# Knight v. State > Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · January 26, 1998 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1083022 ## Case - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee - **Decided:** January 26, 1998 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1083022 ## Opinion text IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE FILED DECEMB ER SESSION, 1997 January 26, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk RANDY BLAINE KNIGHT, ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9705-CR-00162 ) Appe llant, ) ) JOHNSON COUNTY ) V. ) ) HON. LYNN BROWN, JUDGE HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN, ) ) Appellee. ) (HABEAS C ORPU S) FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: RAND Y KN IGHT , pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP N.E.C.C. #101642 Attorney General & Reporter P.O. Box 5000 Mountain City, TN 37683 TIMOTHY F. BEHAN Assistant Attorney General 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243 DAVID CROCKETT District Attorney General Route 19, Box 99 Johnson City, TN 37601 OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE OPINION The Appe llant, Ra ndy B laine K night, a ppea ls as of right from the trial court’s dismissal of his Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief. We affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court. The record shows that on December 1 2, 1983, Appellant was convicted of two counts of second degree burglary, one count of grand larceny, one count o f aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. He received an effective sentence of seventy (70) years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On September 11, 1996, he filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief wh ich is the subject of this appeal. In essence, Appellant argues that the indictment charging all of the offenses is void because the culpab le men tal state for e ach offen se was not allege d in the ind ictmen t. The first count of the indictment, charging Appellant with second degree burglary, alleged that he did “break and enter a dwelling house during the daytime . . . with the felonio us intent to c omm it a felony there in, to-wit: larceny . . . .” The second count of the indictment charged Appellant with the crime of grand larceny and alleged that the property was taken “with the felonious intent to perm anently d eprive the said true o wner the reof.” The third count of the indictment charged second degree bu rglary b y allegin g that th e App ellant d id “felonio usly break and enter a dwelling house by daytime . . . with the felonious intent to com mit a felon y therein, to-w it: an aggra vated rap e . . . .” The fou rth count of the indictment charged that the Appellant committed aggravated rape and tha t he did “felo niously, se xually pen etrate another, to-wit: [victim] and that -2- force or coercion was used to accomplish the act . . . .” The indictment further alleged that he was armed with a .25 c aliber pisto l, caused person al injury to the victim, and pe netrated her gen ital area with his finger. The fifth count of the indictment alleged that Appellant committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping and included allegations that he did “seize, confine, inveigled, enticed, decoyed, abducted, concealed, kidnapped or carried away, [victim] with the felonious intent to cause the said [vic tim] to b e con fined s ecretly , again st her w ill or to de tain the said [victim] against her will . . . .” The indictm ent furth er alleg ed se rious b odily injury to the victim and that a deadly weapon was used during the commission of the crim inal act. Coun ts 1, 2, 3, and 5 plainly and clearly alleged the Appellant’s felonious intent to sa tisfy any req uireme nts of allegations of the appropriate mens rea. Appellant places the most emphasis in his argum ent on the fourth count of the indictment, which alleges in full as follows: The Gran d Juro rs for the State a nd Co unty afo resaid , upon their oath present and say that Rand y Blaine Knigh t on or about the 24 day of July, 1983, in the State and C ounty afores aid did unlaw fully and feloniously, sexually pen etrate another, to-wit: [victim] and that force or coercion was used to accomplish the act and that the defendant was armed with a weapon, to-wit: a .25 caliber autom atic pistol. The defenda nt cause d perso nal injury to th e said [victim ]. The defend ant’s penis touch ed he r genita l area a nd he did penetra te her genital area with his finger se veral tim es, an d did injure her by striking h er with his g un, and biting her, co ntrary to the Statute, [a]gainst the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee. In support of his argument, Appellant relies upon the decision of this Court in State v. Rog er Da le Hill, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267, Wayne -3- Coun ty (Tenn . Crim. A pp., Nas hville, June 20, 199 6). However, our supreme court reversed this Court’s decision in Hill. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn . 1997). Furthermore, a panel of this Co urt has previously h eld in a similar case that the ruling of this Court in State v. Rog er Da le Hill, was based upon an interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-301(c), which was enacted in 1989. See Gregory L. Hatton v. State of Tennessee, C.C.A . No. 02C01-9611-CC-00407, slip op. at 2, Lake County (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Feb. 19 , 1997). As in Hatton, Appellant was convicted of an offense which occurred prior to enactm ent of the 1 989 revis ions to the Crimina l Code. We conclude that the langu age in the ind ictment charging appellant with various offenses was sufficient under the law as it existed at the time of the offenses. Appe llant’s petition may be dismissed sum marily if the pe tition fails to state a co gnizab le claim. See Passa rella v. State , 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State ex rel. Byrd v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Tenn. 1964); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109. The trial court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. ____________________________________ THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge -4- CONCUR: ___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES , Judge ___________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge -5- --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1083022. Public record. Not legal advice.