# SMITH, JR v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 19, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828198

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 19, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that reviewing courts “are not permitted to reweigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations”

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KENNETH S., JR.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:23-cv-22119 (BRM)

v. OPINION

MARTIN O’MALLEY,
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,

Defendant.

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Kenneth Smith, Jr.’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the final decision
of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”1) denying his
application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act
(the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 138183, and for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II
of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 402–34. (ECF Nos. 1, 9.) The Commissioner filed an Opposition. (ECF
No. 15.) As of the date of this Opinion, Plaintiff has not filed a Reply, which was due on August
5, 2024, pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Having
reviewed the submissions filed in connection with this appeal and having declined to hold oral

1 Leland Dudek became Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) on
February 19, 2025. Therefore, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Mr. Dudek is
substituted as Defendant (previously, Martin O’Malley) in this suit. See also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any
change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in
such office.”).
argument in accordance with Local Civil Rule 78.1(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good
cause shown, the Plaintiff’s appeal is DENIED (ECF No. 1) and the Commissioner’s decision is
AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s challenge to the Commissioner’s denial of his application
for SSI and DIB. (See ECF No. 1.) On October 19, 2020, Plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB, alleging
disability beginning January 1, 2017, initially based on a back condition, neuropathy, and traumatic
brain injury.2 (See ECF No. 3 (Transcript of Proceedings3 (“Tr.”)) at 294, 298, 317.) The SSA
denied Plaintiff’s claims on May 25, 2021 (Tr. 234–38), and again upon reconsideration on
October 22, 2021. (Id. 242–49.)
Plaintiff then filed, through counsel, a written request for a hearing (id. at 251–52), and on
March 22, 2022, Administrative Law Judge Sharon Allard (“ALJ Allard”) held a hearing regarding
Plaintiff’s claim (id. at 36–73). In a decision dated September 26, 2022, ALJ Allard found Plaintiff

not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Id. at 15–28.) ALJ Allard considered the entire record
in making her decision. (Id. at 18.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on
September 12, 2023, and ALJ Allard’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
(Id. at 1–7.) Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed his appeal with this
Court, seeking review of ALJ Allard’s decision.

2 In his initial application, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning July 7, 2013, but at the March 22,
2022 hearing he amended the alleged onset date of disability to January 1, 2017. (Tr. at 15.)

3 The administrative record is set forth in this transcript. (See generally ECF No. 5.)
B. Factual Background
As an initial matter, ALJ Allard determined Plaintiff met the SSA’s insured status
requirements through December 31, 2018. (Tr. at 18.) At the time of ALJ Allard’s decision,
Plaintiff was a forty-four-year-old male, who completed his high school education through tenth
grade. (Id. at 27, 318.) At step one, ALJ Allard found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since January 1, 2017, which was the amended alleged onset date of Plaintiff’s
claimed disabilities. (Id. at 18.) Plaintiff had most recently been employed full-time as a custodian
in 2011 and previously as an unskilled laborer, claiming he continued working until 2013 when
the pain became too unbearable. (Id. at 22, 27, 124.) At step two, ALJ Allard found Plaintiff had
the following “severe medical impairments”: “depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, personality disorder, sleep apnea, obesity, osteoarthritis, and
hypertension.” (Id. at 18.) At step three, ALJ Allard did not find Plaintiff had “an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525,

404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).” (Id. at 19.) At step four, ALJ Allard found Plaintiff
had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except he is limited to standing or walking four hours in
an eight hour workday. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs,
occasionally balance on wet moving or uneven surfaces,
occasionally kneel, stoop, and crouch, and never crawl or climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds. He can have occasional exposure to
temperature extremes of heat and cold, wetness, humidity, fumes,
odors, dusts, gases and poor ventilation. He can understand and
execute simple and routine tasks. He can have occasional contact
with coworkers, supervisors, and the public, but not with tasks that
involve direct customer service. He can make simple decisions and
adapt to occasional changes in essential work tasks.
(Id. at 22.) Finally, at step five, ALJ Allard found, based on “Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform.” (Id. at 27.) Specifically, ALJ Allard found
Plaintiff could perform “unskilled, light” work in “sedentary occupations” such as “table worker
(DOT # 739.687-182[)] . . . document preparer (DOT # 249.587-018[)] . . . and ticket counter

(DOT # 219.587-010 . . .),” among other jobs based in part on the testimony of the vocational
expert. (Id. at 27–28.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a review of a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court “shall have power to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir.
2001). The Commissioner’s decisions regarding questions of fact are deemed conclusive by a
reviewing court if supported by “substantial evidence” in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Knepp

v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). A district court must affirm an administrative law judge’s
(“ALJ”) decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted);
Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence
“is more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Newell v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this
understanding of the substantial evidence standard in Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154
(2019). To determine whether an ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, a court must
review the evidence in its totality. Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1984). “Courts are
not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a court may not set an ALJ’s
“decision aside if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if [it] would have decided the factual
inquiry differently.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).

III. THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
Under the Act, the SSA is authorized to pay SSI and DIB to “disabled” persons. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(a). A person is “disabled” if “he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A person is unable to engage in substantial
gainful activity,
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations promulgated under the Act establish a five-step process for determining
whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of SSI and DIB. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.4 First, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant has shown he or she is not currently engaged in “substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140

4 Regulations for DIB and SSI are virtually identical. For the purposes of this appeal, further
citations will only be made to the DIB regulations regarding disability evaluation, 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1501, et seq. The parallel SSI benefits regulations are found under 20 C.F.R. § 416.901, et
seq.
(1987). If a claimant is presently engaged in any form of substantial gainful activity, he or she is
automatically denied disability benefits. Id. Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has
demonstrated a “severe impairment” or “combination of impairments” that significantly limits his
or her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c);
see Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140–41. Basic work activities are defined as “the abilities and aptitudes

necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). These activities include:
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,
pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;

(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;

(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple
instructions;

(4) Use of judgment;

(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual
work situations; and

(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
Id. A claimant who does not have a severe impairment is not considered disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(c); see Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).
Third, if a claimant’s impairment(s) is found to be severe, the ALJ then determines whether
the impairment(s) meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (the “Impairment List”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates
his or her impairment(s) is equal in severity to, or meets, one of the impairments on the Impairment
List, the claimant has satisfied his or her burden of proof and is automatically entitled to benefits.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. If the specific impairment is not
listed, the ALJ will consider in his or her decision the impairment that most closely satisfies those
listed for purposes of deciding whether the impairment is medically equivalent. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1526. If there is more than one impairment, then the ALJ must consider whether the
combination of impairments is equal to any listed impairment. Id. An impairment or combination
of impairments is basically equivalent to a listed impairment if there are medical findings equal in
severity to all the criteria for the one most similar. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186 (3d
Cir. 1992).

If the claimant is not conclusively disabled under the criteria set forth in the Impairment
List, step three is not satisfied, and the claimant must prove at step four whether he or she retains
the RFC to perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), (f); Bowen, 482 U.S.
at 141. Step four involves three sub-steps:
(1) the ALJ must make specific findings of fact as to the claimant’s
[RFC]; (2) the ALJ must make findings of the physical and mental
demands of the claimant’s past relevant work; and (3) the ALJ must
compare the [RFC] to the past relevant work to determine whether
claimant has the level of capability needed to perform the past
relevant work.
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). When
determining RFC, an ALJ’s consideration of medical opinion evidence is subject to the framework
articulated at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (for claims filed before March 27, 2017) or 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c (for claims filed after March 27, 2017).
Claimants are not disabled if their RFC allows them to perform their past relevant work.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). However, if the claimant’s RFC prevents him or her from
doing so, or if the claimant has no past relevant work, an ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step
of the process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(g). The final step requires the ALJ to “show there are
other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can perform,
consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and [RFC].”
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In doing so, “[t]he ALJ must analyze
the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining whether she is capable of
performing work and is not disabled.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. Notably,
an ALJ typically seeks the assistance of a vocational expert at this final step. Plummer, 186 F.3d
at 428.
The claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four. Sykes v. Apfel, 228

F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2000). Neither side bears the burden of proof for step three “[b]ecause step
three involves a conclusive presumption based on the listings[.]” Id. at 263 n.2; see Bowen, 482
U.S. at 146 n.5. An ALJ bears the burden of proof for step five. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 263.
On appeal, the harmless error doctrine5 requires a plaintiff to show, as to the first four steps:
(1) an error occurred; and (2) but for that error, they might have proven their disability. Holloman
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016). In other words, when reviewing an
appeal based on the first four steps, a court considers whether the plaintiff articulated a basis for a
decision in their favor based on the existing record. If the plaintiff cannot, it is unlikely they will
meet their burden of showing an error was harmful. See, e.g., Lippincott v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

982 F. Supp. 2d 358, 38081 (D.N.J. 2013) (finding ALJ’s error harmless); Powers v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 19-21970, 2021 WL 1207793, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2021) (finding the
plaintiff had not demonstrated she was prejudiced by the ALJ’s decision and had not shown an
error occurred amounting to harm).

5 Harmless error review, which requires the appellant to demonstrate harm, applies to
administrative appeals. Holloman, 639 F. App’x at 814. The Supreme Court explained its operation
in a similar procedural context in Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407–11 (2009), which
concerned the review of a governmental agency determination. The Supreme Court stated: “the
burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s
determination.” Id. at 409. In such a case, “the claimant has the ‘burden’ of showing that an error
was harmful[.]” Id. at 410.
The court’s review of legal issues within this appeal is plenary. See Schaudeck v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Factual findings are reviewed “only to determine
whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the findings.” Sykes,
228 F.3d at 262. Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than
a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Substantial evidence also “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When
substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s factual findings, this Court must abide
by those determinations. See id. (citing Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IV. DECISION
Plaintiff appeals ALJ Allard and the Commissioner’s decision and requests the Court either
reverse the decision because substantial evidence exists in the administrative record to support a
finding of disability, or, in the alternative, vacate the decision and remand for reconsideration in
light of numerous alleged deficiencies in the hearing decision. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff argues

the decision failed to “adequately, reasonably or neutrally assess [P]laintiff’s 4 acknowledged
mental illnesses at the step 3 medical equivalence stage or in the announcement of the mental
RFC.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff claims he is “presumptively disabled under the mental listings at step 3
by meeting the paragraph B and C criteria.” (Id.) Given his challenge of the mental RFC, Plaintiff
is also disputing ALJ Allard’s conclusions in step four. Plaintiff is seeking the payment of benefits,
but if that is not granted, he requests remand because “meaningful judicial review [was] frustrated
at both the step 3 and RFC levels” and “a [more] comprehensible set of findings linking the actual
psychological evidence to those findings” should be provided. (Id.)
In response, the Commissioner argues ALJ Allard’s decision is adequately explained and
supported by substantial evidence because she included Plaintiff’s reports and documented
medical records, such as consultative notes, as part of the evidentiary basis of her analysis. (ECF
No. 15 at 9.) The Commissioner states, “Plaintiff’s disagreement with level of severity the ALJ
assigned each of h[is] mental impairments is not a basis for reversal or remand in this case” and
cites to the holding in Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler that a court cannot re-weigh the

evidence but must affirm if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. (Id.
at 11(citing 806 F.2d 1185, 1190–91 (3d Cir. 1986)).) With regards to step four, the Commissioner
claims ALJ Allard “properly reviewed the evidence of record in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC” and
“supported her RFC findings with citations to the record evidence.” (ECF No. 15 at 13, 15.) The
Commissioner argues that although Plaintiff has attempted to claim an opposite determination is
possible due to potentially conflicting information or cherry-picked statements, ALJ Allard
“provided valid reasons pursuant to controlling agency regulations and supported by substantial
evidence to explain why [opposite] opinions were unpersuasive.” (Id. at 15.) The Commissioner
cites to Malloy v. Commissioner of Social Security as further supporting this position. (Id at

20(citing 306 F. App’x 761, 764 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The presence of evidence in the record that
supports a contrary conclusion does not undermine the [ALJ’s] decision so long as the record
provides substantial support for that decision.”)).)
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s challenge to ALJ Allard’s determination under step
three and then under step four with regards to the RFC.
A. Plaintiff’s Challenge to ALJ Allard’s Step Three Determination
Plaintiff’s overarching argument is that ALJ Allard erred in the step three determination
because she failed to consider four separate psychiatric impairments according to the rubric and
criteria established in the listings themselves. (ECF No. 9 at 5.) Plaintiff argues the decision’s
rationale is deficient because it “makes no definitive reference to any medical/psychiatric
evidence, relies entirely on [P]laintiff’s self-description of his regular activities in a required form
filed in conjunction with his disability application, cherry-picks only certain statements from that
form” and fails to “articulate how the stated factors comply with the criteria set forth for the ALJ’s

consideration or bridges [P]laintiff’s statements to the ‘moderate’ conclusion.” (Id. at 1213.)
The Commissioner argues ALJ Allard’s step three determination was backed up by
substantial evidence and properly “concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or
medically equal the criteria of any of the Listings.” (ECF No. 15 at 11.) The Commissioner states
the “Plaintiff did not meet his burden at step three of the sequential evaluation process” and that
the “disagreement with level of severity the ALK assigned each of [his] mental impairments is not
a basis for reversal or remand in this case.” (Id. at 13, 16.)
During step three, the ALJ compares the medical evidence of a claimant’s impairments
with those listed in the Impairment List, which are presumed severe enough to preclude any gainful
work. See Holley v. Colvin, 975 F. Supp. 2d 467, 476 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d sub nom., 590 F. App’x

167 (3d Cir. 2014). The listings articulated in the Impairment List are “descriptions of various
physical and mental illnesses and abnormalities, most of which are categorized by the body system
they affect.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 529–30 (1990). All impairments are “defined in
terms of several specific medical signs, symptoms, or laboratory test results.” Id. at 530. “If a
claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, he will be found disabled
under the [Act]. If the claimant does not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the
analysis proceeds to step four.” Holley, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 476. To be found disabled, claimants
“must present medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed
impairment.” Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 531.
Listings may be satisfied by a claimant meeting the criteria in both paragraphs A and B, or
both paragraphs A and C. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, App’x 1, § 12.00(A)(2). Here, the relevant
listings are Listings 12.02 (neurocognitive disorders), 12.04 (depressive, bipolar, and related
disorders), 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders), 12.08 (personality and impulse-
control disorders), and 12.15 (trauma- and stressor-related disorders). (See Tr. at 20.) Listing 12.08

has requirements listed in paragraphs A and B, and Listings 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15 have
requirements listed in paragraphs A, B, and C. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, App’x 1,
§ 12.00(A)(2). The paragraph B criteria for Listings 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15 are the same
and require claimants to show their mental disorder “result[s] in ‘extreme’ limitation of one, or
‘marked’ limitation of two, of the four areas of mental functioning.” Id. § 12.00(A)(2)(b). The four
“areas of mental functioning a person uses in a work setting” are: (1) understand, remember, or
apply information; (2) interact with others; (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and (4) adapt
or manage oneself. Id. Additionally, the paragraph C criteria for Listings 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and
12.15 are the same and require claimants to demonstrate their mental disorder is “‘serious and

persistent’; that is, there must be a medically documented history of the existence of the disorder
over a period of at least 2 years, and evidence that satisfies the criteria in both C1 and C2.” Id. §
12.00(A)(2)(c). The criteria in C1 and C2 are as follows:
b. The criterion in C1 is satisfied when the evidence shows that you
rely, on an ongoing basis, upon medical treatment, mental health
therapy, psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s), to
diminish the symptoms and signs of your mental disorder (see
12.00D). We consider that you receive ongoing medical treatment
when the medical evidence establishes that you obtain medical
treatment with a frequency consistent with accepted medical
practice for the type of treatment or evaluation required for your
medical condition. . . .

c. The criterion in C2 is satisfied when the evidence shows that,
despite your diminished symptoms and signs, you have achieved
only marginal adjustment. “Marginal adjustment” means that your
adaptation to the requirements of daily life is fragile; that is, you
have minimal capacity to adapt to changes in your environment or
to demands that are not already part of your daily life. We will
consider that you have achieved only marginal adjustment when the
evidence shows that changes or increased demands have led to
exacerbation of your symptoms and signs and to deterioration in
your functioning; for example, you have become unable to function
outside of your home or a more restrictive setting, without
substantial psychosocial supports[.] . . .

Id. § 12.00(G)(2). “For a claimant to show his [or her] impairment matches a listing, it must meet
all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no
matter how severely, does not qualify.” Jones, 364 at 504 (quoting Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530).
ALJs are not required “to use particular language or adhere to a particular format in
conducting [their] analysis.” Id. at 505. Rather, they must “ensure that there is sufficient
development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Id. ALJs’
decisions are read as a whole to determine whether they “considered the appropriate factors in
reaching the conclusion that [the claimant] did not meet the requirements for any listing.” Id. ALJs
satisfy this standard by “clearly evaluating the available medical evidence in the record and then
setting forth that evaluation in an opinion, even where [they] did not identify or analyze the most
relevant Listing.” Scatorchia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 137 F. App’x 468, 470–71 (3d Cir. 2005).
To conclude an applicant is not disabled under the step three analysis, the ALJ must “set
forth the reasons for [her] decision.” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119. Conclusory statements have been
found to be “beyond meaningful judicial review.” Id. In Burnett, the Third Circuit vacated the
ALJ’s decision and remanded the matter because the ALJ made “only a conclusory statement
without mentioning any specific listed impairments or explaining his reasoning” which the court
found was “beyond meaningful judicial review.” Id. at 119–20. Although “conclusory statements”
that an impairment does not meet a certain listing are insufficient, courts have held an ALJ’s
reasoning to be sufficient when the ALJ’s analysis considers the specific medical requirements of
the listing(s) and the relevant medical evidence in evaluating whether the claimant has met the
requirements for that listing(s). See Parrotta v. Kijakazi, Civ. A. No. 21-13602, 2022 WL 2289554,
at *9–11 (D.N.J. June 24, 2022). An ALJ’s decision at step three need not address every single
piece of medical evidence in the record. See Jose L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 20-09749,

2022 WL 603001, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2022). ALJs are entitled to focus on the evidence they
deem most probative; “[t]here is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every tidbit of
evidence included in the record.” Frederick F. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 20-11500, 2022
WL 445538, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F.
App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Here, the Court finds substantial evidence supports ALJ Allard’s step three determination
because she made specific findings and cited to specific evidence in finding the severity of
Plaintiff’s mental impairments, both individually and in combination, did not satisfy the paragraph
B criteria for Listing 12.08 or the paragraphs B and C criteria for Listings 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, and

12.15. ALJ Allard first considered whether Plaintiff met the “paragraph B” criteria for the relevant
listings and explained:
The severity of the claimant’s mental impairments, considered
singly and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the
criteria of listings 12.02, 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 12.15. In making
this finding, the undersigned has considered whether the “paragraph
B” criteria are satisfied. To satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria, the
mental impairments must result in one extreme limitation or two
marked limitations in a broad area of functioning. An extreme
limitation is the inability to function independently, appropriately,
or effectively, and on a sustained basis. A marked limitation is a
seriously limited ability to function independently, appropriately, or
effectively, and on a sustained basis.

In understanding, remembering, or applying information, the
claimant has a moderate limitation. [Plaintiff] reported difficulty
with memory, as well as understanding and following instructions
(Ex. 4E at 6). [Plaintiff] did not report associated problems with
cooking, household chores, following TV shows, or managing his
money (Ex. 4E). Consultative examiner reports note deficits in
memory, while treatment do not reflect observed persistent deficits
in memory. In light of the foregoing, the undersigned finds the
claimant has no more than a moderate limitation in understanding,
remembering, or applying information.

In interacting with others, the claimant has a moderate limitation.
[Plaintiff] reported no difficulty getting along with others, but
reported he was fired for problems interacting with his boss (Ex. 4E
at 6). [Plaintiff] reported socializing several times a week, but
experiencing frequent panic attacks (Ex. 4E). Treatment notes
indicate [Plaintiff] is cooperative with medical staff and do not
indicate abnormal behavior. In light of the foregoing, the
undersigned finds the claimant has no more than a moderate
limitation in interacting with others.

With regard to concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the
claimant has a moderate limitation. [Plaintiff] reported difficulty
with concentration and completing tasks (Ex. 4E at 6). He did not
report difficulty with focusing on TV shows, household chores, or
building model cars (Ex. 10F). Consultative examiner reports note
deficits in concentration while treatment notes do not reflect
observed deficits in focus. Based on all of the foregoing, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has a moderate limitation in his
ability to concentrate, persist or maintain pace.

As for adapting or managing oneself, the claimant has a moderate
limitation. [Plaintiff] reported problems handling stress and changes
in routine (Ex. 4E at 7). However, treatment notes reflect that
[Plaintiff] is generally appropriately dressed and groomed for
appointments, cooperative with medical staff, and compliant with
prescribed treatment. [Plaintiff] reported he can perform personal
care, do household chores, prepare meals, shop for groceries, and
manage his finances (Ex. 4E; 5F; 8F; 10F). Based on the foregoing,
the undersigned finds the claimant has no more than a moderate
limitation in his ability to adapt or manage himself.

Because the claimant’s mental impairments do not cause at least two
"marked" limitations or one "extreme" limitation, the "paragraph B"
criteria are not satisfied.
(ECF No. 5 at 2021.)
ALJ Allard similarly considered whether the “paragraph C” criteria were satisfied for the
relevant listings and stated:
The undersigned has also considered whether the "paragraph C"
criteria are satisfied. In this case, the evidence fails to establish the
presence of the "paragraph C" criteria. The record does not establish
that the claimant has only marginal adjustment, that is, a minimal
capacity to adapt to changes in the claimant’s environment or to
demands that are not already part of the claimant’s daily life. For
example, the claimant reported he can perform personal care, do
household chores, prepare meals, shop for groceries, and manage his
finances (Exs. 4E; 5F; 8F; 10F). The record does not contain
evidence or allegations regarding a need for a highly structured
setting nor does it establish that the claimant has a minimal capacity
to adapt to changes.

(Id. at 21.)
Because ALJ Allard found Plaintiff failed to satisfy the criteria of the relevant listings at
step three, she continued the analysis process and assessed Plaintiff’s RFC during the relevant
period. (Id. at 2228.) Although ALJ Allard could have provided more pincites, precision, and
explanation in the step three analysis as is demonstrated by her more fulsome RFC determination
in step four, this Court is still able to conduct a meaningful review and conclude there is substantial
evidence that all limitations were “limited” at best. See Jones, 364 F.3d at 505 (“[T]he ALJ’s
decision, read as a whole, illustrates that the ALJ considered the appropriate factors in reaching
the conclusion that [the plaintiff] did not meet the requirements for any listing. . . .”); (ECF No. 5
at 8285, 10104, 11920, 12930, 13940, 14951, 328335, 63249, 64650.). ALJ Allard
went through the appropriate requirements in her step three analysis and her decision in step four,
infra, also provides ample evidence that she relied upon the entire record in making all
determinations.
Accordingly, this Court must affirm the ALJ, instead of reevaluating the evidence or
substituting in its own judgment. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359 (holding that reviewing courts
“are not permitted to reweigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations”); see also
Malloy, 306 F. App’x at 764.
B. Plaintiff’s Challenge to ALJ Allard’s Step Four RFC Determination
Plaintiff argues “the mental RFC is not based on substantial evidence and arrives without
a comprehensible rationale for its extremely convenient conclusions.” (ECF No. 9 at 34.) Plaintiff

contends the RFC determination does not consider his mental limitations appropriately, in
particular by not sufficiently incorporating the “moderate limitations” previously determined in
step three. (Id. at 4346.) As such, Plaintiff states there is not substantial evidence for the RFC
determination nor an adequate explanation for how his limitations allow for him to perform the
specified jobs. (Id. 4546.)
The Commissioner argues substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s mental RFC
determination and that she “reasonably found that Plaintiff could understand and execute simple
and routine tasks.” (ECF No. 15 at 17.) The Commissioner states “[a]lthough Plaintiff attempts to

discredit the rationale of the ALJ’s September 26, 2022, decision, he retains the burden of proving
that his condition is disabling.” (Id. at 18.) The Commissioner contends Plaintiff’s argument
should be dismissed because “Plaintiff had failed to prove that he had additional functional
limitations not accounted for in the RFC” and “the record demonstrates that Plaintiff’s mental
impairments were not disabling.” (Id.)
After evaluating all the evidence in the record, ALJ Allard determined Plaintiff has the
RFC “to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he is limited
to standing or walking four hours in an eight hour workday,” but with certain non-exertional
limitations—namely, that Plaintiff (1) “can understand and execute simple and routine tasks,” (2)

“can make simple decisions and adapt to occasional changes in essential work tasks,” and (3) “can
have occasional contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public, but not with tasks that involve
direct customer service.” (Id. at 22.) ALJ Allard’s process in determining Plaintiff’s RFC was
twofold: first, she considered whether there was an underlying medically determinable physical or
mental impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce Plaintiff’s claimed symptoms;
and second, she evaluated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s symptoms

to determine whether, and the extent to which, they limit Plaintiff’s work-related activities, based
upon objective medical evidence and other evidence available in the record, as well as opinion
evidence in accordance with the requirements of 20 CFR 404.1520c, 404.1529, 416.920c, and SSR
16-3p. (Id.)
ALJ Allard considered all the evidence in the record—including Plaintiff’s testimony,
Plaintiff’s medical records, prior administrative medical findings, the opinions of Plaintiff’s
treating and examining/consulting physicians, a vocational expert’s testimony, and Plaintiff’s
function report—and concluded Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Id. at
1928.) ALJ Allard found Plaintiff’s “[m]edical records are not consistent with the degree of

functional limitation alleged,” but “[w]ith regard to mental impairments, records reflect deficits in
mood, irritability, poor insight and judgment, and impaired memory and concentration (See Exs.
2F at 7; 4F at 27; 5F; 11F at 9).” (Id. at 25.)
In reaching her conclusion, ALJ Allard appropriately weighed the opinions of the medical
experts and examining/consulting physicians. Focusing on the challenged mental aspects of the
RFC determination, the relevant step four analysis is supported by substantial evidence and the
various disabilities and related limitations were appropriately considered. For example, ALJ Allard
found the opinion of state agency consultants Melanie Callender and Mercedes DeCubas
unpersuasive since it was “not consistent with the medical record.” (Id. at 26.) She stated “[t]heir
review of the evidence noted no current psychiatric treatment, a history of substance abuse, and
below average cognitive functioning, generally supporting a limitation to simple work,” while
making sure to adequately note “records reflect deficits in mood, irritability, poor insight and
judgment, and impaired memory and concentration, warranting additional limitations (See Exs. 2F
at 7; 4F at 27; 5F; 11F at 9).” (Id.)

Directly relevant to Plaintiff’s challenge, ALJ Allard recites and weighs medical
determinations she utilized that are specific to mental functioning and the step four conclusion:
Consultative examiner Nadine Gardner Psy.D., opined in December
of 2019 that the claimant has a mild to moderate impairment in
understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple directions,
moderate impairment in complex directions, moderate impairments
in sustaining attention and concentration, working at a reasonable
pace, maintaining appropriate social interaction with supervisors,
coworkers, and the public and reacting appropriately to normal work
pressure (Ex. 8F at 7). The undersigned finds limitations to simple
tasks and on interacting with others persuasive, as they are
supported by the medical record. Her examination noted the
claimant was cooperative and well groomed, with poor insight and
judgment, made errors with basic calculations, and could not
perform serial sevens or threes, supporting her opinion (Ex. 8F).
Medical records reflect deficits in mood, irritability, poor insight
and judgment, and impaired memory and concentration, consistent
with limitations to simple tasks and on interacting with others (See
Exs. 2F at 7; 4F at 27; 5F; 11F at 9).

Judy Iturmendi, Psy.D., wrote that the claimant may struggle to
function effectively in day to day tasks and various job settings (Ex.
5F at 4). The undersigned finds her opinion unpersuasive, as it is not
supported by her examination and does not provide specific work
related functional limitations. Her exam noted the claimant was
euthymic and anxious, occasionally circumstantial, with logical
thought content, mildly impaired recent memory, intact remote
memory, seriously impaired attention and concentration, intact
social insight and judgment, and limited overall insight and
judgment, failing to support the degree of limitation suggested (Ex.
5F). Medical records reflect deficits in mood, irritability, poor
insight and judgment, and impaired memory and concentration,
more consistent with limitations to simple tasks and limited
interactions with others (See Exs. 2F at 7; 4F at 27; 5F; 11F at 9).
(Id. at 26.) Based on the above analysis from the decision, vocational expert testimony, and the
administrative record, it is clear to this Court that the four areas of mental functioning a person
uses in a work setting were appropriately considered. In other words, the decision provides a “clear
and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d
Cir. 1981).
The Court finds ALJ Allard adequately determined Plaintiff’s RFC, and her decision
appropriately considered Plaintiff’s mental disabilities and related limitations. ALJ Allard
considered all medical evidence in the record, weighed each as she found appropriate, and
explained how and why she arrived at her decision. She considered and incorporated into her

reasoning and analysis Plaintiff’s testimony, Plaintiff’s treatment history, Plaintiff’s available
medical records, and the opinions and findings of Plaintiff’s treating and examining/consulting
physicians, which are consistent with her decision. Plaintiff’s disagreement with ALJ Allard’s
conclusion does not compel reversal here, as ALJ Allard’s decision is based on “more than a mere
scintilla of evidence.” Newell, 347 F.3d at 545. To the extent ALJ Allard did not explicitly consider
specific details of certain reports, this is not reversible error, as her decision only needs to be
supported by substantial evidence. See Jose L., 2022 WL 603001, at *5; Frederick F., 2022 WL
445538, at *2 (citation omitted).
Moreover, contrary to Plaintiff’s claim that there must be a “more detailed assessment of
mental functioning” explicit in the RFC determination, not every aspect considered in the analysis

must be listed out. It is sufficient for the RFC determination to be supported by “substantial
evidence” in the entire record, and it is unnecessary for the ALJ to engage in an explicit “function-
by-function” analysis where the reasoning for the decision is implicit in the record. Malcolm v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 16-8646, 2017 WL 5951703, at *19 n.14 (D.N.J. Nov. 30,
2017) (finding that “the Third Circuit does not require strict adherence to the function-by-function
analysis set forth in Social Security Ruling 96–8p”); Donna R. v. Kijakazi, Civ. A. No. 20-15449,
2022 WL 13009149, at *12 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2022) (“Although the ALJ did not expressly weigh
Dr. Brown’s opinions at step four, the ALJ’s discussion at step two demonstrates that he implicitly
discounted that examiner's opinions when assessing Plaintiff's limitations in her ability to

understand, remember, or apply information and to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace.”);
Sheppard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 19-18206, 2020 WL 5652450, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept.
23, 2020) (“Here, the RFC did not specifically reference the four non-exertional functions, but that
does not mean the ALJ did not consider those functions, singularly or in combination with
Plaintiff's other limitations from her various impairments.”); Glass v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ.
A. No. 18-15279, 2019 WL 5617508, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2019) (“Contrary to Plaintiff’s
assertion otherwise, the . . . Third Circuit does not require an ALJ to perform a ‘function-by-
function’ analysis at step four, so long as the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial
evidence in the record.”).

Accordingly, the Court affirms ALJ Allard’s determination in step four of the five-step
evaluation process.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to show ALJ Allard erred in
determining Plaintiff was not entitled to SSI and/or DIB benefits under the Act. Therefore, the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order follows.

/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 19, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828198. Public record. Not legal advice.