# WEDDLE v. DEGNER

> District Court, D. Maine · March 21, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828014

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** March 21, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828014

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the state may rebut the presumption
- rejecting a challenge to a sentence of life without parole for possessing a large quantity of cocaine
- rejecting a challenge to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a third nonviolent felony, the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses
- rejecting a challenge to a sentence of 25 years to life for the theft of a few golf clubs under a three-strikes recidivist sentencing scheme

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
RANDALL WEDDLE, )
)
Petitioner )
)
v. ) 2:24-cv-00280-LEW
)
ANTHONY DEGNER, )
)
Respondent )
RECOMMENDED DECISION ON 28 U.S.C. § 2254 PETITION
Petitioner, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeks relief from state court convictions
and sentences for manslaughter and other crimes.1 (Petition, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner
challenges the use of a warrantless blood test, argues his attorney provided ineffective
assistance, and raises several other issues. The State asks the Court to dismiss the petition.
(Response, ECF No. 7.)
After a review of the section 2254 petition, the State’s request for dismissal, and the
record, I recommend the Court grant the State’s request and dismiss the petition.

1 Petitioner was found guilty of two counts of manslaughter, two counts of causing death while operating
under the influence, on count of causing injury while operating under the influence, on count of aggravating
driving to endanger, one count of driving to endanger, and eight counts of violations of commercial motor
carrier operator rule.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
A. The Motor Vehicle Accident
Around 5:00 p.m. on March 18, 2016, first responders arrived at the scene of a motor

vehicle accident on Route 17 in Washington, Maine. The accident involved five vehicles,
one of which was engulfed in flames. Multiple occupants needed medical attention and two
were dead. Petitioner, who had been operating a tractor trailer involved in the accident,
was trapped in the cab of the truck, which was upside down in a ditch with its load of
lumber strewn across the scene.

A law enforcement officer suspected that Petitioner might have been responsible for
the accident and decided that it was necessary to preserve evidence by taking a blood
sample from Petitioner. Law enforcement officers did not request a warrant, gather other
evidence regarding Petitioner’s sobriety, or attempt to obtain Petitioner’s consent. Officers
relied upon the state’s mandatory blood draw statute in effect at the time, 29-A M.R.S. §

2522(2), which required blood testing of any driver involved in a fatal crash. At a hospital
several hours later, officers interviewed Petitioner and he consented to a second blood
draw.

2 The facts recounted below are drawn primarily from state court summaries, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
(“a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant
shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence”);
Hensley v. Roden, 755 F.3d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 2014) (recounting the facts as “derived from the [state court]
decision”), as well as the transcripts, dockets, and other filings in the state court record to the extent the
filings contained important undisputed facts.
B. Criminal Proceedings
Petitioner was arrested and charged by a criminal complaint in April 2016. In June
2016, Petitioner was indicted on two counts of manslaughter in violation of 17-A M.R.S.

§ 203(1)(A), two counts of causing death while operating under the influence in violation
of 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1-A), one count of causing injury while operating under
the influence in violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1), one count of aggravated
driving to endanger in violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1-A), one count of driving to
endanger in violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1), and eight counts of violations of

commercial motor carrier operator rules in violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 558-A(1)(A) (2018),
namely, operating with impaired ability or alertness, operating with a detectable presence
of alcohol, possession or use of alcohol while on duty, and making false reports in
connection with a duty status. Petitioner filed motions to suppress and exclude evidence;
the Superior Court denied the motions. A jury trial was held from January 23 to January

29, 2018.
At trial, motorists involved in the accident testified that they saw Petitioner’s tractor
trailer approaching from the opposite direction with the cab of Petitioner’s truck in
Petitioner’s lane, but the end of the trailer tipping over across the center line in their lane.
The accident occurred in an area where the speed limit was fifty-five mile per hour. The

State presented data recovered from the truck’s electronics, which revealed that the truck
was traveling seventy-nine miles per hour twenty-four seconds before the crash and was
traveling sixty-nine miles per hour when the truck rolled over. The state also played
recordings of Petitioner’s interviews with investigators. Petitioner admitted that before
driving on the day of the accident, he had been feeling ill and had consumed alcohol and
prescription medications, including opiate pain medication. Petitioner told officers that he

had tried to avoid an oncoming vehicle that was near or on the center line, which maneuver
caused the load of lumber to shift, and he was unable to correct the load shift.
The State also presented the results of the blood tests. The blood taken at the scene
of the accident contained .09 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood and 24 ± 4
nanograms of hydrocodone per milliliter of blood; the blood taken at the hospital contained
.07 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood and 23 ± 4 nanograms of hydrocodone per

milliliter of blood. An expert testified that the levels were generally unsafe for driving.
Police found in the truck’s cab a shot glass and a bottle of whiskey that was three-quarters
full. Two of the first responders who interacted with Petitioner during and just after he
was extracted from the cab of the truck testified that they noticed the smell of alcohol from
Petitioner.

The jury found Petitioner guilty on all charges. In March 2018, the Superior Court
sentenced Petitioner to thirty-years in prison with all but twenty-five years suspended on
the manslaughter convictions and lesser concurrent sentences on the other convictions.
Petitioner filed an appeal; in January 2020, the Law Court affirmed. State v. Weddle,
2020 ME 12, 224 A.3d 1035. The Law Court concluded that: (1) given more recent cases

from the United States Supreme Court, Maine’s mandatory blood draw statute was
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, reversal of a 2007 case which had
upheld the state law was warranted,3 but (2) because the officers had reasonably relied on
the 2007 Law Court decision upholding the statute, the good-faith exception to the

exclusionary rule permitted the use of the blood test results in Petitioner’s trial. Weddle,
2020 ME 12 at ¶¶ 30–31, 36–37, 224 A.3d at 1045–47.
C. Postconviction Proceedings
In April 2020, Petitioner filed a state court petition for postconviction relief. An
evidentiary hearing was held in February 2023. Pursuant to an agreement of the parties,
the Superior Court reinstated Petitioner’s ability to seek leave to appeal from his sentences.

Petitioner filed an application for review from the Sentence Review Panel of the Supreme
Judicial Court; leave to appeal was granted in May 2023. In June 2023, the Superior Court
otherwise denied the state postconviction petition.
In July 2023, Petitioner sought discretionary appellate review of the Superior
Court’s decision. In February 2024, the Law Court denied Petitioner’s request for a

certificate of probable cause to appeal the state postconviction petition. In April 2024, the
Sentence Review Panel upheld the sentences. State v. Weddle, 2024 ME 26, 314 A.3d 234.
Petitioner then filed the § 2254 petition.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

state court may apply to a federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus “only on the

3 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013); State v.
Cormier, 2007 ME 112, 928 A.2d 753.
ground that he [or she] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.”

Absent circumstances not relevant to Petitioner’s case, a petitioner is required to
exhaust available state court remedies before he seeks federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b), (c).4 “Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must
exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the
‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.”
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (per curiam)) (quotation marks omitted). In Baldwin, the Court noted that
“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’
his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of

4 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c) address exhaustion and state:
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
applicant.
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding
the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.
(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from
reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the
requirement.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by
any available procedure, the question presented.
discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Id.
(quoting Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365–66).

To exhaust a claim fully in state court in Maine, a petitioner must request
discretionary review by the Law Court. See 15 M.R.S. § 2131. The Supreme Court has
held that a procedural default bars federal review absent cause for the default and prejudice
to the petitioner:
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state
court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal
habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation
of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result
in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).5 A “fundamental miscarriage of justice”
has only been recognized in cases of “actual innocence,” meaning that the petitioner must
demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gunter v. Maloney, 291 F.3d 74, 83 (1st Cir.
2002) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
Because the constitutional right to counsel does not extend beyond a direct appeal
to cover collateral attacks on a conviction, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555
(1987), ineffective assistance in a state postconviction proceeding generally cannot
establish cause to set aside a procedural default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752–55. In Martinez

5 Procedural default is a judicial doctrine “related to the statutory requirement that a habeas petitioner must
exhaust any available state-court remedies before bringing a federal petition.” Lovins v. Parker, 712 F.3d
283, 294 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)).
v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the Supreme Court recognized a “narrow exception” to the
rule, based on equity, not constitutional law: “Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-

review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a
claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” 566 U.S. at 9, 16. However, when the procedural
default relates to post-conviction counsel’s actions at the discretionary-review stage rather
than at the initial-review stage of the collateral proceedings, habeas relief is not available:
The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of
proceedings, including appeals from initial-review collateral proceedings,
second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions for discretionary
review in a State’s appellate courts. It does not extend to attorney errors in
any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise
a claim of ineffective assistance at trial . . . .

Martinez, 566 U.S. at 16 (citations omitted).
As to federal habeas claims that were adjudicated on the merits in state court, the
federal court may not grant relief unless (1) the state court decision was contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or (2) the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts, pursuant to section 2254(d)(2).6

6 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim−
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
As to review of a state court decision under section 2254(d)(1), “[i]t is settled that a
federal habeas court may overturn a state court’s application of federal law only if it is so

erroneous that ‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s
decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.’” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 508-
09 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). “A state
court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case
involves review under the [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] standard
itself.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are thus

subject to a “‘doubly deferential’” standard of review, in deference to both the state court
and defense counsel. Woods v. Etherton, 578 U.S. 113, 117 (2016) (per curiam)
(quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190 (2011)). State court determinations of
fact “shall be presumed to be correct,” and “[t]he applicant shall have the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).7

7 Because the Law Court’s decisions are the final state court adjudications on the merits of each claim, the
decisions under review in this case are the Law Court’s orders affirming the decisions of the trial court. See
Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 40 (2011) (noting that the last state-court adjudication on the merits of the
petitioner’s constitutional claim occurred on direct appeal to the state’s supreme court); Clements v. Clark,
592 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2010) (“A matter is ‘adjudicated on the merits’ if there is a ‘decision finally
resolving the parties’ claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced,
rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.’”) (quoting Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2007)).
However, because the Law Court’s postconviction order did not explain the Court’s reasoning for denying
a certificate of probable cause, the federal court may consider the trial court’s decision for those claims:
We hold that the federal court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last
related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume
that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (noting the state may rebut the presumption).
In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth the relevant Sixth Amendment standard
by which claims of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s errors are evaluated on the

merits; Strickland requires a petitioner to demonstrate that “counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that “there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. A court need not “address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id.

at 697. A court presumes “that counsel has ‘rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’” Companonio
v. O’Brien, 672 F.3d 101, 110 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
A court considers “the totality of the evidence,” and “a verdict or conclusion only
weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with

overwhelming record support.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. “[T]he ultimate focus of
inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being
challenged.” Id. at 696.
B. Fourth Amendment Claims
Petitioner argues the State violated his Fourth Amendment rights by introducing

evidence obtained from a warrantless blood test unsupported by probable cause. (Petition
at 6–7, 11–12; Addendum at 1–2, ECF No. 1-2.) The Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures “has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth [Amendment],” and therefore, “it is
enforceable against them by the . . . sanction of exclusion [of the evidence] . . . .” Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). However, when a state prisoner has “been afforded the

opportunity for full and fair consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule with
respect to seized evidence by the state courts,” the prisoner “may not be granted federal
habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489, 494 (1976).
This approach “emphasizes the integrity of the state court proceedings and assumes
that the state courts will be as diligent as the federal courts in protecting fourth amendment

rights.” Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d 877, 882 (1st Cir. 1980). Accordingly, the First
Circuit has explained:
Although a federal habeas court may inquire into the adequacy and fairness
of available state court procedures for the adjudication of Fourth Amendment
claims, its inquiry ordinarily ends upon a determination that those procedures
pass muster. Put another way, “a full and fair opportunity” to litigate means
that the state has made available to defendants a set of procedures suitably
crafted to test for possible Fourth Amendment violations. So long as a state
prisoner has had an opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims by
means of such a set of procedures, a federal habeas court lacks the authority,
under Stone, to second-guess the accuracy of the state court’s resolution of
those claims. Hence, the mistaken outcome of a state court suppression
hearing, standing alone, cannot be treated as a denial of the opportunity fully
and fairly to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim (and, thus, cannot open the
door to federal habeas review).
Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
Petitioner does not challenge the state procedures that govern the prosecution of his
Fourth Amendment challenge. Indeed, the record establishes that Petitioner had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims. Accordingly, under Stone,
Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief based on his arguments regarding the
warrantless blood test.

C. Evidentiary Rulings
Petitioner contends that the state court erred by allowing into evidence certain
documents police collected from the truck cab after the accident, which documents
included Petitioner’s logbook. Petitioner contends the documents constitute inadmissible
hearsay. (Petition at 8.) The Superior Court allowed the documents into evidence as party
admissions because Petitioner evidently signed the documents. Petitioner raised the issue

on appeal, and the Law Court agreed that the documents were admissions because
Petitioner was required by law to maintain an accurate logbook and supporting records for
inspection. Weddle, 2020 ME 12 at ¶ 1 n.2, 224 A.3d at 1038.
Petitioner now argues (without legal support) that the documents can only be
considered admissions if he intended to provide them to police, and he did not intend for

the police to obtain the documents. Petitioner also asserts that the state’s expert witness
was not qualified to testify and that a defense expert should have been given more
opportunity to challenge the State’s expert’s opinions. (Addendum at 3.) He also contends
that additional inquiry should have been permitted regarding two witnesses who testified
about their observations during the accident. (Id. at 7.)8 Petitioner’s arguments necessarily

fail because federal courts are not authorized to review state courts’ decisions on state

8 Petitioner does not identify the limits he now challenges or describe the additional testimony the witnesses
would have provided. A review of the transcript of their testimony does not show any objections or
limitation on the scope of cross-examination. (Transcript for January 23, 2018, at 57–62, 71.)
evidentiary rules. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions”).
In his reply memorandum, Petitioner claims to raise a federal due process claim
rather than a state evidentiary argument, but the different characterization of the argument
does not alter the result. The argument is likely procedurally defaulted because Petitioner
did not fairly present the federal issue to each available state court during his state
postconviction proceeding. Even if he had exhausted the claim, Petitioner “may

not . . . transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due
process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). For a state evidentiary
ruling to create a cognizable issue on federal habeas review, it must be “‘so arbitrary or
capricious” that it “results in a fundamentally unfair trial” and, therefore, constitutes an
independent due process violation. Lyons v. Brady, 666 F.3d 51, 55 (1st Cir. 2012).

Petitioner’s vague arguments do not establish any error or unfairness,9 and even if
Petitioner proved some error, Petitioner’s argument would fail to demonstrate that the
entire trial was fundamentally unfair.
The only other potential federal claim is Petitioner’s argument that his expert was
not permitted to sufficiently “confront” the State’s expert witness. (Addendum at 3.)

9 For example, Petitioner argues that the state’s expert was not qualified. In his reply memorandum,
Petitioner clarified that he was referring to Karen Simone, but the only argument or explanation he provided
about the witness’s credentials or experience is that the witness had training from online courses, which,
even if true, would not disqualify the witness. According to the witness’s undisputed testimony, she earned
a doctorate in pharmacology, had a faculty appointment at Tufts University, and had twenty years of
experience as a clinical toxicologist at the time of trial. (Transcript for January 25, 2018, at 125–27.)
Petitioner conceivably could have intended to invoke the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, which guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Any potential Confrontation Clause argument is likely procedurally defaulted
because the use of the word “confront,” without more, did not fairly present the federal
issue to the state court during the state postconviction proceeding. Even if Petitioner had
exhausted a Confrontation Clause claim, the argument would fail on the merits. The
federal right to confront witnesses prohibits the “admission of testimonial statements of a

witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant
had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination,” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
53–54 (2004), and protects “the right to conduct reasonable cross-examination,” Olden v.
Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988), although trial courts “retain wide latitude . . . to
impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other

things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation
that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679
(1986). The state’s expert witnesses appeared at trial and Petitioner was permitted
extensive cross-examination. Because Petitioner seeks to challenge a restriction the
Superior Court placed on the scope of direct examination of one of his witnesses, rather

than the scope of cross-examination of one of the State’s witnesses, he has not established
a violation of the Confrontation Clause.10

10 As discussed above, the issue regarding a restriction on the scope of defense expert testimony sounds in
due process, not witness confrontation. The Due Process Clause can limit a state court’s ability to arbitrarily
In sum, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because he failed to show that the
state court’s decisions on the evidentiary issues were contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent.
D. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner argues there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.
(Addendum at 3). The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “that
no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient
proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt

of the existence of every element of the offense.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316
(1979). On such a claim, “the proper inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Morgan v. Dickhaut, 677 F.3d
39, 47 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In a federal habeas proceeding,

review of a sufficiency claim is doubly deferential: First, deference should be given to the
trier-of-fact’s verdict, as contemplated by Jackson; second, deference should be given to
the [state court’s] consideration of the trier-of-fact’s verdict, as dictated by AEDPA.”
Berila v. Watson, No. 24-3188, 2024 WL 4023843, at *2 (6th Cir. July 12, 2024).11

restrict the scope of direct examination of a rebuttal witness, but the Superior Court noted that the only
limitation on the defense expert’s testimony was the inability to opine directly on the jury’s ultimate
determination of whether the chemicals in his blood made Petitioner “impaired” at the time of the accident.
Petitioner has not shown that limitation rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair or otherwise
conflicted with any Supreme Court case.
11 The petition also refers to “actual innocence” in addition to sufficiency of the evidence, but in the
circumstances here, “actual innocence” is not an independent basis for habeas relief and serves only as a
potential gateway to consideration of a defaulted claim. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400–02
The Law Court determined that the Superior Court correctly denied Petitioner’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal, which motion raised essentially the same issue

Petitioner raises here. Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ¶ 1 n.2, 224 A.3d at 1038. The record
establishes that the state court conclusion was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Jackson or its progeny. Although Petitioner asserts that unfavorable
evidence was unreliable, such as the blood alcohol test results, he provides no credible
support for his argument. For example, Petitioner alleges that police officers and
prosecutors “manipulated” the blood test evidence, but he provides no explanation or

factual support that would make the argument plausible.
Petitioner also alleges that there was insufficient evidence for one of the eight motor
vehicle rule violations because although the evidence showed that he had purchased fuel
at a specific time, it did not prove that he was on duty at the time, contrary to his logbook
entries. (Petition at 10). The argument lacks merit because the reasonable doubt standard

does not require the kind of mathematical proof Petitioner evidently contemplates. A
reasonable jury could infer that Petitioner was on duty at the time based on the receipts and
other testimony. The state court’s decision was not contrary to an unreasonable application
of Jackson or its progeny.
E. Prosecutorial Misconduct and Brady Claims

Petitioner argues police officers were untruthful while testifying at trial, the
prosecutors and police officers manipulated the blood test evidence, and the prosecution

(1993). In any event, Petitioner has not produced any new evidence that would make it more likely than
not that no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
failed to disclose exculpatory evidence regarding the dangerousness of the portion of the
roadway on which the accident occurred. (Addendum at 3–4.) The right to due process

prevents government actors from “deliberately fabricating evidence.” Limone v. Condon,
372 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2004). While there is no general right to discovery in a criminal
case, the suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant violates due process “where
the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment,” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963), a category that includes impeachment evidence of key government witnesses.
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). “There are three components of a true

Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it
is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by
the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).
The state court noted that Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred because he

did not raise the issues at trial or on appeal. The state court also rejected Petitioner’s
assertions because his testimony was not believable, and he had not produced any evidence
to support his assertions. Petitioner has not pointed to any evidence in the record to rebut
the state court’s conclusion. Petitioner provided no explanation or factual support to
establish that the fabrication allegations are plausible, and despite having the opportunity

to present the allegedly exculpatory traffic evidence, Petitioner never did so. Other
evidence he cites to support his Brady claim, such as the fact that he passed a physical
examination several weeks prior to the accident, was evidently known to Petitioner and
thus were not suppressed by the State.
In sum, Petitioner has not shown that the state court decisions were contrary to or
unreasonable applications of Brady or other Supreme Court cases.

F. Ineffective Assistance Claims
Petitioner asserts that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance when they failed
to: (1) object to police officers testifying as to what Petitioner said in the hospital while
“misconstruing” what Petitioner intended as negative answers to instead be affirmative
answers; (2) argue that Petitioner’s prescription medication was under the legal limit; (3)
obtain a traffic study or introduce expert testimony on the road conditions; and (4) file a

sentence appeal as planned. (Addendum at 6–7, 12.)
Petitioner already received full relief on the sentence appeal issue when his right to
file an appeal was reinstated and he litigated his challenge to the sentence before the Law
Court. There does not appear to be any additional relief on that issue for the state court or
this Court to consider.

The state court supportably determined that the other issues lack merit. Petitioner
failed to establish deficient performance by counsel on those issues. Petitioner does not
allege a meritorious basis for an objection to the officer’s testimony; he merely disagrees
(on some basis that he does not explain) with the officers’ interpretation of a “yes” answer
to the officers’ question. The record shows that there was no dispute at trial that

Petitioner’s use of prescription medication was not itself illegal, and counsel repeated at
various times that the other drugs in question were prescribed to him. Petitioner does not
point to any argument from the prosecutor or instruction from the state court that implied
that Petitioner’s use of the medication was illicit or that the level in his blood was itself
enough to establish culpability. Because the traffic pattern changed before trial, and
because Petitioner never pursued or introduced into the postconviction record any traffic

study, there is nothing in the record beyond speculation regarding the evidence that further
investigation would have yielded.
Even if Petitioner could establish deficient performance, none of the three issues
would create the necessary prejudice given the abundant evidence of guilt, including that
he admittedly consumed alcohol on duty, his blood tested above the legal limit, he was
speeding, and he was responsible for ensuring the load on the truck was secured properly.

Accordingly, the ineffective assistance claims fail, and the state court decision was not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland or its progeny.
G. Length of Sentence
Petitioner contends the twenty-five-year sentence was unconstitutional under the
Maine and United States constitutions. (Addendum at 8–10.)12 Because questions of state

law are not cognizable on habeas review, see Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67–68, there is no basis
here for Petitioner to challenge the Law Court’s ruling in the sentencing appeal regarding
the proportionality of the sentence under the state constitution and statutes. “In noncapital
cases, the Eighth Amendment does not require a precise calibration of crime and
punishment. Rather, at most, the Eighth Amendment gives rise to a narrow proportionality

principle, forbidding only extreme sentences that are significantly disproportionate to the

12 Petitioner did not explicitly cite the United States Constitution in his petition, but he did so in his reply
memorandum.
underlying crime.” United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2017)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Although Petitioner emphasizes that his crime was unintentional and the length of
the sentence was the longest for any manslaughter case in Maine, the Law Court reasonably
highlighted the presence of aggravating factors, such as the fact that Petitioner caused two
deaths, was speeding, was intoxicated, and had an extensive relevant criminal history,
including twelve prior OUI convictions and eleven prior speeding violations. Weddle,
2024 ME 26, ¶¶ 6, 13–14, 314 A.3d at 238–40. Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s

decision was contrary to or unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s precedent
because the Supreme Court has several times upheld comparable and longer sentences for
crimes of lesser gravity than Petitioner’s. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003)
(rejecting a challenge to a sentence of 25 years to life for the theft of a few golf clubs under
a three-strikes recidivist sentencing scheme); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)

(rejecting a challenge to a sentence of life without parole for possessing a large quantity of
cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, (1982) (per curiam) (rejecting a challenge to a
sentence of 40 years for marijuana possession and distribution); Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263 (1980) (rejecting a challenge to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole
for a third nonviolent felony, the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses). The Eighth

Amendment claim fails, therefore, and the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted under
Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. I recommend the Court dismiss

Petitioner’s petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and that the Court deny a
certificate of appealability pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
because there is no substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
NOTICE

A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum
and shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.

Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 21st day of March, 2025.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10828014. Public record. Not legal advice.