# (PC) Valencia v. Balakian

> District Court, E.D. California · March 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828712

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** March 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828712

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that 28 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal
- discussing “under color of 18 state law”
- holding that, when abstaining under Younger, “a 5 district court must dismiss the federal action . . . [and] there is no discretion to grant injunctive 6 relief”
- holding that state prosecutor had 11 absolute immunity for initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecutions, including presentation of case at trial
- concluding that, 25 to recover damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed, expunged, 26 or otherwise invalidated

## Opinion text

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9

10 ERIC VALENCIA, Case No. 1:24-cv-01477-EPG (PC)

11 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE

12 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION
13 DAVID BALAKIAN, et al., BE DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE,
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM,
14 Defendants. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, AND
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT
15 ORDER

16 (ECF Nos. 1, 8).

17 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS
18
19
Plaintiff Eric Valencia is incarcerated at the Madera County Jail and proceeds pro se
20
and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 7).
21
The complaint, filed on December 4, 2024, generally alleges that Plaintiff’s defense attorneys
22
have conspired with prosecutors in state court proceedings to do him harm.
23
On February 3, 2025, the Court screened the complaint and concluded that Plaintiff
24
failed to state any cognizable claims. (ECF No. 8). The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to file
25
an amended complaint or to notify the Court that he wanted to stand on his complaint. (Id. at
26
12). And the Court warned Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to comply with this order may result in the
27
dismissal of this action.” (Id.).
28
The thirty-day deadline has passed, and Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or
1 otherwise responded to the Court’s order. Accordingly, for the reasons below, the Court will
2 recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim,
3 failure to prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order.
4 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
5 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
6 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
7 The Court must dismiss a complaint, or a portion of it, if the prisoner has raised claims that are
8 frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
9 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),
10 (2). Additionally, as Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 7), the Court may
11 screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
12 thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
13 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
15 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
16 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
17 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
18 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
19 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient
20 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
21 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting
22 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts
23 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d
24 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a
25 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
26 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal
27 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
28 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).
1 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
2 Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that he is a “pretrial detainee being held in the Madera Co.
3 Jail.”1 (ECF No. 1, p. 2). He sues four Defendants: (1) David Balakian, a private defense
4 attorney; (2) Craig Collins, a public defender; (3) Rachel Cartier, a district attorney, and (4)
5 Sally Moreno, a district attorney.
6 He brings two claims, both premised on Defendants conspiring to violate his “Federal
7 constitutional rights to due process (14th Amend. U.S. Const.) and right to effective assistance
8 of counsel (6th Amend. U.S. Const.).” Id. at 2-3.
9 For his first claim, he states as follows:
10 Balakian was hired and soon after fired by Plaintiff for providing ineffective
assistance and conspiring with Prosecutor Rachel Cartier, then acted on
11 conspiracy, in the secret of an unknown fraudulent defense representation of a
cash amount of $74,020.00 out of a 84,020.00 illegally seized by law
12
enforcement during an unwarranted and unreasonable search of Plaintiff’s home.
13 (See Madera Co. Case “People v. 74,020.00 MCV91766). Balakian was never
hired to represent or defend the amount seized, nor has Balakian or Cartier
14 provided any notice of the civil proceedings of said case. Balakian and Cartier
15 are parties in People v. 74,020.00 as conspired for the purpose of using said
litigation to launder and/or extort stolen money. Additionally, Balakian
16 conspired with prosecution to wrongfully convict Plaintiff as well as persuade
Plaintiff into transferring the title of his 2022 BMW 330i over to Balakian.
17
Id. at 3.
18
For his second claim, he states as follows:
19
Collins was court-appointed defense counsel in Plaintiff’s state criminal cases.
20 Collins offered Plaintiff an amplified service for $7,000.00 cash, which Plaintiff
paid. Soon after, Collins accepted an illegally imposed pre-trial terms and
21
conditions for an alcohol monitor to be placed on Plaintiff while knowing
22 Plaintiff’s blood alcohol count was within legal limits. Collins accepted the
illegally imposed terms and conditions as part of the conspiracy with prosecutor
23 against Plaintiff. These terms and conditions is what prosecution used as the
“warranted” force to illegally seize the $84,000.00.
24
Id.
25
Plaintiff seeks $100,000 from each Defendant in what appears to be a request for
26
27
28 1 For readability, minor alterations, like changing capitalization and correcting misspellings, have been
made to Plaintiff’s quotations without indicating each change.
1 general damages and $100,000 from each Defendant for punitive damages.
2 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
3 A. Section 1983
4 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
5 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
6 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
7 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
8
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely
9
provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor,
10
490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see
11
also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los
12
Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.
13
2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
14
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under
15
color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or
16
federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
17
Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of
18
state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983,
19
‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an
20
act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is
21
made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007)
22
(quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection
23
may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor
24
knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional
25
harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of
26
causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”
27
Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City
28
1 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
2 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the
3 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual
4 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have
5 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
6 691, 695 (1978).
7 B. Younger Abstention
8 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s claims against his attorneys and the prosecutors in his
9 ongoing state cases cannot proceed in Federal court for the reasons described below. Instead,
10 Plaintiff must raise these issues in his pending state court proceedings.
11 Plaintiff identifies an apparent asset forfeiture case, People v. $74,020 (MCV091766) in
12 the Madera County Superior Court, which appears to be related to his criminal cases, also
13 presumably in the Madera County Superior Court. From the context of the complaint, these
14 cases appear to be ongoing,2 which implicates the Younger abstention doctrine.
15 The Younger abstention is rooted in the “desire to permit state courts to try state cases
16 free from interference by federal courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Thus,
17 “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, interests of comity and federalism instruct federal courts
18 to abstain from exercising our jurisdiction in certain circumstances when asked to enjoin
19 ongoing state enforcement proceedings.” Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2019)
20 (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial
proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is
22 an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges; and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect
23
of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding.
24
25
26
27 2 Among other things, Plaintiff states that he is a pretrial detainee, indicating he has not been convicted
of a crime; he mentions Collins improperly accepting pretrial terms and conditions, which indicates that
28 his criminal case (or cases) is still in an early stage; and he does not state that any of these cases have
concluded.
1 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (alterations, citation, and internal
2 quotation marks omitted).
3 Typically, dismissal is required for Younger abstention. Aiona v. Judiciary of State of
4 Hawaii, 17 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that, when abstaining under Younger, “a
5 district court must dismiss the federal action . . . [and] there is no discretion to grant injunctive
6 relief”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But “federal courts should not dismiss
7 actions where damages are at issue; rather, damages actions should be stayed until the state
8 proceedings are completed.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). Lastly,
9 “Federal courts will not abstain under Younger in extraordinary circumstances where
10 irreparable injury can be shown.” Page, 932 F.3d at 902 (citation and internal quotation marks
11 omitted). “[B]ad faith and harassment” are “the usual prerequisites” to show “the necessary
12 irreparable injury.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53.
13 Consideration of the above legal standards warrants applying the Younger abstention
14 doctrine here. First, Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that there are ongoing state court
15 proceedings, with Plaintiff alleging that Defendants are conspiring to cause him harm in such
16 cases. See Mason v. Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 2:11-CV-1309-CMK-P, 2012 WL 2457836, at *2
17 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2012) (“Plaintiff essentially claims defendants conspired to subject him to a
18 warrantless search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because plaintiff is now
19 incarcerated, it is reasonable to infer that plaintiff is incarcerated as a result of a criminal
20 prosecution relating to evidence discovered by the body cavity search. If a criminal case is still
21 ongoing in any stage, Younger abstention would be implicated . . . .”).3
22

23
3 Even if Plaintiff’s criminal cases have concluded and he has been convicted, he would still be barred
24 from proceeding on his claims concerning his wrongful conviction, unless and until he shows that his
conviction has been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (concluding that,
25 to recover damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid,” a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed, expunged,
26
or otherwise invalidated). Notably, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior
27 invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the
prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that
28 action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
1 Second, the criminal cases, and related asset forfeiture case, implicate important state
2 interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (“This Court has recognized that the
3 States’ interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is
4 one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering
5 equitable types of relief.”); Ames v. Rogers, No. 2:11-CV-1268 KJM JFM, 2011 WL 5436330,
6 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (“State forfeiture proceedings implicate important state
7 interests.”).
8 Third, Plaintiff’s state court proceedings afford him the opportunity to raise his
9 challenges in state court. See Peterson v. Contra Costa Cnty. Superior Ct., No. C03-5534
10 MMC (PR), 2004 WL 443457, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2004) (“Plaintiff will be afforded an
11 adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in his criminal trial and on appeal in the
12 California courts.”); Ames, 2011 WL 5436330, at *2 (“[S]tate forfeiture proceedings provide an
13 opportunity to litigate federal claims.”).
14 Fourth, Plaintiff ultimately seeks a finding that his attorneys and the prosecution are
15 conspiring to harm him in his state court proceedings, which finding would have the practical
16 effect of enjoining, or interfering, with the state court proceedings. See Jennings v. Leach, No.
17 EDCV 21-00209 JVS (PVC), 2021 WL 12140262, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2021)
18 (“Furthermore, a finding in favor of Plaintiff on his claims, including, but not limited to, his
19 false arrest claim, would have the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial
20 proceeding.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Lastly, there are no extraordinary circumstances indicating that Plaintiff will face
22 irreparable injury unless this Court intervenes. As discussed below, while Plaintiff asserts that
23 there is a conspiracy to cause him harm in his state court proceedings, he provides no
24 developed allegations to support such claims.
25 C. Conspiracy Claims
26 Although Plaintiff may not proceed with his § 1983 claims for the reasons discussed
27 above, there are other legal bars present. Notably, the complaint fails to allege that his attorneys
28 acted under color of state law, and the prosecutors are entitled to prosecutorial immunity.
1 1. Color of state law requirement
2 As noted above, the text of § 1983 requires that a defendant act under color of law.
3 Thus, “[t]o state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts which show a deprivation of
4 a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law by a person acting
5 under color of state law.” Lopez v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1991)
6 (emphasis added); Davis v. John, 485 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“It is axiomatic
7 that a plaintiff asserting a section 1983 claim must allege that the defendant acted under color
8 of state law when performing the challenged acts.”).
9 Generally, neither a public defender (such as Defendant Collins) nor a private attorney
10 (such as Defendant Balakian) act under color of law when performing legal services. Polk Cnty.
11 v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law
12 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal
13 proceeding.”); Campbell v. Geragos, No. 1:10-CV-02231-LJO-GBC (PC), 2010 WL 5244677,
14 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 300159 (E.D.
15 Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) (concluding that allegations against private attorneys did not implicate
16 color-of-law requirement).
17 However, there is a limited exception. The Supreme Court has “held that an otherwise
18 private person acts under color of state law when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to
19 deprive another of federal rights” and thus allegations that public defenders conspired with
20 state officials to secure a criminal conviction were adequate to allege that they acted under
21 color of law. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (internal citation and quotation marks
22 omitted).
23 While Plaintiff repeatedly states that his attorneys conspired with prosecutors to do him
24 harm in state court cases, his allegations are lacking.
25 To state a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of an express or
26 implied agreement among the defendant . . . to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2)
27 an actual deprivation of those rights resulting from that agreement.” Ting v. United States, 927
28 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th Cir. 1991); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d
1 1539, 1540–41 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To prove a conspiracy between the state and private parties
2 under section 1983, [a plaintiff] must show an agreement or meeting of the minds’ to violate
3 constitutional rights”; further, “each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact
4 details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the
5 conspiracy.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “[C]onclusory allegations” are
6 insufficient to support a conspiracy claim; rather, “[t]o state a claim for a conspiracy to violate
7 one’s constitutional rights under section 1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support
8 the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir.
9 1989).
10 Plaintiff offers no specific facts here to show a conspiracy between his attorneys and the
11 prosecutors. Although he repeatedly asserts that a conspiracy existed—e.g., Balkian
12 “conspire[ed] with Prosecutor Rachel Cartier” and Collins was part of “conspiracy with
13 prosecutor”—he does not provide the who, what, where, and when type facts to show any
14 agreement between Defendants. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 937 (9th Cir.
15 2012) (“The conclusory conspiracy allegations in the original complaint do not define the scope
16 of any conspiracy involving Thomas, what role he had, or when or how the conspiracy
17 operated.”). For example, he does not explain the nature of any agreement between Balakian
18 and Cartier to “launder” or “extort stolen money” in what appears to be an asset forfeiture case,
19 nor does he give a basis to conclude that Collins conspired with the prosecution to require an
20 “alcohol monitor” condition in his criminal cases.
21 Accordingly, his allegations are insufficient to state any conspiracy claim, which
22 likewise means that there is no basis to conclude that his attorneys were state actors. Brown v.
23 Duran, No. CIV S-11-0930 WBS, 2011 WL 4088697, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011)
24 (“Plaintiff’s vague allegation that a state court judge he names ‘either conspired with my public
25 defender or conspired to cover up his actions....’ (SAC, p. 6), however, simply does not make a
26 colorable showing of the requisite conspiracy that would serve to transmute the defendants into
27 state actors who may be sued under § 1983.”). Rather than any conspiracy, Plaintiff’s
28 allegations more closely indicate that he is simply dissatisfied with the quality of his attorneys’
1 performances in his state court cases. However, “allegations of general, legal malpractice fail to
2 state a cognizable claim under § 1983 and must be dismissed.” Peterson v. Petty, No. CIV S-
3 10-2193-JAM-DAD(P), 2010 WL 3505095, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010).
4 2. Prosecutorial immunity
5 Because Plaintiff is attempting to sue prosecutors (Defendant Cartier and Defendant
6 Moreno), the Court also addresses prosecutorial immunity. The Ninth Circuit explained this
7 immunity as follows:
8 Absolute immunity is generally accorded to judges and prosecutors functioning
in their official capacities. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364, 98 S.Ct.
9 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (holding that state circuit judge is immune from
suit for all actions within his jurisdiction); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
10
430–31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that state prosecutor had
11 absolute immunity for initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecutions, including
presentation of case at trial). This immunity reflects the long-standing “general
12 principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a
13 judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
14 himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871).

15
Recognizing these considerations, courts have extended the protections of
16 absolute immunity to qualifying state officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003) (explaining that though
17 § 1983 does not include a defense of immunity, “the Supreme Court has
recognized that when Congress enacted § 1983, it was aware of a well-
18
established and well-understood common-law tradition that extended absolute
19 immunity to individuals performing functions necessary to the judicial process”
(citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1988) (superseded by
20 statute))); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125
L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). Indeed, judicial immunity from § 1983 suits is “viewed as
21
necessary to protect the judicial process.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 485, 111
22 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). Likewise, the protections of absolute
immunity accorded prosecutors reflect the “‘concern that harassment by
23 unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from
his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of
24
exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust.’” Id.
25 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423, 96 S.Ct. 984).
26 Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 922-923 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Broam v.
27 Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A state prosecutor is entitled to absolute
28 immunity from liability under § 1983 for violating a person’s federal constitutional rights when
1 he or she engages in activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
2 process.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Cartier and Moreno have taken actions, in their capacity as
4 prosecutors, to harm him in his state court cases, including attempts to wrongfully convict him
5 of crimes. But based on the legal standards above, there are entitled to prosecutorial immunity.
6 See Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that prosecutorial
7 “immunity covers the knowing use of false testimony at trial, the suppression of exculpatory
8 evidence, and malicious prosecution”); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986)
9 (“We therefore hold that a conspiracy between judge and prosecutor to predetermine the
10 outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly improper, nevertheless does not pierce the
11 immunity extended to judges and prosecutors.”).
12 IV. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS
13 The Court will likewise recommend dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute
14 this case and to comply with the Court’s screening order.
15 In determining whether to dismiss a[n] [action] for failure to prosecute or failure
to comply with a court order, the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the
16 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to
manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the
17
availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring
18 disposition of cases on their merits.
19 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d
20 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)).
21 “‘The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.’”
22 Id. (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, the
23 first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
24 As to the Court’s need to manage its docket, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to
25 determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the
26 public interest. . . . It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to
27 routine noncompliance of litigants. . . .” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to respond to
28 the Court’s screening order. This failure to respond is delaying the case and interfering with
1 docket management. Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
2 Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in
3 and of itself to warrant dismissal.” Id. (citing Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991). However, “delay
4 inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade and evidence will become
5 stale,” id. at 643, and it is Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and to prosecute this
6 case that is causing delay. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
7 As for the availability of lesser sanctions, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to
8 prosecute this action and has failed to comply with the Court’s order, despite being warned of
9 possible dismissal, there is little available to the Court which would constitute a satisfactory
10 lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce
11 resources. Considering Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status, it appears that monetary sanctions
12 are of little use to prompt him to comply with future orders. And given the stage of these
13 proceedings, the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is not available. Lastly, because the
14 dismissal being recommended in this case is without prejudice, the Court is stopping short of
15 using the harshest possible sanction of dismissal with prejudice. Therefore, the fourth factor
16 weighs in favor of dismissal.
17 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this final factor weighs
18 against dismissal. Id.
19 After weighing the factors, the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate.
20 V. CONCLUSION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
21 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to assign
22 a District Judge to this case.
23 And based on the forgoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:
24 1. This action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to
25 prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order; and
26 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
27 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
28 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty
1 || (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file
2 || written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to
3 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no
4 || more than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file
5 || objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v.
6 || Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394
7 || 9th Cir. 1991)).
8 IT IS SO ORDERED.
9
10 |[ Dated: _Mareh 21, 2025 _ ___ [sf Fey
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828712. Public record. Not legal advice.