# Reyna v. United States

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · March 11, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10821367

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** March 11, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10821367

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding where no appeal is filed, a judgment of conviction becomes “final” when the period for filing a direct appeal has elapsed

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

MATTHEW REYNA, )
)
Petitioner, ) Case Nos. 1:21-cr-97 & 1:25-cv-71
)
v. ) Judge Atchley
)
UNITED STATES of AMERICA, ) Magistrate Judge Steger
)
Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Matthew Reyna’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [No. 1:21-cr-97, Doc. 35; 1:25-cv-71, Doc. 1]. For the
following reasons, the Motion [No. 1:21-cr-97, Doc. 35; 1:25-cv-71, Doc. 1] is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 24, 2021, Petitioner was indicted on one count of knowingly possessing a
firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). United States v. Reyna, 1:21-cr-97, Doc.
1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2021). Shortly thereafter, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the
Government pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at Doc.
15. Pursuant to this agreement, Petitioner would be sentenced to 53 months imprisonment followed
by a three-year term of supervised release. Id. The Court accepted this agreement and sentenced
Petitioner in accordance with its terms on March 25, 2022. Id. at Doc. 28. Petitioner’s § 2255
Motion followed. [No. 1:21-cr-97, Doc. 35; 1:25-cv-71, Doc. 1]. In the Motion, Petition argues
that his conviction and/or sentence must be vacated because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is an
unconstitutional infringement upon his Second Amendment rights as pronounced by the Supreme
Court in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, (2022). [No. 1:21-cr-97, Doc. 35;
1:25-cv-71, Doc. 1]. Petitioner is incorrect.
II. LAW
Rule 4(b) of the of Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings requires the Court to
“promptly examine” each § 2255 motion. “If it plainly appears from the motion, any attached

exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge
must dismiss the motion and direct the clerk to notify the moving party.” See Rule 4(d) of the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Here, the Motion must be denied for at least three
reasons.
1. Petitioner has waived his right to collateral review.
Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction
and sentence in his plea agreement on any grounds other than (i) prosecutorial misconduct and/or
(ii) ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Reyna, 1:21-cr-97, Doc. 15 ¶ 10(b) (E.D.
Tenn. Oct. 22, 2021). “The Sixth Circuit has consistently enforced such waivers,” even in

situations like Petitioner’s “where changes in the law post-date a defendant’s conviction” Brooks
v. United States, No. 2:23-cv-02753-MSN-tmp, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19600, at *3 (W.D. Tenn.
Feb. 4, 2025) (citing Portis v. United States, 33 F.4th 331, 335–39 (6th Cir. 2022)). Furthermore,
“[i]t is well settled that a defendant in a criminal case may waive any right, even a constitutional
right, by means of a plea agreement.” United States v. Keller, 665 F.3d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Petitioner has waived his right to bring the instant
constitutional challenge.
2. The Motion is time-barred.
Second, even if Petitioner had not waived his right to bring the instant constitutional
challenge, his Motion would still be time-barred. § 2255 motions are subject to a one-year
limitations period which runs from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,
if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental
action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Here, Petitioner has not identified any alleged impediment to filing the Motion
or new facts to support his claim. [See No. 1:21-cr-97, Doc. 35; 1:25-cv-71, Doc. 1]. Accordingly,
the second and fourth potential start dates are not applicable. The third potential start date is
similarly not applicable because “[t]o the extent that Bruen announced a new rule of constitutional
law, the Supreme Court made no declaration that such a rule was retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review.” In re Brown, No. 24-1479, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28142, at *2–3 (6th Cir.
Nov. 5, 2024).
This means that the first potential start date, the date Petitioner’s judgment of conviction
became final, governs when his one-year limitations period began running. See 28 U.S.C. §
2255(f). Petitioner was convicted on March 25, 2022. United States v. Reyna, 1:21-cr-97, Doc. 28
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2022). Because Petitioner did not file a direct appeal, this means his
conviction became final fourteen days later on April 8, 2022. See Sanchez-Castellano v. United
States, 358 F.3d 424, 428 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding where no appeal is filed, a judgment of
conviction becomes “final” when the period for filing a direct appeal has elapsed); see also FED.
R. APP. P. 4(b) (allowing party fourteen days to file appeal in criminal case). Accordingly,
Petitioner had until April 8, 2023, to file the instant Motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). As he did
not file the Motion until February 25, 2025, the Motion is time-barred.

3. Petitioner’s Constitutional Challenge is Meritless.
Even if Petitioner’s Motion could be addressed on the merits, it would still fail. The Sixth
Circuit recently reaffirmed that “922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to dangerous
people.” United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 662–63 (6th Cir. 2024). Given Petitioner’s
previous drug and burglary convictions (and accompanying probation violations) as detailed in the
Presentence Report prepared for his sentencing on the challenged §922(g)(1) conviction, he falls
squarely in the category of dangerous people who may be constitutionally disarmed. See id. at
659–63. Consequently, there is no constitutional basis for vacating his sentence or conviction.
III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [No. 1:21-cr-97, Doc. 35; 1:25-cv-71, Doc. 1] is DENIED. A
separate judgment order will enter.
SO ORDERED.
/s Charles E. Atchley, Jr.
CHARLES E. ATCHLEY JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10821367. Public record. Not legal advice.