# Riley v. Jones

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · February 7, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10818390

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** February 7, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10818390

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming district court dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department as parties because they are not suable entities
- stating that “departments or subdivisions” of local government are not “juridical entities suable as such”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

MICHAEL EDWARD RILEY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:24-cv-04130-BAB

SPECIAL AGENT JOHN JONES;
INVESTIGATOR JAKE EUDY;
CHIEF DEPUTY JOEY DAVIS;
CIRCUIT JUDGE TOM COOPER;
CIRCUIT JUDGE BRYAN CHESSHIR;
SHERIFF BRYAN MCJNUNKINS;
JAIL ADMIN JANA TALLENT;
9TH WEST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT;
9TH WEST JUDICIAL DRUG TASK FORCE;
HOWARD COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
HOWARD COUNTY DETENTION CENTER;
and PROSECUTOR AARON BRASSEL DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Michael Edward Riley, filed this action pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge.
However, because not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned,
and this document will be dispositive of at least some of Plaintiff’s claims, this document will be
filed as a Report and Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to Chief
United States District Judge Susan O. Hickey. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and General Order 2024-02.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint in which
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a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP

Application”) on December 20, 2024. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). Plaintiff was granted IFP status on the
same day. (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff used the Court’s standard complaint form for civil rights
claims brought by pro se plaintiffs.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He list twelve
Defendants in the Complaint section indicated for named Defendants: (1) Special Agent John
Jones from Sevier County; (2) Investigator Jake Eudy from Howard County; (3) Chief Deputy
Joey Davis from Howard County; (4) Circuit Judge Tom Cooper; (5) Circuit Judge Bryan
Chesshir; (6) Sheriff Bryan McJunkins from Howard County; (7) Jail Administrator Jana Tallant
from Howard County Detention Center; (8) the Ninth West Judicial Circuit Court; (9) the Ninth
West Judicial Drug Task Force; (10) Howard County Sheriff’s Office; (11) Howard County Jail;

and (12) Prosecutor Aaron Brasel. (ECF No. 1, pp. 2-3, 8-9).
Plaintiff asserts his claims under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 1, p. 4).
When prompted by the complaint form to indicate how each Defendant acted under color
of law as is required by Section 1983, Plaintiff responded:
All individuals I have named were on duty working as law enforcement officers or as court
authorities at the time of the violations of my rights. Jones asked for arrest warrant and
Cooper signed one for him, and I went to jail for same warrant. Arrested by Joey Davis
on Warrant.

(ECF No. 1, p. 4) (errors in original).
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When prompted by the complaint form to enumerate the facts that gave rise to his claims,
Plaintiff provided four pages of factual allegations and claims. The Court will summarize
Plaintiff’s claims including the relevant facts.
In June 2024, Plaintiff became aware a female acquaintance of his was a confidential

informant for “DTF.” The female acquaintance “set up” another elderly acquaintance of
Plaintiff’s as a drug dealer. This agitated Plaintiff as he thought it was unfair to the elderly
acquaintance. Plaintiff then sent the informant a “message” expressing his opinion of her and the
police involved in the criminal case with the elderly acquaintance. According to Plaintiff, he did
not threaten anyone in his message, but he did give his opinion about the moral character of the
officers involved. (ECF No. 1, p. 10). It was this message that brought about the search of
Plaintiff’s home and Plaintiff’s arrest. The search and Plaintiff’s arrest are the crux of his
Complaint. (ECF No. 1, p. 11).
Plaintiff asserts Defendant Jones and Eudy broke into his home and stole his phone and
computer. He also claims Judge Cooper shouldn’t have destroyed his life by signing his arrest

warrant without any formal charges or affidavit filed. Additionally, Judge Chesshir should not
have signed the search warrant without a supporting affidavit. (ECF No. 1, p. 11). Plaintiff then
claims legal procedures were not followed regarding the search warrant executed on his home.
Specifically, Plaintiff states the warrant was not returned after execution with an inventory of items
seized. Id. As a result of this arrest and search warrant Plaintiff was “kidnapped” and illegally
held for thirty-five days sleeping on a concrete floor with sewage. Id. Plaintiff then lists his
claims based on the above facts as: “Bogus charge. False arrest. Malicious prosecution.
Violated my right to be free from illegal search and seizure. And violated my right to free speech.
And abuse of power on their part.” Id.
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Plaintiff goes on to clarify his claims. His claim against Bryan McJunkins, as Sheriff of
Howard County, is that he is the “boss” of Defendants Eudy and Davis. Plaintiff claims Sheriff
McJunkins also allowed Defendants Eudy and Davis to participate in the above complained of
activities and allowed the Howard County Detention Center (“HCDC”) to be a “base of operation”

for Defendants Jones, Eudy, and Davis. Plaintiff was interrogated by Defendants Jones, Eudy,
and Davis at the HCDC. Id.
Plaintiff next alleges the “9th West Judicial DTF” employs Defendant Jones and allows
him violate people’s rights by entering their homes without warrants and asserting false charges
against citizens of Howard County. (ECF No. 1, p. 11).
Plaintiff then alleges the “9th West Judicial Circuit Court of Arkansas” is allowing Judge
Cooper and Judge Chesshir to violate Plaintiff’s rights in their complicity with these fraudulent
warrants. Furthermore, the Court allowed Judge Cooper and Judge Chesshir to disregard protocol
in handling warrants through issuance, execution, and return. (ECF No. 1, p. 12).
Plaintiff then asserts Jail Administrator Jana Tallant violated his constitutional rights when

she allowed him to sleep on the concrete floor covered in feces for thirty-five days Id.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges a claim against Prosecutor Brasel for failing to release Plaintiff’s
property which was stolen during the search of his home. (ECF No. 1, p. 13).
Plaintiff claims his injuries are a back injury and detriment to his mental state. He also
requests the Defendants be sent to prison for their actions. (ECF No. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff requests
both compensatory and punitive damages for pain and suffering, property reimbursement, and
public humiliation. (ECF No. 1, p. 6).

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II. APPLICABLE STANDARD
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court must dismiss a
complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be
false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather
than to vindicate a cognizable right. In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer
v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). A claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants acted
under color of state law, and that the actor violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009
(8th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, the deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not
suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under Section 1983. Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). Lastly, Defendants
must have been personally involved and caused the violation alleged. “Liability under section
1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To establish
personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal
involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons
v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128,
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1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears
beyond a doubt the Plaintiff’s complaint can prove no set of facts to support the plaintiff’s
purported cause of action. See Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 298 F.3d 736, 740 (8th
Cir. 2001).

“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific
facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint to allege multiple due process claims related to
his arrests, charges, and incarceration. The Court finds these Due Process claims are sufficient to
survive screening under the PLRA. Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims related to his charges, his
arrest, the warrants issued against him and how they were processed, the search and seizure

conducted at his home. Additionally, Plaintiff also states a claim for free speech pursuant to the
First Amendment.1 However, Plaintiff has failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted
0F
on his claims: (1) against Judge Cooper, Judge Chesshir, and Prosecutor Aaron Brasel based on
their immunities; (2) of property conversion regarding his “stolen” property from the search of his
home and the failure to release such property; (3) his claim against Sheriff McJunkins based solely
on a respondeat superior theory of liability; and (4) his claims against “Howard County Jail,”

1 The parties are reminded that Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim asserted against Jana
Tallant has been severed from this matter and a new case created for this claim at Case No. 4:25-
cv-04008.
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“Howard County Sheriff’s Office,” “9th West Judicial Drug Task Force,” and “9th West Judicial
Circuit Court of Arkansas” as they are not entities or persons subject to suit under Section 1983.
A. Immunities
Judge Cooper, Judge Chesshir, and Aaron Brasel are all immune from Plaintiff’s suit.

First Judges Cooper and Chesshir enjoy complete judicial immunity. “Few doctrines were more
solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967)
(explaining the common law principle of judicial immunity was not abolished by Section 1983).
The Supreme Court “has pronounced and followed this doctrine of the common law for more than
a century.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985). Judicial immunity is only overcome
in two narrow situations: (1) if the challenged act is non-judicial; and (2) if the action, although
judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012). Moreover, “[a] judge
will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously,

or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in
the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citations
omitted).
Plaintiff did not allege Judge Cooper or Judge Chesshir acted outside their jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s factual complaints against Judges Cooper and Chesshir relate to what he classifies as
their error in issuing his arrest and search warrants. Clearly, issuing arrest and search warrants
fall within both Judge Cooper and Judge Chesshir’s judicial duties. See Woodworth v. Hulshof,
891 F.3d 1083, 1091 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that judicial immunity applies if the act
complained of is one normally performed by a judge and if the complaining party is dealing with
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the judge in his judicial capacity). Even if Judge Cooper and Judge Chesshir issued the warrants
related to Plaintiff in error they are still entitled to judicial immunity. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-
57.
Next, Aaron Brasel, the prosecuting attorney, also enjoy immunity from suit. The

Supreme Court established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages
under Section 1983 “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). This immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430. Furthermore, immunity
is not defeated by “[a]llegations of unethical conduct and improper motive in the performance of
prosecutorial functions.” Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016). “[A]
prosecutor is immune from suit even if he knowingly presented false, misleading, or perjured
testimony . . . or withheld or suppressed exculpatory evidence.” Woodworth v. Hulshof, 891 F.3d
1083, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, even if Aaron Brasel were not immune from suit, Plaintiff only alleges claims

related to his “stolen property” and “malicious prosecution” against Aaron Brasel. As explained
below, Plaintiff’s claims related to his property are not cognizable Section 1983 claims and fail as
a matter of law. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has consistently held “malicious prosecution by
itself is not punishable under [Section] 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.”
Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Gunderson v. Schlueter,
904 F.2d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 1990)).
Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s claims asserted against Judge Cooper, Judge Chesshir, and
Aaron Brasel should be dismissed without prejudice, and all three of these Defendants should be
dismissed from this case.
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B. Property Conversion
Plaintiff’s clams regarding his property stolen during the execution of his search warrant
or that is being held by the prosecutor, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to Section 1983. Plaintiff has adequate post-deprivation remedies in the Arkansas state

courts to regain his property. See Elliot v. Hurst, 307 Ark. 134, 817 S.W.2d 877, 880 (1991)
(cause of action for conversion lies where a distinct act of dominion is exerted over property in
denial of owner's right). Plaintiff's allegations, therefore, do not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation and should be dismissed. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (intentional
deprivation of property does not violate due process when meaningful post-deprivation remedy is
available under state law); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (negligent or
intentional deprivation of prisoner's property fails to state a claim under § 1983 if state had
adequate post-deprivation remedy).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims related to his property should be dismissed without
prejudice.

C. Respondeat Superior
Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff McJunkins are based solely on a theory of supervisory
liability. Plaintiff claims Sheriff McJunkins, as Defendants Eudy and Davis’s boss, allowed them
to participate in the complained of activities. Thus, Sheriff McJunkins is liable because he
employs Defendants Eudy and Davis. However, a claim of deprivation of a constitutional right
cannot be based on a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 654, 694 (1978). “[A] supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for an employee’s unconstitutional activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994);
see also Whitson v. Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2010) (“In a § 1983 case, an
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official is only liable for his own misconduct and is not accountable for the misdeeds of his agents
under a theory such as respondeat superior or supervisor liability.”) (internal quotations omitted).
“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the
deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff]

must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of
his constitutional rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims asserted
against Sheriff McJunkins fail as a matter of law.
Accordingly, Sheriff McJunkins should be dismissed from this action.
D. Legal Entities Subject to Suit
Next, Plaintiff names the “Howard County Jail,” “Howard County Sheriff’s Office,” “9th
West Judicial Drug Task Force,” and “9th West Judicial Circuit Court of Arkansas” as Defendants.
These buildings, offices, tasks forces, and courts are not a person or a legal entity subject to suit
under Section 1983.  See Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (jails are

not legal entities amenable to suit); see also Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81,
82 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that “departments or subdivisions” of local government are not
“juridical entities suable as such”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th
Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s department as parties
because they are not suable entities). See also Collins v. Dakota Cnty. Dist. Crt., 435 F. App’x
581, 2011 WL 4991623, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 20, 2011) (citing Harris v. Mo. Court of Appeals, 787
F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 1986) (state courts possess Eleventh Amendment immunity from
Section1983 suit).
Furthermore, even if the “9th West Judicial Drug Task Force,” and “9th West Judicial
10
Circuit Court of Arkansas” were suable entities, Plaintiff has failed to allege anything but the fact
this task force and circuit court employed the Defendants and allowed Defendants to violate
Plaintiff’s rights. This is nothing more than an assertion of respondeat superior liability. For
the reasons explained herein, such claims fail as a matter of law.
Accordingly, “Howard County Jail,” “Howard County Sheriff’s Office,” “9th West Judicial

Drug Task Force,” and “9th West Judicial Circuit Court of Arkansas” should all be dismissed from
this action.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is recommended:
(1) All of Plaintiff’s claims asserted against Judge Cooper, Judge Chesshir, and Aaron
Brasel be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) because these Defendants are
immune from suit;
(2) Judge Cooper, Judge Chesshir, and Aaron Brasel be dismissed from this action;
(3) All claims asserted against Defendants Sheriff McJunkins, “Howard County Jail,”
“Howard County Sheriff’s Office,” “9th West Judicial Drug Task Force,” and “9th West

Judicial Circuit Court of Arkansas” be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
(4) Defendants Sheriff McJunkins, “Howard County Jail,” “Howard County Sheriff’s
Office,” “9th West Judicial Drug Task Force,” and “9th West Judicial Circuit Court of
Arkansas” be dismissed from this action; and
(5) Plaintiffs Due Process and First Amendment claims alleged against Defendants Jones,
Eudy, and Davis, in their individual and official capacities, remain for further litigation.

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An order for service will issue separately.
Referral Status: This case should remain referred.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 7th day of February 2025.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10818390. Public record. Not legal advice.