# Moreno v. Social Security Administration

> District Court, E.D. Oklahoma · March 20, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10827882

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** March 20, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10827882

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding ALJ properly considered that “claimant readily admits she did not leave employment as a result of any health-related impairment” in the consistency analysis

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DELIA MORENO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 23-cv-359-DES
)
LELAND DUDEK,1 )
Acting Commissioner of the Social )
Security Administration, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Delia Moreno (“Claimant”) seeks judicial review
of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”)
denying her claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”). For the reasons explained below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision
denying benefits.
I. Statutory Framework and Standard of Review
The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To be deemed disabled under the Act, a claimant’s
impairment(s) must be “of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do h[er] previous work but

1 Effective February 17, 2025, Leland Dudek, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted as
the defendant in this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). No further action is necessary to continue
this suit by reason of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Social security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability
claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). This process requires the Commissioner to consider:
(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant suffers

from a medically determinable severe impairment(s); (3) whether such impairment meets or
medically equals a listed impairment set forth in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P., app. 1; (4) whether
the claimant can perform her past relevant work considering the Commissioner’s assessment of
the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) whether the claimant can perform
other work considering the RFC and certain vocational factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v).
Although the claimant bears the burden of proof through step four, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). If it is determined,
at any step of the process, that the claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent
step is not necessary. Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988).

A district court’s review of the Commissioner’s final decision is governed by 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). The scope of judicial review under § 405(g) is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the Commissioner’s factual findings
are supported by substantial evidence. See Noreja v. Soc. Sec. Comm’r, 952 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th
Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but means only “‘such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.
Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). In
conducting its review, the Court “may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment
for that of the agency.” Noreja, 952 F.3d at 1178 (quotation omitted). Rather, the Court must
“meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from
the ALJ’s findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Flaherty v. Astrue,
515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
II. Claimant’s Background and Procedural History
On February 6, 2012, Claimant protectively applied for disability insurance benefits under

Title II of the Act. (R. 11, 124-29). Claimant alleges she has been unable to work since December
1, 2011, due to problems with her back, neck, and left knee; headaches; high blood pressure; acid
reflux; diabetes; and anxiety. (R.126, 151). Claimant was 58 years old on the date of the
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision. (R. 126, 938, 950). She has a high school education
and past work as a production line assembler. (R. 936, 957, 993).
Claimant’s claim for benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration, therefore she
requested a hearing. (R. 65-70, 83). ALJ Bernard Porter conducted an administrative hearing and
issued a decision on September 13, 2013, finding Claimant not disabled. (R. 11-64). The Appeals
Council denied review, and Claimant appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Oklahoma. (R. 603-24). The Court reversed the ALJ’s decision and remanded the case
on September 28, 2016, with instructions to consider Listing 1.04. (R. 608-23). On remand, ALJ
Doug Gabbard, II conducted a second administrative hearing and issued a decision on July 11,
2017, again finding Claimant not disabled. (R. 540-62, 632-41). Claimant filed written exceptions
to this second unfavorable decision. (R. 707-11). On October 5, 2018, the Appeals Council
reversed and remanded the ALJ’s decision with instructions to consider Listing 1.04(A). (R. 650-
51). On remand, ALJ Gabbard held a third administrative hearing and issued a decision on
February 13, 2019, again finding Claimant not disabled. (R. 520-32, 563-89). Claimant filed
written exceptions to this third unfavorable decision. (R. 783-92). The Appeals Council denied
review, and Claimant again appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma. (R. 510-516, 1019-34). The Court reversed the ALJ’s decision and remanded the case
on March 25, 2022, with instructions to consider Dr. John Anigbogu’s medical source opinion.
(R. 1019-34). On remand, ALJ Michael Mannes held a fourth administrative hearing and issued a
decision on March 29, 2023, once again finding Claimant not disabled. (R. 923-38, 948-1000).

Claimant filed written exceptions to this fourth unfavorable decision. (R. 1131-34). On August 17,
2023, the Appeals Council determined Claimant’s written exceptions did not provide a basis for
changing the ALJ’s decision, rendering ALJ Mannes’s March 29, 2023, decision the
Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of this appeal. 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(b)(2). Claimant
filed this appeal on October 23, 2023. (Docket No. 2).
III. The ALJ’s Decision
In his decision, ALJ Mannes found Claimant last met the insured requirements for Title II
purposes on December 31, 2016. (R. 925). The ALJ then found at step one that Claimant had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of December

1, 2011, through her date last insured of December 31, 2016. (R. 926). At step two, the ALJ found
Claimant had severe impairments of lumbar and cervical spine disorder, dysfunction of major
joints, and asthma. (Id.). At step three, the ALJ found Claimant’s impairments did not meet or
equal a listed impairment. (R. 928-29).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a
range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with the following non-exertional
limitations:
[T]he claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. [T]he claimant can
occasionally climb stairs and ramps. [T]he claimant is limited to frequent balancing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. [T]he claimant can frequently reach,
handle, and finger bilaterally. [T]he claimant must avoid frequent exposure to dusts,
fumes, gases, odors, and pulmonary irritants. The claimant must avoid all exposure
to unprotected heights and occasional exposure to vibrations. [T]he claimant must
avoid frequent exposure to loud noise.

(R. 929). The ALJ provided a summary of the evidence that went into this finding. (R. 929-36).
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Claimant could not return to her past relevant work.
(R. 936). Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), however, the ALJ found at step
five that Claimant could perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national
economy, including housekeeping cleaner, routing clerk, and marker. (R. 936-37). Accordingly,
the ALJ concluded Claimant was not disabled. (R. 937).
IV. Issues Presented
Claimant asserts the ALJ erred by: (1) evaluating her musculoskeletal impairments using
Listings 1.15, 1.16, and 1.18 (Docket No. 9 at 3); (2) failing to properly evaluate Dr. John
Anigbogu’s medical source opinion regarding Claimant’s ability to stand and walk (Id. at 3-5);
and (3) failing to properly evaluate her subjective symptoms (Id. at 5-6). The Court finds no
reversible error in the ALJ’s decision.
V. Analysis
A. Application of Former Listing 1.04
In a largely undeveloped and conclusory argument, Claimant asserts the ALJ erred by
applying Listings 1.15, 1.16, and 1.18, which were not in effect at the time of Claimant’s
application, rather than applying Listing 1.04, which was. Claimant’s argument is unpersuasive.
At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ considers whether a claimant’s severe
impairment(s) meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments the Commissioner deems
sufficiently severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1. Listed impairments are “conclusively presumed to be
disabling.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1085 (quotation omitted). Thus, if a claimant’s medically severe
impairment(s) meets or equals one of the listed impairments, she will be found disabled without
considering her age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). In order to meet a
listing, the claimant’s impairment(s) must satisfy all of the criteria of that listing. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1525(c)(3). “An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how

severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).
At step three, the ALJ considered whether Claimant’s impairments met or medically
equaled Listings 1.15, 1.16, and 1.18, which apply to musculoskeletal disorders, and ultimately
concluded that Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that “would
even closely match the description of listings 1.15, 1.16, and 1.18.” (R. 928-29). In reaching this
conclusion, the ALJ acknowledged Dr. Wilson’s opinion that Claimant met the requirements of
Listing 1.04(A) as well as Dr. Anigbogu’s opinion that she did not; however, the ALJ assigned
these opinions “limited weight” since they were based on the “old musculoskeletal listings.”
(R. 929).

Claimant asserts that Listings 1.15, 1.16, and 1.18 were not the appropriate listings to
consider because they were implemented after her application date and after the Appeals Council’s
October 2018 remand which instructed the ALJ to consider Listing 1.04(A).2 The Court disagrees
and finds that the ALJ considered the proper listings. First, when the Social Security
Administration revised the listings for musculoskeletal disorders, it provided that the rules would

2 Claimant asserts that “all of the decisions and evidence in this claim are directed” to Listing 1.04, but this
is not an accurate account of the history of this claim. Notably, this Court’s order dated September 28, 2016,
as well as the Appeals Council’s order dated October 5, 2018, did instruct the ALJ to consider Listing 1.04
(R. 608-23, 650-51). However, this Court’s order dated March 25, 2022, did not. In that order, the ALJ was
instructed to consider Dr. Anigbogu’s opinion regarding Claimant’s standing and walking limitations, not
Listing 1.04 as Claimant suggests. (R. 1019-34). The Court does not appreciate counsel’s lack of candor
here, especially considering Claimant’s argument is otherwise entirely undeveloped.
become effective on April 2, 2021. 85 Fed. Reg. 78164-01, 2020 WL 7056412 (Dec. 3, 2020). The
Agency then explained: “When the final rules become effective, we will apply them to new
applications filed on or after the effective date of the rules, and to claims that are pending on or
after the effective date.” Id. Thus, under the Agency’s own policies, the ALJ applied the correct
listings. Second, Claimant’s inability to rely on Listing 1.04 is not dispositive of her claim for

disability. Although she is precluded from a determination that she is presumptively disabled at
step three, she is not precluded from demonstrating that she is nevertheless disabled at steps four
and five. Furthermore, Claimant does not cite any case law, nor has this Court been able to find
any, suggesting the older listing should apply. Finally, Tenth Circuit case law suggests otherwise.
See Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1291 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We refer to the regulations in effect
at the time of the ALJ’s decision.”). Therefore, because Listings 1.15, 1.16, and 1.18 were in effect
at the time of the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ did not err by applying them.
B. Dr. Anigbogu’s Standing and Walking Limitations
For claims filed before March 27, 2017, the weight given to a medical opinion depends, in

part, on its source. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Medical opinions from sources who examined the
claimant, such as consultative examiners, generally receive more weight than non-examining
medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1). Nonetheless, the ALJ must “consider a series of
specific factors in determining what weight to give any medical opinion.” Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365
F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Those factors are: (1) the examining
relationship; (2) the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship and frequency of
examination; (3) the degree to which the medical source provides relevant evidence to support the
opinion; (4) the opinion's consistency with the record as a whole; (5) the medical source’s
specialization; and (6) any other factors that may support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). When evidence is inconsistent, the ALJ has the discretion to weigh the
conflicting evidence to determine whether the claimant has shown she is disabled. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(b). The ALJ’s findings are conclusive when they are supported
by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
On November 28, 2018, Dr. Anigbogu completed a form titled “Medical Statement of

Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Physical),” wherein he opined, inter alia, that Claimant
could stand for three hours at a time without interruption for a total of three hours in an eight-hour
work day and could walk for three hours at a time without interruption for a total of three hours in
an eight-hour work day. (R. 907). Although Dr. Anigbogu was instructed to identify the medical
or clinical findings that supported these limitations, he cited none. Id. Likewise, Dr. Anigbogu did
not indicate the time period for which these limitations applied, when they were first present, or if
they would last twelve consecutive months, despite being prompted to do so. (Tr. 911).
In his written opinion, the ALJ thoroughly recounted Dr. Anigbogu’s opinion regarding
Claimant’s standing and walking limitations and noted that Dr. Anigbogu was a medical expert

familiar with social security regulations and had the opportunity to review the medical evidence
of record. (R. 933-34). The ALJ then rejected Dr. Anigbogu’s standing and walking limitations,
finding such limitations were inconsistent with: (1) Claimant’s self-reported ability to walk a mile;
(2) the mild to moderate degenerative changes noted in the MRI imaging; (3) the largely normal
physical examination findings of record, including a normal gait and Claimant’s ability to
ambulate without an assistive device; (4) Claimant’s use of over-the-counter pain medication;
(5) Claimant’s daily activities; (6) the minimal limitations identified by Claimant’s primary care
providers; and (7) Claimant’s two-year gap in treatment during the adjudicative period. (R. 933).
Despite the ALJ’s detailed analysis, Claimant nonetheless asserts the ALJ failed to provide
a legitimate rationale for rejecting Dr. Anigbogu’s standing and walking limitations. (Docket No.
9 at 3-5). The Court finds the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and his decision to reject Dr.
Anigbogu’s opinions is supported by substantial evidence. First, Claimant specifically asserts the
ALJ “picked one comment from the record in 2022” to discount Dr. Anigbogu’s standing and

walking limitations. This argument is belied by the record. As set forth above, the ALJ provided
numerous reasons, supported by the record, for rejecting Dr. Anigbogu’s standing and walking
limitations and concluding instead that Claimant could stand and/or walk six hours in an eight-
hour workday instead. (R. 933-34).
Claimant further contends the ALJ ignored her report to her mental health provider that
increased walking caused intermittent numbness and tingling in her left foot. (Docket No. 9 at 4).
It is well-established that an ALJ may not “pick and choose among medical reports, using portions
of evidence favorable to h[is] position while ignoring other evidence.” Hardman v. Barnhart, 362
F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 2004). This rule follows from the broader directive that “in addition to

discussing the evidence supporting his decision, the ALJ must also discuss the uncontroverted
evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.”
Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1996). However, the ALJ is not required to discuss
each piece of evidence in the record in detail. See id. at 1009-10. (“The record must demonstrate
that the ALJ considered all of the evidence, but an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of
evidence.”). Although the ALJ did not specifically reference this particular treatment note, he did
note Claimant’s testimony that she experiences neuropathy and paresthesia. (R. 926). Claimant
fails to explain how this single report of intermittent numbness and tingling in her left foot with
increased walking to her mental health provider demonstrates greater RFC limitations than the
ALJ identified. Because Claimant points to no evidence the ALJ failed to consider, her arguments
amount to a request that the Court reweigh the evidence, which it cannot do. See Hackett v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We consider whether the ALJ followed the
‘specific rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular types of evidence in disability
cases,’ but we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the Commissioner's.”

(citations omitted)).
In any event, Dr. Anigbogu’s opinion is consistent with the requirements of light work
because he found Claimant could stand for three hours and could walk for three hours, i.e., a
combined total of six hours. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6
(Jan. 1, 1983) (“[T]he full range of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total
of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.”). Thus, the ALJ found Dr. Anigbogu’s specific
standing and walking limitations unpersuasive but adopted his opinion that Claimant could
perform light work. “It is not error for the ALJ to credit a portion of a medical opinion and discount
other portions of the opinion.” Jones v. Astrue, 500 F.Supp 2d 1277, 1285 (D. Kan 2007).

Accordingly, the ALJ's RFC limiting Claimant to a limited range of light work is supported by
substantial evidence.
C. ALJ Properly Evaluated the Consistency of Claimant’s Subjective Symptoms
Claimant next contends the ALJ erred in evaluating her subjective symptoms, specifically
arguing the ALJ improperly discounted her symptoms based on her ability to work beyond her
alleged onset date, her failure to take prescription medication, and her failure to seek treatment.
(Docket No. 9 at 5-6).
The ALJ is required to consider Claimant’s subjective complaints, or symptoms3 in
determining the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) & (d)(4). The Commissioner uses a two-step
process when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms.4 SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *2 (Oct. 25,
2017); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. First, the medical signs or laboratory findings must show
the existence of medical impairment(s) that result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities and could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. SSR 16-3p at
*3. Second, once such impairments are established, the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity and
persistence of the symptoms, so he can determine how the symptoms limit the claimant’s ability
to work. Id. at *4.
Factors the ALJ should consider as part of the symptom evaluation include: (1) the
claimant’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of symptoms;
(3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
medications; (5) treatment aside from medication; (6) any other measures the claimant has used to
relieve symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions due to

the symptoms. Id. at *7-8. The ALJ’s consistency findings “should be closely and affirmatively
linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Cowan v. Astrue,
552 F.3d 1182, 1190 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995).
The ALJ’s decision “must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s

3 Symptoms mean a claimant’s “own description of [her] physical or mental impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(i).

4 Tenth Circuit precedent characterizes this as a three-step process: (1) whether the claimant established a symptom-
producing impairment by objective medical evidence; (2) if so, whether the impairment is reasonably expected to
produce some symptom of the sort alleged (a “loose nexus”); and (3) if so, whether, considering all objective and
subjective evidence, the claimant’s symptom was in fact disabling. See Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156,
1166-67 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1987)). The two-step analysis under
SSR 16-3p comports with this prior, three-step process under Luna. Paulek v. Colvin, 662 F. App’x 593-94 (10th Cir.
2016) (unpublished). However, the term “credibility” is no longer used. SSR 16-3p at *2. For purposes of this
opinion, the Court will refer to the process as a “consistency analysis.”
symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the
individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s
symptoms.” SSR 16-3p at *10. Because consistency findings are “peculiarly the province of the
finder of fact,” reviewing courts should “not upset such determination when supported by
substantial evidence.” Cowan, 552 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Kepler, 683 F.3d at 391).

In his written decision, the ALJ summarized Claimant’s Function Report, administrative
hearing testimony from multiple hearings, the Third-Party Function Report completed by
Claimant’s sister, and the objective medical evidence. (R. 926-36). The ALJ found Claimant’s
statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not
entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence in the record. (R. 930). In reaching this
conclusion, the ALJ discussed numerous inconsistencies between Claimant’s subjective
complaints and the evidence of record, including: (1) Claimant’s report that she stopped working
in 2011 because her employer closed, rather than due to her impairments; (2) negative x-rays of
Claimant’s back immediately after her accident; (3) treatment notes showing Claimant improved

with physical therapy; (4) Claimant’s ability to work after her alleged onset date; (5) primary care
records showing consistently normal physical examination findings; (6) the lack of significant
findings on Claimant’s lumbar and cervical MRIs; (7) the absence of surgical intervention,
emergent care, or hospitalization; (8) the effectiveness of conservative treatment; (9) the lack of a
recommendation for an assistive device; (10) the absence of specialized orthopedic treatment after
July 2012; (11) Claimant’s limited medical treatment since 2014; and (12) Claimant’s daily
activities as reported on her Function Report, at the administrative hearing, and to Dr. Anigbogu.
(R. 929-32).
Claimant asserts the ALJ improperly discounted her subjective symptoms based on her
ability to work beyond her alleged onset date. In essence, Claimant asserts the ALJ ignored that
her earnings after her alleged onset date in 2011 were $6,000.00 less than her earnings in 2010
before her accident. As an initial matter, the Court notes that a claimant’s ability to work after the
alleged onset date and the reasons for termination of such employment are relevant considerations

in a consistency analysis. See, e.g., Potter v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
905 F.2d 1346, 1349 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding ALJ properly considered that “claimant readily
admits she did not leave employment as a result of any health-related impairment” in the
consistency analysis). At the administrative hearing, Claimant herself testified that her reduction
in pay was attributable to both being offered fewer hours due to the impending shut down of the
business as well as her inability to work as many hours as she was able to work before her accident.
(R. 990). Moreover, the ALJ specifically noted that “[a]lthough [Claimant] returned to work in
2011, she did not work full hours.” (R. 929). Thus, the ALJ was clearly aware that Claimant was
not working the same number of hours after her alleged onset date as she was working before her

accident. The Court finds ALJ linked his consistency findings to the evidence and provided clear
and specific reasons for his determination in compliance with the directives of Kepler and its
progeny, SSR 16-3p, and the regulations. Claimant simply disagrees with the ALJ’s interpretation
of the evidence. However, “[t]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s findings from being supported by substantial
evidence.” Cowan, 552 F.3d at 1185 (10th Cir. 2008). Moreover, even if the evidence could
support a different finding, the Court cannot “displace the agency’s choice between two fairly
conflicting views . . . .” Id. Claimant’s arguments again amount to a request that the Court reweigh
the evidence and interpret it in her favor, which the Court cannot do. Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1172.
Claimant further asserts the ALJ improperly discounted her symptoms based on her use of
over-the-counter medication and failure to seek medical care. (Docket No. 9 at 6). Although the
ALJ’s use of this reasoning is questionable, the decision makes clear that the ALJ did not base his
entire consistency analysis on these reasons alone. As set forth above, the ALJ provided numerous
other reasons supported by the record to discount Claimant’s subjective symptoms, which

Claimant does not challenge, and the balance of the consistency analysis is thus supported by
substantial evidence. See, e.g., Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2004) (“While
we have some concerns regarding the ALJ’s reliance on plaintiff’s alleged failure to follow a
weight loss program and her performance of certain minimal household chores, we conclude that
the balance of the ALJ’s [consistency] analysis is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.”).
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision finding Claimant not disabled is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED this 20th day of March, 2025.

______________________________________
D. EDWARD SNOW
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10827882. Public record. Not legal advice.