# Douglas v. Judd

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 13, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10826358

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 13, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10826358

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “police officers falsif[ying] charging documents in order to convict a man of a nonexistent crime . . . is the type of extreme conduct considered to be intolerable in a civilized society”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

QUINTEISE DOUGLAS,
MARKISHA WILSON, and
J.R., a minor by his mother
and natural guardian,
MARKISHA WILSON,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2569-VMC-AAS

SHERIFF GRADY JUDD, in his
official capacity as Sheriff
of Polk County, Florida,
JESSICA WILLIAMS, individually,
and DIAMOND HAYNES,
individually,

Defendants.
______________________________/

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Defendants’ Sheriff Grady Judd, Jessica Williams, and Diamond
Haynes’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. # 14), filed
on December 3, 2024. Plaintiffs Quinteise Douglas, Markisha
Wilson, and J.R. responded to Defendants’ Motion on December
19, 2024. (Doc. # 26). For the reasons that follow, the Motion
is granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
According to the amended complaint, this case arises
from Plaintiffs’ arrest during the early morning hours of
April 24, 2022. (Doc. # 3 at ¶ 31). Plaintiffs were allegedly
arrested by Deputy Haynes without a warrant and without
probable cause. (Id.). The arrest occurred after an incident
involving Deputy Williams several hours earlier on April 23,
2022. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-30).
Specifically, all Plaintiffs were at Plaintiff Wilson’s
residence, which is near the residence of Deputy Williams.

(Id. at ¶¶ 23-24). A dog owned by Deputy Williams’ next-door
neighbor allegedly “ran loose and attacked a small child
related to the Plaintiffs in [Wilson’s] backyard.” (Id. at ¶
24). “After grabbing and biting the child, the dog then
attacked the Wilson family dog.” (Id.). It is alleged that
the family members at Wilson’s residence chased the dog, and
that Wilson stopped Deputy Williams in her police cruiser and
asked her for help. (Id. at ¶ 25). Plaintiffs further allege
that Deputy Williams proceeded to her own house, did not
render aid to the Wilson family, and instead acted to protect
her neighbor and her neighbor’s dog. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28).

According to Plaintiffs, Bartow Police Department
officers appeared at the scene and Deputy Williams confirmed
with them that Plaintiffs had not assaulted or touched her.
(Id. at ¶ 29). “None of the Plaintiffs illegally entered onto
[Deputy Williams’] property or into her house.” (Id.).
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs were allegedly arrested by Deputy
Haynes hours later and all charged with “burglary with
assault,” while Plaintiff Douglas was additionally charged
with “simple assault” and “corrupt by threat public servant.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 31-32, 35). All charges were subsequently
dismissed. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-38).
Plaintiffs initiated this action on November 4, 2024.

(Doc. # 1). The amended complaint asserts the following
claims: false arrest and false imprisonment claims against
Deputy Haynes under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); state law
false arrest and false imprisonment claims against Deputy
Haynes and Sheriff Judd (Counts II and III); malicious
prosecution claims under Section 1983 and state law against
Deputies Williams and Haynes (Counts IV and V); and defamation
and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
against Deputy Williams (Counts VI and VII). (Doc. # 3).
Defendants now move to dismiss the amended complaint.
(Doc. # 14). The Motion is fully briefed (Doc. # 26), and

ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this
Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint
and construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, the Court favors the plaintiff
with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the
complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901
F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court must limit its
consideration to well-pleaded factual allegations, documents
central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters
judicially noticed. La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358
F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
II. Analysis
Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ false arrest and
false imprisonment claims, malicious prosecution claims,
defamation claim, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim.
1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims
Defendants move to dismiss the false arrest and false
imprisonment claims brought under Section 1983 and state law.
(Doc. # 14 at 3-8). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to
defeat qualified immunity because they have not plausibly
alleged that Deputy Haynes lacked probable cause to arrest
them. (Id. at 6). Defendants further contend that, because

there is no underlying false arrest by Deputy Haynes, there
is no basis for vicarious liability, and therefore the state
law claims against Sheriff Judd must also fail. (Id. at 8).
Qualified immunity is a complete defense to Section 1983
claims. Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th
Cir. 2010). “Police officers acting in their discretionary
authority are entitled to qualified immunity from suit unless
a plaintiff can establish that (1) the officer violated a
constitutional right, and (2) the right violated was clearly
established.” Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2020).

“An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause
violates the Constitution and can underpin a [Section] 1983
claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of
arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional
challenge to the arrest.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608
F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). Probable cause is also a
complete bar to a state law action for false arrest and false
imprisonment. Bolanos v. Metro. Dade Cty., 677 So. 2d 1005
(Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
“To receive qualified immunity, an officer need not have
actual probable cause, but only ‘arguable’ probable cause.”
Brown, 608 F.3d at 734 (citation omitted). “Arguable probable

cause exists where ‘reasonable officers in the same
circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the
[arresting officer] could have believed that probable cause
existed to arrest Plaintiff[s].’” Grider, 618 F.3d at 1257
(citation omitted); see also Andrews v. Scott, 729 F. App’x
804, 810 (11th Cir. 2018) (“We need not determine at this
stage whether ‘reasonable officers in the same circumstances
and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could
have believed that probable cause existed to arrest
Plaintiff.’”). The arguable probable cause inquiry in a false
arrest case is the same as the clearly established law inquiry

in any other qualified immunity case. Garcia v. Casey, 75
F.4th 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 2023).
Defendants argue that the amended complaint “does not
plausibly allege that Deputy Haynes did not have a reasonable
basis to believe that there was probable cause to arrest
Plaintiffs.” (Doc. # 14 at 6-7). The Court disagrees.
Plaintiffs allege that a family member was attacked by a dog
belonging to Deputy Williams’ neighbor, that Deputy Williams
arrived at her home, that Plaintiffs neither touched nor
assaulted Deputy Williams, and that Plaintiffs did not
illegally enter onto Deputy Williams’ property or into her
home. (Doc. # 3 at ¶¶ 24, 28-29). Accepting these allegations

as true, an officer could not have reasonably concluded that
there was a substantial chance Plaintiffs had engaged in
criminal activity – that is, committed burglary with assault,
simple assault, or corrupt by threat public servant. See Neira
v. Gualtieri, No. 8:22-CV-1720-CEH-UAM, 2023 WL 6255012, at
*9-10 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2023) (denying qualified immunity
on motion to dismiss because the alleged events leading up to
the arrest, including a bar fight, were insufficient to allow
a reasonable officer to conclude there was a substantial
chance that the plaintiff had engaged in criminal activity).
Plaintiffs have met their burden at this stage of

demonstrating that there was no arguable probable cause for
their arrests. Defendants’ argument that qualified immunity
bars Plaintiffs’ claims against Deputy Haynes thus fails. The
argument that the claims against Sheriff Judd should be
dismissed similarly fails. The Motion is therefore denied as
to Counts I, II, and III. Defendants may, of course, raise
the qualified immunity defense again on a motion for summary
judgment.
2. Malicious Prosecution Claims
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ malicious
prosecution claims should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim. Defendants contend that, rather than alleging that

their arrest was a seizure pursuant to a legal process, as
required under Section 1983, the amended complaint instead
alleges that Plaintiffs were arrested without a warrant or
probable cause. (Doc. # 14 at 8-9). The Court agrees. Notably,
Plaintiffs’ response does not address this argument.
To establish a claim for malicious prosecution under
Section 1983, a plaintiff “must prove (1) the elements of the
common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation
of [their] Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
seizures.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir.
2019) (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220,

1234 (11th Cir. 2004)). “But the illegal seizure cannot be
just any seizure: unlike the torts of false arrest and false
imprisonment, the tort of malicious prosecution requires a
seizure ‘pursuant to legal process.’” Black v. Wigington, 811
F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Indeed, “a warrantless arrest cannot serve as the
predicate Fourth Amendment seizure for purposes of [a
Section] 1983 malicious prosecution claim.” Donley v. City of
Morrow, 601 F. App’x 805, 814 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam);
see also Sullenberger v. City of Coral Gables, No. 22-CV-
21830, 2025 WL 101703, at *23-28 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2025)
(granting motion to dismiss a Section 1983 malicious

prosecution claim because the plaintiff did not allege “that
he suffered a seizure that was pursuant to some legal
process”). As Defendants point out, the amended complaint
only references a warrantless arrest and does not allege that
Plaintiffs suffered a seizure pursuant to legal process.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim under
Section 1983 against Deputies Haynes and Williams must be
dismissed.
However, Defendants do not cite legal authority
establishing that the same standard regarding a seizure
pursuant to legal process applies to the state law malicious

prosecution claims. Defendants have thus failed to establish
that dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state law claims against
Deputies Haynes and Williams for malicious prosecution is
warranted.
Accordingly, the Motion is granted as to Count IV and
denied as to Count V.
3. Defamation Claim
Defendants also seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ defamation
claim for failing to state a claim. (Doc. # 14 at 9).
Defendants emphasize that the amended complaint does not
specify any allegedly defamatory statement, and instead

“leav[es] a blank space between [a] set of quotation marks in
paragraph 74.” (Id.). Plaintiffs acknowledge this drafting
error and request that the Court dismiss Count VI with leave
to amend so that it can be pled with the required specificity.
(Doc. # 26 at 2). Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’
request. (Id.). Accordingly, the Motion is granted as to Count
VI. Plaintiffs may amend the complaint to add allegations
supporting the defamation claim, if possible.
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim should be dismissed.

(Doc. # 14 at 9-10). Defendants submit that the cause of
action is sparingly recognized in Florida and that “Deputy
Williams’ alleged conduct is not such that it goes beyond all
possible bounds of decency.” (Id. at 10). However, at this
stage, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim.
Under Florida Law, a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires that a plaintiff prove: “(1)
deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering; (2) by
outrageous conduct; (3) which conduct must have caused the
suffering; and (4) the suffering must have been severe.” Hart
v. United States, 894 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1990); see
also Tillman v. Orange Cty., 519 F. App’x 632, 636 (11th Cir.

2013) (holding that “police officers falsif[ying] charging
documents in order to convict a man of a nonexistent crime .
. . is the type of extreme conduct considered to be
intolerable in a civilized society”). The amended complaint
alleges that Deputy Williams “fabricat[ed] a story” and
“falsely accused and initiated the arrest and prosecution” of
Plaintiffs without any evidence that they committed a crime.
(Doc. # 3 at ¶¶ 77, 78, 82).
Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs’
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See

Barmapov-Segev v. City of Miami, No. 19-23742-CIV, 2019 WL
6170332, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2019) (declining to dismiss
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim where a
safety officer “made false accusations against the Plaintiff
to ‘punish’ her, which led to her arrest and malicious
prosecution”). Therefore, the Motion is denied as to Count
VII.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. #
14) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth
herein.
(2) Count IV is dismissed with prejudice. Count VI is
dismissed with leave to amend.
(3) To amend the dismissed defamation claim, Plaintiffs must
file a second amended complaint by March 27, 2025.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
13th day of March, 2025.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10826358. Public record. Not legal advice.