# La Belle Dairy, LLC v. Sharpe Holdings, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · March 25, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830566

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** March 25, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830566

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION

LA BELLE DAIRY, LLC, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:25-CV-14 HEA
)
SHARPE HOLDINGS, INC., et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff La Belle Dairy LLC’s (“La
Belle”) Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
against Defendants Sharpe Holdings, Inc. (“Sharpe Holdings”) and Charles N.
Sharpe, Jr. Foundation (the “Sharpe Foundation”) (collectively “Defendants”).
(ECF No. 7). La Belle seeks an injunction prohibiting Defendants from evicting
La Belle from 4,890 acres of land in Lewis and Knox Counties owned by
Defendants and leased to La Belle under a lease agreement as amended and
executed by the parties in 2020. Defendants have filed opposition to the Motion.
On March 24, 2025, the undersigned held a hearing and heard oral argument
on La Belle’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. After considering the
parties’ arguments and reviewing the Complaint and attachments thereto, the
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and its supporting memorandum and
exhibits, Defendants’ Response in Opposition to the Motion to Temporary
Restraining Order and the exhibits attached thereto, the Declarations of Ian A.J.
Pitz and Deric DuQuaine, which were filed on the morning of the hearing, and the

arguments in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds that the entry of
temporary restraining order preventing eviction of La Belle from the leased land is
necessary and proper in this case. The Court grants La Belle’s Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order against Defendants Sharpe Holdings and the Sharpe
Foundation.
Background
La Belle presented evidence, by way of declarations and exhibits, that La

Belle owns a dairy operation in La Belle, Missouri. To operate its dairy, La Belle
currently leases 4,890 acres of land owned by Defendants that is adjacent to La
Belle’s dairy. The leased land is used to raise crops to feed La Belle’s 6,000 head

of dairy cattle. It is also used for land application of manure in accordance with La
Belle’s government-approved nutrient management plan.
On April 30, 2020, La Belle and Sharpe Holdings entered into a Forage
Land Lease with an effective date of January 1, 2020. Defendants leased to La

Belle, and La Belle rented from Defendants land that consisted of approximately
6,100 acres of tillable farmland in Lewis and Knox Counties, Missouri. The Forage
Land Lease provides for three consecutive five-year terms, with an initial term and

two consecutive 5-year renewal terms. The initial term, which ended on January
31, 2025, provided that La Belle would pay rent at $185 per tillable acre for a total
annual rent payment of $1,128,500.00, that was payable to Defendants in monthly
amounts of $94,041.67. (ECF No. 1, Ex. B at 2). Article II of Forage Land Lease

provides the following method by which rents would be determined for the two
renewable terms:
Landlord and Tenant shall establish the new market rate Rent for each
Renewal Term at least four (4) months prior to the end of the then
current Renewal Term, and shall execute a signed, written addendum
to this lease setting forth the new Rent for each Renewal Term. If the
Landlord and Tenant are unable to agree on the new market rate Rent
for a Renewal term, then Landlord and Tenant agree to obtain a third-
party appraiser to establish the new market rate Rent for the particular
Renewal Term.

(Id.)
The Forage Land Lease also has a provision, Article VI, regarding the sale
of the leased premises, which provides that La Belle must purchase, and
Defendants must sell, all of the leased premises under the Forage Land Lease, plus
all additional attached acreage surrounding the lease premises, which included
non-tillable land. (Id. at 4). The Forage Land Lease initially required a purchase
agreement to be executed by October 1, 2020.1 Id.

1The parties had entered into a prior contract in 2017 (the “2017 Forage Contract”) that
afforded La Belle a right of first refusal to purchase the 6,100 acres of land. The 2017 Forage
Contract was terminated by Sharpe Holdings, and the parties entered into the Forage Land Lease.
The Forage Land Lease provides in Article VI that until the 2020 Purchase Agreement is
executed, the provisions of the right of first refusal from the 2017 Forage Contact are
incorporated into and are part of the Forage Land Lease. (ECF No. 1, Ex. B at 4).
La Belle and Defendants executed a First Amendment to Forage Land Lease
(“First Amendment”), with an effective date of September 20, 2020. The scope of
the First Amendment is limited to modification of Article VI of the Forage Land

Lease, which concerns the sale of the leased premises and provides as follows:
6.01. Not later than June 1, 2021, Landlord and Tenant shall enter into
a separate agreement that will provide terms upon which Tenant shall
purchase from Landlord, and Landlord shall sell to Tenant, free and
clear of all liens and encumbrances, the Leased Premises and all
additional acreage surrounding the Leased Premises, consistent with
existing parcel legal descriptions and/or tax parcel descriptions, at fair
market value over the course of up to five years from the
Commencement Date of this Lease (the “2021 Purchase Agreement”).
The Parties acknowledge that the Leased Premises are part of larger
parcels that in certain instances include wooded areas, marshy areas,
and otherwise untillable land, and that the 2021 Purchase Agreement
will contemplate the sale of all such acreage, not just the Leased
Premises. The purchase price shall be negotiated between Landlord
and Tenant to reflect fair market value at the time of closing, and
if Landlord and Tenant are unable to agree on the fair market value of
any parcels of real estate and/or any improvements to be sold under
the 2021 Purchase Agreement, then Landlord and Tenant agree to
obtain a third-party appraiser to establish fair market value. The
obligations of the Parties under this Article VI and under the 2021
Purchase Agreement shall be binding on their respective successors
and assigns.

6.02 Until Landlord and Tenant execute the 2021 Purchase
Agreement, Landlord and Tenant agree that the provisions of the
Right of First Refusal paragraph set forth in the Forage Contract
entered into between Landlord and Tenant on May 24, 2017 (and
attached as Schedule 6.02) are hereby incorporated into and made a
part of this Lease.

(ECF No. 1, Ex. C at 1).
La Belle contends and has presented evidence that it was the intent of the
parties to complete the sale of the leased premises through a series of transactions:
up to five annual purchases of roughly equal acreage each year, at a price to be

determined by the fair market value at the time of purchase. According to the
Complaint and a declaration executed by general counsel of La Belle’s parent
corporation, Deric DuQuaine, the parties discussed the particulars of the five

transactions, broke down the transactions by parcels to be sold, and referred to
them by year: the Year 1, Year 2, Year 3, Year 4, and Year 5 purchases. (ECF No.
7, Ex. 1 at 5).
There is evidence that negotiations concerning Year 1 began in January

2021, and La Belle made a formal proposal for the land purchase. From the
record, it is clear that there were some disagreements, and the parties agreed to
continue to negotiate after June 1, 2021. Finally, on November 18, 2021, La Belle

and Defendants executed the 2021 Purchase Agreement for the purchase of the
Year 1 land, which was approximately 1210 acres, and the parties closed on May
1, 2022. According to La Belle, the parties agreed to extensions for the purchase
agreement and closing. (Id.)

According to allegations in the Complaint and Mr. DuQuaine’s declaration,
in January 2022, the parties had further discussions regarding the purchases for
Years 2-5, but again there were a number of delays. (Id.) There is evidence that

there was a proposed schedule to execute the Year 2 purchase agreement by
October 1, 2022, with a closing date in December 2022 or January 2023. (Id. at 6).
There were negotiations regarding price in September and October 2022, but the
parties were unable to reach an agreement. On November 21, 2022, Mr. DuQuaine

sent Defendants an email offering to work with Defendants to identify a third-party
appraiser under Article VI. The email went unanswered, and on April 4, 2023, La
Belle sent Defendants written notice of default for their failure to comply with

Article VI. (Id. and ECF No. 31 at 2).
On or around November 15, 2023, Defendants informed La Belle that the
Sharpe Foundation had decided not to sell the Year 2 land, or any other land, to La
Belle. There is evidence that on February 23, 2024, La Belle sent Defendants a

second written notice of default for their failure to comply with Article VI. (Id.)
There is evidence in the record that after refusing to sell La Belle the land as
provided for by Article VI of the Forage Land Lease, Defendants proposed

replacing the Forage Land Lease with a new cash rent proposal going forward.
(ECF No. 7, Ex. 1 at 7). The proposal would have begun in 2024 at $295 per acre,
a significant increase in rent, as the Forage Land Lease only contemplated a rent
payment of $185 per acre for 2024. The new lease proposal would be for a three-

year term and would renew for three three-year cycles. No purchase rights were
included in the proposal. (Id.)
The parties did not reach an agreement as to a new cash rent proposal, and

there is also evidence that the parties did not reach agreement as to the amount of
rent for the first renewal term under the Forage Land Lease. (Id.) According to La
Belle, Defendants refused to engage an appraiser as required by the Forage Land
Lease. La Belle presented evidence that on January 17, 2025, Defendants

threatened to lease the land to someone else if La Belle did not agree to their extra-
contractual and increased rent demands. La Belle refused to sign Defendants’
proposed addendum to the Forage Land Lease, which struck La Belle’s purchase

rights and set the rent at Defendants’ preferred rate. (Id.)
In its Complaint, which was filed on January 24, 2025, La Belle alleges
Defendants have breached two articles of the Forage Land Lease. It alleges that
Defendants have breached their obligations under Article VI of the Forage Land

Lease in that after selling one of the parcels, Defendants have “unilaterally
prevented the sale of the remaining land to La Belle.” (ECF No. 1 at 14, ¶ 62). La
Belle also alleges that Defendants breached Article II of the Forage Land Lease

because they have “unilaterally imposed increased and exorbitant rent on La Belle
in a manner inconsistent with Article II of the Forage Land Lease.” (Id. at ¶ 65).
More specifically, La Belle alleges that Defendants have refused to engage a third-
party appraiser to determine the amount of the rent for the first renewal term of the

Forage Land Lease, and instead Defendants have demanded that La Belle sign an
addendum to the Forage Land Lease which is in breach of Article II because the
rent demanded by Defendants is higher than that required by the Forage Land

Lease.
On January 29, 2025, Defendants sent La Belle notice of default of the
Forage Land Lease. (ECF No. 7, Ex 2). Defendants asserted that in September
2024, the parties had reached an agreement as to the terms of the addendum with a

new rent rate of $290.00 per tillable acre, and La Belle refused to execute the
written addendum in violation of Article II of the Forage Land Lease. (Id.) La
Belle responded that Defendant’s proposed addendum contained extra-contractual

provisions that La Belle was under no legal obligation to accept and that
compromised its interests. (ECF No. 7, Ex 3). La Belle stated that it was willing to
sign a “clean addendum” that changes only the amount of rent for the renewal term
to an amount consistent with the fair market value, as determined in accordance

with the Forage Land Lease. (Id. at 3). La Belle further stated that it would make
payments of rent in the amount of $290 per acre, pending appraisal of the
property’s fair market value in accord with the dispute resolution provisions of the

Forage Land Lease. (Id.)
On March 4, 2025, Defendants notified La Belle that it continued to be in
breach of the Forage Land Lease, and because La Belle had not signed the
Defendant’s written addendum setting, among other things, the new rate for rent

for the renewal term, La Belle had not cured its breach. (ECF No. 7, Ex 4).
Defendants stated that pursuant to Article XI of Forage Land Lease, it was
terminating the lease, and they demanded that La Belle vacate the leased premises

within 30 days. (ECF No. 7, Ex 4 at 3). Defendants further stated that if La Belle
did not vacate within 30 days, Defendants would pursue eviction proceedings.
(Id.)
It appears to be undisputed that La Belle has timely made all rent payments

required of it during the initial term if the Forage Land Lease, and following the
initial term, it has paid Defendants rent at the raised amount of $290 per tillable
acre.

According to a declaration executed by Mr. DuQuaine, without the leased
acres, La Belle would be unable to meet the feed requirements of its dairy herd and
its ability to apply manure pursuant to its federally required nutrient management
plan would be compromised, leading to the risk of a significant environmental

hazard. (ECF No. 7, Ex 1). Mr. DuQuaine further attests that without the leased
land, La Belle would be unable to satisfy its obligation to its customers and
affiliates, as well as its legal obligations to regulatory agencies, resulting in loss to

La Belle’s reputation and goodwill. (Id.)
Temporary Restraining Order Standard
In determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order, the Court
must consider four factors: (1) the likelihood the moving party will succeed on the

merits, (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the moving party; (3) the balance
between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other
parties; and (4) the public interest. Kroupa v. Nielsen, 731 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir.

2013); see also Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir.
1981) (en banc)). The inquiry is “whether the balance of equities so favors the
movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until
the merits are determined.” Dataphase Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d at 113.

The likelihood of success is the most important factor. Roudachevski v. All-
Am. Care Centers, Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011). This factor directs
courts to ask whether the party requesting a preliminary injunction has a “fair

chance of prevailing.” Planned Parenthood Minnesota, N. Dakota, S. Dakota v.
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Even when a plaintiff has a
strong claim on the merits, however, “[f]ailure to demonstrate irreparable harm is a
sufficient ground to deny a preliminary injunction.” Phyllis Schlafly Revocable Tr.

v. Cori, 924 F.3d 1004, 1009 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoted case omitted). “Irreparable
harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its
injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” Gen. Motors

Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). The moving
party bears the burden to establish the need for injunctive relief. Chlorine Inst.,
Inc. v. Soo Line R.R., 792 F.3d 903, 914 (8th Cir. 2015).
Discussion

In its motion, La Belle asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from taking any
action to evict or otherwise interfere with La Belle’s possession of the 4,890 acres
of land that are the leased premises under the Forage Land Lease. The Court will

first address La Belle’s likelihood of success. Following argument at the hearing
and upon review of the record, the Court is satisfied that at this stage La Belle has
presented enough evidence to show La Belle is likely to succeed on the merits with
respect to at least one if not both of its claims for breach of contract.

In a diversity action such as this, state law governs the rules for construing
contractual agreements. Orion Fin. Corp. of S. Dakota v. Am. Foods Grp., Inc.,
281 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir. 2002). The parties agree that Missouri law governs

this action. In determining the scope of Missouri law, the Court is bound by the
decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court, although decisions from the Missouri
Court of Appeals are also relevant and “must be followed when they are the best
evidence of Missouri law.” Taylor v. St. Louis Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 625

F.3d 1025, 1027 and 1028, n.2 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation omitted).
Under Missouri law, the elements of a breach of contract action are: “(1) the
existence and terms of a contract; (2) that plaintiff performed or tendered

performance pursuant to the contract; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant;
and (4) damages suffered by the plaintiff.” Keveney v. Missouri Mil. Acad., 304
S.W.3d 98, 104 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). A plaintiff must “identify which rights or
obligations [the defendant] breached under the contract in order to establish a

claim for breach of contract.” Lucero v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 400
S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, La Belle
has identified two contract terms it alleges Defendants have breached – Article VI,
sale of the leased premises, and Article II, setting the rate of rent for first renewal
term.
With regard to Article VI, Defendants argue the terms of this provision are

not enforceable because Article VI is merely an agreement to agree at sometime in
the future, which is a nullity under law. Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370, 376 (Mo.
App. 1964). Defendants argue that Article VI leaves a number of the terms for the

purchase of the lease property undefined, such as price, the description of the land,
and the time of sale and, therefore, it is unenforceable. Citing to Green Street 2900
Investors, LLC v. St. Louis Woodworks, Inc., 654 S.W.3d 380, 389 (Mo. Ct. App.
2022), Defendants argue that Article VI is not enforceable as a contract because

there is nothing in its provisions that requires Defendants to sell to La Belle a
specific parcel of property by a specific time for a specific amount of money.
In general, courts do not create contracts for the parties where there is no

evidence of a meeting of the minds as to essential terms. See United States v.
518.77 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Henry Cnty., State of Mo., 545 F.
Supp. 1246, 1247 (W.D. Mo. 1982). “If the parties have reserved the essential
terms of the contract for future determination, there can be no valid agreement.”

Harrell v. Mercy Health Servs. Corp., 229 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)
(emphasis added) (quoted case omitted). Here, La Belle argues that all the
essential, material terms are present in Article VI as amended in the First

Amendment.
The Court agrees with Defendants that price is an essential term of a contract.
It must be sufficiently definite and ascertainable from the agreement. Sedmak v.
Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). To that end,

Missouri courts require that an agreement must either set the price or provide a
method to ascertain the price. Dierker Assocs., D.C., P.C. v. Gillis, 859 S.W.2d 737,
743 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). While the price for the sale of the leased premises and all

the surrounding acreages is not set out in Article VI of the Forage Land Lease as
amended, Article VI does provide a method by which to determine price – the parties
are to agree as to a fair market price and if the parties are unable to agree, a third-
party appraiser shall establish a fair market price. The Court further finds that the

method to determine price in the Forage Land Lease as amended by the First
Amendment is sufficiently definite. K.C. Air Cargo Servs., Inc. v. City of Kansas
City, 523 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). The agreement for sale of leased

premises does not fail for lack of price. Id.; see also Dierker Associates, D.C., P.C.,
859 S.W.2d at 743.
As for the description of the land, the Court finds that the land is sufficiently
described in Article VI to be the Leased Premises as defined by the Forage Land

Lease, and “all additional acreage surrounding the Leased Premises consistent with
existing parcel legal descriptions and/or tax descriptions.” (ECF No. 1, Ex. C at 1).
With regard to time of performance, Article VI provides that the sale of the land is

to take place over the course of up to five years from the date of the
commencement date of the Forage Land Lease, which commenced on January 1,
2020. Further, La Belle has provided evidence from which a finder of fact may
conclude that either the parties have waived this time schedule or that Defendants

have stymied and prevented performance of the contract – the sale of all the land –
within the agreed upon timeline in Article VI as amended. Sassenrath v.
Sassenrath, 657 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Based on the record before

the Court, Defendants’ argument that Article VI is merely an agreement to agree in
the future is without merit.
Defendants also argue that La Belle is not likely to succeed on the merits
because it is precluded from bringing its breach of contract claims because the

company failed to comply with the notice of default and cure provision of the
Forage Land Lease and, thus, it has not met a condition precedent.
“A condition precedent is an act or event that must exist or occur before a

duty to perform arises.” See In re Marriage of Busch, 310 S.W.3d 253, 265 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2010); see also Vantage Credit Union v. Chisholm, 447 S.W.3d 740, 746
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014). Article XI of the Forage Land Lease does provide that “[i]n
the event of default by Landlord … Tenant shall provide written notice of such

default and Landlord shall have thirty (30) days thereafter to cure such default.”
(ECF No. 1, Ex. B at 8). Further, “[i]f such default is not cured within said grace
period, Tenant may … terminate this Lease upon notice to Landlord and/or seek

any other remedy available at law or in equity.” (Id.) To the extent Article XI is
condition precedent to bringing suit under Missouri law, 2 La Belle has presented
evidence from which a finder of fact could conclude that La Belle did notify
Defendants of their alleged breach of the Forage Land Lease and provided them

with time to cure, at least with regard to Defendants’ alleged breach of the
provisions in Article VI for the sale of the leased land.
On the current record, the Court finds La Belle has shown that it is likely to

succeed on the merits as to at least one of its claims for breach of the Forage Land
Lease, if not both. La Belle has shown that there is evidence that Defendants failed
to perform under Article VI of the Forage Land Lease as amended in that there is
evidence that Defendants hindered or prevented the sale of the leased premises and

all the surrounding acres, despite La Belle being ready and willing purchase the
land. La Belle has also shown that there is evidence that the parties have failed to
reach an agreement as to the rate of rent for the first renewal term under Article II

of the Forage Land Lease, and there have been no efforts to obtain the new market
rate from a third-party appraiser.

2Defendants state in their Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss that
Missouri courts “strictly enforce” notice-and-cure provisions as conditions precedent to
exercising remedies for beach. In support of this assertion, Defendants cite to and quote
language from State ex rel. Nixon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., No. 4:00-CV-8 ERW,
2000 WL 33952262, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 28, 2000). This case, however, relied on a federal
district court case interpreting Maryland law, Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Madison
Three, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 602, 608 (D. Md. 2000), and a federal district court case interpreting
New York law. Sauer v. Xerox Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Allied
Servs., LLC v. Smash My Trash, LLC, No. 21-CV-00249-SRB, 2024 WL 2842633, at *45 (W.D.
Mo. May 16, 2024) (citing State ex rel. Nixon, 2000 WL 33952262 for Missouri law on notice
and cure). The Court has found scant Missouri case law applying notice and cure provisions as
conditions precedent in agreements involving real property.
The Court now turns to the remaining Dataphase factors and finds that they
also weigh in favor of issuing a temporary restraining order. With regard to
irreparable harm, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that

“monetary relief fails to provide adequate compensation for an interest in real
property, which by its very nature is considered unique.” O’Hagan v. United
States, 86 F.3d 776, 783 (8th Cir. 1996). La Belle has shown that the property at

issue in this case is particularly unique in that it is adjacent to La Belle’s dairy
operations. La Belle has presented evidence that if evicted it would suffer harm,
including loss of business goodwill, that cannot be remedied through an award of
money damages. Defendants have threatened to go forward with eviction

proceedings after April 3, 2025, and there is no evidence that replacement land is
available, let alone on such short notice. In the event of eviction, La Belle would
have no land to plant crops in order to feed and sustain its herd of dairy cows, and

it would not be able to find new property that would allow La Belle to spread the
manure that is currently contained in its manure lagoon storage facilities. In short,
La Belle has shown that it would suffer irreparable injury if the status quo is not
maintained. Com. Credit Grp., Inc. v. Ray Cnty. Equip. Leasing, LLC, No. 11-

00947-CV-W-GAF, 2011 WL 13233860, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2011) (“there
is a threat of irreparable harm or injury to Plaintiff absent a temporary restraining
order preventing Defendant from leasing, selling, or otherwise transferring,

removing, misusing, or damaging the [property]”). See also Whole Foods Mkt.
Grp., Inc. v. Wical Ltd. P’ship, 288 F. Supp. 3d 176, 188 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[A]
tenant’s right to possession of a property is irreparable, given that property ‘tends
to have unique characteristics’”).

The Court further finds that Defendants will suffer little to no harm if an
injunction is entered. Defendants are being paid rent at the elevated rate of $290 a
tillable acre on a lease that is renewable through January 2035. And aside from the

parties’ disputes over the sale of the land and the proposed addendum setting rent
for the renewal term, Defendants presented no evidence that Plaintiff has otherwise
breached or defaulted on the Forage Land Lease.
Finally, the Court finds that entering an injunction precluding eviction serves

the public interest. La Belle’s dairy operation is in La Belle, Missouri, and if
evicted from the leased property, which is adjacent to its dairy operation, there is a
risk that La Belle would no longer be able to comply with its government-approved

nutrient management plan, as it would have nowhere to spread the manure
generated by its large herd of dairy cows.
In sum, the Court finds that a temporary restraining order is necessary and
proper in light of the balance among the irreparable harm to La Belle, the relatively

less-significant harm that the temporary injunction may inflict on Defendants, and
the public interest in continued compliance with environmental regulations.
Therefore, upon careful consideration of all the Dataphase factors, the Court will

grant La Belle’s request for a temporary restraining order against Defendants based
on La Belle’s claims for breach of contract. La Belle will be required to give
security in the amount of $300,000 to pay the costs and damages sustained by
Defendants in the event they are later found to have been wrongfully restrained.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff La Belle Dairy, LLC’s motion

for a temporary restraining order against Defendants Sharpe Holdings, Inc. and the
Charles N. Sharpe, Jr. Foundation is GRANTED. [ECF No. 7].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pending this Court’s issuance of a
ruling with respect to Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, Defendants

Sharpe Holdings, Inc. and the Charles N. Sharpe, Jr. Foundation are enjoined and
restrained from directly, on their own or on behalf of, or in conjunction or concert
with, any employee, agent, director, officer, shareholder, associate, partner,

manager, advisor, independent contractor, proprietor, consultant, or in any
capacity, taking any action to evict or otherwise interfere with La Belle Dairy,
LLC’s possession of the Leased Premises as defined by the Forage Land Lease and
the amendments thereto.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff La Belle Dairy, LLC’s shall
post security in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000) with
the Clerk of the Court by March 31, 2025, in cash or through a Court-approved
surety. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
Dated this 25 day of March, 2025.

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10830566. Public record. Not legal advice.