# State v. Walter Wilson > Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · December 10, 1998 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1081986 ## Case - **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee - **Decided:** December 10, 1998 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1081986 ## Opinion text IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON SEPTEMBE R SESSION, 1998 WALTER JAMES WILSON, Appe llant, ) ) ) FILED C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9710-CR-00412 ) December 10, 1998 ) SHELBY COUNTY VS. ) Cecil W. Crowson ) HON. JOSEPH B. BROWN, JR. Clerk Appellate Court STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction) ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: MARY CAY JERMANN JOHN KNOX WALKUP P.O. Box 3410 Attorney General and Reporter Memphis, TN 38173 DOUGLAS D. HIMES Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 WILLIAM GIBBONS District Attorney General MICHAEL H. LEAVITT Assistant District Attorney General Criminal Justice Complex, Suite 301 201 Poplar Avenue Memphis, TN 38103 OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFIRMED DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE OPINION The Petitioner, W alter W ilson, was convicted of second degree murder based upon a guilty plea. H e now appeals as of right the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, pursu ant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-216 and Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court. Petitioner presents one issue on appeal: whether his guilty plea was know ingly and voluntarily made with the effective ass istanc e of co unse l.1 Specifically, Petitioner contends that his attorney failed to explain sentencing ranges and that she fa iled to inform him that had he been convicted at trial, he could have been sentenced as a Range I offender, rather than a R ange II offender. Petition er also conte nds th at his a ttorney failed to adeq uately investigate Petitioner’s men tal state prior to the guilty plea proceeding. He argues that his co unsel sh ould ha ve reque sted a m ental eva luation for the purpos e of deter mining his com petenc y. Petitioner was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury on a charge of first degree murder. On September 11, 1995, Petitioner pleaded guilty to second degree murder and received a twenty-eight year sentence as a multiple Range II offender. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on May 31, 1 In his brief, Petitioner actually presents three issues for our review: (1) whether Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made; (2) whether Petitioner’s guilty plea was made with ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) whether Petitioner was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to request an independent medical evaluation to determine his capacity to understand and knowingly enter a guilty plea. However, because we believe that these three issues are interrelated, we have consolidated them into one issue for purposes of this opinion. -2- 1996. Following appoin tment o f counse l, amended petitions were filed on October 4, 1996 and October 25 , 1996. Eviden tiary hearings were conducted on July 17, 1997, September 18, 1997, and September 22, 1997. The trial court denied Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief by written order filed Septem ber 24, 1 997. At the post-conviction hearing, Petitioner’s mother testified that Petitioner was beaten while living in Atlanta in the early 1980s and tha t upon h is return to Memphis, he acted “strange .” She also testified that while living in Memphis, Petitioner was hit on the head with a shovel, a brick, and a beer bottle. She reported that on one occasion in 1991 or 1992, Petitioner was found lying drunk in the mid dle of a stre et in Mem phis. Both Petitioner’s mother and his step-mother testified that Petitioner attempted to kill him self follo wing th e dea th of his grandmother in 1983. Howeve r, neither Petitioner’s mothe r nor his ste p-moth er were a ble to articu late any specific mental conditions from which Petitioner suffered, and neither of them told Petitioner’s attorney about the mental problems they each claimed Petitioner experienced. Petitioner also testified at the post-conviction hearing. He stated that he attempted suicide after the death of his grandmother and that he had contemplated attempting suicide w hile in jail charg ed with m urder. He claimed to have told his trial counsel about his suicide attempt. In addition, he testified that he was hit with a beer bottle and shovel four years “or longer” before the murder. He also reported that he suffers from headaches and depression. -3- With regard to his guilty plea, Petitioner maintained that he remembered pleading guilty but did not understand what was meant by “twenty-eight years at thirty-five percent,” the sentence which he received. He testified that his attorney did not explain the sentencing range for second degree murder. He also testified that his attorney failed to explain the difference between a Range I and Range II offender. Petitioner testified that he understood that by pleading guilty, he was waiving his right to trial; and he stated that he plead ed gu ilty beca use h is attorney told him that unless he did so, he would “get life [imprisonment].” He stated that he wanted to plead guilty at th e time of his plea and that he understood he was pleading gu ilty to second degre e murde r. Betty Tho mas , Petition er’s atto rney a nd an assista nt pub lic defender, was called to testify at the hearing conducted on September 18, 1997. She stated that she explained the plea agreement to Petitioner, including the sentencing range, and she reported that Petitioner indicated to her that he understood. She stated that Petitioner was interested in avoiding trial and wanted to dispose of the case. She testified that she filed thirty-two or thirty-three motions in his case and that she visited him in jail several times. She further testified that she never observed any behavior on the part of Petitio ner to cause her to question his mental competency. She stated that Petitioner specifically told her he did not suffer from mental problems or take mental health medications. She also stated that Petitioner’s family never informed her of any mental problems from which Petitioner suffered, despite a -4- questionna ire adm inistere d by he r office to Petition er and his fam ily to gath er background information on Petitioner, including informa tion abou t menta l health and head injuries. She reported that she was unaware that Petitioner had attempted suicide or been hit on the head. In determining whether counsel provided effective assistance at trial, the Court must decide whether counsel’s performance was within the range of competence dema nded o f attorneys in crimina l cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 93 6 (Ten n. 1975). To succeed on a claim that his counsel was ineffective at trial, a petitioner bears the burden of showing that his counsel made errors so serious that she was not functioning as counsel as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment and that the deficie nt representation prejudiced the petitioner, resulting in a failure to produce a reliable res ult. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 66 8, 687, (1 984); Coop er v. State , 849 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tenn. 1993); Butler v. State, 789 S.W .2d 898 , 899 (T enn. 19 90). To satisfy the second prong, th e petitione r must s how a re asona ble prob ability that, but for coun sel’s unreasonable error, the fact find er wou ld have had re ason able doubt regarding petitioner’s guilt. Strickland, 466 S .W .2d at 6 95. Th is reas onab le probab ility must be “su fficient to undermine confidence in the outcome .” Harris v. State, 875 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 199 4). When reviewing trial counsel’s actions, this Court should not use the bene fit of hindsight to second-guess trial strategy and criticize counsel’s tactics. Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). Counsel’s alleged errors shou ld be judged at the time they were made in light of all facts and circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S . at 690; see Cooper, 849 S.W.2d at 746. -5- This two-part standa rd of meas uring ineffective assistance of counsel also applies to claims arising out of the plea process. Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Banks ton v. State , 815 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). The prejudice requirem ent is mo dified so th e petitione r “must s how that there is a reaso nable probab ility that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would h ave insisted on g oing to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. In reviewing the case now before us, we observe initially that the record on appeal does not co ntain a transc ript of the guilty ple a proc eedin g. It is Petition er’s duty to preserve an adequate record for purposes of appeal. Tenn. R. App. P . 24(b); State v. B ennett, 798 S.W.2d 783, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Althou gh Pe titioner h as faile d to fully preserve for appeal the proceedings in the court below, we believe that there is adequate inform ation in the record before us, including excerpts from the guilty plea proceeding quoted by the post- conviction judge, upon which to base our decision. We note, however, that our decision is based solely upon the record before us. In arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner first claims that his attorney failed to expla in sen tencin g rang es to h im. Ho weve r, it is clear from the record that Petitioner was offered ample opportunities and sufficient information to understand the terms o f his sente nce an d plea ag reeme nt. At the po st- conviction hearing, Petitioner’s attorney testified that she met with Petitioner several times before he ple aded . She s tated th at she did explain sentencing ranges to him, including the difference between Range I and Range II and why that was part of the plea agreement. She also testified tha t she exp lained to -6- Petitioner what was meant by “twenty-eight years at thirty-five percent” and that Petitioner indicated to her that he understood. In addition, the trial judge clarified Pe titioner’s plea agreem ent before Petitioner pleade d guilty. Petitioner admitted that he remembered the dialogue in which he en gage d with th e trial jud ge be fore m aking his plea . Durin g this discussion, Petitioner stated he understood that he was receiving a sentence of twenty-eight years, that he would be classified as a multiple offender, and that he must serve thirty-five percent of his sentence before being eligible for release classification. The judge continued his questioning: QUESTION: And you’re going to have to serve thirty-five percent before you’re eligible for release classification. You understand that? ANS WE R: Righ t. QUE STIO N: Do you understand that you may or may not be release d after thirty-five p ercent? ANSW ER: Huh? QUESTION: Do you un derstand tha t you may or m ay not be release d after thirty-five p ercent? ANS WE R: No, I did n’t under stand tha t. QUESTION: We ll, do you unde rstand that tha t’s the va rious c redit [sic] that you’ll receive during your incarceration. Do you understand that? That the Court can make no promises exactly when you’ll be release d. Do you unders tand tha t? ANSW ER: Oka y. When Petitioner was called to testify at the post-conviction hearing, he was asked wheth er his attorney explained sentencing ranges to him. He first stated that he could not recall whether she had done so. However, under continued questioning, he changed his mind and stated that she did not do so. Petitioner also a rgues that his attorne y failed to adeq uately investigate his mental condition . The record shows otherwise. Petitioner’s trial counsel testified -7- that during her numerous visits with Petition er prior to his plea, she never had any indication that Petitioner suffered mental problems. In fact, she testified that she and a mitigation specialist from the Public Defender’s office asked Petitioner and his family numerous and specific questions about Petitioner’s mental health, and no one in forme d her o f any m ental h ealth p roblem s or ind icated that Pe titioner might not be competent to enter his plea. Petition er’s testimony that he “thought” he informed his attorne y of his suicide attemp ts presen ts a classic q uestion o f fact for reso lution by the post- conviction judge. Having heard testimony from both sides, the judge concluded that Petitioner’s testimony was not reliable: [The Petitioner] doesn’t appear to be any on e [sic] w ho’s m entally ill to the Court, just som ebod y who is manip ulative and attemp ting to play “Mr. P itiful,” at this point in tim e. He has been characterized by his family as being without the truth in him. An d it is clear by lo oking at the transcript that all of these things that he claims did not occur, were, in fact, discussed on the record. If not by his attorney, at least in his presence with the attorney contrib uting to that, along with the Court and the prosec ution. He says he doesn ’t remem ber. Now, no one tells Ms. Thomas these things. And he indicates that he never told her these things. So how is she su ppose [sic] to develop this intuitive sense that he’s got mental illnesses that wo uld rise to the level of either com petency [sic] or insan ity? In conclusion, viewing the actions of Petitioner’s attorney in light of all facts and circumstanc es at the time of h is plea, we cann ot find any deficiency in Petition er’s represe ntation prio r to or during his guilty plea procee ding. Howeve r, even assu ming that Pe titioner’s repres entatio n was ineffective, Petitioner has failed to dem onstrate prejudice . Petition er has simp ly failed to show that ha d his attorne y’s action s and advice been differen t, there is a reaso nable p robability that -8- he would n ot have pleade d guilty and insisted on going to tria l. See Strickland, 466 U .S. at 690 ; Cooper, 849 S.W.2d at 746. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed. ____________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE CONCUR: ___________________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE ___________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE -9- --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1081986. Public record. Not legal advice.