# Corrales v. Walmart Stores East, LP

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 4, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10816444

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 4, 2025
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

ESTHER CORRALES,

Plaintiff,

v.
Case No.: 2:23-cv-228-JLB-NPM

WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP,

Defendant.
_______________________________________/

ORDER

In this Florida negligence case, Plaintiff Esther Corrales (“Plaintiff” or “Ms.
Corrales”) alleges she fell to the ground after slipping in a puddle of liquid in the
women’s restroom at a Wal-Mart in Clewiston, Florida. Before the Court is the
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
(“Defendant” or “Walmart”). (Doc. 30). Ms. Corrales submitted a response in
opposition (Doc. 35), and Walmart filed a reply (Doc. 37). After a careful review of
the parties’ briefings and the record, the Court concludes that Defendant’s Motion is
due to be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On or about May 25, 2018, Plaintiff visited a Walmart store located at 1005
W. Sugarland Highway in Clewiston, Florida (the “Store”) with her daughter-in-law
and grandchildren. (Doc. 3 at ¶ 14; Doc. 4 at ¶ 14; Doc. 30-4 at 31:12–31:24).
Plaintiff escorted her grandson to Walmart’s restroom during this visit. (Doc. 30-4
at 38:11–39:6; Doc. 30-5 at 6:10:13 P.M.).1 According to Plaintiff, shortly after
entering the women’s restroom, she slipped and fell on the floor. (Doc. 30-4 at
43:12–43:21). Plaintiff testified in her deposition that, after falling, she discovered

that the floor was “totally wet” with multiple puddles of “water spread . . . all over
the floor,” but that she did not notice this prior to her fall. (Doc. 30-4 at 45:1–45:9,
46:4–48:9). Plaintiff further testified that she did not see where the water came
from. (Doc. 30-4 at 49:13–49:19).
Less than 30 seconds after Plaintiff fell, her daughter-in-law, Dayana Abreu
(“Ms. Abreu”), entered the restroom. (Doc. 30-5 at 6:10:49 P.M.). Ms. Abreu

testified that she did not witness Plaintiff fall. (Doc. 30-6 at 27:4–27:13). Rather,
Ms. Abreu stated that she heard a large “boom” sound and her son screaming,
which caused her to look through the open doorway to the bathroom, where she saw
Plaintiff lying on the ground. (Doc. 30-6 at 32:8–32:16; Doc. 30-5 at 6:10:40 P.M.).
Ms. Abreu then entered the women’s restroom, where she allegedly saw
Plaintiff “lying there . . . unconscious” and vomiting “something green.” (Doc. 30-6
at 32:17–33:2). According to Ms. Abreu, Plaintiff asked for a garbage can to vomit

into, and Ms. Abreu was able to provide a trash can so that no vomit made it onto
the floor of the restroom. (Doc. 30-6 at 33:3–33:6). Ms. Abreu later elaborated that

1 CCTV footage shows Plaintiff entering an alcove with restrooms in two separate instances, roughly
twenty minutes apart. (Doc. 30-5 at 5:45:46 P.M., 6:10:13 P.M.). According to Plaintiff, in the first
instance, she took her grandson to the door of the men’s restroom and attempted to convince him to
enter alone. (Doc. 30-4 at 39:1–39:13). Her grandson refused, and Plaintiff returned to her
daughter-in-law to discuss next steps. (Id.). Plaintiff then returned to the alcove a second time to
accompany her grandson to the women’s restroom. (Id.). Plaintiff testified that this was her first
time entering the women’s restroom during her visit to the Store. (Id. at 41:10–42:17).
Plaintiff was unconscious for “maybe . . . a minute or two” before she awoke and
began vomiting. (Doc. 30-6 at 35:12–35:16).
At 6:12 P.M., approximately one minute and thirty seconds after Ms. Abreu

entered the women’s restroom, a Walmart employee (“Ms. Harkins”) arrived at the
scene of the incident. (Doc. 30-5 at 6:12:18 P.M.). This employee testified in her
deposition that, when she arrived in the women’s restroom, she saw Plaintiff
“sitting on the floor.” (Doc. 30-7 at 35:22–35:25). She further testified that she
“didn’t see anything on the floor . . . in the restroom,” and that “[i]f there had been
water on the . . . floor, [she] would have guarded [the] spill until someone came” to

prevent someone else from falling. (Doc. 30-7 at 36:13–37:2).
Instead, Ms. Harkins left to alert a manager of the issue. (Doc. 30-7 at 33:4–
17; Doc. 30-5 at 6:12:24 P.M.). Ms. Harkins notified another Walmart employee,
Shaquanda Brown (“Ms. Brown”), of the incident. (Doc. 30-8 at 16:15–16:18, 17:5–
18:5). Ms. Brown entered the women’s restroom at 6:13 P.M. and saw Plaintiff
sitting on the floor against the wall. (Doc. 30-5 at 16:15–16:18, 18:6–18:13; Doc. 30-
5 at 6:13:09 P.M.). Ms. Brown did not observe any signs of physical injury to

Plaintiff. (Doc. 30-5 at 18:24–19:10).
Plaintiff testified that she saw a Walmart employee, Breviles Loralus (“Mr.
Loralus”), take photos after the incident but before anyone cleaned the floor. (Doc.
30-4 at 53:22–54:24; Doc. 30-6 at 42:10–42:14, 71:3–71:5). The parties provided the
following photos, which Mr. Loralus took on the day of the incident:2

2 None of the photographs provided by Plaintiff were taken on the day of the incident. (Doc. 30-6 at
78:12–78:18). Defendant also provided CCTV footage from the date and time of the incident, but the
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(Doc. 35-14 at 1-8).
Plaintiff admits in her Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment that these photos “show where [she] slipped” but argues that they do not
represent the conditions that caused Plaintiff's fall because her clothes “absorbed
much of the water.” (Doc. 35 at 8-9). Plaintiff argues that this is demonstrated by
“wet paper towels” in the photographs. (Ud. at 9). The Court has carefully reviewed
the photos. They depict a floor with three small scraps of what appears to be either
paper towel or toilet paper.? Two of the scraps of paper appear to be dry. The third
scrap of paper is partially obscured by an employee name tag.‘ This scrap of paper

3 Plaintiff did not allege that paper towels constituted a dangerous condition in this case. Instead, she specified that
she “slipped in a puddle of liquid . . . causing her to fall hard to the ground,” and that this puddle of liquid was the
dangerous condition motivating her claim. (Doc. 3 at § 15—16; Doc. 28-4 at 54:2—-54:4; Doc. 28-7 at 38:10—38:15).
“An issue of fact is material if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might
affect the outcome of the case.” Burgos v. Chertoff, 274 F.App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Allen v. Tyson
Foods Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Plaintiff does not allege
that the paper towel constituted a dangerous condition, the presence of paper towel does not constitute a material
fact in this case. (See id.). However, characteristics of the paper towel are relevant for determining whether the
dangerous condition Plaintiff complained of—a wet floor—was present.

has a dark splotch in its center, suggesting it was either damp or dirty. Notably,
the floor otherwise appears dry. No droplets or puddles of water are visible in the
image. The floor did not have dirt, footprints, or any other marks on it. (See Doc.

35-14 at 1–3; Doc. 28-4 at 49:3–49:10).
The testimony in this case also indicates that the floor was dry. Plaintiff
argues that the photos provided by Mr. Loralus, which depict a dry floor, do not
“best represent the conditions that caused [her] fall” because her clothes absorbed
much of the liquid. (Doc. 33 at ¶ 7; see Doc. 28-7 at 37:17–37:24). Plaintiff testified
that she did not see anything on the floor of the women’s restroom until after she

slipped (Doc. 28-4 at 44:7–44:9, 45:4–45:7). While Plaintiff and Ms. Abreu describe
the wetness of the floor differently—Plaintiff testified that there were “puddles of
one foot” (Doc. 28-4 at 48:25) “spread all over the floor” (id. at 46:17–46:21), while
Ms. Abreu testified that there were “droplets” ranging from the size of a quarter to
the size of an average person’s palm (Doc. 28-7 at 35:20–37:2)—both Plaintiff and
Ms. Abreu testified that the floor was not cleaned between the time of Plaintiff’s fall
and when Mr. Loralus photographed the scene (Doc. 28-4 at 53:17–53:24; Doc. 28-7

at 69:24–70:5). Thus, for Plaintiff’s account to be accurate, Plaintiff’s clothes would
have had to seep up all of the liquid on the floor in the time between her fall and
Mr. Loralus photographing the scene. Testimony from other witnesses further
refutes this. The first Walmart employee who arrived at the scene testified that she
“didn’t see anything on the floor . . . in the restroom,” and that “[i]f there had been
water on the . . . floor, [she] would have guarded [the] spill until someone came” to
prevent someone else from falling. (Doc. 30-7 at 36:13–37:2). Mr. Loralus testified
that he would not have placed his name tag on the ground for the photographs if
there had been water on the floor. (Id. at 23:7–24:21). The photographic evidence,

in addition to the testimony in this case, leads the Court to conclude that the floor
was dry after Plaintiff’s fall.
The parties agree that Plaintiff was a business invitee during the incident
(Doc. 3 at 14; Doc. 4 at 14) and that Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff (Doc. 3 at 10,
12–14, 19; Doc. 4 at 10, 12–14, 19). However, Defendant contends in its Motion for
Summary Judgment that even assuming that a dangerous condition existed, it had

no actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition and that
Plaintiff therefore cannot establish a claim for negligence as a matter of law. (Doc.
30 at 2).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant can show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A district court must grant a motion for

summary judgment only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Essex Ins. Co. v. Barrett Moving & Storage, Inc., 885
F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
An issue is “genuine” if a rational trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence,
could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288,
1298 (11th Cir. 2014). And a fact is “material” if, “under the applicable substantive
law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357

F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, courts must “resolve all
ambiguities and draw reasonable factual inferences from the evidence in the non-
movant’s favor.” Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Moore, 763 F.3d 1265, 1268
(11th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Both the Supreme
Court and the Eleventh Circuit have addressed video evidence in the context of this

summary judgment standard.
In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), the Supreme Court found error
in the lower court’s reliance on the plaintiff’s (there, the non-movant’s) version of
events because the “videotape quite clearly contradict[ed] the version of the story
told by” the plaintiff. After addressing what the videotape showed in that case, the
Supreme Court returned to the summary judgment standard and explained:

At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a “genuine”
dispute as to those facts. As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the moving
party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
‘genuine issue for trial.’” “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.” When opposing parties tell
two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.

That was the case here with regard to the factual issue whether
respondent was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life.
Respondent’s version of events is so utterly discredited by the record
that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals
should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the
facts in the light depicted by the videotape.

Id. at 380–81 (citations omitted).
Following Scott, the Eleventh Circuit explained that it views the facts in light
of video evidence “to the extent that it squarely contradicts with [non-movant’s]
testimonial descriptions.” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 2022).
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that it has “repeatedly applied [a]
preference rule in affirming summary judgment based on objective evidence
notwithstanding the presence of some contradictory testimony from the nonmovant
elsewhere in the record.” Id. at 1258 n.12. That said, “[w]here the videos do not
answer all the questions or resolve all the details of the encounter, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to [the non-moving party].” Johnson v. City of
Miami Beach, 18 F.4th 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2021).
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant has established that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to Plaintiff’s negligence claim.

Based on the circumstances of Plaintiff’s fall gleaned from the video,
photographs, testimony, and other summary judgment evidence, the Court
determines that summary judgment for Defendant is warranted.
To establish negligence under Florida law, a plaintiff must show a duty, a
breach of that duty, causation, and damages. Clay Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873
So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003).5 The parties agree that Plaintiff was an invitee of

Walmart. (Doc. 3 at 14; Doc. 4 at 14); see also Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 147–
49 (Fla. 1972) (defining an “invitee”).
As to the duty element, Florida law prescribes that “’[t]he duty of the
landowner to a business invitee is to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition and to warn the invitee of latent perils which are known or should be
known to the owner but which are not known to the invitee or which, by the exercise

of due care could not be known to him.’” Wilson-Greene v. City of Miami, 208 So. 3d
1271, 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting Storr v. Proctor, 490 So. 2d 135, 136 (Fla.
3d DCA 1986)). Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that Defendant breached both
duties. (Doc. 3 at ¶ 19).
Turning to the breach element, under Florida statutory law, “where a
business invitee slips and falls on a ‘transitory substance’ in a business
establishment . . . proof of the breach element of the claim against an owner of the

establishment is statutorily constrained by section 768.0755 of the Florida
Statutes.” Encarnacion v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 211 So. 3d 275, 278 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2017). Specifically, Florida Statute § 768.0755 requires the following in
relevant part:
(1) If a person slips and falls on a transitory foreign substance in a
business establishment, the injured person must prove that the

5 Florida’s substantive law applies to this diversity case. See, e.g., Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
592 F.3d 1119, 1132–33 (11th Cir. 2010).
business establishment had actual or constructive knowledge of the
dangerous condition and should have taken action to remedy it.
Constructive knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence
showing that:

(a) The dangerous condition existed for such a length of time
that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the business establishment
should have known of the condition; or

(b) The condition occurred with regularity and was therefore
foreseeable.

(2) This section does not affect any common-law duty of care owed by a person
or entity in possession or control of a business premises.

Fla. Stat. § 768.0755 (2017). In all events, Florida courts have held that section
768.0755(1) “does not create any new element of a cause of action for negligence.”
Kenz v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 116 So. 3d 461, 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). Instead, it
merely “codifies a means and method by which a plaintiff shows that the defendant-
business establishment has breached its duty of care.” Id. (emphasis omitted)
(citing Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087, 1089 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)).
Thus, Defendant is only liable to Plaintiff if it had actual or constructive notice of
the alleged dangerous condition. See Fla. Stat. § 768.0755 (2017).
A. Actual Notice

As previously noted, to find a breach of a duty owed to a business invitee,
section 768.0755 requires proof of either actual or constructive knowledge of the
condition that caused injury to the business invitee. Fla. Stat. § 768.0755 (2017).
Plaintiff argues that the testimony of Defendant’s corporate representative,
Heather Marie Zilen (“Ms. Zilen”), contains evidence of Defendant’s “actual
knowledge” of the dangerous condition sufficient to avoid summary judgment. (See
Doc. 35 at ¶ 3).
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Zilen’s acknowledgment that she has

observed pieces of paper towel on the floors of Walmarts in other instances (Doc. 35-
6 at 87:6–87:17), that paper towels can be a slip hazard (id. at 87:18–87:23), and
that Walmart does not employ bathroom attendants to resolve this issue (id. at
40:25–41:22), which Plaintiff contends constitutes notice of the allegedly dangerous
condition present in this case. (Doc. 35 at ¶ 3). Plaintiff also argues that Walmart’s
use of floormats in some parts of the store but not in the bathroom demonstrates

the requisite notice in this case. (Doc. 35 at ¶ 3).
“Actual knowledge of a dangerous condition exists when a business owner’s
employees or agents know of or create the dangerous condition.” Palavicini v. Wal-
Mart Stores E., LP, 787 F. App’x at 1010 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Barbour v. Brinker
Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 953, 957 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)). Defendant’s acknowledgment
that paper towels may present a slip hazard and its use of floormats to address
other slip hazards in other areas of its stores did nothing to demonstrate actual

notice of the allegedly dangerous condition present in this case. Plaintiff did not
allege that she slipped on paper towel; instead, she alleged that she “slipped in a
puddle of liquid . . . causing her to fall hard to the ground.” (Doc. 3 at ¶ 15; Doc. 28-
4 at 54:2–54:4; Doc. 28-7 at 38:10–38:15). There is no evidence that Defendant or
any of its employees knew about the allegedly wet floor in the women’s restroom on
the date of the incident. Thus, there is no evidence that Defendant is liable on the
theory that it had actual notice of a dangerous condition and failed to correct it.
B. Constructive Notice

To establish constructive notice of a dangerous condition under Florida
Statute § 768.0755(1), the record must contain evidence demonstrating either (a)
that the water spill existed for such a length of time that, in the exercise of ordinary
care, Defendant should have known about the spill; or (b) water spills in the area of
the incident occurred with regularity and therefore were foreseeable. See Fla. Stat.
§ 768.0755(1). The Court finds that the record is devoid of such evidence.

Plaintiff fails to point to any record evidence identifying the type of liquid
that caused the incident, how long it was on the floor, or where it came from.
Plaintiff testified in her deposition that “[t]he floor was wet,” but “[n]ot like after
some cleaning was done.” (Doc. 30-4 at 46:2–46:8). When asked why Plaintiff
believed the liquid was water, Plaintiff simply responded, “Well, because it was a
liquid.” (Doc. 30-4 at 47:18–47:23). Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant
should have known about the presence of an unknown liquid that appeared at an

unknown time from an unknown cause. Thus, even assuming that a spill existed,
that constituted a dangerous condition, nothing in the record demonstrates that the
spill “existed for such a length of time that, in the exercise of ordinary care,
[Defendant] should have known of [it].” See Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1).
Florida courts have granted summary judgment where, as here, transitory
liquids present on the ground/floor near where the plaintiff slipped and fell
appeared without dirt, grocery cart wheel marks, or footprints. Those courts have
reasoned that this is one indicator that any liquid present had not been there for
such a duration to place the business on notice of a potentially dangerous condition.

See Mashni v. Lasalle Partners Mgmt. Ltd., 842 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA
2003) (noting that a dirty puddle of liquid in a business’s restroom, for example, was
sufficient to preclude summary judgment on the issue of constructive notice, and
reasoning, “Even though the dirt could have been created by Mashni’s fall, . . . the
fact that the water was dirty could also create an inference that it was on the floor
for a period of time sufficient to create constructive notice.”); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.

v. Guenther, 395 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (“[T]estimony that the liquid
was dirty and scuffed and had several tracks running through it was, in our
opinion, adequate to impute constructive notice of the hazardous condition to the
store manager.”).
Additionally, nothing in the record indicates that “the condition occurred with
regularity and was therefore foreseeable.” Id. To the contrary, record evidence
indicates that no substantially similar incidents occurred in the women’s restroom

within the six months prior to the incident. (Doc. 30-9 at ¶ 14).
Thus, applying section 768.0755(1), the Court concludes that, even viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she has not shown either actual or
constructive notice of the dangerous condition. As a result, the Court finds that
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
C. Mode of Operation Theory of Liability

Even if the Court read Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as alleging a
negligence claim based on a “mode of operation” theory of liability, such a claim
would fail. That theory is articulated (though not expressly labeled) in the
Amended Complaint as follows: Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “[n]egligently
fail[ed] to properly equip, instruct, direct, train, or supervise its employees”;
“[n]egligently fail[ed] to have adequate staff on duty assigned to the task of
inspecting and maintaining the woman’s restroom for dangerous conditions”;
“[n]egligently fail[ed] to have adequate policies in place to identify dangerous

conditions within the women’s bathroom or the plumbing therein that were within
Defendant’s control or were created by Defendant”; and “[n]egligently select[ed] and
us[ed] flooring that failed to properly drain, disperse, or dissipate liquid
substances.” (Doc. 3 at ¶ 20(d)–(e), 20(h), 20(l)). In Owens v. Publix Supermarkets,
Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 323 (Fla. 2001), the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that
“modern-day supermarkets, self-service marts, cafeterias, fast-food restaurants and
other business premises should be aware of the potentially hazardous conditions

that arise from the way in which they conduct their business.” Accordingly, the
court held as follows:
If the evidence establishes a specific negligent mode of operation such that
the premises owner could reasonably anticipate that dangerous conditions
would arise as a result of its mode of operation, then whether the owner had
actual or constructive knowledge of the specific transitory foreign substance
is not an issue. The dispositive issue is whether the specific method of
operation was negligent and whether the accident occurred as a result of that
negligence.
Id. at 332; see also Schaap v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 579 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla.
1st DCA 1991).
However, in 2010, the Florida Legislature enacted section 768.0755, which

eliminated section 768.0755’s mode of operation basis for slip-and-fall negligence
cases. See Pembroke Lakes Mall Ltd. v. McGruder, 137 So. 3d 418, 426 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2014). The Florida Third District Court of Appeal succinctly explained that
section 768.0755 eliminated section 768.0710’s mode of operation mode of recovery
as follows:
The most significant change between sections 768.0710
and 768.0755 concerned prior notice of a dangerous
condition. The older 2002 statute expressly stated actual
or constructive notice was not “a required element of proof
to this claim,” but the new 2010 statute expressly stated
the plaintiff “must prove that the business establishment
had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition.” Additionally, the new statute does not contain
any language regarding the owner’s negligent
maintenance, inspection, repair, warning, or mode of
operation.
* * *

Under the 2002 statute, a plaintiff could succeed in a slip
and fall case by showing “the business premises acted
negligently by failing to exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance, inspection, repair, warning, or mode of
operation of the business premises,” without showing the
business had actual or constructive knowledge of the
transitory foreign substance. Under the 2010 statute,
however, the same plaintiff would be unable to successfully
assert such a cause of action, no matter how persuasive or
compelling the evidence the plaintiff had in support of the
claim.

Pembroke Lakes Mall Ltd., 137 So. 3d at 426 (emphases added; citations omitted).
Because section 768.0755 controls and eliminates the negligent mode of
operation theory of liability, Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action against
Defendant based on the negligent mode of operation allegations as pleaded in the
Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 30) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment
accordingly, terminate all deadlines, deny any pending motions as moot, and close
the case.
ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida on March 4, 2025.

bh bf LF
JOHN L. BADALAMENTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10816444. Public record. Not legal advice.