# Reaves v. Immediate Medical Care, P.A.

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10821474

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10821474

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting Title I’s assumption that employers have basic familiarity with their employees, as opposed to Title III’s dealing with the citizenry at large
- applying direct threat exception to potential threat to train passengers’ allergies posed by service dog
- finding evidence of training insufficient where there was no link between monkey’s comforting presence and aggressive behaviors toward others and any training or cues

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

)
ERIN REAVES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION
) NO. 3:23-00403-WGY-SJH
IMMEDIATE MEDICAL CARE, P.A. )
)
Defendant. )

YOUNG, D.J.1 March 12, 2025

FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS OF LAW
The Court enters the following findings of fact and rulings
of law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Erin Reaves (“Reaves”) brought this action against
Immediate Medical Care, P.A. (“Immediate”) for declaratory and
injunctive relief pursuant to Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. See Am.
Compl., ECF No. 63. Reaves alleges that she arrived at
Immediate’s clinic in Jacksonville, Florida for an appointment
on April 5, 2023, but was unlawfully denied access to
Immediate’s public accommodation due to the presence of her

1 Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
service dog Malia. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment, ECF Nos. 85 & 91.
On January 30, 2025, this Court held a status conference at

which it denied Reaves’s motion for summary judgment, and set
the date for a prompt bench trial to begin on February 3, 2025.
See Minute Entry, ECF No. 106. On the first day of trial, the
Court denied Immediate’s motion for summary judgment. See
Minute Entry, ECF No. 109. After a three-day bench trial, the
Court ruled in favor of Immediate. See Minute Entries, ECF Nos.
109, 111, and 119. The Court now provides its written findings
of fact and rulings of law.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT2
After reviewing the testimonial, documentary, and video
evidence admitted at trial, the Court finds the following facts
by a preponderance of the evidence.

Immediate operates a medical facility in Jacksonville,
Florida.
Reaves suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), anxiety, and bipolar disorder. The Court credits
Reaves’s testimony that each of these conditions substantially

2 The Court issued initial findings of fact from the bench
immediately upon the conclusion of the final arguments when
matters were freshest in the Court’s mind. What follows is
completely consistent with the transcript. If it is not, of
course, the transcript governs.
limit one or more major life activities, including the jobs she
is able to perform and, on bad days, her ability to perform
basic tasks. Reaves’s testimony is further buttressed by the

testimony of her fiancée Mariah Hockman (“Hockman”), and by
other record evidence. Hockman testified that Hockman has
observed Reaves’s panic attacks, destructive behaviors, and
regular fainting incidents.
Reaves has a service dog, Malia, who is trained to perform
tasks to alert Reaves and to mitigate self-harming behavior.
Malia was trained by Hockman and Reaves, and attended
specialized service training at East Tennessee Canine Academy in
Lenoir City, Tennessee.
On April 5, 2023, Reaves and her fiancée Hockman arrived at
Immediate’s facility where Reaves had an appointment in her
search for a new primary care physician. Reaves and Hockman,

who have family in the area, resided in the area at the time.
Eve Hochstetler (“Hochstetler”), a patient of Immediate,
was in Immediate’s waiting area and provided an affidavit that
was stipulated as admissible in lieu of testimony. See Minute
Entry, ECF No. 111. Hochstetler averred that she witnessed the
incident in question, and that, after Reaves arrived, Immediate
employee Julia Smith (“Smith”) asked Reaves what kind of dog
Malia is, and was told that Malia is her “emotional support
dog.”3 Hochstetler Aff., Ex. 20. Hochstetler then observed the
following:
Then, Julia said to Erin that Dr. Gargin has an
allergy to dogs. Erin’s friend stated that allergy is
not an exception to the ADA policy. Julia said that
Dr. [Kathleen] Gargin [Bechen] has a very bad allergy
to dogs and it could cause her to breath [sic] with
difficulty. She is able to see you if you leave the
dog in the lobby or outside the front door with your
friend. Again, Erin’s friend stated now in a much
louder voice that allergy is not one of the exceptions
to the ADA policy. Julia tried to explain to Erin
Reaves again about the allergy and offered to see
[Immediate’s owner] Dr. Moosavi but she was
argumentative. Julia went to the back office and came
back to her desk and called the police for assistance
with the situation. In addition, . . . Erin Reaves .
. . exited from her car and walked perfectly fine to
her car’s trunk. She stood unassisted, unsupported,
and walked around before sitting in her wheelchair.
The wheelchair did not have any foot or leg support.
She was moving her legs freely on the ground to move
her wheelchair forward. She did not use the wheels
and her arms to move the wheelchair as someone who has
a disability and is wheelchair bound. The reason I
noticed her actions are due to my advanced training
with Veterans and their ADA needs at my tenure at
Wounded Warrior Project, Inc. Upon entering the
office Erin Reaves blocked the front desk and she
instructed to her friend to pull her phone out to
start recording and stated “We are going to get them.”

Id. (emphasis added). The Court credits Hochstetler’s
testimony.
Malia was at all times on a leash, in a harness identifying
Malia as a service animal, and at all times relevant here, was
well-behaved. Malia was neither disruptive nor aggressive.

3 The Court is aware that an emotional support animal is not
necessarily a service animal under the ADA.
Dr. Gargin testified that she is severely allergic to dogs.
As for the incident, Dr. Gargin was not an eyewitness to most of
this encounter, having spotted the dog as she passed by the

front desk and immediately told Smith, “the dog has to go,”
before returning to her office. Dr. Gargin did, however,
confirm that she soon discussed with Smith in her office
possible modifications with Smith, such as an alternative
appointment with another doctor or going ahead with the
appointment herself while Malia waited outside. The Court
credits that Smith relayed Dr. Gargin’s options to Reaves and
Hockman, but at that point their backs were up, and they
insisted that Reaves’s ADA rights had been violated.
This is approximately where Reaves’s video recording of the
incident picks up: Reaves asks an employee (apparently Smith, as
she was identified at trial) to “confirm that [Reaves is] being

denied [her] appointment because of [her] task trained medical
alert service dog,” Smith tells her that Immediate “cannot see
[her] today” because it “cannot have animals inside [its]
office” due to “patients with allergies,” and then informs
Reaves that Immediate will have to cancel her appointment and
that she must leave immediately with her dog, while Reaves and
(as was clarified at trial) Hockman describe their rights under
the ADA and its lack of an allergies exception. Ex. 2.
Immediate called the Sheriff’s Office and, shortly after
the Sheriff’s Deputy arrived, Reaves and Hockman left the
facility with Malia. Portions of the Sheriff’s Deputy’s body

camera video were admitted into evidence, including discussions
between the Sheriff’s Deputy, Reaves, and Hockman just after
Reaves and Hockman left Immediate. Ex. 1.
III. RULINGS OF LAW
To prevail on her ADA claim, Reaves must prove: (1) that
she is disabled; (2) that the defendant owns, leases, or
operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) that the
defendants discriminated against the plaintiff within the
meaning of the ADA. Norkunas v. Seahorse NB, LLC, 444 Fed.
App’x 412, 416 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
“[T]he plaintiff has the burden of proving discrimination in an
ADA claim.” Id. The parties do not dispute that Immediate is a

place of public accommodation. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. & Mem.
Law Supp. 2-3, ECF No. 91.
The Court rules on the above facts that Reaves was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, but that Immediate did not
unlawfully discriminate against Reaves because Malia posed a
threat to the health and safety of the doctor Reaves was
scheduled to see, and Immediate attempted to offer safe
alternatives to the scheduled appointment. That attempt shows
the required “individualized assessment” of a direct threat to
safety, including a determination of whether “reasonable
modifications” would mitigate the threat, that stands as an
exception to the general rule that service dogs must be allowed

in places of public accommodation. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b).
Accordingly, judgment shall enter in favor of Immediate.
A. Reaves Proved She Is Disabled
The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The ADA’s implementing
regulations define “major life activities” broadly to encompass
“[c]aring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing,
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, . . . breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, writing, communicating,
interacting with others, and working,” and the like. 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.105(c)(1)(i). “[T]he threshold issue of whether an

impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not
demand extensive analysis.” Id. § 36.105(d)(1)(ii).
At least some of the disabilities Reaves identified,
including PTSD and bipolar disorder, qualify as protected
disabilities for purposes of the ADA provided that they
substantially limit one’s life activities, and Reaves has
presented some evidence that she was diagnosed with PTSD as
early as 2013. Ex. 5, at 33; see 28 C.F.R. §
36.105(d)(2)(iii)(K) (listing bipolar disorder and PTSD as among
those impairments that should “easily be concluded” will
“substantially limit . . . major life activities”); C.L. v. Del
Amo Hospital, Inc., 992 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2021) (treating PTSD

as a protected disability under Title III of the ADA). As the
Court has found that Reaves suffers from medical conditions that
interfere with one or more major functions, the Court rules that
she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA.
B. Reaves’s Service Dog Malia
Malia is a “service dog” under the ADA. The ADA does not
set a demanding standard for evaluating the qualifications and
training of service dogs:
The ADA’s implementing regulations define a service
animal as “any dog that is individually trained to do
work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual
with a disability,” including a psychiatric
disability, where the work or tasks are “directly
related to the individual’s disability.” The
regulations do not specify by whom the dog must be
trained.

Del Amo Hosp., Inc., 992 F.3d at 910–11 (quoting 28 C.F.R. §
36.104). More specifically, “DOJ regulations and commentary
make clear that individuals may self-train service animals
without obtaining formal certification.” Id. at 911.
Consistent with these regulations, the Ninth Circuit has
rejected a strict formal certification requirement, on the
grounds that the ADA defines a service dog by its function, not
its training, and that such a requirement would frustrate the
purposes of the ADA and its implementing regulations. Id. at
910. Indeed, in only the most egregious circumstances have
courts ruled that a service animal fails based upon its

training. See, e.g., Salari v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts
U.S., Inc., No. 8:23-cv-01406, 2024 WL 4867567, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 6, 2024) (finding that dog was not a service animal where
it had received no formal service animal training and performed
no identified tasks beyond comforting presence); Rose v.
Springfield-Greene Cnty. Health Dept., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1206,
1214-15 (W.D. Mo. 2009) (finding evidence of training
insufficient where there was no link between monkey’s comforting
presence and aggressive behaviors toward others and any training
or cues).
Reaves and Hockman testified that they both trained Malia.
Reaves testified that Malia performs specific tasks that assist

with her disability, such as pressing on her body, licking, and
clawing her to “ground” her when she is struggling with anxiety,
and noticing and responding to symptoms such as picking at her
skin. Hockman testified that Malia is very attentive to Reaves
and does as she is trained. Immediate misconstrues the one
piece of evidence that suggests Malia received professional
service training: the certificate from East Tennessee Canine
Academy states that “we can consider the service training of the
dog Malia to be completed and . . . they are ready to assist her
owner Erin Reaves to live their life to the fullest,” indicating
that the Academy considered Malia’s service training to be
“completed,” not, as Immediate contends, that it was still to be

completed in the future. Def.’s Ex. 7, ECF No. 93-5.
While the eyewitness affidavit, discussed above, represents
that Reaves initially identified Malia as an “emotional support
dog” that “helps with [her] anxiety” when she arrived at
Immediate for her appointment, see Hochstetler Aff., the
preponderance of the evidence supports a ruling that Malia
qualifies as a “service animal.” This Court credits Reaves’s
and Hockman’s consistent representations as to Malia’s training,
supported by record evidence. Immediate’s attempt to undercut
this evidence at trial by pointing out that Reaves represented
Hockman to be Malia’s “primary trainer” in response to an
interrogatory, and that Hockman admits to not being a

professional trainer, is not relevant, since even a self-trained
dog may qualify as a service animal if, as here, she performs
specific, trained tasks. See Frequently Asked Questions about
Service Animals and the ADA (“DOJ FAQ”), ADA.gov (Feb. 28,
2020), Question 5, https://www.ada.gov/resources/service-
animals-faqs/ (“People with disabilities have the right to train
the dog themselves and are not required to use a professional
service dog training program.”). This Court also directly
observed Malia at trial and in video evidence responding to
Reaves’s mental state. The weight of the evidence paints a
consistent picture of Malia as trained, by Reaves and others, to
perform specific tasks that assist her in dealing with her

disabilities. Thus, this Court rules that Malia is a “service
animal” for purposes of the ADA.
C. Immediate Did Not Discriminate Against Reaves

As a general rule, “[p]ublic accommodations . . . must
permit disabled individuals to use service animals unless they
can show a regulatory exception applies.” Matheis v. CSL
Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2019). Allowing
service animals in a place of public accommodation is a
presumptively reasonable modification to that accommodation’s
policies: “Generally a public accommodation shall modify
policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a
service animal by an individual with a disability.” 28 C.F.R. §
36.302(c)(1). Given that the Court has ruled that Reaves was
disabled and that Malia is a service animal, then, the case
hinges on whether some exception to this general rule applies to
Reaves’s visit.
As a general proposition, allergies are not enough to
except a place of public accommodation from accommodating a
service animal. See ADA Requirements: Service Animals, ADA.gov
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.ada.gov/resources/service-animals-
2010-requirements/ (“Allergies and fear of dogs are not valid
reasons for denying access or refusing service to people using
service animals. When a person who is allergic to dog dander
and a person who uses a service animal must spend time in the

same room or facility, for example, in a school classroom or at
a homeless shelter, they both should be accommodated by
assigning them, if possible, to different locations within the
room or different rooms in the facility.”). Despite this rule,
a service animal may nonetheless be excluded if it poses a
direct threat to the health and safety of persons providing or
receiving services from an accommodation. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208;
see, e.g., Lockett v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 496 F.3d
1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying direct threat exception to
potential threat to train passengers’ allergies posed by service
dog).
Whether a service animal poses a “direct threat” for

purposes of the ADA must be determined by:
an individualized assessment, based on reasonable
judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or
on the best available objective evidence, to
ascertain: The nature, duration, and severity of the
risk; the probability that the potential injury will
actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications
of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision
of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk.

28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b) (emphasis added); see also Bennett, 86 F.
4th at 327-28. “Service animals need not be accommodated under
every circumstance, and the regulations specify the situations
in which a public entity may reasonably exclude a service
animal” -- safety among them, such that “if an individual’s use
of a service animal poses a direct threat, it may be excluded

under this provision.” Bennett, 86 F. 4th at 327. “‘The
existence, or nonexistence, of a significant risk must be
determined from the standpoint of the person who [makes the
decision], and the risk assessment must be based on medical or
other objective evidence.’ The belief that a significant risk
existed . . . does not relieve a defendant of liability.” R.W.
v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 114 F. Supp. 3d
1260, 1283-84 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 649 (1998)). Specifically, courts “should assess the
objective reasonableness of the views of health care
professionals without deferring to their individual judgments.”
Id. (quoting Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 650).

It is not entirely clear what special burden, if any, ought
be placed on Immediate to show that it has conducted an
individualized assessment of an alleged safety risk, given that
the burden to show discrimination rests, in general, on Reaves.
See Matheis, 936 F.3d at 179 (rejecting the burden-shifting
framework used in other discrimination contexts in favor of a
requirement that the defendant “establish[] exceptions that
permit . . . [it] . . . to deny a disabled individual’s use of a
service animal” (emphasis added) (citing Berardelli v. Allied
Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104 (3d Cir. 2018)));
Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1058-60
(5th Cir. 1997) (placing the burden of proof to show that a

proposed reasonable modification would fundamentally alter the
nature of the public accommodation or jeopardize its safety on
the defendant, and characterizing these exceptions as
“affirmative defense[s],” without addressing the regulations at
issue here)).4 The Eleventh Circuit has placed the burden on the
defendant to show that the analogous exception for modifications
that would “fundamentally alter the nature of” a public
accommodation’s services and facilities applies, A.L. by and
through D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.3d
1270, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2018), and the parties here agree that
the burden shifts to Immediate on this issue. Accordingly, this

4 One federal district court has recently stated that
“[d]irect threat is an affirmative defense,” Bennett v. Hurley
Med. Ctr., 2023 WL 319925, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2023)
(citing Tamara v. El Camino Hosp., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1085
(N.D. Cal. 2013)), and in the Ninth Circuit this defense comes
with a “heavy burden” on the defendant to show that it applies,
Tamara, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (quoting Lockett v. Catalina
Channel Express, Inc., 496 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Another federal district court has recently described it as “the
defendants’ burden to demonstrate” that a reasonable
modification would pose a direct threat to health and safety.
Doe v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 735 F. Supp. 3d 99,
114 (D.R.I. 2024) (emphasis added); see also Doe v. Deer
Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (similar).
Court presumes that it does, while noting that the Eleventh
Circuit has not squarely ruled on this issue.5
Based upon the facts found above by a preponderance of the

evidence, the Court rules that the direct threat exception
applies, and thus Immediate has not discriminated against Reaves
for purposes of the ADA as matter of law. Even the Ninth
Circuit, which has decisively held that the burden to show
direct threat shifts to the plaintiff and that it is a “heavy
burden,” Tamara, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (quoting Lockett, 496

5 In the Eleventh Circuit, in the context of deciding
whether an employee’s disability poses a “direct threat” to its
employer (a question governed by Title I, not Title III, of the
ADA), “[t]he employee retains at all times the burden of
persuading the jury either that he was not a direct threat or
that reasonable accommodations were available.” Moses v.
American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996).
The circuits are not uniform in this interpretation. See
Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1292-94
(10th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases across circuits on this
issue, some of which place the burden on the employer). There
are good reasons to distinguish Title I of the ADA from Title
III on some issues, see Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d
299, 308-09 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting Title I’s assumption that
employers have basic familiarity with their employees, as
opposed to Title III’s dealing with the citizenry at large), but
the “fundamentally alter” and “direct threat” exceptions stem
from distinct parts of the relevant statutes and regulations, so
it is not clear that they should always be interpreted in the
same way, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii),
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), 12182(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.208,
36.301(b), 36.302(a). Thus, Eleventh Circuit case law on the
issue of whether the burden shifts to the defendant to show that
the plaintiff posed a “direct threat,” including a showing that
the defendant considered reasonable modifications to mitigate
the threat, is inconclusive. Nevertheless, the weight of
persuasive authority suggests that the burden ought shift to
Immediate, and this Court presumes that it does.
F.3d at 1066), has allowed for the “one-time” exclusion of a
service dog from certain areas, informed by a prior policy of
exclusion of such dogs from an allergy-free zone, which forced

employees to “decide on the spot whether to potentially expose
[allergic customers] to dander or to ask [the plaintiff to move
to a different area],” Lockett, 496 F.3d at 1065-66. Since this
Court credits that Smith did, indeed, offer Reaves an
alternative appointment with Dr. Moosavi, or an appointment with
Dr. Gargin herself so long as Malia was taken outside, Immediate
has shown that it conducted an “individualized assessment” of
the risks posed by Malia based on “the best available objective
evidence,” and considered “reasonable modifications” to mitigate
those risks. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b); see also Bennett, 86 F. 4th
at 329-31 (affirming district court’s determination that
defendant reasonably concluded service animal was a direct

threat to medical center based on an individualized assessment
factoring in previous allergic reactions, particularly
threatened allergic individual, and lack of knowledge regarding
other potentially allergic patients).
This ruling is supported by the evidence presented at trial
and by the comparative credibility of the witnesses. Immediate
produced evidence suggesting that it weighed the best available
objective evidence -- Dr. Gargin’s testimony regarding her
severe allergy to dogs, based on her prior consultation with her
doctor and her own knowledge of her allergy and its symptoms --
in determining that Dr. Gargin could not conduct the scheduled
visit with Reaves with Reaves’s service animal present, and

evidence that it weighed reasonable modifications in deciding
that this was the case -- particularly Hochstetler’s affidavit,
relaying her eyewitness testimony of what occurred during
Reaves’s visit.6
Conversely, Reaves’s failure to produce medical records
pertaining to serious medical conditions and incidents to which
she testified, while not determinative on the issue of whether
she has a protected disability, raises concerns that she may
exaggerate and may not have been fully forthcoming in her
representations to this Court. Additionally, Reaves’s seemingly
conflicting representations in the record as to whether she does
or does not smoke further raises concerns with her credibility

on other issues. See Ex. 5, at 19, 29. Hochstetler, on the
other hand, is an apparently disinterested eyewitness, and her
testimony by affidavit is consistent with the testimony of Dr.
Gargin about her allergy and her instructions to Smith at trial,
which this Court finds credible.

6 In addition to Hochstetler’s affidavit, the sheriff’s
bodycam video of the incident shows that Immediate at least
discussed Dr. Gargin’s allergy with Reaves at some point -- a
fact which Reaves minimized at trial -- which fits better with
Immediate’s version of the events. Ex. 1.
Given that this appears to have been a one-time decision,
based on Dr. Gargin’s warning and informed by a previous
incident involving her severe allergy, as Dr. Gargin testified

at trial, even the apparently somewhat expedient decision to
exclude Malia clears the bar for establishing the direct threat
exception. The regulation requires only a “reasonable
judgment,” not a perfect one. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b).
Therefore, this Court rules that Immediate has carried its
burden and shown that it conducted an individualized assessment
of the direct threat posed by Malia and reasonably concluded
that, without the reasonable modifications it proposed to
Reaves, this threat to Dr. Gargin’s health and safety required
Malia’s exclusion from Reaves’s appointment with Dr. Gargin.
There was, therefore, no ADA violation as matter of law when
Immediate canceled Reaves’s appointment and required Reaves to

leave with Malia upon Reaves’s rejection of the alternatives
that Immediate offered.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this Court rules in favor of Immediate and
finds that there was no ADA violation as matter of law based

upon a preponderance of the evidence adduced at trial.
SO ORDERED.
_/s/ William G. Young_
WILLIAM G. YOUNG
JUDGE
of the
UNITED STATES7

7 This is how my predecessor, Peleg Sprague (D. Mass. 1841-
1865), would sign official documents. Now that I’m a Senior
District Judge I adopt this format in honor of all the judicial
colleagues, state and federal, with whom I have had the
privilege to serve over the past 47 years.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10821474. Public record. Not legal advice.