# Edward Rudolph Turnbull, IV v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, Daniela Grosz, Daniel Martinez, Seana Willing, John S. Brannon, Amanda Kates, Jenny Hodgkins, and the Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas, Cindy v. Tisdale, Steve Benesh, Laura Gibson, Kennon Lily Wooten

> Texas Court of Appeals, 15th District · March 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823657

## Case

- **Court:** Texas Court of Appeals, 15th District
- **Decided:** March 10, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823657

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that constitutional harms are sufficient to satisfy the injury prong of standing

## Opinion text

ACCEPTED
15-24-00095-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
3/10/2025 3:36 PM
NO. 15-24-00095-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
FOR THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM
AUSTIN, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk

EDWARD RANDOLPH TURNBULL IV,
Appellant,

V.

THE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, ET AL.,
Appellees.

On Appeal from the 201st Judicial District Court of Texas
Cause No. D-1-GN-24-002025
The Honorable Amy Clark Meachum, Presiding

APPELLANT’S REPLY TO APPELLEES’ BRIEFS

GAINES WEST WEST, WEBB, ALLBRITTON & GENTRY, P.C.
State Bar No. 21197500 1515 Emerald Plaza
gaines.west@westwebblaw.com College Station, Texas 77845
JOHN “JAY” RUDINGER, JR. Telephone: (979) 694-7000
State Bar No. 24067852
jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com

JUDD E. STONE II STONE HILTON PLLC
State Bar No. 24076720 600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350
judd@stonehilton.com Austin, Texas 7870
Telephone: (737) 465-3897

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

i
RECORD REFERENCES

For clarity and the Court’s convenience, Mr. Turnbull will reference the

Clerk’s Record and Appellees’ briefs as follows:

Document Reference

Clerk’s Record CR ____

Brief of Appellee Hodgkins Hodgkins Br. ____

Brief of Appellees CFLD, CDC, CFLD Br. ____
Kates, Brannon, Grosz, and Martinez

Brief of State Bar Appellees SBA Br. ____

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Record References .......................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents ........................................................................................... iii
Table of Authorities ......................................................................................... v
Summary of the Facts ..................................................................................... 1
Introduction .................................................................................................... 4

Argument .................................................................................................... 6

I. Mr. Turnbull Has Established Standing .................................... 6

A. Mr. Turnbull’s injuries are neither speculative nor
based on prosecutorial discretion ......................................... 6

B. Mr. Turnbull complains solely of Appellee’s conduct ......... 7

C. Maintaining suit is Mr. Turnbull’s only means of redress…10

D. Appellees misplace reliance on Linda R.S., Martinez
and Lefebure........................................................................ 12

II. Mr. Turnbull’s Claims Are Based in Both Law and Fact ........ 16

A. A reasonable person could believe Mr. Turnbull’s
allegations............................................................................ 16

B. Mr. Turnbull’s claims are not legally foreclosed ................ 18

III. Immunity Does Not Bar Mr. Turnbull’s Claims ...................... 20

A. The Legislature waived immunity in the State Bar Act ...... 21

B. Sovereign immunity does bar injunctive relief from
constitutional harms ............................................................ 22
iii
C. Ministerial acts are not protected by absolute
immunity ............................................................................. 23

D. Appellees are not entitled to immunity under the Texas
Rules of Disciplinary Conduct ............................................ 24

IV. Alternatively, Mr. Turnbull should have the opportunity
to replead .................................................................................. 26

Conclusion & Prayer for Relief .................................................................... 27

Certificate of Service .................................................................................... 30

Certificate of Compliance ............................................................................. 30

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Apollo Enters., Inc. v. ScripNet, Inc.,
301 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) ..................................6, 8

Bacon v. Tex. Historical Comm’n,
411 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) ....................................25

Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc.,
144 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. 2004) ........................................................................23

City of Elsa v. M.A.L.,
226 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2007) ........................................................................ 11

Crampton v. Farris,
596 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.)………….24

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman,
252 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. 2008) ........................................................................27

Davis v. Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co.,
No. 05-21-00092-CV, 2023 WL 3735115
(Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2023, no pet.) .................................................17

Drake v. Walker,
No. 05-14-00355-CV, 2015 WL 2160565
(Tex. App.—Dallas May 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) ................................17

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59 (1978) ........................................................................................13

Heckman v. Williamson Cnty.,
369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) ...................................................... 6, 8, 9, 10, 11

In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc.,
991 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999) .......................................................................... 4

In re RNDC Tex., LLC,
No. 05-18-00555-CV, 2018 WL 27773262
(Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ..............................18
v
In re Shire PLC,
633 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021,
orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) ..................................................................18

Johnson v. Lynaugh,
796 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) ...................................................16

Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emp. Pension Sys.,
458 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2015) ............................................................................22

Lefebure v. D’Aquilla,
15 F.4th 650 (5th Cir. 2021) .......................................................12, 14, 15, 16

Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614 (1973) ..............................................................12, 13, 14, 15, 16

Longhorn Creek Ltd. v. Gardens of Connemara Ltd.,
686 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, pet. filed) ...........................16, 18

Martinez v. State Bar of Tex.,
797 Fed. Appx. 167 (5th Cir. 2020) ............................................12, 13, 14, 16

McGregor v. Clawson,
506 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1974, no writ) ............................... 5

Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,
233 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2007) ..................................................................26, 27

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) .......................................................................... 5

Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Holmes,
294 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. denied) .............................22

Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ........................................................................20

Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik,
355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011) .........................................................................26

vi
Tex. Nat’l Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy,
74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) ....................................................................21, 22

Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust,
354 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2011) ........................................................................20

Univ. of Houston v. Clark,
38 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000) ..........................................................................23

Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. York,
871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994) ........................................................................21

Wooley v. Schaffer,
447 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)……..16

Statutes and Constitutions:

Tex. Const. art. I § 3.................................................................................................19
Tex. Const. art. I § 13...............................................................................................20
Tex. Const. art. I § 19...............................................................................................19
Tex. Const. art. V, § 1 ................................................................................................4
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.017(b) ...................................................................................21
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.072(b)(2) ................................................................. in passim
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.073 .......................................................................................23
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.106........................................................................................21
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.107(a) ..................................................................................21
Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034 .....................................................................................21
Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1 .........................................................................................16, 18
Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 1.06(W) .............................................................................25
Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 2.12 ....................................................................................25
Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 17.09 ............................................................................24, 25

Other Sources:

Chief Justice James Blacklock, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MRsf5Vz4M-c (Feb. 26, 2025)……..12

vii
TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellant Edward Randolph Turnbull IV (“Appellant” or “Mr. Turnbull”)

respectfully submits this reply brief in support of his appeal from the trial court’s

orders dismissing his claims. Appellees’ response briefs fail to refute Mr. Turnbull’s

standing to maintain suit or demonstrate that Appellees are entitled to immunity as

to any of his claims. For the reasons Mr. Turnbull discussed in his opening brief and

those addressed below, the trial court’s orders should be reversed.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Mr. Turnbull is a criminal defense attorney from Houston. CR 9. He and his

law firm, Turnbull Legal Group (“TLG”), represent defendants charged with crimes

in courts across Texas. Id. For several years, TLG subscribed to Microsoft

Corporation’s OneDrive cloud service to store important documents and data,

including case-critical attorney work product and discovery received from the State.

Id.

In October 2019, without prior notice or any warning, Microsoft denied TLG

access to all data that had been stored on its OneDrive account and remotely

removed all of TLG’s data from its in-office computer hard drive. CR 9–10. This

devastated Mr. Turnbull’s ability to serve his clients. Id. After almost three weeks

of non-responsive replies from Microsoft, Mr. Turnbull and TLG filed suit and

obtained a temporary restraining order against Microsoft. CR 10.

1
In retaliation for Mr. Turnbull’s pursuit of civil recourse against Microsoft,

for its improper denial and remote seizure of TLG’s data and subsequent refusal to

return the data, Microsoft took a series of actions that affect Mr. Turnbull and TLG’s

staff and attorneys to this day. First, Microsoft’s attorneys threatened Mr. Turnbull

with criminal charges and bar complaints and threatened to file public pleadings

claiming Mr. Turnbull possessed and publicized child pornography. CR 13–14.

Next, Microsoft’s attorneys filed publicly accessible pleadings containing those false

and baseless allegations, claiming that Mr. Turnbull shared or made public images

of child exploitation imagery, and that those images were being preserved for a

criminal investigation and bar complaint. Id. Microsoft’s attorneys did so despite

knowing that those allegations were patently false, that the disputed OneDrive data

was unknowingly received by TLG from state prosecutors in the ordinary course of

discovery as part of a 3000+ page “phone dump”, and the data did not contain any

illegal images. CR 11.

In addition, to date (and more than five years later), Microsoft and their

attorneys have repeatedly refused to communicate and correct erroneous and

knowingly false reports Microsoft made to the National Center for Missing and

Exploited Children (NCMEC) claiming that Mr. Turnbull and TLG’s staff and

attorneys possessed and publicized child pornography. CR 16–17. Consequently,

those false reports remain with the federal and state agencies NCMEC regularly

2
shares information with, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration

and Customs, the Postal Inspection Service, and the Secret Service. Id.

This egregious campaign violated multiple provisions of the Texas

Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”). In February 2021, Mr.

Turnbull turned to the State Bar of Texas (“State Bar”), comprised of the Board of

Directors, the Commission for Lawyer Discipline (“CFLD”), the Board of

Disciplinary Appeals (“BODA”), the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel

(“CDC”), and other State Bar staff to report Microsoft’s attorneys’ professional

misconduct. Mr. Turnbull filed grievances with the CDC demonstrating that

Microsoft’s attorneys violated Texas’s disciplinary rules.

There were various administrative failures in how Appellees—including the

CDC, various State Bar officials, and the CFLD—processed his grievances:

1. Mr. Turnbull’s initial grievances were dismissed without a full

explanation as to why they were dismissed, in contravention of Texas

law;

2. The CDC dismissed Mr. Turnbull’s grievances that Microsoft’s

attorneys misrepresented the truth and were dishonest in their pleadings

filed with a court, but, less than one year later, the CDC instituted

disciplinary petitions against Sydney Powell, Attorney General Ken

3
Paxton, and First Assistant Attorney General Brent Webster based on

the exact same category of misconduct;

3. The CDC wrongly treated Mr. Turnbull’s subsequent grievances, which

alleged additional and distinct allegations of misconduct, as one

collective grievance and dismissed them;

4. The CDC thereafter arbitrarily refused to accept Mr. Turnbull’s

amended grievances, in contravention of Texas law; and

5. The Assistant Disciplinary Counsel for the CDC who handled Mr.

Turnbull’s case failed to disclose a conflict of interest when he

dismissed Mr. Turnbull’s grievances (that he was previously employed

by the firm that was representing Microsoft in the related bar

proceedings Mr. Turnbull filed in the state of Washington) and

discriminated against Mr. Turnbull based on his political views.

INTRODUCTION

Under the Texas Constitution, the Supreme Court of Texas has the inherent

authority to regulate the Texas judiciary, including the practice of law. In re Nolo

Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. 1999); TEX. CONST. ART. V, § 1.

Working together with the Supreme Court, the Texas Legislature enacted the State

Bar Act in 1939 and therein created the State Bar of Texas to address the “growing

demand upon the part of the public and the lawyers of this State” for the regulation

4
and governance of the “legal profession and the professional conduct of attorneys.”

Act of Apr. 6, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 1, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 64. As one Texas

appellate court summarized:

[T]he State Bar Act was intended to result in a new and comprehensive
system regulating the practice of law in Texas. The intent and purpose
of the Legislature was to provide for a full and comprehensive set of
laws to cover completely the practice of law, and regulation of and
disciplining of lawyers…The State Bar Act is purely a creature of
statute, prescribing the machinery and procedure by which the State Bar
has been empowered to bring and maintain [disciplinary proceedings].
But for the statute, the State Bar and [its subsidiaries] would have no
existence.

McGregor v. Clawson, 506 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1974, no writ)

(internal citations omitted). The State Bar Act has been amended numerous times in

its 86-year existence, including the addition of rights afforded to complainants. See,

e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.072(b)(2) (entitling complainants to a “full explanation”

upon dismissal of their complaint).

This case concerns Appellees’ failure to protect complainants’ rights. Their

briefing, however, improperly shifts focus away from the actual legal issues before

the Court. By bogging this litigation down in jurisdictional limbo, Appellees seek to

prevent the merits of Mr. Turnbull’s claims from ever being reached. Of course, no

one disputes that subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the power of a court to

decide the case, Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443

(Tex. 1993), but that is no obstacle to the full airing of Mr. Turnbull’s claims. He

5
affirmatively established standing and his claims are not barred by immunity. The

district court erred in finding otherwise.

ARGUMENT

I. Mr. Turnbull Has Established Standing.

Standing is an inherent part of subject matter jurisdiction, and in determining

whether the plaintiff has established standing, the court must “construe the pleadings

in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader’s intent.” Id. at 446 (emphasis

added). In each of their briefs, Appellees ignore this fundamental principle of Texas

jurisprudence and, instead mischaracterize Mr. Turnbull’s claims as failure-to-

prosecute claims rather than the stated basis of his claims: Appellees’ refusal to

follow their statutorily mandated authority and intentional discrimination against

Mr. Turnbull. Both have led Mr. Turnbull to suffer legally cognizable injuries that

can be redressed by the relief that he has sought.

A. Mr. Turnbull’s injuries are neither speculative nor based on
prosecutorial discretion.

To satisfy the first prong of standing, Mr. Turnbull must plead that he suffered

some concrete, particularized, non-hypothetical injury. Heckman v. Williamson

Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154–55 (Tex. 2012) (holding that constitutional harms are

sufficient to satisfy the injury prong of standing). Mr. Turnbull did just that.

Appellees, as entities and actors within a legislatively created agency, are

bound by the statute that created their existence—the State Bar Act. See Apollo

6
Enters., Inc. v. ScripNet, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 848, 859 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no

pet.). Accordingly, Appellees are bound to follow the Legislature’s mandate in the

State Bar Act that Appellees give complainants, like Mr. Turnbull, a “full

explanation” upon the dismissal of their grievance. TEX. GOV’T CODE

§§ 81.072(b)(2). It is from Appellees’ refusal to follow their statutory and

constitutional mandate that Mr. Turnbull suffered harm.

To get around this, Appellees again consistently mischaracterize Mr.

Turnbull’s claims as complaints about “nonprosecution.” Hodgkins Br. 12; SBA Br.

11; CFLD Br. 40. Contrary to Appellees’ assertion, however, Mr. Turnbull’s

Original Petition identified various, specific actions actually taken—or not taken—

by Appellees that Mr. Turnbull alleges injured him. See CR 28 (Appellees “failed to

provide a full and fair explanation”), 29 (Appellees “refused to act in an open and

fair manner” and “acted arbitrarily because they have denied Mr. Turnbull the

recommendation/reasoning for their determination that they would provide to other

similarly situated complainants”), 30 (Appellees did not provide a “transparent

disciplinary proceeding”).

Importantly, nowhere in the above-outlined allegations did Mr. Turnbull

complain of the prosecutorial outcome of his grievances. Rather, because Mr.

Turnbull identified conduct actually taken by Appellees that violated his

constitutional rights, Mr. Turnbull has satisfied the “injury” prong of standing.

7
B. Mr. Turnbull complains solely of Appellees’ conduct.

To satisfy the second prong of standing, Mr. Turnbull must plead facts that

trace his alleged injuries to the Appellees’ conduct, as opposed to those of a third

party. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155. Mr. Turnbull did just that.

Appellees are required to follow the provisions of the State Bar Act and the

Texas Constitution. See Apollo Enters., Inc., 301 S.W.3d at 859. This includes

Appellees’ obligation to fully comply with the Legislature’s mandate that

complainants, like Mr. Turnbull, are given a “full explanation” upon the dismissal

of their grievance. TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 81.072(b)(2) (emphasis added).

To get around this, Appellees construe Mr. Turnbull’s complaints as against

Microsoft’s attorneys rather than Appellees. See, e.g., SBA Br. 15–16. Not so. Mr.

Turnbull has alleged that: (i) Appellee Brannon failed to disclose his conflict of

interest and subsequently told Mr. Turnbull that the CDC placed his grievances on

the summary disposition docket [CR 19]; (ii) Appellee Baldwin informed Mr.

Turnbull that the summary disposition panel dismissed his grievances [CR 20]; (iii)

Appellee Reynolds informed Mr. Turnbull that the CDC denies Mr. Turnbull’s

public information request regarding his grievances and their dismissal [CR 20]; (iv)

Appellee Grosz informed Mr. Turnbull that the CDC dismissed his new grievances

[CR 22]; (v) Appellee Hodgkins informed Mr. Turnbull that BODA affirmed the

dismissal of his grievances, told Mr. Turnbull that BODA’s decision was final and

8
denied Mr. Turnbull his right to amend his grievances, in violation of the Texas

Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (“TRDP”) [CR 22]; (vi) Appellee Martinez returned

Mr. Turnbull’s amended grievances and informed Mr. Turnbull that he would not be

permitted to amend or refile his grievances [CR 23]; and (vii) Appellees CDC and

CFLD, including Appellee Willing, Appellee Brannon, and Appellee Kates, refused

to provide Mr. Turnbull his statutory right to a “full explanation” as to why his

grievances were dismissed and why Mr. Turnbull was denied his statutory right to

amend or appeal his grievances, why he was intentionally treated differently than

other similarly-situated complainants, and why the attorney discipline system was

used to cloud in secrecy its arbitrary, capricious, and political decision making

process [CR 25–27].

To be sure, the misconduct of Microsoft’s attorneys brought Mr. Turnbull to

Appellees in the first place. However, it is the conduct of Appellees—not

Microsoft’s attorneys—from whom Mr. Turnbull seeks relief. That brings this case

squarely within Heckman’s reach. After all, in Heckman, the Supreme Court held

that a breach in legislative duties is traceable to the state actor or agency responsible

for carrying out that legislative duty. 369 S.W.3d at 157. Furthermore, the Supreme

Court noted that the traceability prong of standing does not require the plaintiff to

show exactly what responsibility the defendants bear for his alleged injuries but,

9
instead, only requires the plaintiff to show that his injuries are fairly traceable to the

defendants. Id.

Appellees attempt to distinguish Heckman, claiming that any mandate by the

Legislature in the State Bar Act applies only to the Supreme Court, not Appellees.

See, e.g., CFLD Br. 46. In other words, Appellees inexplicably advocate for Mr.

Turnbull to file suit against the Supreme Court itself. Id. at 45. Nothing in Texas

jurisprudence supports that strange outcome.

As the traceability prong of standing requires, Mr. Turnbull has identified the

proper defendants because Mr. Turnbull has pointed to specific conduct taken by

each Appellee that resulted in Mr. Turnbull’s constitutional harm. As the Supreme

Court stated in Heckman, whether or not Appellees bear ultimate responsibility for

Mr. Turnbull’s harms is irrelevant because Mr. Turnbull need not prevail on the

merits of his claims at this stage of the litigation. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 157.

Rather, Mr. Turnbull need only show that his injuries are fairly traceable to

Appellees’ conduct. Id. By identifying the specific and independent actions taken by

each Appellee that violated their statutorily and constitutionally mandated duties,

Mr. Turnbull has satisfied the traceability prong of standing.

C. Maintaining suit is Mr. Turnbull’s only means of redress.

To satisfy the final prong of standing, Mr. Turnbull need only prove that there

is a “substantial likelihood” that his requested relief will remedy his alleged injury.

10
Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155–56 (holding that “mathematical certainty” is not

required). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that constitutional violations by

the State may be remedied by injunctive relief. Id. at 158; City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226

S.W.3d 390, 391 (Tex. 2007). Mr. Turnbull did just that by requesting injunctive

relief.

In Heckman, the Supreme Court held that because the plaintiff’s requested

injunction would “in some way” redress his alleged injuries, the plaintiff satisfied

the redressability prong of standing. 369 S.W.3d at 159. Like the plaintiff in

Heckman, Mr. Turnbull seeks injunctive relief against the government to prevent the

government from continuing to violate his constitutional rights. See CR 31–33.

Specifically, Mr. Turnbull requested injunctive relief for Appellees to re-open the

grievances, investigate the grievances fairly, and provide Mr. Turnbull with a full,

fair, and complete explanation of the decision—whatever decision—it makes. CR

31. Contrary to Appellees’ insistence, such relief would not compel Appellees to

make any prosecutorial decision. SBA Br. 16. Rather, Appellees would simply be

required to comply with the law as it is already written, which they failed to do.

Without relief from a federal or state court, Mr. Turnbull would be left with

no forum to seek redress for Appellees’ unconstitutional weaponization of the

attorney discipline system—a fact recently acknowledged by Chief Justice

Blacklock:

11
It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the State Bar remain
completely politically neutral in everything it does, both as a matter of
substance and as a matter of the perception that its actions give to
people on both sides of the aisle. The Supreme Court will accept
nothing less from the State Bar, and we expect the Bar to live up to that
high standard.

Chief Justice James Blacklock, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MRsf5Vz4M-c (Feb. 26, 2025) (emphasis

added). Because injunctive relief would remedy the constitutional harms Appellees

caused Mr. Turnbull, Mr. Turnbull has satisfied the redressability prong of standing.

D. Appellees misplace reliance on Linda R.S., Martinez, and Lefebure.

To all this, Appellees largely defer to three federal cases: Linda R.S.,

Martinez, and Lefebure. But the holdings in those cases are based on facts easily

distinguishable from those presented here, and thus, the Court should decline to

follow them.

First, Appellees cherry-pick 52-year-old dicta from Linda R.S. v. Richard D.

to support their arguments. See Hodgkins Br. 13; SBA Br. 11–13; CFLD Br. 41, 43.

At issue was whether a mother had standing to force a district attorney to initiate a

criminal prosecution against her child’s father for failure to pay child support. Linda

R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 614 (1973). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the

mother lacked standing because she “failed to allege a sufficient nexus between her

injury and the government action which she attacks to justify judicial intervention.”

Id. at 617–18. This was because she “made no showing that her failure to secure
12
support payments”—the injury-in-fact she claimed—“results from the

nonenforcement, as to her child’s father.” Id. at 618. And that was because the statute

created a completed offense with a fixed penalty, so “if appellant were granted the

requested relief, it would result only in the jailing of the child’s father.” Id. After

announcing this holding, the court added in language best understood as elaboration,

if not outright dicta, 1 that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in

the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Id. at 619.

Unlike the plaintiff in Linda R.S., Mr. Turnbull does not seek to compel the

prosecution of Microsoft’s attorneys. Rather, Mr. Turnbull seeks only to require

Appellees to follow the procedures and the law they are required to follow. CR 31–

33. Further, unlike in Linda R.S., Mr. Turnbull’s requested relief would actually

remedy his injuries.

Second, Appellees rely on the Fifth Circuit’s unpublished opinion 2 in

Martinez. See Hodgkins Br. 13; SBA Br. 13–14, 16, 32; CFLD Br. 41, 43, 51, 68. In

Martinez, after the State Bar allowed a convicted criminal’s defense attorney to file

a late response to his grievance, the convicted criminal sued the State Bar, alleging

1
Five years later, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that Linda R.S. was a redressability
decision, noting that “standing was denied not because of the absence of a subject-matter nexus
between the injury asserted and the constitutional claim, but instead because of the unlikelihood
that the relief requested would redress appellant’s claimed injury.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 n.24 (1978).
2
Unpublished Fifth Circuit opinions “are not precedent, except under the doctrine of res
judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case (or similarly to show double jeopardy, notice,
sanctionable conduct, entitlement to attorney’s fees, or the like).” 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
13
that had the State Bar not done so, the attorney would have been found guilty of

professional misconduct and would have resulted in his conviction being overturned.

Martinez v. State Bar of Tex., 797 Fed. Appx. 167, 167–68 (5th Cir. 2020)

(unpublished). The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that the convicted criminal, acting

pro se, lacked standing because he failed to point to any statutory or constitutional

provision preventing the State Bar from allowing and considering a late response.

Id. at 167.

Unlike the plaintiff in Martinez, who made broad and vague assertions of

constitutional harm, Mr. Turnbull has identified specific statutory provisions that

Appellees willfully refused to follow, resulting in constitutional harm to Mr.

Turnbull. Furthermore, unlike the plaintiff in Martinez, who speculatively claimed

his conviction would have been overturned had the State Bar prosecuted his attorney,

Mr. Turnbull does not complain of the prosecutorial outcome but, rather,

Appellees’ willful refusal to follow the requisite procedures and the law.

Finally, Appellees rely on the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Lefebure. See

Hodgkins Br 12; 11–12, 14–16; CFLD Br. 43. There, the plaintiff sued the local

district attorney to compel him to investigate and prosecute the man who sexually

assaulted her for his crimes. Lefebure v. D’Aquilla, 15 F.4th 650, 651–52 (5th Cir.

2021). The Fifth Circuit, relying on the above-identified dicta in Linda R.S., held

that the plaintiff lacked standing because she did not have “a legally cognizable

14
interest in how others,” such as her rapist, are treated by the government. Id.

(emphasis in original).

That holding was controversial. It resulted in a forceful dissent, which

distinguished failure-to-prosecute claims (for which plaintiffs lack standing) from

claims of failure to protect, an independent equal protection violation. Id. at 664

(Graves, J., dissenting). In the dissent’s view, the plaintiff “articulate[d] a failure-to-

protect injury that we have recognized for at least twenty years—and one that

invokes the original concerns of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 668 (Graves, J.,

dissenting).

Even accepting the rule in Lebefure for purposes of resolving this appeal, its

holding is still distinguishable. Unlike the plaintiff in Lefebure, Mr. Turnbull does

not seek to compel the prosecution of Microsoft’s attorneys. See CR 31–33.

Moreover, while the relief requested by the plaintiff in Lefebure would not have

redressed her injuries , Mr. Turnbull’s relief would redress his injuries because it

is Appellees’ failure to follow the requisite procedures that caused his constitutional

harms.

*****

Because Mr. Turnbull (i) does not seek to compel the prosecution of

Microsoft’s attorneys, (ii) has identified specific statutory and constitution

provisions Appellees violated, and (iii) has pointed to requested relief that would

15
simply require Appellees to follow their already-mandated authority, Linda R.S.,

Martinez, and Lefebure are inapposite and should be distinguished by the Court.

Surely Appellees do not contend that the Texas judiciary cannot compel state actors,

like Appellees, to follow their clearly defined statutory and constitutional

obligations.

II. Mr. Turnbull’s Claims Are Based in Both Law and Fact.

Though Appellees urge this Court to hold otherwise, Mr. Turnbull’s claims

are not baseless. A proceeding is baseless when it lacks an arguable basis in law or

fact. Johnson v. Lynaugh, 796 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam). In

determining whether a claim is baseless, the Court must construe the pleadings

liberally in favor of Mr. Turnbull, look to his intent, and accept as true the factual

allegation in his pleadings to determine if his claims have a basis in law or fact.

Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet.

denied). Because a reasonable person could believe Mr. Turnbull’s allegations and

his claims are not legally foreclosed, the district court erred in finding that Mr.

Turnbull’s suit is frivolous.

A. A reasonable person could believe Mr. Turnbull’s allegations.

Mr. Turnbull’s claims lack a basis in law if “no reasonable person could

believe the facts” that he pleaded. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; Longhorn Creek Ltd. v.

Gardens of Connemara Ltd., 686 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, pet.

16
filed). Irrelevant in this determination is whether Mr. Turnbull’s claims are likely or

outlandish. Id. (quoting Drake v. Walker, No. 05-14-00355-CV, 2015 WL 2160565,

at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)). This threshold is so

low and, therefore, it “seldom rises to a point of contention in the case law.” Id. at

425 (quoting Davis v. Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co., No. 05-21-00092-CV, 2023 WL

3735115, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2023, no pet.)).

Mr. Turnbull has alleged that: (i) Appellee Brannon failed to disclose his

conflict of interest and subsequently told Mr. Turnbull that the CDC placed his

grievances on the summary disposition docket [CR 19]; (ii) Appellee Baldwin

informed Mr. Turnbull that the summary disposition panel dismissed his grievances

[CR 20]; (iii) Appellee Reynolds informed Mr. Turnbull that the CDC denies Mr.

Turnbull’s public information request regarding his grievances and their dismissal

[CR 20]; (iv) Appellee Grosz informed Mr. Turnbull that the CDC dismissed his

new grievances [CR 22]; (v) Appellee Hodgkins informed Mr. Turnbull that BODA

affirmed the dismissal of his grievances, told Mr. Turnbull that BODA’s decision

was final and denied Mr. Turnbull his right to amend his grievances, in violation of

the TRDP [CR 22]; (vi) Appellee Martinez returned Mr. Turnbull’s amended

grievances and informed Mr. Turnbull that he would not be permitted to amend or

refile his grievances [CR 23]; and (vii) Appellees CDC and CFLD, including

Appellee Willing, Appellee Brannon, and Appellee Kates, refused to provide Mr.

17
Turnbull his statutory right to an explanation as to why his grievances were

dismissed, denied Mr. Turnbull his statutory right to amend or appeal his grievances,

intentionally treated Mr. Turnbull differently than other similarly-situated

complainants, and used the attorney discipline system to cloud in secrecy its

arbitrary, capricious, and political decision making process [CR 25–27].

Appellees—and only Appellees—could have taken the actions alleged by Mr.

Turnbull because Appellees are the very entities and actors charged with overseeing

the attorney discipline system. Therefore, a reasonable person could believe Mr.

Turnbull’s allegations. Therefore, contrary to Appellees’ insistence, Mr. Turnbull’s

claims have a basis in fact.

B. Mr. Turnbull’s claims are not legally foreclosed.

Similarly, Mr. Turnbull’s claims lack a basis in law only if his allegations

taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle

him to his requested relief. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. In other words, “the defendant

must establish the plaintiff’s claims are ‘foreclose[d] as a matter of law.” Longhorn

Creek Ltd., 686 S.W.3d at 426 (quoting In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2021, orig. proceeding [mand. denied])). However, if nothing in

the pleadings “trigger a clear legal bar” to the claims, then the claims are not

frivolous. In re RNDC Tex., LLC, No. 05-18-00555-CV, 2018 WL 27773262, at *1

(Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

18
Mr. Turnbull’s due course of law, equal protection, and open courts claims

are not legally foreclosed as they are based on specific provisions of the Texas

Constitution. First, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that Appellees failed to provide him a

full explanation upon the dismissal of his grievances, as required by the State Bar

Act, and did not allow Mr. Turnbull to amend his grievances as required by law. CR

20–27. Because Mr. Turnbull’s allegations are based on article I section 19 of the

Texas Constitution, which forbids Appellees, as an arm of the State, from depriving

Mr. Turnbull of “life, liberty, property, privileges, or immunities” without “due

course of the law of the land,” TEX. CONST. art. I § 19, his due course of law claim

is based in law.

Second, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that Appellees used the attorney discipline

system to treat him differently from similarly situated complainants. CR 26–27.

Because Mr. Turnbull’s allegations are based on article I section 3 of the Texas

Constitution, which forbids Appellees, as an arm of the State, from treating similarly

situated persons differently, TEX. CONST. art. I § 3, Mr. Turnbull’s equal protection

claim is based in law.

Finally, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that Appellees failed to provide Mr.

Turnbull a full explanation upon dismissal of his grievances, prohibited him from

amending his grievances, and failed to ensure that the State Bar and its subsidiaries

and actors followed their statutory and constitutional obligations. CR 20–27.

19
Because Mr. Turnbull’s allegations are based on article I section 13 of the Texas

Constitution, which forbids Appellees, as an arm of the State, from unreasonably

restricting his access to the judicial system, TEX. CONST. art. I § 13, Mr. Turnbull’s

open courts claim is based in law.

Appellees argue that even if the Court were to let Mr. Turnbull to proceed to

the next phase of litigation, he ultimately cannot prevail on his claims against them.

However, at this stage in the litigation, Mr. Turnbull need not conclusively prove

that he is entitled to recover on the merits of his claims. Rather, Mr. Turnbull need

only show that his claims are not baseless or legally foreclosed. Because immunity

does not bar his claims, as discussed infra, and because Mr. Turnbull’s claims are

based on Appellees’ willful abridgement of specifically identified rights provided to

Mr. Turnbull by the Texas Constitution, Mr. Turnbull’s due course of law, equal

protection, and open courts claims are based in law and should have survived

Appellees’ motions to dismiss in the trial court.

III. Immunity Does Not Bar Mr. Turnbull’s Claims.

Sovereign immunity deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t

of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Though

Appellees, as an arm of the State, are generally immune from suit, Tex. Parks &

Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011), sovereign

immunity does not protect Appellees from a lawsuit for injunctive relief or where

20
the Legislature waived immunity. Tex. Nat’l Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74

S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034; Univ. of Tex. Med.

Branch at Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994). Furthermore,

absolute immunity does not bar Mr. Turnbull’s claims because such immunity is

inapplicable to the failure to perform ministerial acts within Appellees’ scope of

authority.

A. The Legislature waived immunity in the State Bar Act.

Sovereign immunity may be legislatively waived by “clear and unambiguous

language.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034; Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v.

York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. 1994). The Legislature did so here in the State Bar

Act by intentionally excluding Appellees from its grant of immunity.

Specifically, the Legislature expressly provided immunity to complainants,

witnesses, and persons associated with the unauthorized practice of law committee.

TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 81.072, .106. Notably, this list excludes Appellees.

Additionally, no amount of wordplay by Appellees can skew the fact that the

Legislature limited the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of the State Bar of Texas

to the State Bar itself and not any other entity or state actors “other than the state

bar.” Id. § 81.107(a). Finally, the Legislature limited the liability of the State Bar of

Texas to nonmonetary relief but otherwise allowed for relief in the form of

declaratory and injunctive relief. See id. § 81.017(b).

21
Accordingly, the Legislature waived sovereign immunity as applied to

Appellees and, contrary to Appellees’ insistence otherwise, had the Legislature

believed it necessary to clearly provide immunity to Appellees, the Legislature

would have done so at any point over the last 85 years of the State Bar Act’s reign.

B. Sovereign immunity does bar injunctive relief from constitutional
harms.

Even if the Court holds that the Legislature did not waive sovereign immunity

for Appellees in the State Bar Act, Texas law is crystal clear that Appellees cannot

avail themselves of sovereign immunity against claims for injunctive relief from

constitutional harm. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Holmes, 294 S.W.3d 328,

334 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. denied) (“Sovereign immunity does not shield a

governmental entity from suit for equitable relief for a violation of constitutional

rights”); Tex. Nat’l Conservation Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d at 853.

Contrary to Appellees’ assertions, Mr. Turnbull did plead that Appellees are

not entitled to sovereign immunity in this case because of his constitutional harms.

CR 29. When a plaintiff alleges that a governmental entity or actor committed a

constitutional violation, the proper focus is on whether the plaintiff has pleaded a

facially viable claim, not whether the entity or actor performed a ministerial act.

Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emp. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2015).

To be sure, had Mr. Turnbull sought monetary relief from Appellees’ conduct,

Appellees would have been able to avail themselves of sovereign immunity.
22
However, because Mr. Turnbull seeks injunctive relief and his claims are based in

law and fact, as briefed supra, Appellees cannot avail themselves of sovereign

immunity in this case.

C. Ministerial acts are not protected by absolute immunity.

When a state actor failed to perform a ministerial duty, as Appellees did here,

absolute immunity does not apply. Univ. of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580

(Tex. 2000). A ministerial act is one for which “the law prescribes and defines the

duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the

exercise of discretion or judgment.” Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144

S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. 2004). The State Bar Act requires Appellees to provide

complainants, like Mr. Turnbull, a “full explanation” upon the dismissal of their

grievance. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.072(b). The State Bar Act requires Appellees to

provide complainants, like Mr. Turnbull, the opportunity to amend their grievance.

Id. § 81.073(b).

Importantly, the Legislature provided no discretion to Appellees on whether

or not to provide this full explanation or to allow amendments to a grievance.

Accordingly, Appellees’ obligations to follow these provisions were ministerial and,

therefore, not subject to immunity. Furthermore, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that

Appellees acted outside the scope of their authority by, among other things,

prohibiting Mr. Turnbull from amending his grievances, disallowing Mr. Turnbull

23
to amend his grievances, refusing to provide Mr. Turnbull a full explanation upon

the dismissal of his grievances, and intentionally treating him different that other

similarly situated complainants based on his political affiliation. CR 20–27.

Appellees took these actions deliberately and outside the scope of their legal

authority to do so. Therefore, Appellees cannot avail themselves of absolute

immunity.

D. Appellees are not entitled to immunity under the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Conduct.

Appellees rely heavily on TRDP 17.09 to evade accountability for their

lawlessness. That rule generally provides that Appellees are “immune from suit for

any conduct in the course of their official duties.” TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 17.09.

However, to determine whether such immunity applies in this case, this Court must

look to the “nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor performing

it.” Crampton v. Farris, 596 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019,

no pet.). Furthermore, activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of prosecution” may entitle a governmental entity or actor to immunity. Id.

Here, Mr. Turnbull has alleged that Appellees sued in their official capacity

refused to provide Mr. Turnbull his statutory right to a “full explanation” of why his

grievances were dismissed, denied Mr. Turnbull his statutory right to amend or

appeal his grievances, intentionally treated Mr. Turnbull differently than other

similarly-situated complainants, and used the attorney discipline to cloud in secrecy
24
its arbitrary, capricious, and political decision making process. CR 27–31.

Importantly, all of these actions were taken during the just cause determination stage

of the attorney disciplinary process, which is non-judicial and non-adversarial. TEX.

R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.06(W), 2.12. Because Mr. Turnbull’s grievances were

dismissed as part of a non-adversarial process, Appellees were not acting as part of

the “judicial phase of prosecution.”

Moreover, only the Legislature may grant absolute and unqualified immunity.

This Court must “defer to the Legislature as the gatekeeper controlling when and

how citizens can sue their state government or its officers for their official acts.”

Bacon v. Tex. Historical Comm’n, 411 S.W.3d 161, 173 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013,

no pet.) (emphasis added). This is because the Legislature is in the best position to

bestow absolute and unqualified immunity, not the judiciary.

Importantly, the apparent immunity provided by TRDP 17.09 was not granted

by the Legislature but, instead, the Supreme Court. Though Mr. Turnbull has argued

that the Supreme Court abridged the separation of powers doctrine by providing such

immunity, Appellees have not—and cannot—point to any provision within the State

Bar Act or any other statute that provides the same absolute and unqualified

immunity to the entire State Bar, including Appellees. Accordingly, Appellees

cannot reasonably hide behind a judicial rule to circumvent accountability for

violating their statutory and constitutional obligations.

25
IV. Alternatively, Mr. Turnbull should have the opportunity to replead.

In her brief, Ms. Hodgkins argues that Mr. Turnbull should not be allowed to

amend his pleadings if the Court were to affirm the trial court’s determination that

Mr. Turnbull’s claims against her are barred by sovereign immunity. However,

because any alleged defect could be cured on remand, Mr. Turnbull should be given

the opportunity to do so.

When courts grant a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity,

courts allow the plaintiff the opportunity to replead if the defect can be cured. Tex.

Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2011); Tex. A&M Univ. Sys.

v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2007) (plaintiff “deserves the opportunity to

amend his pleadings if the defects can be cured”). Ms. Hodgkins inappropriately

relies on Koseoglu to support her argument that Mr. Turnbull should not be given an

opportunity to replead. Hodgkins Br. 32.

In Koseoglu, a state employee sued a state university system and other state

defendants for breach of contract stemming from an employment dispute. Koseoglu,

233 S.W.3d at 838. The Supreme Court of Texas prevented the plaintiff from

repleading to “cure the jurisdictional defect” based on sovereign immunity because

the plaintiff’s only argument against sovereign immunity—that the state defendants

waived sovereign immunity by accepting benefits under the alleged employment

contract—had been “consistently rejected” by the court. Id. at 840 (citations

26
omitted). Because no additional repleading would be able to overcome sovereign

immunity for the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, remanding the case “would

serve no legitimate purpose.” Id.

By contrast, assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Turnbull’s claims against Ms.

Hodgkins are barred by sovereign and official immunity—which Mr. Turnbull

vehemently denies—Mr. Turnbull’s claims may be repleaded to cure such a pleading

defect. Unlike in Koseoglu, Mr. Turnbull’s claims are not wholly barred and may, if

required, be repleaded. Ms. Hodgkins’ immunity defense is based on her contention

that Mr. Turnbull sued her “in her official capacity for conduct taken in the course

of her official duties.” Hodgkins Br. 29, 32. Even if the Court were to adopt Ms.

Hodgkins’ view, Mr. Turnbull’s alleged failure to plead conduct taken outside Ms.

Hodgkins’ course of official duties is a factual defect, not a legal one (as in

Koseoglu).

Because any defects in his petition may be cured by repleading, Mr. Turnbull

should be afforded that opportunity.

CONCLUSION & PRAYER

Whether Mr. Turnbull will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claims is a

question appropriately reserved for the trial court in the first instance. It is not one

that this Court can or should reach. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d

229 (Tex. 2008) (“A plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he cannot

27
prevail on the merits of his claim; he lacks standing because his claim of injury is

too slight for a court to afford redress”). Rather, the Court need only decide whether

the laws of the State of Texas provide Mr. Turnbull an opportunity to explore his

claims through the discovery process.

Mr. Turnbull respectfully requests that this Court reverse each of the five

orders of the district court, remand the proceedings for discovery and eventual

resolution on the merits, and grant such other and further relief for which he may be

entitled.

28
DATE: March 10, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

WEST, WEBB, ALLBRITTON & GENTRY,
P.C.
1515 Emerald Plaza
College Station, Texas 77845
Telephone: (979) 694-7000
Facsimile: (979) 694-8000

By: /s Gaines West
GAINES WEST
State Bar No. 21197500
gaines.west@westwebblaw.com
JOHN “JAY” RUDINGER, JR.
State Bar No. 24067852
jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com

~ AND ~

JUDD E. STONE II
State Bar No. 24076720
judd@stonehilton.com
STONE HILTON PLLC
600 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350
Austin, Texas 7870
Telephone: (737) 465-3897

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

29
CERTIFCATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been served on the
following counsel of record on March 10, 2025.

Daniel J. Olds Via E-File
CLARK HILL PLC
901 Main Street, Suite 6000
Dallas, Texas 75202
dolds@clarkhill.com

Patrick W. Mizell Via E-File
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
845 Texas Avenue, Suite 4700
Houston, Texas 77002
pmizell@velaw.com

Royce LeMoine Via E-File
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
P.O. Box 12487, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
royce.lemoine@texasbar.com

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

/s Gaines West
GAINES WEST

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, I certify
that the foregoing document complies with the word count limitation of Rule 9.4(i).
It contains 6,534 total words, including any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1). In
making this Certificate of Compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by
Microsoft Word, the software used to prepare this document. This is a computer-
generated document using Times New Roman 14-point font.

/s Gaines West
GAINES WEST
30
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Billy Hart on behalf of Gaines West
Bar No. 21197500
billy.hart@westwebblaw.com
Envelope ID: 98275795
Filing Code Description: Brief Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: Appellant's Reply to Appellees' Briefs
Status as of 3/10/2025 3:51 PM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Pat Mizell pmizell@velaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Billy SHart billy.hart@westwebblaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Jay Rudinger jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

David Kitner 11541500 dkitner@clarkhill.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Jadd Masso 24041411 jmasso@clarkhill.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Royce Lemoine 24026421 royce.lemoine@texasbar.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Richard Huntpalmer 24097857 Richard.Huntpalmer@texasbar.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Gaines West 21197500 gaines.west@westwebb.law 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

John Rudinger 24067852 jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Judd Stone 24076720 Judd@stonehilton.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Daniel Olds 24088152 dolds@clarkhill.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Brooke Noble bnoble@velaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Michael Graham 24113581 Michael.Graham@TEXASBAR.COM 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Emily Bamesberger ebamesberger@velaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Justin B.Cox jbcox@clarkhill.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

Gaines West gaines.west@westwebblaw.com 3/10/2025 3:36:13 PM SENT

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823657. Public record. Not legal advice.