# THOMAS v. TEKSYSTEMS, INC.

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · March 10, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10820240

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 10, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10820240

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that minor differences in duties cannot defeat predominance where all class members “have the same primary responsibility”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL THOMAS, et al,
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-460
V. Hon. William S. Stickman IV
TEKSYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Michael Thomas (“Thomas”), Maria Conyers-Jordan (“Conyers-Jordan”),
Austin Sherman (“Sherman”), Lynda Alexandra Maher (“Maher”), Ava Doré (“Doré”), Rachel
Richenberg (“Richenberg”), and Emily Burke (“Burke”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”), on behalf of
themselves and all other persons similarly situated, filed this action against Defendant
TEKsystems, Inc. (““TEK”). (ECF No. 52). Plaintiffs’ claims against TEK arise under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., for TEK’s alleged failure to pay Plaintiffs
and other similarly situated employees overtime wages. Ud § 1). Additionally, (1) Thomas and
Conyers-Jordan bring a claim against TEK under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act
(““PMWA”), 43 P.S. §§ 333.101, et seg. for TEK’s failure to pay them and other similarly situated
employees overtime wages; (2) Doré brings claims against TEK under Washington state law for
TEK’s failure to pay her and other similarly situated employees overtime wages, meal and rest
breaks, and related penalties; (3) Richenberg brings claims against TEK under New York state law
for TEK’s failure to pay her and other similarly situated employees overtime wages, as well as for
failure to provide her and similarly situated employees with statutorily required wage notices and

wage statements, and related penalties; and (4) Burke brings a claim against TEK under
Massachusetts state law for TEK’s failure to pay her and other similarly situated employees
overtime wages. (Ud. § 142-47).
After the close of discovery, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking final FLSA collective action
certification (ECF No. 141) and a supporting brief (ECF No. 142). Plaintiffs also filed a motion
to certify four state law classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) (“Rule 23”) (ECF
No. 144) and a supporting brief (ECF No. 145). For the following reasons, the Court will grant
Plaintiffs’ motions to certify their FLSA collective action and to certify their four proposed state
law class actions in accordance with Rules 23(a) and (b)(3). □
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
TEK describes itself as “a global business and technology firm” that assists its clients in
-achieving their “business goals” through “staff augmentation” (“placing workers with specific
skills on assignment at customer companies for a certain period of time”). (ECF No. 158, p. 12).
This involves assembling teams of employees for customers who need a larger or more specialized
workforce for a project. (/d.). TEK has two client bases — customers (companies that TEK works
with to help them build staffing) and candidates or consultants who TEK works with to place with
its customers. (ECF No. 60-6, pp. 23-24). At the core of all of TEK’s services are its recruiters
(“Recruiters”). Recruiters identify potential candidates who meet the requirements for an open
position with one of TEK’s customers. (ECF No. 142, pp. 9-10); (ECF No. 155, pp. 11-12).
Recruiters locate candidates to be placed with TEK customers. (ECF No. 143-68, p. 4). Recruiters
screen candidates to gain insights into their skills, goals, interests, and provide aligned career
opportunities. Jd. When Recruiters begin with TEK, they are classified as Recruiter Trainees.
(ECF No. 156-14, p. 13). Employees remain in the position of Recruiter Trainee until they have

completed all the required training and demonstrate their ability to perform the duties of a
Recruiter. (/d.). Recruiter Trainees are paid overtime wages if they work over 40 hours per week.
(id.). On the other hand, TEK classifies Recruiters as exempt from state and federal overtime
wage requirements. (ECF No. 55, p. 4). Thus, TEK does not pay Recruiters overtime wages when
they work over 40 hours in a workweek. (/d.).
TEK also employs account managers (“AMs”). AMs primarily work directly with TEK’s
customers to understand and outline the customer’s hiring needs. (ECF No. 155, p. 15); (ECF No.
142, p. 12); (ECF No. 143-3, p. 36). In contrast, Recruiters are primarily responsible for locating
candidates who meet the requirements for an open position. (ECF No. 157-13, p. 4). Recruiters
present their proposed candidates to their AMs. (ECF No. 143-3, p. 20). AMs ultimately decide
which candidates to present to TEK’s customers. (Ud. (“From a [R]Jecruiter perspective, we
consistently remain in communication with the consultant while our [AMs] remain in consistent
communication with the customers.”)). The parties dispute the role of Recruiters and TEK’s
expectations of Recruiters. Plaintiffs contend that Recruiters work in a “producing role.” (ECF
No. 142, p. 10.). They assert that “Recruiters’ primary duty is to screen and match IT job □

candidates for open roles with TEK’s [customers] and to submit candidates who match with the
open roles to TEK’s AMs.” (/d. at 11). TEK counters that it reasonably expects Recruiters to do
more than “rote screening and matching.” (ECF No. 155, p. 11). Instead, it expects Recruiters to:
e Recruit top IT talent and match their career goals with our clients’ hiring
needs|;]
e Develop recruiting strategies to identify qualified candidates by using
specialized networking tools[;]
e Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of candidates through our screening
process];

e Negotiate unique compensation packages (wages, benefits, etc.) to attract and
close candidates[;]
e Communicate details of new assignments and manage contract employees
while on assignment|; |
e Partner with TEKsystems sales team to identify top accounts and target skill
sets[; and]
e Maintain relationships with Technical Professionals to gain industry knowledge
and obtain referrals[.|
(ECF No. 143-68, p. 4). TEK uses the same job description for all Recruiters. (d.). It is
undisputed that AMs decide whether to approve Recruiters’ chosen candidates and that AMs focus
primarily on working with TEK’s customers to define their hiring needs (as opposed to focusing
on candidates and consultants as Recruiters do). (ECF No. 155, p. 15); (ECF No. 142, p. 12). The
parties dispute whether Recruiters are more akin to personnel clerks, merely screening candidates
to determine whether they meet the minimum qualifications and fitness for employment with
TEK’s customers, as Plaintiffs contend, (ECF No. 142, p. 41), or whether Recruiters’ work is more
involved and requires independent judgment and initiative, as TEK contends (ECF No. 155, p. 13).
The parties also dispute whether Recruiters are entry-level employees. According to
Plaintiffs, Recruiters are entry-level employees. (ECF No. 142, p. 9). Plaintiffs assert that
Recruiters are generally hired early in their career and have an annual attrition rate of
approximately 38 to 47%. (/d.). The average tenure of named Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs who have
opted-in to the FLSA collective action, according to Plaintiffs, is 1.28 years as a Recruiter. (/d.).
TEK does not require Recruiters to have any previous information technology (“IT”) knowledge
or experience. (/d. at 9-10). TEK argues that the Recruiter position is not an entry-level role
because it does not hire employees into the Recruiter role directly, employees are hired as Recruiter
Trainees. (ECF No. 155, p. 10). TEK argues that many people are never promoted to Recruiter.

(id.). Further, it highlights that for those who do obtain promotion, the length of time needed to
complete the training and demonstrate their abilities is highly variable, ranging from 13 weeks to
more than 1 year for some Plaintiffs. (/d.). Finally, it argues that (1) many Recruiters remain in
the role for years, (2) employees have been Recruiters, moved to roles with different
responsibilities and then returned to the Recruiter role, and (3) many Recruiters possess substantial
experience in recruiting or another relevant industry prior to working at TEK. (/d.)
TEK subjects all Recruiters to the same production quotas. (ECF No. 143-4, pp. 21-22).
The quota for Recruiters is 25 points a week based on the following activity points: G2s (intakes),
reference checks; submittals (which is when an AM submits a candidate to a customer that the
Recruiter solicits); interviews (which is when TEK’s customers interview the candidate); and starts
(which is when a candidate ultimately starts a job with a TEK client). (/d at 29). Prior to July
2022, TEK required Recruiters to maintain a weekly average of 30 “interactions,” such as reference
checks, G2s, and meals with candidates. (/d. at 28). TEK requires all Recruiters to meet the same
spread levels which is the difference between the amount a customer pays TEK for placing the
consultant and the costs to TEK to place them. (/d. at 14); (ECF No. 143-6, p. 15).
TEK provides uniform training to Recruiters. The Recruiter Trainees undergo a 13-week
training period designed by TEK’s corporate training department. (ECF No. 143-4, p. 8). TEK
provides uniform guides to all its Recruiters including, but not limited to: Recruiter Onboarding
Plan and the Participant Guide, which contain sample scripts for conversations with candidates;
Recruiter Onboarding Plan; Reference Check Guidance; Red Zone Script; Search Strings for
LinkedIn Recruiters; “Sourcing Strategy: Plan of Attack;” “Consultant Conversation Guide;” and
“Application Recruiting Smart Questions.” (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 143-78, 143-57, 143-79, 143-82).

TEK’s policies explain that Recruiters are expected to work 45-60 hours per week. (ECF
No. 143-23, p. 15 (“The habits you develop early in your career play a pivotal role in determining
success. Working long days and weekends are often a necessary part of meeting business goals.”)).
Recruiters also respond to AM and potential candidate emails, texts, and calls in the evenings and
on the weekends. (ECF No. 143-12, p. 10); (ECF No. 143-46, p. 5); (ECF No. 91, pp. 29-30).
Recruiters often work through lunch either taking consultants and/or job candidates out to lunch
or soliciting potential candidates. (ECF No. 143-33, p. 19); (ECF No. 143-91, p. 4).
At Count I of the amended complaint, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the FLSA
collective, bring a claim under the FLSA alleging that TEK does not pay Recruiters overtime
wages when they work over 40 hours in individual workweeks even though Plaintiffs and members
of the collective are not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. (ECF No. 52, 9] 92-
101). The primary merits dispute regarding Count I is whether Plaintiffs and other members of
the collective are exempt from the FLSA overtime requirements pursuant to the administrative
exemption.
At Count II, Thomas and Conyers-Jordan, on behalf of themselves and those similarly
situated within Pennsylvania, allege that TEK violated PMWA, 43 P.S. §§ 333.101, ef seq., by
failing to pay Recruiters in Pennsylvania overtime wages when they worked in excess of 40 hours
per workweek. (Ud. 102-108).
At Count III, Doré, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated in Washington, alleges
that TEK violated the Washington Minimum Wage Act (“WMWA”) by failing to pay Recruiters
overtime wages for their overtime hours worked. (/d. {§ 109-113). At Count IV, Doré, on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated in Washington, alleges that TEK violated the Washington
Meal and Rest Period Provisions by failing to provide Doré and other Recruiters in Washington

with meal and rest periods (or failing to properly compensate Recruiters for their missed meals
and rest periods). Ud. J§ 114-24). At Count V, Doré, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated in Washington, alleges that TEK is liable under the Washington Wage and Rebate Act for
willfully and unlawfully refusing to pay Recruiters in Washington the wages they are owed. (id.
125-27).
At Count VI, Richenberg, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated in New York,
alleges that TEK violated the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) by willfully and intentionally
failing to pay Recruiters in New York overtime wages. (/d. 128-33). At Count VII, Richenberg,
on behalf of herself and those similarly situated in New York, alleges that TEK violated the NYLL
by willfully failing to supply Recruiters in New York with wage notices at the time of their hire;
the regular pay day designated by the employer; the name of the employer; any “doing business
as” names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal
place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus
such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. (Ud. {| 134-37). At
Count VIIL, Richenberg, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated in New York, alleges that
TEK violated the NYLL by failing to provide Recruiters in New York with accurate statements of
wages as required by the NYLL. (/d. {J 138-41).
At Count IX, Burke, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated in Massachusetts,
alleges that TEK violated the Massachusetts Overtime Law by failing to pay Recruiters in
Massachusetts the overtime to which they were entitled. Ud. 9] 142-47).
Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their motion for final FLSA collective action
certification. (ECF No. 141). They also request that the Court certify the following state law
classes for all issues under Rule 23(b)(3):

Pennsylvania Overtime Class — Plaintiffs Michael Thomas and Maria Conyers-
Jordan request the Court certify a class of “All current and former Recruiters
employed by Defendant in Pennsylvania from April 9, 2018 to the final date of
judgment.”
Washington Overtime and Meal and Rest Break Class — Plaintiff Ava Doré
requests the Court certify a class of “All current and former Recruiters employed
by Defendant in Washington from January 19, 2019 to the final date of judgment.”
New York Overtime and Accurate Paystub Class — Plaintiff Rachel Richenberg
requests the Court certify a class off “All current and former Recruiters employed
by Defendant in New York from January 19, 2016 to the final date of judgment.”
Massachusetts Overtime Class — Plaintiff Emily Burke requests the Court certify
a class of “All current and former Recruiters employed by Defendant in
Massachusetts from January 19, 2019 to the final date of judgment.”
(ECF No. 144, p. 1).
TI. ANALYSIS
A. FLSA Collective Action Certification
The FLSA “was designed ‘to aid the unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the
nation’s working population; that is, those employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power to
secure for themselves a minimum subsistence wage.’” Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 656
F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symezyk,
569 U.S. 66 (2013). “Under the ‘collective action’ mechanism set forth in... § 216(b), an
employee alleging an FLSA violation may bring an action on ‘behalf of hfer]self . . . and other
employees similarly situated,’ subject to the requirement that ‘no employee shall be a party
plaintiff to any such action unless he gives consent in writing to become such a party ....”” Jd.
Courts follow a two-tiered analysis in determining whether a case may move forward as a
collective action. Jd Further, Plaintiffs are dispersed across four states. “Although the advances in remote hearings,
conferences, and depositions, has blunted the effect of geographic dispersion on the
impracticability of joinder, it still may cause logistical problems, such as when [TEK] needs to
depose . . . joined plaintiffs.” Muse v. Holloway Credit Sols., LLC, 337 F.R.D. 80, 87 (E.D. Pa.
2020). Geographic dispersion favors a finding of numerosity.

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of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but rather, the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Ferreras, 946 F.3d at 185.
Plaintiffs argue that they have proven the commonality requirement because TEK
uniformly classified Recruiters as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. (ECF No. 145,
p. 37). Given that Recruiters’ job duties are well-defined, there are common questions of law or
fact — despite any arguments about individualized differences in job function or methods. (/d.).
TEK contends that Plaintiffs have not offered a single common question of law or fact. (ECF No.
158, p. 31). It argues that TEK’s uniform classification of Recruiters as exempt does not generate
a common answer to whether Recruiters are properly classified as exempt. (/d.). The Court holds
that Plaintiffs have proven the commonality requirement in accordance with Rule 23(a).
A court in the Northern District of California considered a similar issue in Avery □□
TEKsystems, Inc., No. 3:22-CV-02733-JSC, 2024 WL 590364 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2024). In
Avery, Recruiters sought to certify a class action under Rule 23 against TEK for allegedly violating
California overtime, wage, and hour laws by classifying Recruiters as exempt from state law
overtime requirements. Avery, 2024 WL 590364, at *1. Like in the instant case, TEK’s main
defense was that Recruiters were exempt from the overtime requirements because they fell under
the administrative exemption. /d. at *3. The court held that the plaintiffs proved the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a):

_ [B]oth parties agree TEK classifies all purported class members as exempt. So, the
central dispute is whether purported class members were properly characterized as
exempt. Resolving that dispute involves at least the common question of whether
all Recruiters’ work is “directly related to management policies or general business
operations” of TEK or TEK’s customers. ... This question can be answered on a
class-wide basis.
Id. at *5.

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In the instant case, like in Avery, TEK uniformly classifies Recruiters as exempt from
Pennsylvania, Washington, New York, and Massachusetts overtime requirements. (ECF No. 55,
p. 4). Thus, the common question in each class, as acknowledged by TEK, (ECF No. 158, p. 31),
is whether TEK properly classifies Recruiters as exempt.° TEK’s central defense is that Recruiters
are exempt pursuant to each state’s administrative exemption. Thus, there are two main questions

6 Plaintiffs’ state law overtime wage claims are similar to their FLSA claims.
Pennsylvania: Like the FLSA, the PMWA requires employers to pay employees an overtime rate
“not less than one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate” for hours worked in excess of
forty in a workweek, 43 Pa. C.S. § 333.104(c), and exempts from this overtime requirement
employees employed “[i]n a bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity,” 43 Pa.
C.S. § 333.105(a)(5). “Although the criteria for [the administrative exemption] under the PMWA
are not identical to FLSA’s criteria, the . . . tests are sufficiently similar that [a] court’s analysis
regarding the FLSA exemptions also applies to the PMWA exemptions.” Vanstory-Frazier v.
CHHS Hosp. Co., LLC, No. CIV.A. 08-3910, 2010 WL 22770, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2010).
Washington: The WMWA “mirrors the FLSA’s overtime and exemption provisions.” Bollinger
v. Residential Cap., LLC, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044 (W.D. Wash. 2012); see also Wash. Rev.
Code § 49.46.010(3)(c); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.46.130; Palazzolo-Robinson v. Sharis Mgmt.
Corp., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1189 n.3 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
New York: “The NYLL provides wage and overtime protections for employees similar to the
protections afforded to employees by the FLSA.” Sethi v. Narod, 974 F. Supp. 2d 162, 183
(E.D.N.Y. 2013), Reiseck vy. Universal Comme’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“The NYLL . . . mandates overtime pay and applies the same exemptions as the FLSA.”)
abrogated on other grounds by Flood v. Just Energy Mktg. Corp., 904 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2018).
Massachusetts: Massachusetts overtime requirements are “essentially identical to the FLSA.”
Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Goodrow v. Lane Bryant,
Inc., 732 N.E.2d 289, 294 (Mass. 2000).
Likewise, the California overtime wage requirements and exemptions are not meaningfully
different from the requirements of the FLSA. While California’s administrative exemption does
not expressly incorporate the FLSA exemption, it is “essentially the same as the FLSA.” Deluca
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 386 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1251 n.17 (N.D. Cal. 2019). There are minor
differences between the statutes. California’s administrative exemption contains additional
‘elements not found within the FLSA. Moreover, California’s administrative exemption requires
that an employee be “primarily engaged” in administrative tasks rather than having those tasks as
his or her “primary duty,” but otherwise it mirrors the federal exemption. See Cal. Code Regs.
Title 8, § 11070.
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of fact and law at issue in each class: (1) whether Recruiters’ primary duty is the performance of
office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of
the employer or the employer’s customers; and (2) whether Recruiters’ primary duty includes the
exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. See 29
CFR. § 541.200; 29 C.F.R. 541.66; see also Smith, 593 F.3d at 285.
In light of TEK’s uniform treatment of Recruiters, these common questions can be
answered on a class wide basis. TEK uses the same job description for Recruiters, tasks Recruiters
with the same responsibilities, requires Recruiters to have uniform qualifications, and offers
Recruiters compensation and benefits on the same scale. (ECF No. 143-68, p. 4). Recruiters are
subject to and evaluated based on uniform production quotas. (ECF No. 143-4, pp. 21-22). TEK
provides an identical training program to Recruiters. (ECF No. 143-4, p. 8); (ECF Nos. 143-78,
143-57, 143-79, 143-82). There may be minor variations in how Recruiters perform their tasks.
Nevertheless, these differences are immaterial in light of the common questions posed by named
Plaintiffs and class members. In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions, 148
F.3d 283, 310 (3d Cir. 1998) (“A finding of commonality does not require that all class members
share identical claims, and indeed factual differences among the claims of the putative class
members do not defeat certification. .. . The commonality requirement will be satisfied if the
named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective
class.” (internal citations omitted)). Recruiters perform the same primary job duties, are subject
to uniform expectations, and TEK classifies all Plaintiffs and members of the collective as exempt
from the overtime requirements of the FLSA and state law. Plaintiffs have satisfied the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a).
iii. Typicality

27

Plaintiffs must show that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class.” FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Satisfaction of this standard is a
“low threshold.” In re Nat'l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 ¥.3d 410, 428
(3d Cir. 2016). “Even relatively pronounced factual differences will generally not preclude a
finding of typicality where there is a strong similarity of legal theories or where the claim arises
from the same practice or course of conduct.” Jd. (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales
Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 311 Gd Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “To conduct the typicality inquiry, the court must examine ‘whether the named
plaintiffs’. claims are typical, in common-sense terms, of the class, thus suggesting that the
incentives of the plaintiffs are aligned with those of the class.”” In re Niaspan, 397 F. Supp. 3d at
680 (quoting In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., No. 09-2081, 2015 WL 6123211, at *26 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 19, 2015)).
Plaintiffs assert that they have met the typicality requirement because named Plaintiffs’
claims arise out of TEK’s uniform conduct towards Plaintiffs and class members — TEK’s
classification of Recruiters as exempt from state law overtime wage requirements. (ECF No. 145,
p. 38). The Court holds that Plaintiffs met the typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).
The Court holds that Plaintiffs proved that their claims are typical of class members’
claims. Plaintiffs worked as Recruiters and are seeking to represent classes of Recruiters. (See
ECF No. 143-54 (Thomas’s declaration)); (ECF No. 143-34 (Conyers-Jordan’s declaration));
(ECF No. 143-94 (Sherman’s declaration)); (ECF No. 143-91 (Maher’s declaration)); (ECF No.
143-46 (Doré’s declaration)); (ECF No. 143-48 (Richenberg’s declaration)); (ECF No. 143-33
(Burke’s declaration)); (ECF No. 144, p. 1 (defining the four state law classes)). TEK does not
contest that Plaintiffs proved this requirement. (See ECF No. 158). TEK classified all Recruiters

28

as exempt from state law overtime wage requirements. (ECF No. 55, p. 4). Plaintiffs allege that
they were misclassified as exempt and are therefore entitled to overtime pay, penalties for meal
and rest break violations (Washington class), and penalties for inaccurate wage notices and
statements (New York class). (ECF No. 52). Plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality requirement
because they have the same alleged injuries as class members resulting from TEK.’s classification
of Recruiters.
iv. Adequacy
Under Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs must show that “the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a)(4). The adequacy inquiry under
Rule 23 “has two components designed to ensure that [class members] interests are fully pursued.”
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir. 1996). First, the adequacy inquiry
“tests the qualifications of the counsel to represent the class.” Jn re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust
Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 532 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Second, it seeks “to uncover
conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Jd. (internal
citations omitted).
Plaintiffs assert that they have proved the adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) because (1)
there is no conflict between named Plaintiffs and members of the class, (2) named Plaintiffs are
pursuing the same claims as the class and are subject to the same defenses, and (3) they have
actively participated in the discovery process. (ECF No. 145, p. 39). Plaintiffs contend that their
attorneys meet the adequacy requirements in this case as their law firms “have done a tremendous
amount of work on this case, have experience in complex litigation, have knowledge of the
applicable law, and will devote all necessary resources to the prosecution of this case.” (/d.). TEK

29

does not contest adequacy. (ECF No. 158). The Court holds that Plaintiffs have established
adequacy as required by Rule 23(a).
There is no evidence of any conflicts of interests between named Plaintiffs and class
members. (ECF No. 146, § 22). Plaintiffs’ counsel provided evidence indicating that they have
experience litigating class actions and have sufficient resources to zealously represent named
Plaintiffs and class members. (/d. {J 14-21). Plaintiffs have actively participated in an extensive
discovery process. (/d. 20, 24). Plaintiffs have established that they will adequately represent
the interest of the class members.
2. Rule 23(b)(3)
In addition to the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a), parties seeking class certification
must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3). Rule 23(b)(3), the
provision at issue in this case, provides for so-called “opt-out” class actions lawsuits. See In re
Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 527 (internal citations omitted). Under Rule 23(b)(3), two additional
requirements must be met in order for a class to be certified: (1) common questions must
“predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” (the predominance
requirement), and (2) class resolution must be “superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy” (the superiority requirement). Id.; see also FED. R. CIv.
P. 23(b).
i. Predominance!’

7 Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality element requires that the proposed class members share at least one
question of fact or law in common with each other. See Baby Neal ex. rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43
F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994). Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance element in turn requires that common
issues predominate over issues affecting only individual class members. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3). “Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, which is far more demanding, incorporates
the Rule 23(a) commonality requirement.” Jn re Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 528 (internal citations
omitted). The Court incorporates its commonality analysis by reference.
30

“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 623 (1997). The Third Circuit has stated:
To assess predominance, a court at the certification stage must examine each
element of a legal claim “through the prism” of Rule 23(b)(3). A plaintiff must
“demonstrate that the element of [the legal claim] is capable of proof at trial through
evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to its members.”
“Because the nature of the evidence that will suffice to resolve a question
determines whether the question is common or individual, a district court must
formulate some prediction as to how specific issues will play out in order to
determine whether common or individual issues predominate in a given case.”
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 600 (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiffs assert that they have met the predominance requirement because the
“applicability of the administrative exemption and TEK’s failure to pay Recruiters overtime pay
when they work more than 40 hours per week . . . can be resolved through common proof
applicable to all class members’ claims” (ECF No. 145, p. 40). TEK contends that Plaintiffs have
not shown predominance because (1) “there is no common evidence that the primary duty of
Recruiters is merely to ‘screen’ and ‘match’ candidates to requirements determined by TEK’s
customers,” (2) there are no standardized templates or other tools TEK requires Recruiters to use,
(3) Recruiters are not subject to standardized supervision and hierarchy, (4) Recruiters are not
subject to uniform “production” standards, and (5) common evidence cannot answer whether
Recruiters’ primary job duty relates to management policies or general business operations of TEK
or its customers, or whether Recruiters customarily and regularly exercise discretion and
independent judgment in executing their primary duties. (ECF No. 155, pp. 34-40). TEK further
contends that (1) whether Recruiters meet TEK’s reasonable expectations raises individualized
issues; (2) some class members are subject to agreements that require them to pursue any claims
in arbitration on an individual basis; (3) some class members are subject to the individualized

31

defense that state law does not have extraterritorial effect as to their claims; and (4) some class
members in Massachusetts and New York are subject to the defense that they satisfy the highly
compensated employee exemption. (/d. at 40-44). The Court holds that Plaintiffs have satisfied
the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).
Pennsylvania Class
Count II (Overtime Wage Requirements)
At Count II, Plaintiffs allege TEK violated 43 P.S. § 333.104 by failing to pay Thomas,
Conyers-Jordan, and class members overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per
week. (ECF No. 52, Jf 102-08). Under § 331.104, “[e]mployes shall be paid for overtime not less
than one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate” for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours
in an individual workweek. 43 P.S. § 333.104. Based on the pleadings filed in the instant
litigation, the Court anticipates that TEK will argue at trial that it did not pay Plaintiffs and class
members overtime wages because it classified them as exempt pursuant to the PMWA’s
administrative exemption.
Under the PMWA’s administrative employee exemption, anyone employed in a “bona fide

... administrative . . . capacity” is exempt from the PMWA’s overtime protections. 43 P.S. §
333.105(a)(S). The exemption applies to employees whose (1) salaried compensation is at least
“$250 per week, exclusive of board, lodging or other facilities,” 34 Pa. Code § 231.83(5); (2)
“primary duty consists of the performance of office or nonmanual work directly related to
management policies or general operation of his employer or the customers of the employer,” 34
Pa. Code § 231.83(1), and (3) primary duty “requir[es] the exercise of discretion and independent
judgment,” 34 Pa. Code § 231.83(5). The parties primarily dispute the second and third element.
“In general, the exercise of discretion and independent judgment involves the comparison and the

32

evaluation of possible courses of conduct and acting or making a decision after the various
possibilities have been considered.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a) (explaining “discretion and
independent judgment” for the purposes of the FLSA whose administrative exemption mirrors
PMWA’s exemption).
TEK. uniformly classifies all Recruiters as exempt from PMWA’s overtime requirements.
(ECF No. 55, p. 4). Thus, the issue with regard to Count I] is whether the administrative exemption
applies. For the purpose of this analysis, the question is whether the administrative exemption is
capable of proof through common evidence. The Court acknowledges that while TEK’s uniform
exemption policy suggests “the employer believes some degree of homogeneity exists among the
employees, the existence of a blanket exemption policy, standing alone, is not itself determinative
of the main concern in the predominance inquiry: the balance between individual and common
issues.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 549 (quoting In re Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Overtime Pay Litig.,
571 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Whether Recruiters’ “primary duty consists of the performance of office or nonmanual
work directly related to management policies or general operation of his employer or the customers
of the employer” is subject to proof through collective evidence. TEK does not seem to dispute
‘this proposition. (ECF No. 158, p. 38 (“[T]he first prong of the administrative exemption can be
decided as a matter of law.”)). As discussed above, Recruiters fulfill the same role for TEK:
sourcing candidates to place with TEK’s customers. TEK uses the same job description for
Recruiters, tasks Recruiters with the same responsibilities, requires Recruiters to have uniform
qualifications, and offers Recruiters compensation and benefits on the same scale. (ECF No. 143-
68, p. 4). Recruiters are subject to and evaluated based on uniform production quotas. (ECF No.
143-4, pp. 21-22). TEK provides uniform training to Recruiters. (ECF No. 143-4, p. 8); (ECF

33

Nos. 143-78, 143-57, 143-79, 143-82). Thus, based on TEK’s own policies and materials,
Recruiters share a primary duty across the class.
TEK argues that whether Recruiters’ primary duty “requir[es] the exercise of discretion
and independent judgment” must be resolved on an individual basis because Recruiters acted with
different levels of discretion and judgment when performing their duties. (ECF No. 158, p. 40).
Moreover, TEK argues that there is a wide variation among Recruiters on how they accomplish
tasks. (/d.). The Court finds that these potential differences are insufficient to overcome Plaintiffs’
showing of predominance for certification purposes. See Wood v. Mike Bloomberg 2020, Inc., No.
1:20-CV-2489-LTS-GWG, 2024 WL 3952718, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2024) (“[S]o long as
there is evidence that proposed class members’ primary job duties are ‘largely similar’ the
predominance requirement is satisfied.”); Jackson, 298 F.R.D. at 166 (finding that minor
differences in duties cannot defeat predominance where all class members “have the same primary
responsibility”); Jacob, 289 F.R.D. at 421-22 (holding that predominance was satisfied,
notwithstanding some slight variations among class members, because of significant common
evidence of similar duties); Pruess, 2024 WL 3844965, at *13 (stating, in applying an almost
identical administrative exemption, that predominance is present even when employees’ duties
“certainly have some variation” when most of the employees performed similar duties). In
showing the commonalities between TEK Recruiters, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that common
questions of law and fact will predominate with respect to the Pennsylvania Class.
Washington Class
Count JIT (Overtime Wage Requirements)

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At Count III, Doré, on behalf of herself and members of the Washington class, alleges that
TEK violated the WMWA by failing to pay Recruiters overtime wages for hours worked in excess
of 40 hours per week. (ECF No. 52, fff 109-13). Washington law states that:
no employer shall employ any of his or her employees for a workweek longer than
forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his or her employment
in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times
the regular rate at which he or she is employed.
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.46.130. Administrative employees are exempt from Washington’s overtime
wage requirements. Employees can be defined as administrative if: (1) their “primary duty consists
of the performance of office or non-manual field work directly related to management policies or
general business operations of his employer or his employer’s customers,” and (2) they
“customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment.” Wash. Admin. Code
§§ 296-128-520(1), (3). Given that Washington’s overtime requirements and administrative
exemption are essentially identical to Pennsylvania’s, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have proven
predominance with regards to Count II for the reasons discussed in detail above in the Count I
analysis.
Count IV (Meal and Rest Break Requirements)
At Count IV, Doré, on behalf of herself and members of the Washington class, alleges that
TEK violated Washington’s Meal and Rest Period Provisions by failing to provide Recruiters with
the meal and rest breaks to which they are entitled, failing to ensure Recruiters took meal and rest
breaks, and failing to provide Recruiters with pay to compensate for each missed break. (ECF No.
52, Jf 114-24). Washington Administrative Code § 296-126-092 states that:
(1) Employees shall be allowed a meal period of at least thirty minutes which
commences no less than two hours nor more than five hours from the beginning of
the shift. Meal periods shall be on the employer’s time when the employee is
required by the employer to remain on duty on the premises or at a prescribed work
site in the interest of the employer. □

35

(2) No employee shall be required to work more than five consecutive hours
without a meal period.
(3) Employees working three or more hours longer than a normal work day shall
be allowed at least one thirty-minute meal period prior to or during the overtime
period.
(4) Employees shall be allowed a rest period of not less than ten minutes, on the
employer’s time, for each four hours of working time. Rest periods shall be
scheduled as near as possible to the midpoint of the work period. No employee shall
be required to work more than three hours without a rest period.
(5) Where the nature of the work allows employees to take intermittent rest periods
equivalent to ten minutes for each 4 hours worked, scheduled rest periods are not
required.
Wash. Admin. Code § 296-126-092.
TEK concedes that, since April 9, 2018, it had a policy and practice to provide meal and
rest breaks to Recruiter Trainees in Washington. (ECF No. 146-1, p. 1). The policy was not
applicable to Recruiters. (/d.). TEK did not track whether Recruiters in Washington took meal
and rest breaks. (/d.). Moreover, TEK did not provide additional compensation to Recruiters for
missed meal and rest breaks. (/d. at 2).
The Court holds that common questions of fact and law predominate Count IV. The issue
is whether TEK’s policy of not providing Recruiters with meal and rest breaks (or compensation
for missed meal and rest breaks) violates Washington’s meal and rest break provisions. This
question is common to all class members in the Washington class. See Chavez v. Our Lady of
Lourdes Hosp. at Pasco, 415 P.3d 224, 230 (Wash. 2018) (holding that employees satisfied
Washington’s Superior Court Civil Rule 23’s predominance requirement, which is nearly identical
its federal counterpart, despite minor differences among employees, when employees alleged that
the employer failed to ensure employees could take meal and rest breaks).
Count V (Depriving Employees of Earned Wages)

36

At Count V, Doré, on behalf of herself and members of the Washington class, alleges that
TEK violated the Washington Wage Rebate Act. (ECF No. 52, J 125-27). Washington’s Wage
Rebate Act prohibits employers from “[w]ilfully and with intent to deprive the employee of any
part of his or her wages” paying “any employee a lower wage than the wage such employer is
obligated to pay such employee by any statute, ordinance, or contract.” Wash. Rev. Code §
49.52.050. Washington law also provides that:
Any employer and any officer, vice principal or agent of any employer who shall
violate any of the provisions of RCW 49.52.050 (1) and (2) shall be liable in a civil
action by the aggrieved employee or his or her assignee to judgment for twice the
amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld by way of exemplary damages,
together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees.
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.52.070. Thus, similar to Count III, the issue at Count V is whether TEK
unlawfully classified Recruiters as exempt from the WMWA’s overtime requirements. For the
reasons explained above, the Court holds that Plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement with respect to Count V.
New York Class
Count VI (Overtime Wage Requirements)
At Count VI, Richenberg, on behalf of herself and members of the New York class, alleges
that TEK violated NYLL by failing to pay Richenberg and class members the overtime
compensation to which they are entitled. New York law states that: “[aJn employer shall pay an
employee for overtime at a wage rate of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate.” N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12 § 142-3.2; see also N.Y. Lab. Law § 650 (McKinney). Administrative
employees are exempt from New York’s overtime wage requirements. Jd New York’s
administrative exemption mirrors the FLSA’s exemption. See Sethi, 974 F. Supp. at 162; Reiseck,
591 F.3d at 105 (“NYLL .. . mandates overtime pay and applies the same exemptions as the

37

FLSA.”). Given that Washington’s overtime requirements and administrative exemption are
essentially identical to the FLSA’s, and therefore Pennsylvania’s, the Court holds that Plaintiffs
have proven predominance with regards to Count VI for the reasons discussed in detail above in
the Count I analysis.
Counts VI. & VIII (Failure to Provide Wage Notices and Accurate Pay Statements)
At Counts VII and VIII, Richenberg, on behalf of herself and members of the New York
class, alleges that TEK violated NYLL by willfully failing to supply Richenberg and New York
class members with wage notices at the time of their hire, (ECF No. 52, 134-37), and accurate
statements of wages every pay period, (id. J§ 138-41). New York law requires employers to
provide employees, at the time of hiring, a notice containing various information including “their
rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece,
commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable;
[and] the regular pay day designated by the employer... .” N.Y. Lab. Law § 195; see N.Y. Lab.
Law §§ 190, et seg. Employers are also required to provide employees with an accurate statement
every pay period containing “the regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate or rates of
pay; the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked.” Jd.
Plaintiffs allege that TEK failed to provide Recruiters with accurate wage notices at the
time of hire and pay statements at each pay period. (ECF No. 52, {9134-37). The Court finds that
whether TEK provided Recruiters in New York with an accurate wage notice at the time of hiring
and accurate pay statements is subject to collective proof — the common question to all members
of the class is whether TEK had a practice of providing employees with proper wage notice and
pay statements. Plaintiffs have proved predominance with respect to Counts VII and VIII.

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Massachusetts Class
Count IX (Overtime Wage Requirements)
At Count IX, Burke, on behalf of herself and members of the Massachusetts class, alleges
that TEK violated Massachusetts state law requirements by failing to pay Burke and class members
the overtime compensation to which they are entitled. (ECF No. 52, { 142-47). Massachusetts
law states that “no employer .. . shall employ any of his employees . . . for a work week longer
than forty hours, unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of
forty hours at a rate not less than one and one half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1A. The overtime wage requirement does not apply to administrative
employees. Jd. The Massachusetts administrative exemption is identical to that of the FLSA. See
Tam vy. Fed. Mgmt. Co., 163 N.E.3d 395, 398 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021). Given that Massachusetts’ □
overtime requirements and administrative exemption are essentially identical to the FLSA’s, and
therefore Pennsylvania’s, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have proven predominance with regards
to Count IX for the reasons discussed in detail above in the Count I analysis.
Arbitration Agreements
TEK contends that common issues do not predominate in any class since there are 381
class members who are parties to an arbitration agreement and whose claims must be pursued in
individual arbitration. (ECF No. 158, pp. 41-42). TEK does not specify which of the four proposed
classes the 381 individuals belong within. Plaintiffs counter that the arbitration agreements do not
justify denying class certification because those class members may be handled through a subclass
or by removing class members at a later date. (ECF No. 163, p. 21).

39

Class certification is not necessarily precluded by the existence of an arbitration defense as
to some putative class members.* Plaintiffs have presented strong evidence that common questions
of law and fact will predominate in the litigation of the four proposed class actions. This strong
predominance cannot be overcome by a potential arbitration agreement defense as to some
members. The Court reserves the right to “create a subclass, modify the class definition, or
otherwise specially treat the class members potentially subject to arbitration at a later suncture.”
See Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 220 F.R.D. 64, 91 (M.D. Tenn. 2004).
The Extraterritorial Effect of State Law
TEK argues that remote work is common at TEK and “some individuals aligned to an
office may not perform work in or otherwise have substantial ties to that state.” (ECF No. 158, p.
42). TEK highlights that “[nJumerous class members reside in states other than the state of the
office to which they are aligned: 65 of the New York putative class, 21 of the Massachusetts
putative class, 61 of the Pennsylvania putative class; and 17 of the Washington putative class.”
(id.). Thus, TEK may present a defense with respect to the extraterritorial effect of each state’s
laws. Plaintiffs counter that “[t]he class definitions for all four states restrict the class to employees
who were employed ‘by Defendant in’ the respective states.” (ECF No. 163, p. 21 (emphasis in
original)). Thus, if an employee did not physically work in Pennsylvania, Washington, New York,

8 Herrera v. LCS Fin. Servs. Corp., 274 F.R.D. 666, 681 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“The fact that some
members of a putative class may have signed arbitration agreements or released claims against a
defendant does not bar class certification.”); Bittinger v. Tecumseh Products Co., 123 F.3d 877,
884 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding class certification to be proper despite the fact that some class
members signed papers releasing the defendant from liability); Finnan v. Rothschild & Co., 726
F.Supp. 460, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the fact that some class members had signed
releases or arbitration agreements was subordinate to the larger common defense of the defendant
and did not defeat the merits of class certification).

40

or Massachusetts, they are not part of the class. Given Plaintiffs’ concession, the Court finds that
there is no extraterritorial issue and thus no basis to deny certification based upon this argument.
These collective members will be removed from the litigation. Assuming that the aforementioned
individuals do not belong in the proposed classes, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer
to (1) reach an agreement regarding which members do not belong in the collective and (2) discuss
a procedure for removing members who do not fall within the FLSA collective definition from this
litigation. Further, even if the extraterritorial effect of state law applies to some of the proposed
class members, the Court holds that this defense, applicable to only a small portion of each class,
is not sufficient to defeat certification.
The Highly Compensated Employee Exemption
TEK contends that it may assert the highly compensated employee exemption defense
against certain class members in Massachusetts and New York. (ECF No. 158, pp. 43-44). TEK
acknowledges that the parties have yet to engage in discovery concerning the wages earned by
putative class members. (/d. at 44). Thus, TEK did not identify how many members of the New
York and Massachusetts classes may be subject to this defense. The fact that the highly
compensated employee exemption may only apply to a subset of members of the New York and
Massachusetts classes does not warrant denial of class certification — especially when there is
substantial overlap between the requirements of the administrative and highly compensated
employee exemptions. See Snively, 314 F. Supp. at 734.
ii. Superiority
Rule 23(b)(3) requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate “a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. Crv. PRo. 23(b)(3). In
making this decision, Rule 23(b)(3) instructs courts to consider:

4]

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Td. This list of factors is non-exhaustive. Amchem, 521 US. at 616.
Plaintiffs contend that they have satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement because:
(1) there is no indication that any class members want to individually control the litigation; (2)
Plaintiffs challenge TEK’s uniform exemption policy and all Recruiters share the same primary
job duty; and (3) class litigation allows employees to pursue their claims without fear of retaliation.
(ECF No. 145, p. 47). TEK contends that Plaintiffs’ FLSA collective action demonstrates that
class litigation is not a superior method of resolving this litigation. (ECF No. 158, pp. 45-46).
TEK asserts that there is no evidence of retaliation and adjudicating Plaintiffs’ claims on a class-
wide basis would not be manageable because individualized inquiries are necessary to resolve this
litigation. (Ud. at 46-47). In essence, TEK reasserts its numerosity, commonality, and
predominance arguments. The Court holds that Plaintiffs have shown that class litigation is
superior to other available methods for resolving this litigation.
There is no indication that members of the proposed classes have a desire to litigate their
claims individually. There is no pending litigation that counsels against the superiority of class
litigation. The Court is a proper forum for this litigation as events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims
arose in this district and TEK conducts sufficient business within Pennsylvania to subject itself to
personal jurisdiction within the state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Court declines to re-address

42

most of TEK’s argument as it pertains to superiority because it has previously addressed these
arguments in the numerosity, commonality, and predominance sections of this opinion.
Further, adjudicating Plaintiffs’ claims on a class basis will be manageable. As discussed
in. detail in the commonality and predominance sections, every claim may be proven through
representative evidence. TEK’s defenses can be litigated through representative proof. Common
questions of law and fact overwhelm any purported individualized defenses and inquiries,
rendering class litigation appropriate. TEK argues that individual damages issues will predominate
because “the existence, type, and extent of damages” varies between class members. (ECF No.
158, p. 47). This argument fails as “damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification.” Leyva
v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 2013); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727
F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he fact that damages are not identical across all class members
should not preclude class certification.”); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods.
Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 861 (6th Cir. 2013) (“ [A] class may obtain certification under Rule
23(b)(3) when liability questions common to the class predominate over damages questions unique
to class members.”’).
C. Appointment of Class Counsel
Under Rule 23(g)(1), since the Court will certify the four proposed classes, the Court will
appoint class counsel. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g). In appointing class counsel, the Court must consider:
(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the
action;
(ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the
types of claims asserted in the action;
(iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and
(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class[. |

43

Id. The Court “may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class.” Jd. Plaintiffs’ counsel, Werman Salas P.C. and Lichten &
Liss-Riordan, P.C., request appointment as class counsel. (ECF No. 145, p. 39). Both firms have
experience in class litigation, have the resources to meet the economic burdens of class action
litigation, have been involved in this litigation since its inception, and have participated actively
in this litigation through the pre-trial process. (ECF No. 146, pp. 4-5); (ECF No. 147, pp. 1, 6, 9).
The Court will appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as class counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final FLSA Collective Action
Certification (ECF No. 141) and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 144). The
Court will appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as class counsel. Orders of Court will follow.’
BY THE COURT:
“yp CS Sa
Ln UA % Qa
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
bof .
Bite} 2s
Dated

° TEK raised a multitude of arguments against Plaintiffs’ FLSA collective action and why four
proposed state law classes should not be certified in its various briefs. (ECF Nos. 155, 158, 167).
The Court addressed the most relevant and focused arguments in this opinion. To the extent the
Court did not address an argument raised in one of these documents, the Court did not find the
argument to be dispositive in adjudicating Plaintiffs’ certification motions.
44

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10820240. Public record. Not legal advice.