# In Re Ann Blankenship (d/b/a Ann Blankenship Bonding)

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · March 20, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10827112

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 20, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Judge J. Ross Dyer
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10827112

## Opinion text

03/20/2025
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
January 14, 2025 Session

IN RE ANN BLANKENSHIP (D/B/A ANN BLANKENSHIP BONDING)

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Decatur County
No. NA J. Brent Bradberry, Judge
___________________________________

No. W2024-00425-CCA-R3-CD
___________________________________

The appellant, Ann Blankenship d/b/a Ann Blankenship Bonding, appeals her suspension
from writing bonds in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District due to her failure to comply with
the applicable statutes. Based upon the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral argument, we
affirm that decision of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR. and
MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

David W. Camp, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ann Blankenship, doing business
as Ann Blankenship Bonding.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; J. Katie Neff, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

This appeal arises from allegations of the appellant’s conduct in her professional
capacity as a bail bondsman that are prohibited by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-
11-126. On November 9, 2023, Shelly Alexander, the owner of A Close Bonding Co.,
LLC, a local competitor to the appellant, submitted a complaint concerning several
instances of alleged professional misconduct by the appellant. Specifically, Ms. Alexander
alleged the appellant had committed misconduct by (1) failing to maintain a permanent
office with appropriate signage; (2) charging a service fee in addition to bond premiums;
and (3) committing unspecified actions that make it “difficult for the officials of this
County to do their sworn duty.” In support of her complaint, Ms. Alexander attached an
affidavit sworn by Herby Blankenship, an employee of Ms. Alexander and the estranged
nephew of the appellant. Mr. Blankenship had also previously been employed by the
appellant for approximately ten to twelve years. Mr. Blankenship’s affidavit included
additional allegations against the appellant, including (1) an instance in which the appellant
solicited his client; and (2) the distribution of a “vulgar and slanderous” t-shirt design
directed at Mr. Blankenship.

On November 14, 2023, the trial court “orally informed [the appellant] of the
complaint and the Clerk provided [her] with a copy of the complaint.” In response, the
appellant submitted a letter and affidavit contesting the facts alleged in the complaint. The
appellant responded that (1) as to the allegation that she lacked a statutorily required
permanent business address, the appellant contended that she maintains a business address
at 857 Crawford School Road that has a bench identifying her profession near the front
door and additional signage; and (2) as to the allegation that she has charged a service fee
on her promissory notes, the appellant contended the promissory note in question was
drafted by Mr. Blankenship during his employment with her. The appellant’s response
also included a description of the communication between herself and a potential client,
“Hugh Brian Bradley,” that did not include solicitation. In addition to the response letter,
the appellant submitted an affidavit which attested that she “never had any t-shirt
manufactured for a gift or sale” concerning another bond company.

On February 13, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the suspension, whereby the
appellant appeared and testified.1 Prior to hearing testimony, the trial court stated,

[t]he Court has had verbal complaints about both Ms. Blankenship and, not
really A Close Bonding in general, but Herby Blankenship . . . since I took
the bench in October of ’21. And many of the allegations in this – we’ll call
a formal complaint – were over that time frame. So, it’s not something that
just specifically occurred in some specific instance. But it’s a series of events
over time that evidently A Close Bonding felt it was appropriate for them to
file something in writing for this court to see and the court to consider.

The trial court did not specify further details as to these instances or allegations.

During the hearing, the appellant testified that she has been a bail bondsman for
thirty-two years and that her principal place of business is located at 857 Crawford School
1
The record indicates that Mr. Blankenship and an attorney representing A Close Bonding were
planning to attend the hearing originally scheduled for 11:00 a.m. The trial court changed the time of the
hearing to 9:00 a.m. and did not notify Mr. Blankenship or the attorney “because they had told [the trial
court] they weren’t a part of this proceeding. We changed it to nine o’clock, and we conducted it.”
-2-
Road, but she fluctuates between that address and a secondary place of business at 969
Crawford School Road. The appellant testified that although her business card lists her
address as 857 Crawford School Road, that location was only her business mailing address.
In addition, the 857 Crawford School Road building is protected from public access by a
gate. The building at 969 Crawford School Road, the location with public access, has the
required signage. The appellant has used both addresses as places of business since 2015.

Regarding the promissory note in which it was alleged that the appellant had been
charging an improper service fee, the appellant testified that particular promissory note was
drafted by Mr. Blankenship approximately 15 years ago while in her employment. She
also testified that she did not know the fee was prohibited at the time Mr. Blankenship
proposed it. The appellant’s current promissory note does not charge a service fee.

As to the “vulgar” t-shirt, the appellant denied having any knowledge or
involvement with the shirt. She stated, “the first time I ever heard of it was in the
Complaint,” and that she “had nothing to do with it.”

Lastly, the appellant testified regarding the allegation of an improper solicitation of
Mr. Blankenship’s client. The appellant described a series of bonding transactions with a
defendant, “Jason,” that culminated in her refusal to sign a third bond on his behalf.
Despite refusing to write him a bond, the appellant agreed to move the defendant’s towed
vehicle to help him avoid storage fees. The next day, when the appellant saw the defendant
outside the Decatur County Jail, she approached him even though he was Mr.
Blankenship’s client. The appellant testified that she “walked outside to tell [the
defendant] that the vehicle was not at the tow service” and claimed that no further
solicitation occurred.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court referenced a video of the alleged
solicitation.2 According to the trial court, the video, which was reviewed by the appellant,
showed the appellant approach a man sitting in the parking lot of the Decatur County Jail
after he had been bonded out by Mr. Blankenship. The trial court described the video as
including a statement by the appellant: “If you need another bond, let me know.” The trial
court ended the hearing by requesting the appellant provide a copy of her current
promissory note and taking the matter under advisement.

On February 27, 2023, the trial court issued an Order of Temporary Suspension
against the appellant. The trial court found the appellant had (1) violated Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-11-126(6), by actively attempting to dissuade a client of A Close

2
As we will discuss further infra, the video was not made part of the record on appeal. However,
it appears from the record that the video was reviewed by both the trial court and the appellant.
-3-
Bonding; (2) violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-126(9), by having business
signage at a different address than her principal place of business and the mailing address
on her business card; and (3) committed misconduct by creating and disseminating
derogatory t-shirts about her competitor. Ultimately, the trial court suspended the
appellant’s license to write bonds for forty-five days. Though not specifically listed as a
factor relied on by the trial court in reaching its decision to suspend the appellant’s license,
the trial court also admonished the appellant noting that it was aware of “multiple
complaints from law enforcement and county officials about the conduct” of the appellant
and that her actions “cast shade on professional bondman (sic) and the entire judicial
system.”

This timely appeal followed.

Analysis

The appellant appeals the forty-five-day suspension contending that the trial court
erred in finding that the appellant had engaged in “unprofessional activities.” Specifically,
the appellant argues the trial court failed to provide a fair hearing at which the appellant
could cross-examine the witnesses against her and failed to give the appellant notice of the
anonymous “multiple complaints” the trial court relied upon in making its determination.
The appellant also contends that the trial court’s reliance upon the specific instances of
conduct provided by Ms. Alexander and Mr. Blankenship was in error because the
allegations contained in the complaint were hearsay, and the only evidence presented at the
hearing contradicted those allegations. The State contends the trial court’s determination
to suspend the appellant was proper because it “appears from the record that the appellant
engaged in professional misconduct.” Though the evidence presented does not support the
trial court’s findings concerning the t-shirt, the record does support the trial court’s
remaining findings and decision to suspend the appellant’s license for forty-five days.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

I. Due Process

The appellant first contends that the trial court failed to give full notice of the
allegations against her and hold a fair hearing before depriving her of the right to write
bonds, thus violating her due process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution provide procedural
protections against the government from infringing on a citizen’s protected interest without
providing notice and opportunity to be heard in a “meaningful time and in a [meaningful]
manner.” State v. AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds, Inc., 993 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tenn.
Crim App. 1998) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Louderville, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105
S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed2d 494 (1985)). A due process analysis requires a two-step
-4-
inquiry of whether the appellant was deprived of a “protected interest and, if so, what
process is due.” Rowe v. Board of Educ. of Chattanooga, 938 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tenn.
1996).

As to the case at bar, this Court has previously recognized the suspension of a bail
bondsman’s license to be a protected interest requiring due process protections. See AAA
Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds, Inc., 993 S.W.2d at 85. Therefore, the trial court’s
suspension of the appellant’s right to write bail bonds is a government deprivation of her
“right to engage in business and earn a livelihood.” See id. As such, the remaining
questions as to the due process claim of the appellant are whether the trial court gave
adequate notice of the complaints against her and whether she was provided an opportunity
to be heard in a meaningful way.

a. Notice of Allegations Against Appellant

Due process requires “‘notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties’ of the claims of the opposing parties.” McClellan v. Board of
Regents of State University, 921 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tenn. 1996). “The purpose of due
process requirements is to notify the individual in advance in order to allow adequate
preparation and reduce surprise.” AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds, Inc., 993
S.W.2d at 86 (citing McClellan, 921 S.W.2d at 688). The due process requirement of
notice is also reflected in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-125(b) requiring the trial court notify
the bondsman in writing of the action taken against him.

Here, the record reflects the trial court notified the appellant of the allegations
against her orally in court and a copy of Ms. Alexander’s complaint was provided to the
appellant on November 14, 2023. We find this notice to be sufficient to apprise the
appellant of the allegations against her that were enumerated in the complaint submitted
by Ms. Alexander and Mr. Blankenship.

The appellant further contends that she was not provided with notice of the “multiple
complaints” from unnamed law enforcement or court officials which the trial court relied
on in suspending her license. However, while the trial court mentioned at the hearing and
in its order of suspension that it had “heard multiple complaints from law enforcement and
county officials about the conduct of [appellant] in her capacity as a professional
bondsman,” the trial court did not base its decision on these complaints and, therefore,
notice was not required. A review of the trial court’s order shows that it had three
numbered grounds upon which it based its decision to suspend the appellant’s license –
failure to properly maintain a permanent business address; soliciting business in the
vicinity of a jail; and general misconduct relating to the production of a derogatory t-shirt
directed at her competitor. The comments noted by the appellant are nothing more than an
-5-
admonishment by the trial court, noting that these two bonding companies have a history
and warning the appellant of further misconduct. Because these comments were not the
basis for the trial court’s decision, no notice was required.3

b. Opportunity to Be Heard

In addition to adequate notice, due process requires that the appellant be provided
with an opportunity to be heard. Here, the trial court properly held a hearing at which the
appellant appeared and provided testimony under oath answering the allegations of the
complaint. However, the appellant contends that the hearing was inadequate, because the
trial court failed to require live testimony capable of cross-examination of the appellant’s
accusers, Ms. Alexander and Mr. Blankenship. We disagree.

The question before this Court is whether a non-adversarial, pre-suspension hearing,
such as the one provided to the appellant, provides procedurally sufficient due process.
Due process is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484
(1972)). While the appellant argues a full evidentiary and adversarial hearing was due, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “something less than an evidentiary hearing is
sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at
90. The Supreme Court set out in Mathews a series of factors to be balanced in determining
the level of process owed to the appellant: (1) the private interest affected by the
deprivation; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest in the process used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or alternative precautions; and (3) the
governmental interest involved, including the burden of additional safeguards. Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335, 96, S.Ct. at 903.

Here, the appellant’s ability to engage in private enterprise was temporarily
deprived. There is no question that this property interest is protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at
543, 105 S.Ct. at 1494. “A professional license, issued by a State, which can be suspended
or revoked only upon a showing of cause is a constitutionally protectable property interest

3
While the trial court’s comments in the instant case were merely an admonishment to the appellant
and we recognize the trial court’s inherent authority to regulate bonding companies, see In re Bonding, 599
S.W.3d 17, 21 (Tenn. 2020) (citing Taylor v. Waddey, 206 Tenn. 497, 334 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1960) (trial
courts have “inherent power” to adopt “reasonable regulations” governing bondsmen who appear before
them)), we caution that the trial court should not base its regulatory decisions on unnamed sources or
unspecified complaints.

-6-
because the holder of the license has a clear expectation that he or she will be able to
continue to hold the license absent proof of culpable conduct.” Martin v. Sizemore, 78
S.W.3d 249, 262-263 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (citing Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 &
n.11, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649 & n.11, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1968)). Therefore, the State cannot
take away the appellant’s license without affording her the protection of due process of
law.

The second Mathews factor to be considered is what was the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the appellant’s property interest by the hearing provided by the trial court.
At the pre-determination hearing in question, the appellant was represented by counsel and
afforded the opportunity to testify as to the factual allegations against her. While the trial
court did not require either Ms. Alexander or Mr. Blankenship to be present for cross-
examination, there was no prohibition on the appellant’s ability to subpoena them as
witnesses. In fact, the appellant’s “right to produce witnesses” is statutorily enshrined:
“[T]he parties shall have the right to produce witnesses, and to appear personally with or
without representation by counsel.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-125(b). The procedural
safeguards afforded to the appellant would have allowed the appellant to testify and
subpoena and examine her accusers, she merely did not avail herself of the procedures
already at her disposal. Therefore, the hearing provided by the trial court did not place her
at risk of having her right to write bonds erroneously deprived.

The third factor to be considered, the government’s interest and the administrative
burdens if further procedural safeguards were required, also weighs in favor of finding the
pre-deprivation hearing provided to the appellant to be constitutionally adequate. The
government has a clear interest in an efficient administration of justice, which includes the
bond process. If full evidentiary, adversarial hearings, such as the one requested by the
appellant, were required, the administration of the criminal justice system would be
hindered.

Given the strong interest in preserving judicial economy and the low risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the appellant’s interest, we conclude that the appellant’s due
process rights were not violated by her inability to cross-examine her accusers, especially
given that she had opportunity to subpoena and examine the witnesses herself. Therefore,
the hearing provided by the trial court did not violate the appellant’s right to due process.

II. Alleged Misconduct

In addition to the alleged violation of due process, the appellant also contends that
the trial court erred in finding the appellant violated Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-11-126 which governs professional misconduct by a bondsman. The State argues the
evidence was sufficient for the trial court to properly find the appellant guilty of
-7-
committing professional misconduct. We review the suspension of the appellant’s
authority to write bonds de novo. In re Cox, 389 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012)
(citing Tenn. Code Ann. §40-11-125(d)).

a. Permanent Business Address

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-126 enumerates a non-exhaustive list of
actions considered to be misconduct when committed by a licensed bail bondsman. Under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-126(9), no bondsman shall “engage in the
business of a professional bondsman or surety without maintaining a permanent business
office, business telephone and appropriate signage indicating that the office is a
professional bail bond business.” Here, the trial court found the appellant violated this
provision by maintaining one address as her principal place of business where she received
mail and official court correspondence and a second address with signage. The trial court
found this to be a violation of the statute by interpreting the statute to require these three
elements to be present in only one location. We agree with the trial court.

The statute’s intent is to require a stable location for official purposes to ensure
consistent and reliable service to a vulnerable population. While the statute does not
prohibit a separate office, the spirit of the statute is to require one central location at which
a person in need of a bond may visit and rely on that they are dealing with a professional
bondsman. Here, the appellant listed a private address on her business card and placed
signage at a separate, publicly accessible address. Additionally, the appellant testified that
her principal place of business was located at the private address which was not accessible
to the public. We find these dual business locations to be a violation of Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-11-126(9) and affirm the trial court’s finding.

b. Solicitation

The trial court also found the appellant committed professional misconduct by
soliciting business in the vicinity of a jail in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-11-126(6). The section states that no bonding agent shall “[s]olicit business directly or
indirectly, by active or passive means, or engage in any other conduct which may
reasonably be construed as intended for the purpose of solicitation of business in any place
where prisoners are confined or in any place immediately surrounding where prisoners are
confined.” Tenn. Code Ann. §40-11-126(6). The complaint against the appellant included
an affidavit from Mr. Blankenship attesting that the appellant solicited business outside the
Decatur County Jail. At the hearing, the trial court referenced a video supplied with the
complaint that showed the appellant tell the defendant, “if you need another bond, let me
know.”

-8-
This video was neither entered into evidence at the hearing, nor was it included in
the appellate record. Tennessee Rule 24 of Appellate Procedure places the burden on the
appellant to ensure the record is complete for review: “[t]he appellant shall have prepared
a transcript of such part of the evidence or proceedings as is necessary to convey a fair,
accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the
bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P 24(b). Here, the appellant has failed to make sure the
video that was the basis for the trial court’s determination that she engaged in professional
misconduct was included in the record. Without a full and complete record, this Court is
precluded from considering that issue. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 784 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1990); see also Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156, 172 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1997). We conclude the appellant, by failing to include the video for review, has not met
her burden under Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b) and, therefore, has waived this issue on appeal.

c. General Misconduct

Lastly, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by finding that the appellant
engaged in professional misconduct in the creation, and distribution of t-shirts with a
derogatory image and message about “Herby.” The evidence presented at the hearing, and
in the record, included two screen shots submitted to the trial court and the appellant’s
testimony denying the allegation. The screenshots depicted the torso of an unidentified
male with a t-shirt containing a derogatory message about “Herby” with text indicating that
“Ann” had sold the shirt. During her testimony, Ms. Blankenship adamantly denied having
any involvement in the creation or distribution of the shirt. Without further proof that the
appellant was involved in the shirt’s manufacture, design, or distribution, there is not
sufficient evidence that she engaged in any misconduct. Therefore, we conclude that the
trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of this allegation.

Despite the trial court’s erroneous finding, however, our de novo review of the
record, which contains ample evidence of the appellant’s other violations, supports the
decision of the trial court and the imposition of a forty-five-day suspension of the
appellant’s license.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

S/ J. ROSS DYER _
J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE
-9-

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10827112. Public record. Not legal advice.