# TAYLOR v. O'MALLEY

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · March 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10816585

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 4, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10816585

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating the ALJ was not obligated to give significant weight to a medical source’s opinion “because the opinion related to the ultimate issue of disability--an issue reserved exclusively to the Commissioner.”
- stating “[t]here is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GRACE ANN TAYLOR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-2109
)
LELAND DUDEK,1 )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4th day of March, 2025, upon consideration of the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for supplemental security income
benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., finds that the
Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.
Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.
Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s
decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

1 Leland Dudek is substituted as the defendant in this matter pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to amend
the docket to reflect this change.
1
merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).2

2 Plaintiff contends the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by failing to provide
an explanation for the evidence he relied upon to determine her residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). Specifically, Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not explain exactly how he
formulated her sit/stand limitation and failed to explain the evidence used to craft her
migraine and mental health related limitations. (Doc. No. 11). After a thorough review
of the record, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds the ALJ’s RFC finding to be
supported by substantial evidence.

After reviewing all the evidence in this case, the ALJ crafted the following RFC:

[T]he undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except:
• She must alternate to sitting for every 25 minutes of standing or walking,
but she can remain on task during changes of position;
• She can occasionally operate foot controls with the right lower extremity;
• She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds;
• She can frequently balance, but only occasionally kneel, crouch, or
crawl;
• She cannot work at unprotected heights or around moving mechanical
parts;
• She cannot operate a motor vehicle;
• She can occasionally work in humidity, wetness, and extreme
temperatures;
• She can work in environments of moderate noise level;
• She can understand and remember simple instructions;
• She can make judgment to make simple work-related decisions;
• She can occasionally interact with supervisors and coworkers;
• She cannot work with the public;
• She can only tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting; and
• She cannot perform work requiring specific production rate work such
[as] assembly line work or work requiring hourly quotas.

(R. 22-23). Plaintiff posits that the ALJ crafted this RFC based on his own lay opinion,
as the ALJ rejected all medical opinions in the record. (Doc. No. 11 at 10-17 (citing, inter
alia, Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1986)). The Court disagrees for the following
reasons.
2
This Court holds the ALJ’s RFC finding need not be based on a specific medical
opinion. As the Honorable Alan N. Bloch astutely explained, Doak “does not, as Plaintiff
suggests, hold that an ALJ's RFC finding must be based on a particular medical opinion . .
.” Doty v. Colvin, No. 13–80–J, 2014 WL 29036, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2014).
Rather, in Doak, “[t]he Third Circuit did nothing more than make a substantial evidence
finding in light of a limited record . . . and subsequent Third Circuit case law confirms this
understanding.” Id. Such caselaw explains that “[a]lthough reliance on State
consultants' reports and treating physicians' opinions is common and ALJs are required to
consider any existing State consultant reports . . . the regulations do not require ALJs to
seek outside expert assistance.” Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 362 (3d
Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 Fed. Appx. 6, 11 (3d
Cir. 2006) (stating “[t]here is no legal requirement that a physician have made the particular
findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.”). Indeed, “[s]urveying
the medical evidence to craft an RFC is part of the ALJ's duties.” Id. “Consistent with
this later case law, Doak does not prohibit the ALJ from making an RFC assessment even
if no doctor has specifically made the same findings and even if the only medical opinion
in the record is to the contrary.” Doty, 2014 WL 29036, at *1 n. 1 (citing Hayes v. Astrue,
No. CIV.A. 07–710, 2007 WL 4456119, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2007)). The same is true
even when the claimant’s impairments are mental in nature. See Abbey v. O’Malley, 709
F. Supp. 3d 195, 197 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 2023) (explaining in a case involving mental
impairments that “the ALJ need not base the RFC determination specially on any medical
opinion.”) (emphasis in original).

With this in mind, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that her RFC was based on
the ALJ’s lay opinion and improper analysis of the medical source opinions. (Doc. No. 11
at 10-17). The ALJ properly analyzed all the medical opinions, many of which opined that
Plaintiff was not very limited. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(b),
(c). The state agency psychological consultants, Drs. Shelley Ross, Ph.D., and Emanuel
Schnepp, Ph.D., both opined that Plaintiff had only mild difficulties with concentration,
persistence, and pace, and mild difficulties with adapting and managing herself. (R. 25;
Exs. 2A/4; 3A/4). Similarly, Dr. Angela Chiodo, Ph.D., found Plaintiff had no functional
limitations provided she abstain from using marijuana. (R. 25; Ex. 5F/6-7).

Applying the relevant regulations, the ALJ rejected all these opinions and adopted
limitations in Plaintiff’s favor. The ALJ found the state agency psychological consultants’
opinions to be unpersuasive because they were not consistent with the record, which
showed Plaintiff had greater functional limitations than those opined, and because both
doctors failed to support their opinions by adequately addressing the Plaintiff’s difficulties
interacting with others and maintaining her concentration, persistence, and pace. (R. 25).
Similarly, the ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Chiodo to be unpersuasive because, although
it was supported by Dr. Chiodo’s contemporaneous mental status examination, which was
largely unremarkable, it was inconsistent with the longitudinal treatment records and failed
3
to address Plaintiff’s concentration problems and social anxiety. (Id.). The long and the
short of it is that the ALJ acknowledged the assessments of the opinions as to the symptoms
and condition of the Plaintiff but declined to adopt their opinions as to the limitations
properly attributable to the Plaintiff on the basis that they were too restrictive in light of
the entire record. Thus, the RFC as formulated by the ALJ did account for the medical
evidence and is the result of the ALJ’s considered judgment that the Plaintiff’s limitations
were more pronounced than set out in the conclusions of those opinions. Rather than the
RFC being untethered to medical evidence, as the Plaintiff argues, it instead is the result of
the ALJ doing his work in formulating the RFC in light of the entire record before him,
which resulted in the Plaintiff receiving the benefit of any doubt as to her limitations,
making remand improvident.

The ALJ also rejected the opinion of Dr. Stephen Mills, M.D., who repeatedly
stated that Plaintiff was disabled throughout the period at issue. (R. 25; Exs. 9F, 11F).
The ALJ correctly determined that these statements were not opinions, but comments on
an issue reserved to the Commissioner. (R. 25); see Zonak v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 290
Fed. Appx. 493, 497 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating the ALJ was not obligated to give significant
weight to a medical source’s opinion “because the opinion related to the ultimate issue of
disability--an issue reserved exclusively to the Commissioner.”) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ’s finding on this opinion. (See Doc. No. 11 at 11).
Accordingly, the ALJ properly analyzed all medical opinions in the record.

Plaintiff’s specific contentions with the ALJ’s formulated sit/stand option and the
limitations accounting for her migraines and mental health impairments are similarly
without merit. Plaintiff argues that the crafted sit/stand option makes this case similar to
Fisher v. Berryhill, No. 16-1884, 2018 WL 783715, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2018), where
remand was required because the ALJ failed to explain how he arrived at a specific sit/stand
option in the absence of any medical opinion. The Court disagrees as, unlike in Fisher,
here the ALJ expressly discussed the sit/stand option and what evidence was used to
formulate this specific limitation. The ALJ explained that he crafted the sit/stand option
based on Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her right ankle pain, which was consistent with
medical records showing that this pain was attributed to a remote fracture and resultant
swelling. (R. 23-24). Moreover, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s medical diagnosis of right
ankle arthropathy and specifically considered this diagnosis in the context of the greater
medical records. (R. 20). In sum, the ALJ’s included sit/stand option was not based on
his lay opinion and was instead formulated based on his review of the record, making it a
proper administrative finding.

Likewise, the Court finds the ALJ adequately explained the evidence he relied upon
to determine Plaintiff’s limitations related to her migraines and mental impairments. As
Defendant points out, this issue is similar to that in Ellinger v. Kijakazi, No. 22-349-E,
2023 WL 8282057, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2023). There, as here, the ALJ explained
4
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings3 (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak, J.
Chief United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

how he accounted for Plaintiff’s migraines and mental limitations. In this matter, the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s allegations that she had difficulty concentrating and handling
changes in routine. (R. 21-22). The ALJ contrasted these allegations against the medical
records showing that Plaintiff’s Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder was well-
controlled with medications and other evidence showing that she was responding well to
conservative treatment for her mental impairments. (Id.). The ALJ also considered
Plaintiff’s testimony that she has five or six migraines per-week, but found these
allegations were not fully supported by the record and that Plaintiff’s migraines were
mostly stable with medication. (R. 22-24). All told, the ALJ’s included limitations were
adequately explained and substantial evidence supports Plaintiff’s RFC.

The ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

3 Consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), the Court has construed
Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
See, e.g., Westfield Grp. v. Campisi, No. 2:02-CV-977, 2006 WL 328415, at *1 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 10, 2006) (noting the Honorable Judge David S. Cercone construed defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion for summary judgment).
5

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10816585. Public record. Not legal advice.