# Raja Development Co. v. Napa Sanitation District CA1/4

> California Court of Appeal · March 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823490

## Case

- **Court:** California Court of Appeal
- **Decided:** March 14, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

Filed 3/14/25 Raja Development Co. v. Napa Sanitation District CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

RAJA DEVELOPMENT CO.
INC. et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, A170777

v. (Napa County Super. Ct.
NAPA SANITATION No. 19CV000682)
DISTRICT,
Defendant and
Respondent;

COUNTY OF NAPA,
Real Party in Interest.

Plaintiffs Raja Development Co., Inc., Cashel, Inc., and
Carter Randall Callahan (plaintiffs) appeal an order denying
their motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5.1 We find no error and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In May 2019, plaintiffs filed the present action seeking a
refund of sewer service charges that they, as condominium
owners, paid to the Napa Sanitation District (the District). They

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of

Civil Procedure.
also sought to enjoin further collection of those charges.2 As
amended, their complaint alleged, among other things, that the
sewer service charge included a use fee for general operations,
general revenue purposes, and other non-capacity related
purposes, and that this fee was “an invalid tax because it exceeds
the reasonable cost of providing the service for which it is
charged, the District has not justified the fee with a nexus study,
and the fee has not been approved by two-thirds of voters.” (Raja
Development Co. v. Napa Sanitary Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 85,
91.) Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the use fee was
improperly calculated for townhomes and condominiums at the
same rate that was used to calculate the charges for single family
homes, rather than at the lesser rate charged for apartments,
and that the District had not justified the higher charges with a
rate study showing that the charges were limited to the cost of
providing the associated services as required by law. The
operative complaint omitted the cause of action seeking refunds
of the amounts that plaintiffs alleged had been illegally collected
because the court had previously sustained a demurrer to that
cause of action without leave to amend.
On October 31, 2023, the District moved for judgment on
the pleadings on the ground that plaintiffs’ claim was moot
because the ordinance challenged in the lawsuit was no longer in
effect. The District explained that the sewer service charges

2 The operative complaint names the District (erroneously

referred to as the Napa Sanitary District) as the defendant but
identifies Napa County as the real party in interest.

2
challenged in the litigation were imposed under the authority of
Ordinance 87, and that Ordinance 87 was superseded by
Ordinance 112, which was adopted by the District’s Board of
Directors on March 31, 2021 and took effect on July 1, 2021. The
motion further explained: “Ordinance 112 changed the rate
structure for the sewer service charges at issue based on a rate
study conducted in 2020. The District periodically commissions
such rate studies to ensure that sewer service charges properly
align with costs; revisiting the rates at this time was especially
appropriate given the fluctuating water demands due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The Rate Study analyzed, inter alia, the
cost of providing services to various types of dwellings—including
townhomes and condominiums—and the appropriate nexus
between these costs and the corresponding rates and fees charged
to customers. It determined that the [Equivalent Dwelling Unit]
ratios for townhomes and condominiums, as well as certain other
residential properties, should be adjusted over a five year
period.[3] Ordinance 112 reflects these recommendations, and,
accordingly, the sewer service charges for condominiums and
townhomes are no longer set at [the rates alleged in the
complaint].” Plaintiffs did not dispute that its claims were moot
but argued that a judgment should be entered in their favor since

3 An Equivalent Dwelling Unit is a measure defined under

Section 1.02.010 of the Napa Sanitation District Code as “the
combination of flow and strength of wastestream that is
equivalent to the waste discharged from a single family home.
This is often evaluated on a per day basis.”

3
the District had “taken all actions demanded in the []
Complaint.” The trial court disagreed and granted the motion.
On February 29, 2024, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking
approximately $700,000 in attorney fees under section 1021.5.
They claimed that, despite the fact that there was no judgment in
their favor, their lawsuit was “CLEARLY the catalyst for the
actions taken by the District” because the changes demanded by
plaintiffs were “made by the District in the middle of this
litigation.” The District opposed the motion, claiming that its
decision to conduct a rate study and later to change its rate
structure was motivated not by plaintiffs’ lawsuit but by a
separate administrative appeal brought by another entity
in 2016. The District argued further that even if plaintiffs had
established an entitlement to attorney fees, the amount of fees
claimed was not reasonable.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that it was
procedurally and substantively deficient.
DISCUSSION
“The Legislature adopted Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5, a codification of the private attorney general
doctrine, as an exception to the general rule that litigants are to
bear their own attorney fees. [Citation.] ‘ “[T]he private attorney
general doctrine ‘rests upon the recognition that privately
initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the
fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or
statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism
authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce

4
such important public policies will as a practical matter
frequently be infeasible.’ ” ’ [Citation.] The fundamental purpose
of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public
policies by rewarding attorneys who successfully prosecute such
cases and prevent worthy claimants from being silenced or stifled
by a lack of legal resources.” (Department of Water Resources
Environmental Impact Cases (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 556, 570–571
(Environmental Impact Cases).)
To qualify for fees under section 1021.5, a plaintiff must
show, among other things, that it is a successful party.
(Environmental Impact Cases, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 571.)
“Our Supreme Court has taken a ‘broad, pragmatic’ view of what
constitutes a successful party for purposes of Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5. [Citation.] The trial court ‘ “ ‘must
realistically assess the litigation and determine, from a practical
perspective, whether or not the action served to vindicate an
important right so as to justify an attorney fee award’ under
[Code of Civil Procedure] section 1021.5.” ’ [Citation.] [¶] It is not
necessary for a plaintiff to obtain a judgment in its favor to
qualify as a successful party. [Citation.] In Graham
[v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 560–561, 568
(Graham)], our Supreme Court endorsed the ‘catalyst theory’ of
attorney fees, under which plaintiffs may be considered
successful if their lawsuit caused the defendant to voluntarily
provide the relief sought. [Citation.] Under the catalyst theory,
attorney fees may be awarded even when litigation does not
result in a judicial resolution if the defendant voluntarily changes

5
its behavior substantially because of, and in the manner sought
by, the litigation.” (Environmental Impact Cases, supra, at
p. 571.)
A plaintiff moving for attorney fees under the catalyst
theory “must establish that (1) its ‘lawsuit was a catalyst
motivating the defendants to provide the primary relief sought’;
(2) ‘the lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by
threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of expense’;
and (3) it ‘reasonably attempted to settle the litigation prior to
filing the lawsuit.’ ” (Environmental Impact Cases, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 571–572.) “To satisfy the first (causation)
prong, the plaintiff need not show the litigation was the only
cause of defendant’s acquiescence. [Citation.] The litigation need
only be a ‘ “substantial factor” ’ contributing to the relief
obtained.” (Id. at p. 572.)
We review a trial court’s determination of whether a
litigant is a successful party under the catalyst theory party for
abuse of discretion. (Environmental Impact Cases, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 573.) “To determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion, we must review the entire record, paying
particular attention to the court’s stated reasons and whether it
applied the proper standards of law in reaching its decision.
[Citation.] ‘ “We accept the trial court’s resolution of credibility
and conflicting substantial evidence, and its choice of possible
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)

6
Here, the trial court found that: (1) plaintiffs failed to show
that they engaged in any attempts, let alone reasonable
attempts, to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit;
(2) plaintiffs provided only “conclusory argument that
Ordinance 112 achieves the relief that was demanded by
plaintiffs” but presented no evidence, by declaration or request
for judicial notice, “to show what their primary litigation
objective was and what action Defendants allegedly took to
achieve those objectives;” (3) plaintiffs failed to establish that
their lawsuit was the catalyst motivating the defendants to
provide the primary relief sought; and (4) plaintiffs failed to
establish that the lawsuit was meritorious and that they
achieved the catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of
nuisance and threat of expense.
Initially, we agree with the trial court’s characterization of
plaintiffs’ moving papers as procedurally deficient and their
argument as conclusory. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the
trial court raised their failure to address prelitigation settlement
sua sponte, and they argue that the allegations in their complaint
that they met with the staff of the District and detailed the issues
that would later be raised in the complaint were sufficient to
meet this requirement. But it is the burden of the moving party
to ensure that the moving papers support each element required
for relief. (City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362, 429 [a party moving for an attorney
fees award must establish each element for such an award in
order for their motion to be granted].) This they did not do.

7
Similarly, plaintiffs’ conclusory statements that the adoption of
Ordinance 112 necessarily proves the prior charges were illegal
and that the District conceded or admitted as much through or by
their actions is not sufficient to meet their burden as the moving
party. However, we need not rely on these additional grounds to
affirm the trial court’s order because, as discussed below, the
record establishes that the court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not a catalyst for the
District’s decision to conduct the 2020 rate study or enact
Ordinance 112.
On appeal, plaintiffs again rely solely on the chronology of
events to support their argument that the lawsuit was the
catalyst for the actions taken by the District. They argue:
“Plaintiffs’ Action sought 1) to compel the District either [to]
conduct a nexus study for the sewer fees charge or to put the
fee/tax on the ballot for approval, and 2) to adopt a fee for
townhomes and condominiums that is accurate and separate and
apart from the fee charged for single family residences. The
District had refused to take these actions for 44 years before the
Action was filed. Two years after the action was filed, the
District, for the very first time conducted the required nexus
study and establishing a separate fee for townhomes and
condominiums. Following the unprecedented study of rates for
townhomes and condominiums, the District then satisfied the
second demand of Plaintiffs by adopting a separate fee for
townhomes and condominiums which is lower than the fee
charged to single-family residences. The District, through these

8
actions, conceded that all of the allegations in the Third Amended
Complaint were true and corrected their illegal actions, for the
first time in almost half a century because of this action.”
This chronology of events was initially sufficient to raise an
inference that plaintiffs’ lawsuit motivated the District’s actions.
As the court explained in Environmental Impact Cases, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at pages 572–573, “[b]ecause defendants usually
are reluctant to concede that litigation induced them to provide
the relief sought, ‘[c]lues to the provocative effects of the
plaintiffs’ legal efforts are often best gleaned from the chronology
of events . . . .’ [Citations.] ‘When, after litigation is initiated, a
defendant has voluntarily provided the relief a plaintiff is
seeking, the chronology of events may raise an inference that the
litigation was the catalyst for the relief.’ [Citations.] This shifts
to the defendant the burden to produce evidence to rebut that
inference. [Citation.] The ultimate burden of proof, however,
remains on the claimant to establish each element of the statute.”
(See also Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 573 [defendant “knows
better than anyone why it made the decision that granted the
plaintiff the relief sought, and the defendant is in the best
position to either concede that the plaintiff was a catalyst or to
document why the plaintiff was not”]; Californians for
Responsible Toxics Management v. Kizer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d
961, 969 [credible evidence submitted by defendant may “suffice
to rebut the presumption of causation raised solely by the
chronology of events”].)

9
Here, the District submitted a declaration by its General
Manager, who explained that he served as the District’s Senior
Civil Engineer / Capital Projects Manager from April 2013 to
August 2016 and as Technical Services Director from
August 2016 to April 2023, and that in those roles he was
responsible for reviewing the District’s annual sewer service
charges. His declaration asserts that the District’s 2020 rate
study and the subsequent changes enacted by Ordinance 112
were motivated by an assessment appeal filed in 2016 by the
management company operating the Oaktree Vineyard Mobile
Home Park (Oaktree Vineyard) and that “neither the 2020 rate
study nor Ordinance 112 were influenced by this lawsuit.” The
declaration sets out in significant detail and with supporting
documentary evidence the following history of the 2016 Oak
Vineyard appeal and how it motivated the District to adjust its
sewer charges: In April 2016, Oaktree Vineyard applied for
review of a determination by the District that the manufactured
homes at Oaktree Vineyard did not qualify as mobile homes
under state statutes and thus, that they should be assessed fees
at the same rate as single family homes and not mobile homes.
The declarant states that he reviewed this application as part of
his job duties and, based on his review of Oaktree Vineyard’s
water usage, “determined that Oaktree Vineyard’s water usage
was more akin to the water usage for mobile homes in the area
than it was to the water usage for single family homes.” In
July 2016, based on the declarant’s report and testimony, the

10
District approved the application and reduced Oaktree
Vineyard’s sewer service charges.
The declaration continues: “Because the Oaktree Vineyard
appeal revealed a discrepancy between water usage and
wastewater generation on the one hand, and residential unit
classification and sewer service charges on the other hand, with
respect to the homes at issue in that appeal, I recommended to
[the District’s] management shortly after the appeal that [it]
conduct a further study of water usage and wastewater
generation from different types of residential and commercial
unit types, to assess whether other such discrepancies existed.”
The District’s management agreed with his recommendation and
“determined that [the District] should broaden its next cost of
service analysis to include consideration of a wider range of
residential and commercial unit types, to study the alignment of
water usage and wastewater generation with residential and
commercial unit classification and charges in the most
economical manner.”
According to the declaration, the District conducts rate
studies every five years and the next rate study was scheduled to
take place in 2020. The declarant explained, “we planned to
include wider range of residential and commercial unit types in
the 2020 rate study” but did not “plan for a rate study to be done
outside the regular schedule, in part because conducting a rate
study requires a process to select an appropriate vendor and
requires budgeting time and money to complete the analysis
(including a fair amount of staff time). Because we had recently

11
finished a rate study and had another planned to take place in
about three years, and because the expanded analysis we
planned would be complex and would take time to develop, I
believed and [the District’s] management determined in the
course of our discussions in 2016 that it would be more efficient
to add these expanded issues to the 2020 rate study rather than
trying to put together budget and proposal for a study prior to
that time. [¶] When it came time for the Board to commission the
2020 rate study, . . . we recommended that the rate study include
a wider variety of residential and commercial unit types than
those typically included in [the District’s] cost of service analyses.
The Board accepted this recommendation, and on March 4, 2020,
the Board approved a consultant contract for the 2020 rate
study.”
The 2020 rate study “analyzed the cost of providing services
to various types of residential and commercial unit types and the
appropriate nexus between these costs and the corresponding
rates and fees charged to customers” and “concluded that the []
ratios for certain residential properties should be adjusted over a
five-year period.” On March 31, 2021, the District adopted
Ordinance 112, which amended applicable provisions of the
municipal code “to change the rate structure for certain
residential properties as recommended by the 2020 rate study.”
The declarant concludes that “[t]he changes the Board made to
residential sewer service charges would have occurred regardless
of this lawsuit, in my opinion, because through my involvement
in [the District’s] assessment of the [Oaktree Vineyard appeal]

12
and in [the District’s] subsequent discussions and determinations
about the scope of the 2020 rate study, and as one of the persons
responsible for that study, I am aware that [the District] had
already put these changes into motion beginning in 2016.”
The trial court reasonably concluded that any inference
that plaintiffs’ litigation was the catalyst for the District’s actions
based on the chronology of events was rebutted by the District’s
evidence submitted in opposition to the motion. Plaintiffs’
arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
On appeal, plaintiffs repeat, almost verbatim, their
argument in the trial court that the declaration was inadmissible
because “the legislative thought process privilege prohibits staff
statements regarding the intent of the legislative body.” They
cite Regents of Univ. of California v. Superior Court (1990)
20 Cal.4th 509, 540, in which the court held that “[u]nder the
deliberative thought process privilege, senior officials of all three
branches of government enjoy a qualified, limited privilege not to
disclose or be examined concerning not only the mental processes
by which a given decision was reached, but the substance of
conversations, discussions, debates, deliberations and like
material reflecting advice, opinions, and recommendations by
which government policy is processed and formulated.” The trial
court, however, overruled plaintiffs’ objection on the ground that,
because the District is the holder of the deliberative process
privilege, its “decision to include evidence of their motivation
behind adopting Ordinance 112 is better classified as a waiver of
that privilege, rather than a violation of the privilege.”

13
Plaintiffs have made no attempt to challenge the trial
court’s conclusion or explain why the general rule that the
“holder of the privilege” is the person entitled to claim or waive it
does not apply. The issue has therefore been forfeited. (Telish v.
State Personnel Bd. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1487, fn. 4.) In
any event, the trial court was correct. (See, e.g., Evid. Code,
§ 912 [“the right of any person to claim a privilege . . . is waived
with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any
holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a
significant part of the communication or has consented to
disclosure made by anyone”]; Citizens for Open Government v.
City of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 306 [“The burden is on
the [one claiming the deliberative process privilege] to establish
the conditions for creation of the privilege”].)
Plaintiffs also argue summarily that the “only purpose of
the [] Declaration is to establish the motives and intent of the
Napa Sanitation District in adopting Ordinance 112” and that
“[n]o one can truly know the intent of those voting except from
statement made from the dais by those voting.” The declaration,
however, provides credible evidence as to the events that led to
the District’s actions as set forth by a direct participant in the
process. Plaintiffs do not suggest that the declaration lacked
credibility. Nor do they argue that the declaration was
insufficient to establish that the specific issue raised by their
lawsuit—whether water usage for condominiums was more
similar to single family homes or apartments—was considered in
the 2020 rate study as a result of the Oaktree Vineyard appeal

14
and not their litigation. Rather, they suggest that despite this
evidence individual members of the District’s Board may have
voted in favor of the new ordinance for the undisclosed reason
that they were motivated by plaintiffs’ pending litigation.
Plaintiffs’ argument is entirely speculative and insufficient to
establish that the trial court abused its discretion in relying on
the declaration to conclude that plaintiffs were not a successful
party for purposes of awarding attorney fees.
DISPOSITION
The order denying plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees is
affirmed. The District is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.
GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823490. Public record. Not legal advice.