# Rohan Mangroo v. U.S. Attorney General

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · March 14, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823143

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** March 14, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** CON
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a party must “plainly and prominently” raise a claim by “devoting a discrete section of his argument” to it and cannot merely make a “passing reference” to it “without advancing any arguments or citing any authorities” establishing there was error

## Opinion text

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11486
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

ROHAN MANGROO,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

____________________

Petitions for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A089-570-503
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11486

____________________

No. 23-13811
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

ROHAN MANGROO,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

____________________

Petitions for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A089-570-503
____________________

Before BRANCH, ANDERSON, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this consolidated appeal, Rohan Mangroo petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decisions
(1) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Mangroo’s
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22-11486 Opinion of the Court 3

request for a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility under
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(H), and (2) dismissing Mangroo’s subsequent motion
for reconsideration as untimely. After review, we dismiss in part
and deny in part Mangroo’s petitions.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Mangroo is a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago. In
April 1999, Mangroo (at age 34) entered the United States as a non-
immigrant visitor and then overstayed his visa.
A. Adjustment of Status Based on Fraudulent Marriage
On October 1, 2002, Mangroo married Pamela Meagher, a
U.S. citizen. Meagher was the mother of Mangroo’s then-girlfriend
Sharon Mackoon. Mangroo and Mackoon, who still resided in
Trinidad and Tobago, already had an eleven-year-old daughter,
Melissa, who also resided in Trinidad and Tobago. The marriage
to Meagher was a sham.
In 2006, based on his sham marriage to Meagher, Mangroo
sought adjustment of status, and on March 14, 2007, he became a
lawful permanent resident and obtained a “green card.” After
Mangroo obtained his immigration benefits, Mangroo and
Meagher divorced in November 2007.
B. Application for Citizenship and Admission of Fraud
In May 2012, Mangroo applied for naturalization to be a U.S.
citizen. After interviewing Mangroo, a United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) officer determined that a
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11486

decision could not be made on Mangroo’s application without
further investigation.
On July 23, 2013, another USCIS officer visited Mangroo at
his home. Upon questioning, Mangroo admitted to the USCIS
officer that his prior marriage to Meagher was fraudulent. In two
separate affidavits, Mangroo averred that he had married Meagher
only to obtain valid immigration status so he could support his
family. USCIS recommended Mangroo’s removal.
C. Notice to Appear and Master Calendar Hearing
On October 27, 2014 the Department of Homeland Security
served Mangroo with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). The NTA
charged Mangroo, inter alia, with removability under INA
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), as an alien who sought
to procure entry or status by means of fraud or willful
misrepresentation.
At a December 2, 2015 master calendar hearing before an IJ,
Mangroo conceded his removability and indicated he planned to
apply for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 237(a)(1)(H), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). A § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver is discretionary and
specifically for certain aliens who have been found inadmissible
due to fraud under § 212(a)(6)(C)(i). See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).
During the master calendar hearing, the IJ instructed
Mangroo’s counsel to request the § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver on Form
I-601. When Mangroo’s counsel questioned whether the form was
needed, the IJ stated that Mangroo was “seeking a waiver of
admissibility and the I-601 operates to waive that ground of
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22-11486 Opinion of the Court 5

inadmissibility before this Court.” Mangroo’s counsel responded,
“That’s fine. We’ll file it, Your Honor.” At the IJ’s urging,
Mangroo’s counsel also indicated that Mangroo would file an I-130
visa petition based on his relationship with his adult daughter, who
is a U.S. citizen.
On December 9, 2015, Mangroo married Mackoon.
As directed, Mangroo filed a Form I-601 Application for
Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility that requested a
§ 237(a)(1)(H) waiver, signed April 28, 2017. But Mangroo did not
file the promised I-130 visa petition based on his relationship to his
adult daughter.
D. Removal Hearing
At his May 2, 2019 removal hearing, Mangroo testified that
he is married to Sharon Mackoon, with whom he has two
daughters—Melissa who was 31 years old and Mikayla, who was 9
years old—and that both daughters are U.S. citizens. Mangroo
explained that he entered the United States on a B-2 visa (in 1999)
to look for work to support his then-girlfriend Mackoon and their
daughter Melissa, who remained in Trinidad and Tobago.
When Mangroo could not find an employer to sponsor him,
he became desperate to avoid deportation. Mangroo decided to
marry Mackoon’s mother, Pamela Meagher, “for the papers, for
the Green Card.” After marrying Meagher on October 1, 2002,
Mangroo became a lawful permanent resident on March 14, 2007.
During his five-year marriage to Meagher, Mangroo never lived
with Meagher but instead lived with Mackoon, who had followed
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11486

him to the United States. As noted, Mangroo divorced Meagher in
November 2007.
In 2012, Mangroo applied for U.S. citizenship. When an
immigration officer came to his home, Mangroo admitted to the
fraudulent marriage to Meagher. Mangroo later signed an affidavit
stating that he had entered into the fraudulent marriage to obtain
residency to support his family. At the hearing, Mangroo admitted
he had done something wrong and apologized. Mangroo said that
he could not return to Trinidad and Tobago because his younger
daughter did not like it there, the drugs and crime were “very bad,”
he had no relatives there, and his family would suffer because there
is no work and the educational system is “very backward.”
Mackoon also testified. Mackoon described Mangroo’s close
relationship with their younger daughter Mikayla and said that
Mikayla would “suffer tremendously” if Mangroo were removed
because of her attachment to him. Mackoon admitted that
Mangroo had sisters and brothers in Trinidad and Tobago, but she
insisted the family would be homeless if they returned there and
that she would be unable to get a job. Mikayla also appeared at the
hearing and read a statement describing her close relationship with
her father.
E. IJ’s Decision
At the end of the hearing, the IJ entered an oral decision
denying Mangroo’s request for a § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver. In doing
so, the IJ found Mangroo and Mackoon credible except to the
extent (1) they both claimed Mackoon was unaware of the
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22-11486 Opinion of the Court 7

fraudulent marriage to her mother when it occurred and
(2) Mangroo claimed Mackoon was not aware he had applied for
U.S. citizenship.
The IJ identified positive factors that weighed in favor of
relief, including that Mangroo had resided in the United States
since 1999, did not have a criminal record, was in a 33-year
relationship with Mackoon, with whom he has two daughters, had
a very close relationship with his daughters, was gainfully
employed, owned his home and vehicles, and showed remorse for
his actions.
As to adverse factors, the IJ pointed to Mangroo’s
willingness to engage in marriage fraud and apply for lawful
permanent residence and seek citizenship based on that fraud. The
IJ also emphasized that Mangroo twice swore falsely under penalty
of perjury in his application for adjustment to lawful permanent
resident and then in his application for citizenship. The IJ pointed
out that Mangroo did not admit to his fraudulent conduct until the
government initiated an investigation.
The IJ acknowledged that Mangroo had many “weighty
positive factors” and that his relatives would suffer emotional
hardship if he was removed, but the IJ noted the hardship would
not be “extreme” but rather the kind of hardship that is “common
in cases of removal and deportation.” The IJ observed that
Mangroo’s older daughter, Melissa, was a lawful permanent
resident with her own family and that Mikayla could go with
Mangroo to Trinidad and Tobago. The IJ concluded Mangroo did
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11486

not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims about the poor
conditions in Trinidad and Tobago. And because Mackoon knew
of Mangroo’s marriage fraud with her mother in October 2002 and
then married him in December 2015, only after his removal
proceedings began in October 2014, Mackoon did not have a
reasonable expectation that he could remain in the United States.
The IJ noted that Mackoon risked losing her own lawful permanent
resident status (obtained through her older daughter) if she moved
to Trinidad and Tobago with Mangroo and would need to travel
frequently to maintain her U.S. residence until becoming a U.S.
citizen.
The IJ concluded that the favorable factors were
“insufficient to overcome the extreme weight of [Mangroo’s] fraud
both at the time of adjustment of status and with respect to his
application for United States citizenship.” The IJ stressed that
Mangroo’s conduct included engaging in marriage fraud with his
then-girlfriend’s mother, acquiring lawful permanent residence
through fraud, attempting to obtain citizenship through fraud,
traveling out of the United States and knowingly gaining reentry to
the country based on his fraudulent status, attending a citizenship
interview with a government official and not admitting to fraud,
and then only admitting the fraud after requiring the government
to conduct further investigation. Accordingly, the IJ determined
that Mangroo did not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion and
denied his application for a waiver.
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F. BIA Appeal
On appeal to the BIA, Mangroo argued that the IJ failed to
give sufficient weight to his positive factors.
On March 31, 2022, the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s
decision. The BIA disagreed with Mangroo that the IJ did not
weigh factors properly and dismissed his appeal. The BIA reviewed
the IJ’s discretionary determination de novo, outlined the positive
and adverse factors the IJ had identified, and agreed with the IJ that
Mangroo did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion.
The BIA emphasized that Mangroo twice lied about the
validity of his marriage under penalty of perjury, maintained that
lie “at every point necessary to obtain an immigration benefit,” and
“only became truthful when confronted by an immigration officer
years later in connection with his citizenship application.”
G. Construed Motion for Reconsideration
On June 17, 2022, Mangroo filed a motion with the BIA
styled a “Motion to Reopen.” Mangroo argued that the IJ erred by
(1) requiring him to file a Form I-601; (2) applying an improper legal
standard—extreme hardship to a qualifying relative—to his
§ 237(a)(1)(H) waiver request; and (3) failing to address whether he
could readjust his status based on his U.S.-citizen daughter Melissa,
along with a different waiver under INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i),
based on the extreme hardship to his now-wife Mackoon.
As to the last argument, Mangroo attached, inter alia, a new
I-485 application for adjustment of status and a new I-130 family-
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11486

based petition filed on Mangroo’s behalf by his daughter Melissa.
Mangroo asked that his case be reopened so he could pursue these
forms of relief. Mangroo also attached a copy of Melissa’s
naturalization certificate showing she became a U.S. citizen on July
18, 2014.
On October 20, 2023, the BIA construed Mangroo’s motion
to reopen as a motion for reconsideration and denied the motion.
The BIA determined that Mangroo’s motion was properly
characterized as a motion for reconsideration because he did not
seek to introduce previously unavailable evidence, as required to
reopen proceedings, and instead alleged various errors by the IJ.
To the extent Mangroo sought reconsideration, the BIA deemed
the motion untimely because he did not file it within 30 days of the
BIA’s March 31, 2022 decision and had not identified an exception
to the statutory time-bar.
The BIA also declined to reconsider Mangroo’s proceedings
sua sponte because he had not shown exceptional circumstances.
The BIA acknowledged that Mangroo was correct that he did not
need to file a Form I-601 to pursue a § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver but
concluded any error in requiring him to do so was harmless. The
BIA rejected Mangroo’s claim that the agency applied the wrong
legal standard in evaluating his waiver request, concluding both the
BIA and the IJ considered the relevant factors, as outlined in Matter
of Tijam, 22 I. & N. Dec. 408 (BIA 1998). As for the IJ not allowing
Mangroo to pursue readjustment with a § 212(i) waiver, the BIA
stressed that Mangroo had not addressed or rebutted the agency’s
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determination that a favorable exercise of discretion was not
warranted, a finding that was “dispositive of [his] eligibility for a
waiver, as well as for adjustment of status.”
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review the BIA’s decision and also the IJ’s decision to the
extent the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision or expressly agrees with its
reasoning. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th
Cir. 2009). In deciding whether to uphold the BIA’s decision, we
are limited to the grounds upon which the BIA relied. See Gonzalez
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016).
We review de novo all legal issues. Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
451 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 2006). Likewise, we review de novo
our own subject matter jurisdiction. Clement v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 75
F.4th 1193, 1198 (11th Cir. 2023).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 237(a)(1)(H) Fraud Waiver
Mangroo applied for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA
§ 237(a)(1)(H). Under that provision, the Attorney General has the
discretion to waive an alien’s inadmissibility (and removal based on
inadmissibility) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) due to
immigration fraud if, among other things, the alien is the spouse,
parent, or child of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. See
INA § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).
In Tijam, the BIA set forth favorable and adverse factors to
be balanced in determining whether a § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver should
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-11486

be granted as a matter of discretion. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 412-13. 1 The
BIA explained that the waiver decision requires balancing a
petitioner’s “undesirability as a permanent resident with the social
and humane considerations present to determine whether a grant
of relief is in the best interests of this country.” Id. at 412.
Adverse factors include the nature and underlying
circumstances of the fraud or misrepresentation involved; the
nature, seriousness, and recency of any criminal record; and any
other evidence of the petitioner’s bad character or undesirability as
a lawful resident. Id. Favorable factors include long residence in
the country, especially from a young age; evidence of hardship to
the petitioner or his family if removal occurs; stable employment
history; business or property ties; evidence of value and service to
the community; and other evidence of the petitioner’s good
character. Id. at 412-13.
B. Jurisdiction
By statute, we lack jurisdiction to review “any . . . decision
or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter
to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security.” INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). We do, however, retain jurisdiction, under
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), to review “constitutional claims or questions of

1 Tijam addressed INA § 241(a)(1)(H), which in 1996 was renumbered as

§ 237(a)(1)(H). See 22 I. & N. Dec. at 408 n.1.
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law.” INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The
constitutional claim or question of law must be “non-frivolous,”
and it cannot simply be a “garden-variety abuse of discretion
argument” framed as a question of law to evade the jurisdictional
bar. See Alvarez Acosta v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191, 1196-97
(11th Cir. 2008).
Here, the waiver provision in INA § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(H), specifies that whether to grant relief to an eligible
alien is “in the discretion of the Attorney General.” See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(H). Therefore, absent a constitutional question or
question of law, we lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary
denial of a § 237(a)(1)(H) fraud waiver. Alhuay v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
661 F.3d 534, 549 (11th Cir. 2011).
Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision
denying Mangroo a § 237(a)(1)(H) fraud waiver as a matter of
discretion, including any claim that the agency weighed the
evidence incorrectly in finding that a waiver was not warranted.
See Alvarez Acosta, 524 F.3d at 1196-97.
C. Mangroo’s § 237(a)(1)(H) Waiver Claim
Mangroo does raise one argument that presents a question
of law.2 Mangroo contends that the IJ erroneously applied an

2 For the first time in his reply brief, Mangroo argues that, although he

conceded his removability in the immigration court, he was in fact not
removable for marriage fraud under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Mangroo’s
reply brief asserts that he raised this removability issue in his opening brief,
but that is not correct. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,
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“extreme hardship” standard rather than a balancing test in
denying his § 237(a)(1)(H) waiver request.
We have jurisdiction to review whether the IJ applied the
proper legal standard. See Makir-Marwil v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d
1227, 1234 n.4 (11th Cir. 2012). Here, however, Mangroo failed to
exhaust this legal issue in his appeal to the BIA, as the government
correctly points out.
We may review a final order of removal only after a
petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies available to
him as of right. INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). This
exhaustion requirement is a claims-processing rule, rather than a
jurisdictional rule. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 413, 419
(2023). But this exhaustion requirement is applied when, as here,
it has been asserted by a party. See Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 83
F.4th 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2023).
To exhaust administrative remedies, a petitioner must raise
the claim before the BIA clearly enough that the BIA can review
and correct any errors below. Indrawati v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 779 F.3d

681 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a party must “plainly and prominently”
raise a claim by “devoting a discrete section of his argument” to it and cannot
merely make a “passing reference” to it “without advancing any arguments or
citing any authorities” establishing there was error). Accordingly, we need not
decide if we have jurisdiction to address this issue on appeal because Mangroo
has forfeited any removability issue, and we decline to address it. See Farah v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 12 F.4th 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2021).
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1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Santos-
Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 415 n.2, 419-23 (2023).
Here, Mangroo did not exhaust his claim that the IJ
incorrectly applied an “extreme hardship” standard. Mangroo’s
notice of appeal and his brief filed with the BIA argued only that
the IJ gave too much weight to his adverse factors and not enough
weight to his favorable factors. This argument is insufficient to
raise clearly the alleged legal error Mangroo now raises in his
petition for review. And, because the government raised the
exhaustion requirement here, we can dispose of this claim on that
basis alone. See Kemokai, 83 F.4th at 891.
We note, however, that even if Mangroo was not required
to exhaust, or had exhausted, this claim in his BIA appeal, he still
would not prevail. The record clearly shows that both the IJ and
the BIA weighed the favorable and adverse factors identified in
Tijam, one of which is the “evidence of hardship to the alien or [his]
family if deportation occurs.” 22 I. & N. Dec. at 412. Mangroo
takes out of context the IJ’s observation that the hardship
Mangroo’s family would suffer upon his removal was not extreme
but rather common in cases of removal. When the IJ’s analysis is
considered as a whole, however, it is clear the IJ carefully weighed
all of the Tijam factors, including the hardship to his family, and did
not replace that balancing test with an “extreme hardship”
standard, as Mangroo claims.
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D. Motion to Reopen/Reconsider
Mangroo also argues that the BIA erred in recharacterizing
his motion to reopen as a motion for reconsideration.
Ordinarily, we review for an abuse of discretion the BIA’s
denial of a motion to reopen or a motion for reconsideration and
any underlying legal conclusions de novo. See Dacostagomez-Aguilar
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 40 F.4th 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022) (motion to
reopen); Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007)
(motion for reconsideration). However, when, as here, “direct
review of the underlying order is barred by one of the INA’s
jurisdiction-stripping provisions, we also lack jurisdiction to
entertain an attack on that order mounted through a motion to
reopen.” Ponce Flores v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 64 F.4th 1208, 1223 (11th
Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). In that circumstance, we
retain jurisdiction to review only non-discretionary legal or
constitutional questions underlying the requested relief. See Patel
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc); 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 3
Here, whether the BIA properly construed Mangroo’s
motion as a motion for reconsideration is a legal question we retain

3 To the extent Mangroo challenges the BIA’s denial of sua sponte
reconsideration, we lack jurisdiction to review this discretionary decision and
dismiss the petition. See Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir.
2008).
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jurisdiction to review. For the reasons that follow, we can find no
reversible error in the BIA’s decision.
A petitioner in removal proceedings generally may file one
motion to reopen proceedings, provided that the motion is filed
within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal. INA
§ 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
A motion to reopen shall state “new facts that will be proven at a
hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported
by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (B),
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (B). Motions to reopen may be granted
if there is new evidence that is material and was not available and
could not have been discovered or presented at the removal
hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
Motions to reconsider, on the other hand, must be filed
within 30 days of the entry of the removal order. INA
§ 240(c)(6)(A), (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (B). A motion to
reconsider must specify the errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior
decision—in this case, the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ—and be
supported by pertinent authority. INA § 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). 4
Given the foregoing, the BIA correctly concluded that
Mangroo’s motion was a motion for reconsideration. Mangroo’s

4 On appeal, Mangroo does not dispute that his motion for reconsideration, if

properly construed, was untimely and thus has forfeited this issue. See
Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681.
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motion raised three errors that he alleged the IJ made in
considering facts known to the parties at the time of the removal
hearing—specifically (1) the IJ’s ordering Mangroo to file a Form
I-601, (2) the IJ’s applying the incorrect legal standard to his waiver
request, and (3) the IJ’s “not going forward with [Mangroo’s]
application to readjust status.” In other words, Mangroo’s motion
sought reconsideration of the same facts due to these alleged errors
and not reopening of proceedings for the agency to consider new
facts. These kinds of arguments are made in a motion for
reconsideration, not a motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).
Mangroo contends his motion was “not merely seek[ing]
reconsideration” because he submitted with it a new I-130
immediate relative petition filed by his daughter Melissa along with
a corresponding I-485 application for adjustment of status. But, as
the government points out, this new I-130 petition was “based on
equities [Mangroo] already possessed at the time of his individual
hearing,” namely his relationship to his daughter Melissa, who has
been a U.S. citizen since 2014.
Notably, at the December 2015 master calendar hearing, the
IJ specifically urged Mangroo to pursue these forms of relief (I-130
petition and I-485 adjustment application), evidencing that these
applications could have been filed well before the final removal
hearing in May 2019. Mangroo’s motion for reconsideration tacitly
acknowledged this fact by arguing that Mangroo was already eligible
for this relief at the time of the removal hearing and that the IJ erred
USCA11 Case: 22-11486 Document: 65-1 Date Filed: 03/14/2025 Page: 19 of 19

22-11486 Opinion of the Court 19

by not considering that form of relief at that time. The BIA did not
err in concluding Mangroo’s I-130 petition and corresponding I-485
application did not constitute new evidence that was previously
unavailable at the time of his removal hearing. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s
determination that a § 237(a)(1)(H) fraud waiver was not
warranted as a matter of discretion, and Mangroo failed to
administratively exhaust his claim that the IJ applied the wrong
legal standard in denying his waiver request. Accordingly, we
dismiss his petition for review of the BIA’s March 31, 2022 decision.
Further, the BIA did not err in construing Mangroo’s motion
to reopen as a motion for reconsideration because it did not present
new evidence but rather sought to correct perceived errors by the
IJ. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte
reconsideration. Accordingly, we deny in part and dismiss in part
Mangroo’s petition for review of the BIA’s October 20, 2023, order.
PETITIONS DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10823143. Public record. Not legal advice.