# Hughes v. University Hospitals

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · February 6, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10817641

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** February 6, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JUSTIN HUGHES, pro se, ) CASE NO. 1:24-cv-00093
)
) JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ
Plaintiff, )
)
V. )
)
UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
)
Defendants. )
)

Now pending is Plaintiff Justin Hughes’s pro se Complaint against Defendants,
University Hospitals, Bryon Harrell, Dr. Anupam Jha, Dr. Riley Grosso, Deb Gedridge, and
Irene Fries (collectively, the UH Defendants), as well as against Ohio Governor Mike DeWine
and LeeAnne Cornyn, Director of the Ohio Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services
(Ohio Defendants) in their official capacities. (R. 1). The Ohio Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (R. 7). Plaintiff has
filed an Opposition to which the Ohio Defendants have replied. (R. 11; R. 12).
The causes of action in the Complaint are not clearly delineated, but the Court construes
the Complaint as raising the following against the Ohio Defendants:! (1) a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) an equal protection claim. (R. 1,
PageID# 12, 25-26; 49102, 220-228). The Complaint also attaches three-pages of medical
records (R. 1-3), and an affidavit from an individual named Shawna Guthrie, who reviewed some

! The UH Defendants have filed a separate Motion to Dismiss (R. 5), which is addressed by a
separate Order.

of Plaintiff’s medical records and disagreed with the assessments of the medical health
professionals who determined that Plaintiff posed a suicide risk resulting in an involuntary
committal. (R. 1-2). Ms. Guthrie’s affidavit does not indicate that she possesses any medical
degree or certification beyond the assertion that she completed an online training course

concerning the Columbia-Suicide Severity Rating Scale. (R. 1-2, PageID# 31-32).
For the following reasons, the Court grants the Ohio Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that UH Defendants did not have a good faith basis to
involuntarily commit (“pink slip”) Plaintiff on or about January 15, 2023, pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code (O.R.C.) § 5122.02, et seq. The Court need not recount the voluminous allegations
in the Complaint, as the following factual allegations in the Complaint undermine his assertions
that his committal was improper or unwarranted.
On January 15, 2023, Plaintiff reported to a University Hospital emergency room (ER) in
Cleveland, Ohio “to seek medical treatment and a mental health evaluation.” (R. 1, PageID# 6,

¶31) (emphasis added). Plaintiff admits that he “had recently been prescribed an oral steroid for
my neck that had caused my insomnia, and I was concerned that I might be experiencing a
‘manic episode’ as a side effect from the drug, so I requested a mental health exam just to be
safe.” Id. at ¶35. Plaintiff’s thought content “endorse[d] suicide ideation,” and he had “persistent
thoughts of death” as well as “a passive death wish.” (R. 1, PageID# 7, ¶45). The Complaint
asserts that treatment notes indicated he lacked a “plan or intent” related to suicide. Id. at ¶46.
His suicide risk was allegedly recorded as “moderate.” Id. at ¶49. Medical records from that date
state that “Patient is displaying bizarre behavior with some internal stimulation and endorsing
suicidal ideation with a history of prior attempts.” (R. 1-2, PageID# 35). The same record stated
th at Plaintiff “[r]epresents a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or others if allowed to
remain at liberty pending examination.” Id.
Despite the Complaint’s general tenor that indicates Plaintiff should never have been
hospitalized as a suicide risk, the Complaint acknowledges that, soon after Plaintiff was

hospitalized at the UH Elyria Medical Center, he wanted to kill himself. (R. 1, PageID# 11, ¶90).
The Complaint acknowledges that the very next day, Plaintiff had concocted an alarmingly
imaginative and detailed plan to take his own life:
I was provided a bag of toiletries that contained a roll-on deodorant and plastic
toothbrush. I thought to myself that I could take that deodorant, place the can on
the floor, and step on it to remove the applicator ball. Then, I could increase its
size by tying a knot around the ball with a ripped sock. I figure I could then use
my toothbrush to lodge the object deep into my throat to stop my breathing
and end my suffering.
(R. 1, PageID# 11, n. 5) (emphasis added).
II.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) Standards
A Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and, unlike
state trial courts, they do not have general jurisdiction to review all questions of law. See Ohio ex
rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). Rule 12(b)(1) motions may challenge
jurisdiction facially or factually. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592,
598 (6th Cir. 1994). In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in the
Complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. See In re Title Ins.
Antitrust Cases, 702 F.Supp.2d 840, 884-85 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (citing Ohio Hosp. Ass’n v.
Shalala, 978 F.Supp. 735, 739 (N.D. Ohio. 1997)). By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger
disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal
ju risdiction. Id.
When ruling upon a motion to dismiss filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must
accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93-94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007); accord Streater v. Cox, 336 Fed.

App’x 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, a court need not accept conclusions of law as true:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As
the Court held in [Bell Atlantic Corp. v.] Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
167 L. Ed. 2d 929, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require
“detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 929 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L.
Ed. 2d 209 (1986)). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 550 U.S., at
555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570,
127 S.Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id.,
at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
III.Analysis
A. Sovereign Immunity
The Ohio Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
Const. Amend XI. (R. 7, PageID# 93). The Supreme Court’s cases “have extended the
[Eleventh] Amendment’s applicability to suits by citizens against their own States.” Bd. of

Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962, 148 L. Ed. 2d
866 (2001) (citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has unambiguously held that neither States nor state
officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” within meaning of § 1983, explaining as
follows:
Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil
liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy
against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh
Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity, Welch v.
Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 472–473, 107
S.Ct. 2941, 2945–2946, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987) (plurality opinion), or unless
Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to override that immunity. That Congress, in passing § 1983, had no
intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity and so to alter the
federal–state balance in that respect was made clear in our decision in Quern.
Given that a principal purpose behind the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a
federal forum for civil rights claims, and that Congress did not provide such a
federal forum for civil rights claims against States, we cannot accept petitioner’s
argument that Congress intended nevertheless to create a cause of action against
States to be brought in state courts, which are precisely the courts Congress
sought to allow civil rights claimants to avoid through § 1983.
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2305 (1989); accord
Johnson v. Ohio, 2005 WL 3113061, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2005) (noting that the State of
Ohio has neither constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the
federal courts and plaintiff, therefore, cannot seek monetary relief from the State of Ohio in a
§1983 action) (citing Johns v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U .S. 824, 106 S.Ct. 79, 88 L.Ed.2d 65 (1985); State of Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes,
694 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1982)).
Plaintiff argues that the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity is inapplicable
where a citizen seeks prospective relief against a state official to end a continuing violation of

federal law. (R. 11, PageID# 128, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct.
441 (1908) (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court has declined to extend the Young doctrine to
encompass retroactive relief, as “to do so would effectively eliminate the States’ constitutional
immunity.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 89-90 (1984).2
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court established an exception to the Eleventh
Amendment immunity for claims for injunctive relief against individual state officials in their
official capacities. 209 U.S. 123, 150-57 (1908). “In order to qualify under Ex parte Young, such
an action must seek prospective relief to end a continuing violation of federal law.” Carten v.
Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing MacDonald v. Vill. of Northport,
Mich., 164 F.3d 964, 970-72 (6th Cir. 1999).

The Court agrees with the Ohio Defendants that the Ex parte Young exception does not
apply to Plaintiff’s claims, because the Ohio Defendants had no connection to the involuntary
committal of Defendant. Those actions were undertaken by medical professionals. In addition,
2 The Pennhurst decision explained that the “distinction between prospective and retroactive
relief protects Young’s underlying purpose of vindicating the supreme authority of federal law
while, at the same time, preserves the States’ constitutional immunity. 465 U.S. at 90. To the
extent Plaintiff’s suit asserts a violation of state law or the state’s failure to follow its own
established procedures, the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply as “th[e] need to reconcile
competing interests is wholly absent when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated state
law. In such a case the entire basis for the doctrine of Young and Edelman [v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974)] disappears. A federal court’s grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal
law.” Id.
de spite Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions to the contrary, he is indeed seeking retrospective relief.
Plaintiff is no longer involuntarily committed, and has not alleged that he is in any danger of
being recommitted. Thus, he has failed to plausibly allege a continuing violation. As aptly
explained by a case from the Southern District of Ohio:

For the Young exception to apply, “the state official sued [must] have ‘some
connection’ with the enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional Act.” Allied
Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 n.25 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ.,
836 F.2d 986, 990-91 (6th Cir. 1987) (declining to apply Young when defendants
were not threatening to enforce any unconstitutional act). Courts have not read
Young expansively. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 102, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984). (“While the rule permitting suits
alleging conduct contrary to ‘the supreme authority of the United States’ has
survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive
interpretation.”). Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has expressly held that the phrase
“ ‘some connection with the enforcement of the act’ does not diminish the
requirement that the official threaten and be about to commence proceedings.”
Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc., 92 F.3d at 1416 (citing Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56).
Brown v. Strickland, No. 2:10-cv-166, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63878, at *8-9, 2010 WL 2629878
(S.D. Ohio June 28, 2010). Here, there is simply no plausible allegation that Governor DeWine
or Director Cornyn had any connection to Plaintiff’s involuntary committal, or that they, or
anyone acting under their authority are making threats of committal.
In addition, while the Court finds no past violation of federal law, even if Plaintiff could
allege further allegations that there was, the Supreme Court has affirmed an appellate court’s
decision that found a suit seeking declaratory relief for a past violation of federal law was
retrospective in nature and, therefore, barred. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 67, 106 S. Ct.
423, 425 (1985).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds well taken the Ohio Defendants’ arguments
that they are immune from the claims raised by Plaintiff.
B . Equal Protection Claim
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Clause claim is not barred by
sovereign immunity as discussed above, the Ohio Defendants argue that this claim should be
dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege unequal treatment of similarly-situated

individuals. (R. 7, PageID# 100-101). Defendants’ opposition brief is unresponsive to this
argument.3 (R. 11).
The Complaint alleges that Ohio’s involuntary commitment statutes violate the Equal
Protection Clause because Ohio’s civil procedures relating to involuntary hospitalizations of
mentally ill individuals are different from criminal procedures that would allow the state to
detain a non-mentally ill criminal defendant. (R. 1, PageID# 25, ¶¶222-224). “The Equal
Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by the government that burdens a fundamental right,
targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others similarly situated
without any rational basis for the difference.” Superior Communs. v. City of Riverview, 881 F.3d
432, 446 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). The Complaint does not allege that

Plaintiff was a member of a suspect class, nor has he alleged that individuals who are
experiencing mental illness—illness of such severity that they potentially trigger involuntary
hospitalization statutes—constitute a suspect class. Further, Plaintiff’s opposition brief has not
cited any authority suggesting such individuals constitute a suspect class under the law. Nor has
the Complaint sufficiently identified a similarly situated class that is treated differently without

3 Defendants’ reply brief asserts that “Plaintiff appears to abandon his Equal Protection claim in
his memorandum in opposition as he failed to respond to Defendant’s arguments.” (R. 12,
PageID# 137). The Court agrees that Plaintiff made no attempt to counter the arguments raised in
the Ohio Defendants’ motion with respect to the failure to allege unequal treatment of similarly-
situated individuals.
an y rational basis for the difference.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s attempted comparison of criminal defendants and
mentally-ill individuals is an apples-to-oranges comparison that fails to support an equal
protection claim. Mentally ill individuals facing civil commitment proceedings may be

involuntarily committed, like Plaintiff, to protect themselves from self-harm. Criminal
defendants are not similarly situated to individuals suffering from severe mental illness because,
when considering a few obvious distinctions, the following is apparent: (1) absent evidence to
the contrary, they are presumably not suffering from a severe mental illness; (2) the possibility of
pretrial detention for a criminal defendant is not invoked to prevent self-harm (such as the fears
Plaintiff might act on his suicidal thoughts); and (3) although pretrial detention may last until
trial, many involuntary committals for mental health treatment are likely to be transitory—like
Plaintiff’s—until mental health symptoms stabilize. These are but a few clearly distinguishing
characteristics that provide a rational basis for treating differently these two different categories
of individuals.

As explained by the Supreme Court, “[t]here are significant reasons why different
standards of proof are called for in civil commitment proceedings as opposed to criminal
prosecutions. In a civil commitment state power is not exercised in a punitive sense… [and] a
civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution.” Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1810 (1979). Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court has
addressed a different statute that allows for confinement, which is instructive. State v. Williams,
126 Ohio St.3d 65, 71 (2010). There, the Ohio Supreme Court held O.R.C. § 2945.39, which
subjects a criminal defendant who remains incompetent to stand trial to involuntary
hospitalization, is a civil statute, and, therefore, said individual is not afforded the constitutional
ri ghts afforded to a defendant in a criminal prosecution.
Although the Court agrees that Plaintiff has essentially abandoned his equal protection
claim, the Court also finds that the Complaint fails to allege unequal treatment of similarly
situated individuals. His attempt to compare with individuals facing criminal charges, who are

not in a mental health crisis, presents categorically different groups that fail to constitute
similarly situated individuals. Finally, even if a criminal defendant could be construed to be
sufficiently similar to those experiencing severe mental illness—which this court does not find
an apt comparison—the above authority demonstrates why there is a rational basis for treating
these groups differently. As such, dismissal of Defendant’s Equal Protection Clause claim is
warranted.
IV.Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Ohio Defendants’ motion to dismiss (R. 7) is hereby
GRANTED. This action is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ David A. Ruiz
David A. Ruiz
United States District Judge
Date: February 6, 2025

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10817641. Public record. Not legal advice.