# Dare Adewumi v. Wellstar Medical Group, LLC

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · March 17, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823851

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** March 17, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823851

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “[t]he inquiry into pretext centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it exists outside of the decision maker’s head”
- explaining that a valid comparator will have engaged in “the same basic conduct (or misconduct)” and “will share the plaintiff’s employment and disciplinary history”
- explaining that under a cat’s paw theory of liability, the plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker followed the recommendation of another individual who was motivated by “discriminatory animus”

## Opinion text

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-12243
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

DR. DARE ADEWUMI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WELLSTAR MEDICAL GROUP AND
WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees,

NORTHSIDE HOSPITAL, INC.,

Defendant.
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____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-04048-CAP
____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dr. Dare Adewumi appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of his former employers Wellstar
Medical Group, LLC and Wellstar Health Systems, Inc.
(collectively “the Wellstar defendants” or “Wellstar”) on his race
discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After review, we
affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The report and recommendation (“R&R”), adopted by the
district court, thoroughly reviewed the summary judgment facts,
the procedural history, and the applicable legal principles in this
case. Because we write only for the benefit of the parties, we
discuss only the facts and procedural history necessary to explain
the context of our decision.
A. 2018 Hiring
In March 2018, Dr. Adewumi, who is African American,
began working as the sole neurosurgeon at Wellstar Cobb
Hospital, one of Wellstar’s hospitals. Dr. Adewumi was hired to
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restart the neurosurgery service line at Cobb Hospital, which had
been defunct for twenty years.
Dr. William Benedict, the practice lead of Wellstar Medical
Group’s neurosurgery practice group, interviewed Dr. Adewumi
for the position. Dr. Benedict worked at Kennestone Regional
Medical Center, another of the Wellstar defendants’ affiliate
hospitals. Dr. Benedict reported to Dr. Alan Muster, the Senior
Vice President of Wellstar Medical Group’s specialty division, who
oversaw all surgeons and medical specialists and was the final
decisionmaker for hiring and firing physicians within the specialty
groups. Dr. Benedict recommended to Dr. Muster that Dr.
Adewumi be hired.
B. Peer Review Process
Beginning in late 2018 and into 2019, some of Dr.
Adewumi’s cases were referred to a peer review process conducted
by Cobb Hospital’s surgery Medical Executive Committee
(“MEC”). Dr. Benedict was not a member of the MEC and did not
vote on any of the MEC’s final determinations. However, because
there was no other neurosurgeon at Cobb Hospital to perform a
peer review, Dr. Benedict was asked to review Dr. Adewumi’s
cases and give guidance to the MEC. In some cases, the MEC
found Dr. Adewumi’s care to be “appropriate,” but in other cases,
the MEC found Dr. Adewumi’s care to be either “appropriate with
opportunity for improvement” or “inappropriate.” With Dr.
Benedict’s support, the MEC also referred for external review
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several cases in which Dr. Adewumi’s care was deemed
inappropriate.
Dr. Adewumi came to believe Dr. Benedict did not like him
and had “weaponized” the peer review process to damage his
career. According to Dr. Adewumi, Dr. Benedict criticized and
belittled him in a condescending manner, questioned his
competency, called him callous, uncaring, arrogant, and lazy, and
suggested Dr. Adewumi needed remediation. Dr. Benedict also
made disparaging remarks to Dr. Adewumi about two other
African-American neurosurgeons, Dr. Kenneth Hill and Dr. Paul
King, who had worked for Wellstar, criticizing their surgical skill
and medical knowledge and suggesting they should not have been
employed.
C. Dr. Adewumi’s Complaints
Between March and June 2019, Dr. Adewumi complained to
Dr. Muster “multiple times” about Dr. Benedict’s treatment of
him. Specifically, Dr. Adewumi advised that “Dr. Benedict did not
like [him], and [he] did not know why [Dr. Benedict] did not like
[him].” Dr. Adewumi told Dr. Muster that Dr. Benedict also “did
not like” Dr. Hill and Dr. King, but Dr. Adewumi “was afraid to be
too direct because [he] did not want to jeopardize [his] job.”
Dr. Adewumi also expressed concerns to Dr. Muster about
the MEC peer review process and that Dr. Benedict was biased
against him and “was out to damage [his] career.” Dr. Adewumi
complained to Dr. Muster and others in Wellstar’s “leadership”
that Dr. Benedict was targeting him and trying to end his career,
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but Dr. Adewumi admitted that he was “afraid to bring up race” in
these conversations with “white superiors” because he was “afraid
of being accused of using a race card” and “afraid of further
retaliation.” After one such conversation on April 4, 2019, Dr.
Muster emailed Dr. Benedict, advising him that Dr. Adewumi
“feels you may have already determined that he is not going to
succeed and are biased against him.”
D. Formal Action Plan
In July 2019, the MEC decided to place Dr. Adewumi on a
formal action plan. The proposed action plan (1) called for Dr.
Adewumi to work for 4.5 months at Kennestone Hospital under
the supervised mentorship of other neurosurgeons in the practice
group, and (2) thereafter Dr. Adewumi could return to Cobb
Hospital and the MEC would conduct a focused review of his cases
there for the next twelve months. Under the action plan, Dr.
Adewumi would “take call” and perform surgeries in partnership
with other Kennestone-based neurosurgeons in a “buddy system.”
The intent was to immerse Dr. Adewumi in the “processes at
Kennestone” so that he could learn from them and bring them back
to Cobb Hospital.
Because the MEC’s action plan would need the
neurosurgery team’s support, the MEC consulted Dr. Muster, who
in turn sought Dr. Benedict’s input, before the action plan was
presented to Dr. Adewumi. After a July 9, 2019 meeting with Dr.
Muster and the Kennestone-based neurosurgeons tasked with
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mentoring him, Dr. Adewumi signed the action plan on July 17,
2019.
E. Neurosurgeons at Kennestone Hospital
Once Dr. Adewumi was on the action plan, other
neurosurgeons in the practice expressed concerns to Dr. Benedict
about the burden that the action plan placed on them while they
also had to manage their own caseloads at Kennestone Hospital, a
Level 2 trauma center. 1 Some neurosurgeons also said they
believed Dr. Adewumi was merely “checking the boxes” to
complete the action plan and not internalizing the learning the plan
was meant to instill.
Dr. Benedict relayed these concerns about the strain on the
Kennestone neurosurgery team to Dr. Muster, explaining it was
causing disruption to the team, who felt they were more invested
in Dr. Adewumi’s success than Dr. Adewumi was. In fall 2019, Dr.
Benedict recommended to Dr. Muster that Dr. Adewumi be
terminated.
Dr. Muster said that some of the neurosurgeons at
Kennestone Hospital indicated to him that they did not feel they
could continue to support the action plan. Dr. Muster was
concerned that Wellstar “could lose one or more [of] the
neurosurgeons if [they] continued with this path.” Dr. Muster

1 At the time, Kennestone Hospital was the busiest hospital in the Wellstar

system, “with the highest acuity patients.” And the volume of cases “per
doctor” was higher at Kennestone than at Cobb Hospital.
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decided to terminate Dr. Adewumi because the action plan was
putting too much strain on the already heavily burdened
neurosurgery practice at Kennestone Hospital.
F. Termination
On October 8, 2019, Dr. Muster and the Human Resources
Vice President met with Dr. Adewumi and terminated him
“without cause” pursuant to the terms of his employment contract.
Dr. Muster told Dr. Adewumi that his termination was because the
action plan put too much strain on the neurosurgery group at
Kennestone Hospital and that his termination was not based on
any non-compliance with the action plan. Dr. Muster also
suggested that Dr. Adewumi had not fostered relationships that
should have been fostered.
In the fall of 2021, Dr. Marcus Gates, who is African
American, began working for Wellstar Medical Group as a
neurosurgeon at Cobb Hospital. In July 2022, Dr. Gates was joined
by Dr. Saint-Aaron Morris, another African-American
neurosurgeon, at Cobb Hospital.
II. DEFENDANTS’ SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
On September 21, 2023, the Wellstar defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, a brief in support, and a separate
statement of undisputed material facts, as required by Northern
District of Georgia Local Rule 56.1(B)(1).
Dr. Adewumi filed a brief and a separate response to
Wellstar’s statement of undisputed material facts, admitting some
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facts and denying others. But Dr. Adewumi did not file his own
separate statement of additional facts that he contended were
material and created a genuine issue for trial, as required by Local
Rule 56.1(B)(2)(a)(4).
Dr. Adewumi did file a 47-page declaration that outlined his
version of events—sometimes with citations to the depositions of
Dr. Muster and Dr. Benedict—and also alleged additional facts. Dr.
Adewumi’s declaration also disputed various statements in
affidavits that Wellstar submitted in support of summary
judgment. In addition, Dr. Adewumi filed a declaration of Dr. Paul
King, a retired African-American neurosurgeon who had worked
at Atlanta Medical Center, another Wellstar hospital. Both Dr.
Adewumi’s summary judgment brief and his separate response to
Wellstar’s statement of undisputed material facts relied upon his
and Dr. King’s declarations to refute Wellstar’s facts and support
his additional facts.
III. MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S R&R
As a threshold matter, the R&R, adopted by the district
court, declined to consider the facts set forth in Dr. Adewumi’s and
Dr. King’s declarations for two reasons. First, and primarily, the
R&R concluded that these facts were “not properly before the
Court” because, although they were cited in Dr. Adewumi’s
response brief, none of them “were included in a separate
statement of additional facts as required by [Local Rule]
56.1(B)(1)(d) and (2)(b).” The R&R cited several other district court
decisions in the Northern District of Georgia likewise refusing to
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consider facts stated in a declaration or affidavit but not
incorporated into a statement of material facts as required by
Northern District of Georgia’s Local Rule 56.1.
Second, and in a footnote, the R&R concluded that Dr.
Adewumi’s and Dr. King’s declarations were “unsworn and fail to
comply with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The R&R
stressed that these two declarations (1) did not contain the precise
language required by § 1746; (2) did not declare that the statements
were “true and correct”; and (3) were not sworn, “i.e., sworn under
oath before a notary or other oath-taker as shown by a notary
signature and seal, in spite of the assertion that the declarant was
‘duly sworn.’”
On the merits, the R&R recommended granting summary
judgment to the Wellstar defendants, concluding that Dr.
Adewumi had failed to present sufficient evidence to create a
triable issue of fact as to whether he was terminated because of his
race under either the McDonnell Douglas2 burden-shifting
framework or the alternative “convincing mosaic” approach.
Dr. Adewumi filed multiple objections to the R&R. In a 30-
page order, after reviewing the summary judgment facts, the
district court overruled Dr. Adewumi’s objections and adopted the
R&R. Among other things, the district court ruled that the
magistrate judge properly disregarded Dr. Adewumi’s and Dr.
King’s declarations.

2 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s application of its local rules for
abuse of discretion. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302
(11th Cir. 2009). Likewise, we review a district court’s evidentiary
rulings at summary judgment for abuse of discretion. Wright v.
Farouk Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2012).
We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary
judgment, viewing all evidence and drawing all inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1249 (11th
Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record
demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
V. TWO DECLARATIONS
For the following reasons, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to consider the declarations of Dr. King and
Dr. Adewumi.
A. Dr. King’s Declaration
Dr. King’s declaration, which is unsworn, does not comply
with the requirements of § 1746. For an unsworn declaration
executed in the United States to have the same force and effect as
a sworn declaration, § 1746(2) provides that the unsworn
declaration must be “subscribed by [the declarant], as true under
penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following
form: . . ‘I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of
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perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date).
(Signature)’.” 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2). Dr. King’s declaration omits any
statement declaring that its contents are “true and correct,” and
thus does not satisfy all of § 1746(2)’s requirements. As such, Dr.
King’s unsworn declaration does not constitute competent
summary judgment evidence. See Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1347
(11th Cir. 2022) (explaining § 1746 provides a statutory exception
to the general rule that unsworn statements may not be considered
for summary judgment purposes).
B. Dr. Adewumi’s Declaration
Dr. Adewumi’s declaration does not precisely track the
declaratory language set out in § 1746(2). However, the
declaration’s preamble does state that Dr. Adewumi “hereby
declares under the pains and penalties of perjury” and then the first
numbered statement after the preamble further “declare[s] that the
statements made herein are true . . . .”
We need not decide whether Dr. Adewumi’s declaration
substantially complies with § 1746(2), however, because even
assuming it does, we still must affirm the district court’s declining
to consider the facts contained in Dr. Adewumi’s declaration. The
district court declined to consider those facts because in responding
to summary judgment, Dr. Adewumi failed to comply with Local
Rule 56.1(B)(2).
More specifically, Local Rule 56.1(B)(1)(d) provides that the
district court “will not consider a fact . . . set out only in the brief
and not in the movant’s statement of undisputed facts.” Local Rule
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56.1(B)(2)(a) requires the respondent to a summary judgment
motion to include with his responsive brief a “response to the
movant’s statement of facts.” In addition, Local Rule 56.1(B)(2)(b)
requires a “statement of additional facts which the respondent
contends are material and present a genuine issue for trial.” Local
Rule 56.1(B)(2)(b) further states that the respondent’s “separate
statement of material facts must meet the requirements set out in
LR 56.1(B)(1).”
As the adopted R&R explained, district courts in the
Northern District of Georgia long have interpreted Local Rule
56.1(B)(2)(b) to prohibit the court from considering a fact in the
respondent’s responsive brief that is not also found in the
respondent’s separate statement of additional facts. See, e.g.,
Ghertner v. Corp. Env’ts of Ga., Inc., 2020 WL 4551269, at *2 (N.D.
Ga. June 26, 2020) (reviewing cases), adopted by 2020 WL 4577709
(N.D. Ga. July 31, 2020). We afford great deference to a district
court’s interpretation of its local rules. Mann, 588 F.3d at 1302. We
have said that the Northern District of Georgia’s Local Rule 56.1
“protects judicial resources by making the parties organize the
evidence rather than leaving the burden upon the district judge”
and “streamlines the resolution of summary judgment motions by
focusing the district court’s attention on what is, and what is not,
genuinely controverted.” Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268-69
(11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and alterations omitted)
(rejecting an argument that Local Rule 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2) conflicts
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56).
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Here, Dr. Adewumi offers no argument on appeal as to
(1) why we should not defer to the district court’s interpretation of
Rule 56.1(B)(2)(b), or (2) how the district court’s application of Rule
56.1(B)(2)(b) to Dr. Adewumi—who was (and still is) represented
by counsel—amounted to an abuse of discretion. Indeed, Dr.
Adewumi’s opening appeal brief does not even acknowledge his
failure to comply with Rule 56.1(B)(2)(b) in the district court.3
Thus, Dr. Adewumi has abandoned any argument on appeal as to
Rule 56.1(B)(2)(b), and we must affirm the district court’s decision
to disregard the facts in his declaration on this ground. See Sapuppo
v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of
the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is
deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it
follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”).
We now turn to the merits of the summary judgment order.
VI. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Dr. Adewumi claims that the Wellstar defendants
terminated him based on his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 4

3 We find no merit to Dr. Adewumi’s suggestion in his reply brief that his

“extensive response to each of the contested facts set forth in [Wellstar’s] Rule
56.1 statement,” which was required by Local Rule 56.1(B)(2)(a), was also
sufficient to comply with his separate obligations under Rule 56.1(B)(2)(b).
4 In a prior order granting in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district

court concluded that Dr. Adewumi’s placement on an action plan was not an
adverse employment action but could be considered in conjunction with Dr.
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Under § 1981, intentional race discrimination is prohibited
in employment contracts. Jenkins, 26 F.4th at 1249. Employment
discrimination claims under § 1981 are analyzed using the same
legal framework as disparate treatment claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. At summary judgment, there are
two paths an employment discrimination plaintiff can take to
survive summary judgment—the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework or the “convincing mosaic” approach. See
McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 2024). We
discuss each below.
A. McDonnell Douglas - Prima Facie Case
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Lewis v. City
of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). To
make out a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) that he was subjected to
an adverse employment action; (3) that he was qualified to perform
the job in question; and (4) that he was treated less favorably by his
employer than “similarly situated” employees outside the
protected class. Id. at 1220-21.
The district court correctly concluded, under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, that Dr. Adewumi satisfied the first three

Adewumi’s termination as a pretextual justification for his termination. Dr.
Adewumi does not challenge this determination on appeal.
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prongs of a prima facia case of race discrimination but failed to
establish a proper comparator for purposes of the fourth prong.
To establish the fourth prong, the plaintiff must present
evidence of a comparator who is “similarly situated in all material
respects.” Jenkins, 26 F.4th at 1249. What is a “material” similarity
or difference will vary from case to case, but ordinarily a similarly
situated comparator and the plaintiff will “have engaged in the
same basic conduct or misconduct, be subject to the same
employment policies, have the same supervisor(s), and share an
employment or disciplinary history.” Id.
Dr. Adewumi identified as a comparator Dr. Phil Parry, a
white neurosurgeon in the practice group.5 Dr. Adewumi testified
that “Dr. Parry was involved” with “a deviation from the standard
of care” that resulted in complications and that, unlike with Dr.
Adewumi’s complications, “Dr. Benedict did not discuss it in
conference” or “bring it up at all.”
This comparator evidence is insufficient for several reasons.
For starters, Wellstar did not terminate Dr. Adewumi’s
employment because of concerns about his deviations from the
standard of care, but because his action plan placed too great a
strain on the rest of his practice group. To be a proper comparator
and give rise to a presumption of discrimination, Dr. Parry needed

5 Although Dr. Adewumi claimed his “white counterparts had cases that were

clearly outside the standard of care” that were “swept under the rug,” Dr.
Parry was the only comparator Dr. Adewumi was able to identify.
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to have been placed on a similar action plan—i.e., a buddy system
that required other neurosurgeons in the practice group to “take
call” and perform surgeries with him for several months—but was
not terminated. See id. In fact, Dr. Adewumi acknowledged he did
not “know the peer review status” of the neurosurgeons at
Kennestone Hospital.
Additionally, even if we considered the different treatment
of Dr. Adewumi’s and Dr. Parry’s deviations from the standard of
care, this evidence does not establish that Dr. Parry is “similarly
situated in all material respects.” See id. Dr. Parry’s single instance
of deviating from the standard of care is not materially similar to
Dr. Adewumi’s twenty cases referred to the MEC for peer review,
some of which led the MEC to issue letters of inquiry to Dr.
Adewumi, make findings of inappropriate care, send some cases for
external review, and ultimately to place Dr. Adewumi on an action
plan. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1225, 1227-28 (explaining that a valid
comparator will have engaged in “the same basic conduct (or
misconduct)” and “will share the plaintiff’s employment and
disciplinary history”).
B. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason
Even assuming arguendo that Dr. Adewumi established a
prima facie case, the burden shifted to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.
Id. at 1221. If the employer carries this intermediate burden of
production, “the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the
defendant’s proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful
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discrimination, an obligation that merges with the plaintiff’s
ultimate burden of persuading the factfinder that [the plaintiff] has
been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted and alteration adopted).
Here, the Wellstar defendants carried their burden.
Specifically, Dr. Muster terminated Dr. Adewumi’s employment
contract because the formal action plan placed too great a strain on
the neurosurgery practice at Kennestone Hospital. In addition to
the deposition testimony of Drs. Muster and Benedict, the Wellstar
defendants submitted declarations from two members of the
neurosurgery practice at Kennestone, Drs. Hsu and Parry, who
supported Dr. Muster’s reason for termination.
C. Pretext
A plaintiff proves pretext by showing that the defendant’s
proffered reason is so weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent,
or contradictory that a reasonable factfinder could find the reason
unworthy of credence. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d
1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010). If the defendant’s proffered reason is
one that would motivate a reasonable employer to take the adverse
action, the plaintiff “must meet that reason head on and rebut it,”
and cannot prove pretext by merely recasting the defendant’s
reason or by arguing his own business judgment over that of the
defendant’s. Id. at 1265-66. The plaintiff must show both that the
proffered reason was false and that discrimination was the true
reason for the adverse action. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
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The district court correctly concluded that Dr. Adewumi did
not present circumstantial evidence that Wellstar’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating him was pretextual.
Although Dr. Adewumi testified that no one informed him that the
action plan was placing a strain on his fellow neurosurgeons, that
assertion does not refute his colleagues’ statements, and Dr.
Adewumi did not present any evidence that their statements were
false.
Most of Dr. Adewumi’s evidence attempts to show that Dr.
Benedict’s scrutiny and micromanagement of him through the
peer review process was unwarranted and that he (Dr. Adewumi)
was successfully implementing the action plan when he was
terminated. But this evidence fails to address, much less rebut head
on, the reason Dr. Muster gave for terminating Dr. Adewumi. See
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(stating that “[p]rovided that the proffered reason is one that might
motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that
reason head on and rebut it” to prove pretext).
Dr. Muster terminated Dr. Adewumi’s employment
because the MEC’s action plan—to improve Dr. Adewumi’s
performance and medical care—placed too much strain on the rest
of the neurosurgeons at Kennestone Hospital who had to “take
call” and perform surgeries with Dr. Adewumi while also
managing their own heavy caseloads and who felt that Dr.
Adewumi was not as invested in the action plan as they were. Dr.
Adewumi did not present any evidence that Dr. Muster did not
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honestly believe that the MEC’s action plan was placing too great
a strain on them. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266 (explaining that
“[t]he inquiry into pretext centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the
employee’s beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it
exists outside of the decision maker’s head”). Notably, Drs. Hsu
and Parry averred that on many occasions they shared their
concerns about the strain being placed on the team with their
colleagues, including Dr. Benedict.
Further, Dr. Adewumi did not present evidence that Dr.
Muster harbored a racial animus, such as making derogatory
comments about African Americans. Dr. Adewumi’s testimony
that Dr. Muster called him arrogant and uncaring and that Dr.
Muster “did nothing” when Dr. Benedict called him “arrogant,
lazy, callous, obnoxious” does not support an inference that Dr.
Muster (or Dr. Benedict) harbored a racial animus.
Similarly, to the extent Dr. Adewumi relies on a cat’s paw
theory—that Dr. Benedict targeted him and Dr. Muster merely
accepted “whatever Dr. Benedict told him about” Dr. Adewumi—
he also did not present evidence that Dr. Benedict’s actions were
motivated by a racial animus. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab,
Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that under a
cat’s paw theory of liability, the plaintiff must show that the
decisionmaker followed the recommendation of another
individual who was motivated by “discriminatory animus”). In the
district court, Dr. Adewumi pointed to what he called an “indirect
slur” by Dr. Benedict in which Dr. Benedict said he could never
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travel to a Muslim country. Dr. Adewumi also highlighted that he
heard Dr. Benedict criticize the medical skills of two other African-
American surgeons who worked at Wellstar in the past, but there
is no evidence that these criticisms were based on race either.
These comments by Dr. Benedict, without more, do not support a
reasonable inference of racial animus.
In any event, under a “cat’s paw” theory, the plaintiff must
show that the biased non-decisionmaker manipulated the
decisionmaker into terminating him. Wright v. Southland Corp., 187
F.3d 1287, 1304 n.20 (11th Cir. 1999). It is not enough to show that
the decisionmaker considered accurate information from the biased
non-decisionmaker. See id. But at most that is what we have here.
There is no evidence to suggest Dr. Benedict’s report to Dr.
Muster—that the Kennestone neurosurgery team was concerned
about the strain placed on them by the action plan—was
inaccurate. To the contrary, two neurosurgeons confirmed the
accuracy of Dr. Benedict’s report. Therefore, there is no evidence
that Dr. Benedict manipulated Dr. Muster such that any racial bias
Dr. Benedict might have harbored tainted Dr. Muster’s decision.
D. Convincing Mosaic Evidence
Alternatively, under the “convincing mosaic” approach, a
plaintiff still can survive summary judgment by presenting
circumstantial evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to
infer intentional discrimination. Jenkins, 26 F.4th at 1250. “A
plaintiff may establish a convincing mosaic by pointing to evidence
that demonstrates, among other things, (1) suspicious timing,
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ambiguous statements, or other information from which
discriminatory intent might be inferred, (2) systematically better
treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) pretext.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted).
We agree with the district court that Dr. Adewumi’s
circumstantial evidence, considered as a whole, was insufficient to
survive summary judgment under the alternative “convincing
mosaic” approach. Dr. Adewumi did not identify any suspicious
timings, ambiguous statements, or other information from which
discriminatory intent might reasonably be inferred, and as
discussed above, he did not present evidence of pretext. See id.
On appeal, Dr. Adewumi argues that Dr. Benedict
micromanaged him and subjected his medical errors to more
scrutiny than his white colleagues. While evidence of
“systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees”
can support an inference of discriminatory intent, here Dr.
Adewumi failed to present evidence of how his white counterparts
within the practice group were managed or peer reviewed. See id.
Although Dr. Adewumi testified that Dr. Benedict “buried” his
white colleagues’ complications, he was unable to identify any
instances in which this happened apart from the single instance of
Dr. Parry’s deviation from the standard of care, which Dr. Benedict
did not discuss in conference.
Dr. Adewumi also contends that the neurosurgery practice
did not support him with “a rotation of neurosurgeons at Cobb
[Hospital] from the beginning,” “did nothing to assist him,” and
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22 Opinion of the Court 24-12243

then “turned on” him “after agreeing to provide mentorship
through the action plan.” This characterization of what happened
is not supported by the record.
Dr. Adewumi accepted the position as the sole
neurosurgeon at Cobb Hospital understanding that he was tasked
with restarting the neurosurgery line there. Dr. Benedict testified
that at the time the neurosurgery practice was “struggling to cover
the call schedule at Kennestone, and separating a partner from
Kennestone would have increased the call burden to the other
partners, which was already severe.” Once Cobb Hospital’s MEC
decided to place Dr. Adewumi on an action plan, his colleagues at
Kennestone Hospital agreed to mentor him through a “buddy
system” as part of the action plan, after which he would return to
Cobb Hospital. Ultimately, however, the strain this “buddy
system” placed on other neurosurgeons in the practice at
Kennestone was too great and caused disruption within the team.
These undisputed facts do not give rise to an inference of race
discrimination.
VII. CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
consider Dr. King’s declaration and the facts in Dr. Adewumi’s
declaration. Further, the district court did not err in concluding
that Dr. Adewumi’s circumstantial evidence failed to establish race
discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework and did not
otherwise permit a reasonable inference of racially discriminatory
intent under the convincing mosaic approach. Accordingly, we
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affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Wellstar
defendants on Dr. Adewumi’s § 1981 claim.
AFFIRMED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823851. Public record. Not legal advice.