# Jennifer Favela v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.

> District Court, C.D. California · March 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828620

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** March 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-00128-MAA Date: March 21, 2025
Title Jennifer Favela v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., et al.

Present: The Honorable MARIA A. AUDERO, United States Magistrate Judge

Cindy Delgado N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
N/A N/A

Proceedings (In Chambers): Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Case (ECF
No. 17)
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On December 4, 2024, Plaintiff Jennifer Favela (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in Los Angeles
County Superior Court, raising disability discrimination and employment retaliation claims under
state law (“Complaint”). (Compl., ECF No. 4, at 10–231.) On January 6, 2025, Defendant Lowes
Home Centers, Inc. (“Defendant”) filed its Answer in the Superior Court (ECF No. 4, at 41–46) and
a Notice of Removal in this Court (“Removal Notice”), the latter supported by Declarations of Grace
Ridley (“Ridely Declaration”) and Nichole Browning (Removal Not., ECF No. 1; Ridley Decl, ECF
No. 3; ECF No. 4).
On January 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand (“Motion”), which included a
Declaration of Alixandra M. Powers and Request for Judicial Notice. (Mot., ECF No. 17; ECF No.
18.) On February 19, 2025, Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”), which
included a Declaration of Nichole T. Browning and a Request for Judicial Notice. (Opp’n, ECF No.
20-1–20-2.) On February 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Reply to the Opposition (“Reply”). (Reply, ECF
No. 21.) The Motion is fully briefed. The Court deems the Motion appropriate for decision without
oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.R. 7-15. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the
Motion.

1 Pinpoint citations in this Order refer to page numbers generated in the CM/ECF headers of the
cited documents or, where applicable, paragraph numbers of the cited documents.
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-00128-MAA Date: March 21, 2025
Title Jennifer Favela v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., et al.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action in state court to federal court if
the federal court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original
jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law or where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse
from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, excluding
interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). “Where . . . it is unclear or ambiguous from the face
of a state-court complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled, the removing
defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899
F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “If at any time before
final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to
the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION
Through the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks, as relevant here, the following: (1) past and future
economic damages, (2) past and future noneconomic damages, (3) attorney’s fees, and (4) punitive
damages. (Id. at 14; ¶¶ 21, 40.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should remand this action because
Defendant has not met its burden to show by a preponderance of evidence that there is a sufficient
amount in controversy to confer jurisdiction to this Court. (Mot.) Plaintiff does not challenge any
other basis for diversity jurisdiction over this action. (See generally id.) Defendant opposes remand,
contending it has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy
exceeds the jurisdictional threshold based on the four above-mentioned forms of requested relief.
(Opp’n.) Below, the Court addresses the theories put forth by Defendant as to why the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.
A. Lost Past and Future Wages
Defendant avers, supported by a declaration from its “Senior Director Income & Payroll
Tax,” that Plaintiff generally worked approximately twenty-five hours per week during her
employment with Defendant, last earned $29.99 per hour, and had a last date of employment on or
about May 31, 2024. (Removal Not. ¶ 21; Ridley Decl. ¶¶ 3–4). Using an estimated trial date of
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-00128-MAA Date: March 21, 2025
Title Jennifer Favela v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., et al.

March 2026—twenty-two months after Plaintiff’s last date of employment—Defendant calculates an
approximate $71,226.25 in lost wages ($749.75 per week x 95 weeks). (Removal Not. ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s wage or hour figures, but argues that the correct time
period to calculate lost wages is from June 7, 2024, when she received her last paycheck, to January
6, 2025, the date of removal. (Mot. 8.) Plaintiff argues that the standard followed by courts in the
Central District of California determines the amount in controversy as of the date of removal. (Id. at
7–8.) However, the Ninth Circuit has clarified this point, holding otherwise:
We conclude that the amount in controversy is not limited to damages
incurred prior to removal—for example, it is not limited to wages a
plaintiff-employee would have earned before removal (as opposed to after
removal). Rather, the amount in controversy is determined by the
complaint operative at the time of removal and encompasses all relief a
court may grant on that complaint if the plaintiff is victorious.
Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 414–15 (9th Cir. 2018).
Accordingly, the Court considers the amount in controversy to include all the potential relief
that is available to Plaintiff based on the complaint operative at the time of removal, not just
damages incurred up to the date of removal. To calculate the potential back pay at stake, the Court
will use a conservative trial date estimate of one year after removal, or January 6, 2026. See Beltran
v. Procare Pharmacy, LLC, No. CV 19-08819-ODW (RAOx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26098, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) (“When the date of a trial is not set, courts have found one year from the
date of removal to be a conservative trial date estimate.”). Plaintiff’s last date of work is not clear
from the pleadings. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff received a letter on June 6, 2024
informing her that her employment ended. (Compl. ¶ 20.) According to the Motion, Plaintiff
received her final paycheck on June 7, 2024. (Mot. 8.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s last day
of work was on or about May 31, 2024. (Ridley Decl. ¶ 3; Opp’n 12.) In consideration of Plaintiff
as the moving party, the Court will use Plaintiff’s asserted last pay date of June 7, 2024, rather than
the earlier date of last employment asserted by Defendant (May 31, 2024).2 Gaus, Inc., 980 F.2d at

2 However, even if the Court used Defendant’s date of May 31, 2024—which would yield
$60,729.75 in lost wages ($749.75 per week x 81 weeks)—it would not be material to the ultimate
determination of the Motion. (Opp’n 12.)
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-00128-MAA Date: March 21, 2025
Title Jennifer Favela v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., et al.

566. Accordingly, the Court finds that a conservative estimate of the lost past and future wages at
issue in this case is approximately $61,479.50 ($749.75 per week x 82 weeks).
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant failed to consider Plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages
from any lost wages. (Mot. 7.) However, Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that
mitigation of damages—a potential affirmative defense—factors into determining the amount in
controversy for diversity jurisdiction. (See generally id.) On the other hand, the Supreme Court
long has established that a defendant’s “valid defense, if asserted, to all or a portion of the claim . . .
will not justify remand.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 292; see also Jackson v.
Compass Grp. USA, Inc., No. CV19-4678-PSG (GJSx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129001, at *10–11
(C.D. Cal. July 31, 2019) (“mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense, and . . . is therefore not
relevant to the Court’s determination of the amount in controversy”). Moreover, Plaintiff makes no
argument and offers no evidence in support of her purported mitigation of damages. (See generally
Compl.; Mot.; Reply.) See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84
(2014) (“both sides” are obligated to “submit proof” when the amount in controversy is challenged).
Thus, even if the Court could consider mitigation of damages at this stage, there is no amount to
subtract from Plaintiff’s potential lost wages.
B. Emotional Distress Damages
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims in the Complaint that she suffered emotional distress
damages “in an amount in excess of [the state court’s] minimal jurisdiction” are effectively claims
that she sustained at least the minimal jurisdictional amount of $25,000. (Opp’n 13 (citing Compl.
¶¶ 29, 50).) Though Plaintiff argues that this “general jurisdictional allegation does not give notice
of the actual amount of damages sought by Plaintiff” (Reply 4), the Court agrees with Defendant
that, in effect, the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff sustained more than $25,000 in emotional distress
damages—the jurisdictional minimum amount for an unlimited civil case in California state court.
See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 85, 88. See e.g., Velez-Guerra v. Crescent Hotels & Resorts, LLC, No.
CV 20-6861-DMG (PJWx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233510, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020)
(finding complaint that sought emotional distress damages “in an amount in excess of [the state]
court’s minimal jurisdiction” to have sufficiently alleged at least $25,000 in damages); Lamke v.
Sunstate Equip. Co., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1030-1031 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding jurisdictional
amount satisfied by adding $25,000 for emotional distress to the damages at issue because plaintiff
alleged emotional distress damages “in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdiction of the state
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-00128-MAA Date: March 21, 2025
Title Jennifer Favela v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., et al.

court.”). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged at least $25,000 in emotional distress
damages.
* * *
From just a conservative estimate of the lost wages through trial and the minimum amount of
emotional distress damages alone, the Court can determine that the amount in controversy is at least
$86,479.50. Because this amount exceeds the $75,000 minimum amount for diversity jurisdiction,
the Court need not address the parties’ remaining arguments pertaining to possible emotional distress
damages, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant has demonstrated that the Court has diversity jurisdiction
over this action because the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of $75,000.
In the absence of any other challenge to the existence of diversity jurisdiction over this action, the
Court finds that diversity jurisdiction has been established. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as
follows:
(1) The Motion (ECF No. 17) is DENIED.

(2) Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 18) is DENIED as unnecessary to
the resolution of the Motion.

(3) Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 20-2) is DENIED as unnecessary
to the resolution of the Motion.
It is so ordered.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828620. Public record. Not legal advice.