plaintiff could
perform simple work with no fast-paced work or production quotas and occasional
interaction with others. (R. 1819, 1827). Additionally, Dr. Ostrich opined, in pertinent
part, that Plaintiff “could understand, retain, and follow simple job instructions (i.e.,
perform one and two step tasks) and perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a stable
environment[.]” (R. 1827 (citing Ex. 1A)). The ALJ gave this opinion partial weight
and explained that he did not limit Plaintiff to one and two step tasks because “simple
routine repetitive tasks may be considered vague and internally inconsistent with ‘mild
deficits in executive functioning[.]’” (R. 1827). In this way, the ALJ explained the
changes made to the RFC to comply with this Court’s prior remand order.

In this appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in removing the one to two step
instruction limitation in the RFC because this Court’s remand order did not demand that it
be removed; rather it just instructed that the conflict within the previous RFC be addressed.
(Doc. No. 8 at 9-19). The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument because when it remanded
the previous RFC it did not affirm or resolve any part of the RFC, it instead remanded the
case for further evaluation and the ALJ’s prior decision was vacated by Appeals Council.
(R. 1802-03, 1807). While the Court acknowledges that it stated that it did not “make any
broad findings as to whether the limitation to one or two step instructions necessarily
restricts Plaintiff to jobs with a reasoning level of 1[,]” it also instructed the ALJ to “address
the potential conflict between Plaintiff’s RFC and the GED level 2 occupations relied
upon.” Vickers, 2022 WL 1620076, at *3. The ALJ was not bound by his previous
decision as Plaintiff’s RFC finding in the decision at issue was decided de novo.
HALLEX: Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual § 1-2-8-18(A), 1993 WL 643058
(May 26, 2017). Thus, the ALJ was under no obligation to include the one to two step
instruction limitation in the latest RFC.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ should have kept the one to two step instruction
limitation in her RFC as it was consistent with and supported by the record. (Doc. No. 8 at
7-11). Plaintiff points to the opinion of Dr. Lindsey Groves, Psy.D., in support of this
proposition. Dr. Groves performed two cognitive evaluations and found that Plaintiff had
severe deficits in memory, mild deficits in executive functioning and verbal fluency, and that
Plaintiff showed a decline in cognitive functioning between the time of her two evaluations
in 2010 and 2018. (Ex. 17F/8). Plaintiff overlooks, however, that the ALJ considered
both of Dr. Groves’ opinions and assigned them some weight and little weight, respectively.
(R. 1826). The ALJ noted that he accounted for some of Dr. Groves’ assessed limitations
because they were “generally consistent with and based on the contemporaneous testing with
3
the WAIS-IV and WRAML-s testing showing normal cognitive functioning other than in the
area of immediate memory and variable attention.” (Id.). However, he found Dr. Groves’
later assessed limitations, where she opined that Plaintiff “would be unable to sustain gainful
employment” only of little weight because they were conclusory, did not address specific
functional limitations, and opined on disability, which is an issue reserved for the
Commissioner. (Id.). Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff’s argument on this point
as merely a request to reweigh the evidence.

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s RFC is not supported by substantial evidence
because the ALJ did not sufficiently explain why the one to two step instruction limitation
was removed. (Doc. No. 8 at 12-15). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not explicitly
reject Dr. Ostrich’s limitation to one and two step instructions and that the ALJ’s
“explanation” that the one to two step instruction limitation “may be . . . internally
inconsistent with ‘mild deficits in executive functioning,’” is not a finding that facilitates
meaningful judicial review. (Id. at 13-14). The Court disagrees. As noted, in
evaluating Dr. Pacella’s opinion, opining that Plaintiff be limited to one and two step
instructions, the ALJ explained that he did not adopt this limitation because “simple routine
repetitive tasks may be considered vague and internally inconsistent with ‘mild deficits in
executive functioning[.]’” (R. 1827). The Court finds this is an adequate explanation
for the ALJ’s exclusion of this limitation as it provides a satisfactory explanation for the
ALJ’s basis to exclude this limitation. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (3d
Cir. 2001) (quotations and citation omitted) (explaining the RFC assessment must “be
accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication on the basis on which it rests.”). In
this way, the ALJ explained the changes made to the RFC to comply with this Court’s prior
remand order.

Lastly, Plaintiff posits that the ALJ erred by incorporating the definition of
reasoning level 2 into the RFC in a blatant attempt to avoid this Court’s previous
instructions on remand. (Doc. No. 8 at 15-17). Plaintiff points to the ALJ’s inclusion
of two limitations in her RFC, specifically: “[s]he can apply common sense understanding
to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions; [and] [s]he can deal with
problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations[.]” (R.
1819). Plaintiff contends that these limitations were not the product of thoughtful
consideration of the record as the ALJ simply copied and pasted the reasoning level 2
limitations. (Doc. No. 8 at 15-17). The Court disagrees. The ALJ explained that he
limited Plaintiff to simple work due, in part, to the opinions of Drs. Pacella and Ostrich.
(R. 1826-27). Indeed, as noted, the ALJ explained that he assigned both of these opinions
partial weight and agreed with Dr. Pacella’s finding that Plaintiff could not deal with
complex instructions and decisions. (R. 1819, 1827). Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ
was bound by the law of the case doctrine to keep the previous RFC limitation to one to
two step instructions is without merit for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, the Court
rejects Plaintiff’s arguments on this point.
4
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak
Chief United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

All told, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence
and the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

5

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830681. Public record. Not legal advice.