# Colangelo v. Albert

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 5, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10817591

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 5, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CAROL ANNE COLANGELO and : CIVIL ACTION
DONALD COLANGELO :
□□ NO. 25-41
SGT. JUSTIN ALBERT

CAROL ANNE COLANGELO and : CIVIL ACTION
DONALD COLANGELO ;
v. NO. 25-45
PA STATE POLICE AVONDALE

CAROL ANNE COLANGELO and : CIVIL ACTION
DONALD COLANGELO :
v. NO. 25-48
CPL. KATHERINE FRANCK

CAROL ANNE COLANGELO and : CIVIL ACTION
DONALD COLANGELO :
Y. NO. 25-50
TROOPER IAN HUTCHINSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Before this Court are four Complaints filed in state Court by Plaintiffs Carol Anne
Colangelo (“Carol”) and her husband Donald Joseph Colangelo (“Donald”, and, with Carol,
“Plaintiffs”) against various police officers and the Pennsylvania State Police (collectively, or in

any grouping, “Defendants”). Defendants removed these actions to Federal Court, and
subsequently filed motions to dismiss. Because the Complaints are nearly identical and the bases
for dismissal are as well, this Court will address all four Complaints in one omnibus opinion,
Upon review of the pleadings, the Complaints each fail to state a claim for which relief can be
granted, each motion to dismiss is granted.
Il. = Factual Background!
The following facts are present in afl four of the above Complaints. Plaintiffs allege* that
they received mail from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”), noting
that its records reflected that their vehicles were no longer insured. Consequently, the letter
stated, those vehicle registrations were going to be cancelled. Plaintiffs allege this letter was
mistaken, as they had switched insurance carrier, and did not fail to maintain proper insurance.
Plaintiffs allege they sent PennDOT a ietter informing it of their new vehicle insurance.
Plaintiffs allege that on August 31, 2024, Janiyiah Hope Colangelo (“Janiyiah”),
Plaintiffs’ daughter, was stopped by the Corporal Katherine Franck of the Pennsylvania State
Police. Plaintiffs allege that this vehicle stop was based upon the canceled vehicle registration,
Plaintiffs concede that Janiyiah handed Cpl. Franck an expired insurance card, which would have

‘The factual allegations of this case are, at times, difficult to discern from the Complaint,
which does not generally conform with the pleading rules of either the Pennsylvania or Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Although it is not this Court’s responsibility to sift through the filings
to form a coherent set of factual allegations, this Court has done so, given the pro se status of
Plaintiffs. This Court considers factual assertions made in the letters which were attached as
exhibits to the Complaints to be well-plead allegations of the Complaints.
For the benefit of the pro se Plaintiffs, this Court wishes to explain what the word
“allege” means when used while analyzing a motion to dismiss, “Allege” when given its legal
meaning, does not express any skepticism about the truth of the statement, as it often does in
casual conversation. All the word “allege” means here is that Plaintiffs have asserted something
as a fact in their Complaint. If a Complaint stated that the sky is blue, this Court would still say
that Plaintiffs “allege” that the sky is blue. “Allege” just means that someone has claimed
something is true, and passes no judgment on whether it is true or not.

corroborated the information Cpl. Franck obtained from running the vehicle’s licenses plates
(that the registration had expired due to expired insurance). Plaintiffs aliege that either Caro! or
Donald then spoke with Cpl. Franck by speakerphone and that Plaintiffs offered to send proof of
the active insurance card. Cpl, Franck allegedly suggested that Plaintiffs update the registration
online. Plaintiffs concede that they did not wish to do so because they believed the onus was on
the Commonwealth to update the registration. That vehicle stop resulted in a traffic citation,
attached by Plaintiffs to their Complaint, for “Operation Following Suspension of Registration”
to Jantyiah, with the notation “Provided Expired Insurance Card.”
After that interaction, Plaintiffs allege that cither Carol or Donald called the State Police
Internal Affairs and reached Set. Justin Albert. Plaintiffs allege that Sgt. Albert said there was
nothing he could do about the issue until after it went to court. Plaintiffs then summarily allege
harassment by letter from the Commonwealth, and that Cpl. Franck and Sgt. Albert “failed to
prevent the situation from continuing... .” On November 6, 2024, while awaiting a court date on
the aforementioned traffic citation, Janiyiah was again stopped, this time by Kennett ‘Township
Police Officer Ford (not a party to any of these cases), who upon receiving proof of the active
insurance policy, issued a warning which stated no further action was required of Janiyiah.
In only the Colangelo, et al. v. Hutchinson (2:25-cv-00050-GAW) Complaint, Plaintiffs
make separate allegations regarding a third traffic stop. In just the Hutchinson case, Plaintiffs
allege that on November 30, 2024, Trooper Jan Hutchinson stopped one of the family vehicles
while Donald was driving the vehicle and Carol was a passenger within it. The Hutchinson
Complaint alleges that Trooper Hutchinson said he was aware of the problems caused by
switching vehicle insurance but issued a traffic citation for driving on a suspended registration.
The Complaint alleges that Carol “felt very threaten” [sic] when Trooper Hutchinson ordered

Donald out of his car during the traffic stop. Carol also alleges that she thought Trooper
Hutchinson was “going to beat [Donald] up.” Carol alleges that when she stepped out of the
vehicle, Trooper Hutchinson ordered her to return to the vehicle.
WI. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits this Court to dismiss counts of a
complaint if they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Zuber v. Boscov's, 871 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court must “construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,
the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009), But the Court cannot draw any unreasonable or unsupported inferences, See, e.g.: Curay-
Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 Gd Cir. 2006)
CFWle need not credit the non-movant's conclusions of law or unreasonable factual
inferences.”); Little v. Chambersburg Hosp., No. 1:11-CV-01804, 2012 WL 1048820, at *4
(M.D. Pa. Mar, 28, 2012) (“The deferential standard of review applicable to a motion to dismiss
does not go so far as to require this Court to accept unsupported inferences drawn by the
Plaintiff”).
A formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim will not suffice. Rather, a pleader is
required to “set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claim or to permit
inferences to be drawn that these elements exist.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir,
1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Conclusory statements and unfounded
speculation are insufficient to state a claim. Parker y. Pennstar Bank, NBT, 436 F. App'x 124,

127 (3d Cir. 2611). While this Court holds a pre se complaint to a less stringent standard, a case
must be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See, e.g.: Johnson
v. Hill, 910 F. Supp. 218, 221 (E.D, Pa. 1996) (dismissing pro se complaint despite deference).
IV. Analysis
a. § 1983 Claim in Colangelo, et al, vy. Hutchinson (No. 25-50)
This Court first begins with the $1983 claim in the Hutchinson case, which comes closest
to stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. Unlike each of the other cases (explained
infra), the Hutchinson Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs- not their daughter- were stopped by
Trooper Hutchinson.
As Trooper Hutchinson rightly points out, the Hutchinson Complaint does not actually
allege what substantive right Plaintiffs seek to vindicate under §1983. But, reading the
attachments to the Hufchinson Complaint generously, this Court assumes that Piaintiffs seek to
claim that Trooper Hutchinson committed a § 1983 violation of their 4% Amendment right to be
free of unreasonable search and seizure. This claim must be dismissed.
From the face of the Complaint, it is clear that PennDOT’s records reported to Officer
Hutchinson that Plaintiffs’ vehicles were no longer properly registered. Whether or not that
information was ultimately accurate or was inaccurate due to alleged recordkeeping failings at
PennDOT, that information still formed probable cause which justified the temporary seizure of
Plaintiffs and their vehicle by Trooper Hutchinson? United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d
392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006) (“fA]n officer need not be factually accurate in her belief that a traffic
law had been violated but, instead, need only produce facts establishing that she reasonably
3 It is far from clear that there was even a mistake by any officers here. The onus may well
be on Plaintiffs to take whatever steps are necessary to ensure their vehicles are properly
registered before taking them on the road, even if they are blameless for the cancellation of the
registration in the first instance. But because this Court is not Traffic Court, it need not resolve
that question to resolve these motions.

believed that a violation had taken place.”). “A reasonable mistake of fact does not violate the
Fourth Amendment.” /d (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). There are no facts in
the Complaint from which the Court can reasonably infer that the duration of the stop went
beyond what was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Nor are Carol’s subjective fears
or Trooper Hutchinson’s allegedly loud commands enough to create a claim of misconduct in the
course of the traffic stop. Because there are no allegations which would form an unreasonable
search or seizure that would violate the 4" Amendment, Plaintiffs have not alleged a § 1983
claim upon which relief can be granted as to Trooper Hutchinson.
b. § 1983 Claim in Colangelo, et al. v. Sgt. Justin Albert (No. 25-41); Colangelo
et al. v. PA State Police Avondale (No. 25-45); Colangelo et al. v. Cpl.
Katherine Franck (No. 24-58),
The Complaints against Sgt. Albert, Cpl. Franck, and PA State Police Avondale each
assert a § 1983 claim against their defendants, which this Court again gieans is also likely rooted
in an argument that there was a seizure which violated the 4" Amendment, Unlike the
Hutchinson Complaint, these three Complaints make no reference to the third traffic stop where
Donald and Carol where in the vehicle. Rather, the only traffic stops alluded to in these
Complaints are the two aforementioned stops of Janiyiah, Carol and Donald’s daughter, who is
not a party to these claims. These claims are easily dismissed.
In the first instance, for the same reasons explained supra regarding Trooper
Hutchinson’s traffic stop, there are no facts in the Complaints which could lead this Court to find
the traffic stops in question were a violation of anyone's civil rights, But were there a colorable
civil rights claim which could find its basis in those stops, it could only conceivably belong to
Janiyiah, not Plaintiffs. The fact that Janiviah was stopped- not Plaintiffs- is fatal to the § 1983
claims in the case against Sgt. Albert, Cpl. Franck, and the PA State Police Avondale. As a

general rule, one cannot challenge the Constitutional validity of a stop of another. United States
v. Marrocco, 578 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir, 2009) (“Mr. Marrocco does not have standing to claim
that the officers impermissibly detained Mr. Fallon.’”)
c. The Remaining Claims in Ali Cases.
Because the Complaint fails to comport with the standards generally required under the
Pennsylvania or Federal Ruies of Civil Procedure, this Court expended great effort to identify the
remaining claims of the Complaints. Having construed the Complaints liberally, this Court has
identified at least five additional causes of action. Upon analysis of these claims, this Court
determines that the remaining counts of each Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
i. 18 ULS.C, §§ 241 and 242
Plaintiffs’ claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 fail because, as Defendants each point
out, there is no private cause of action available under these statutes. Carpenter v. Ashby, 351 F.
App’x 684, 688 Gd Cir. 2009) ([W]e agree with the District Court's dismissal of the 18 U.S.C. §
241 and § 242 claims. Neither statute creates a civil cause of action.”). Put more simply, these
statutes create criminal offenses which federal prosecutors can choose to pursue or not pursue in
criminal court. The statutes do not create a basis by which private citizens can sue each other or
the government. For that reason, these civil causes of action which Plaintiffs attempt to bring
under a criminal statute must be dismissed.
ii, 42 CFR 488.301 “Mental Anguish”
Plaintiffs purport to bring a claim for mental anguish pursuant to 42 CFR 488,30, That
citation leads to a definitional section of the Code of Federal Regulations. More specifically, it is
a series of definitions applicable to certain regulations regarding the Centers for Medicare &

Medicaid Services. These definitions are clearly irrelevant. Furthermore, they do not create any
cause of action, Any claim purportedly brought under this definitional section must be dismissed.
fii, 42 U.S.C. § 1986
In order to prevail on a claim under § 1986, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the defendant
had actual knowledge of a § 1985 conspiracy, (2) the defendant had the power to prevent or aid
in preventing the commission of a § 1985 violation, (3) the defendant neglected or refused to
prevent a § 1985 conspiracy, and (4) a wrongful act was committed,” Clark vy. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d
1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994), In order to have a § 1985(3) violation’, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a
conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive,
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act
in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 Gd Cir.
1997).
There are no facts alleged in the Complaints which would permit this Court to infer, even
with additional pro se deference, that any of the Defendants have stated a claim for neglecting to
prevent a § 1985 conspiracy. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts whatsoever related to racial or
class-based discriminatory animus. Further, there are no allegations of any conversations or
agreements or common purposes among alleged conspirators. And, as this Court explained
supra, there was no deprivation of rights associated with the three traffic stops referenced in the
Complaints, For that reason, the § 1986 claim must fail.

4 The other types of conspiracies prohibited by 42 U.S.C § 1985 (preventing an officer
from performing duties, obstructing justice, and intimidating a party, witness, or juror) are even
less applicable here.

iv. Breach of Fiduciary Duties
Plaintiffs allege that Set. Albert and Trooper Hutchinson breached a fiduciary duty in the
course of their official duties; fielding and responding to complaints for interna! affairs (for Sgt.
Albert), and conducting the third traffic stop (for Trooper Hutchinson). There are no facts in
either Complaint which could possibly lead to a finding that either officer owed a fiduciary duty
to Plaintiffs as individual citizens to perform his their responsibilities in a particular way. For
that reason, the claims are meritless. And even if there were some theorical merit to the claim,
Defendants enjoy sovereign immunity with respect to actions and inactions taken within the
scope of their duties. 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. None of the enumerated exceptions apply, 42 Pa.C.S. §
8522(a), (b)(1)-(10). For this reason, too, this claim must be dismissed. Finally, even if this claim
were viable, because the federal claims (addressed supra) have each been dismissed, there would
no longer be a federal question justifying subject matter jurisdiction, and this Court would
decline to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.
v. Miscellanea
Finaily, Plaintiffs bare list of causes of action includes things like “not listening to the
citizens [sic] right,” and “not obeying her oath of office.” There are no associated statutes or
causes of action cited. For the avoidance of doubt, this Court will directly state that these are not
recognized private causes of action under Pennsylvania or federal law and therefore any causes
of action purporting to be brought under these theories are dismissed.
d. Prejudice
This Court’s final determination is whether these cases should be dismissed with or
without prejudice. A complaint can be dismissed with prejudice when amendment would be
“futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 Gd Cir. 2002). Amendment is

futile where, even after amendment, the complaint would still fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 Gd Cir. 2000).
As this Court has held above, there are no private claims available under 18 U.S.C. §§
241 and 242 or 42 CFR 488.301. For that reason, all claims based on those are dismissed with
prejudice. Because Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity applies, no amendment could save the
fiduciary duty claims against Sgt. Albert and Trooper Hutchinson, those claims are also
dismissed with prejudice. Because this Court has found that the traffic stops were lawful and
because there are no allegations whatsoever regarding discrimination based on membership in a
protected class, Plaintiffs’ § 1986 claims must be dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiffs’ § 1983
claims against Sgt. Albert, Cpl. Franck, and PA State Police Avondale must be dismissed with
prejudice because they themselves were not seized and the traffic stops and steps taken
afterward were clearly lawful.’ Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Trooper Hutchinson is
dismissed with prejudice as to the lawfulness of the initial stop and the traffic citation received.
This Court, giving additional deference to pro se Plaintiffs, will dismiss the § 1983 count
without prejudice as to Trooper Hutchinson’s conduct during the course of the stop. An
appropriate order will be docketed separately.

Dated: March 5, 2025 BY THE COURT:

While this order does not bind Janiyiah as she is not presently before it, Plaintiffs are
advised that pro se representation only permits non-lawyers to represent themselves, and would
therefore prohibit Plaintiffs from pursuing a further action on behalf of Janiyiah. See generally:
https://perma.cc/96JT-8A8N (EDPA Pro Se Instructions); Yoder v. Dist, Att'y Montgomery Cnty.,
790 F. App'x 478, 481 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A]n individual proceeding pro se may not represent
third parties in federal court... .”).
10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10817591. Public record. Not legal advice.