# Susan L Simpson v. Department of the Navy

> Merit Systems Protection Board · February 28, 2025

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10815199

## Case

- **Court:** Merit Systems Protection Board
- **Decided:** February 28, 2025
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10815199

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a policy that adds a requirement not found in the relevant statute and regulation is a substantive rule that is invalid unless it is promulgated with notice and comment

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SUSAN LYN SIMPSON, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, AT-0842-18-0549-I-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: February 28, 2025
Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Stephan B. Caldwell , Esquire, Riverdale, Georgia, for the appellant.

Kendall Scott Rocio , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
reversed its decision denying the appellant’s request for Federal Employees’
Retirement System (FERS) air traffic controller (ATC) special retirement
coverage. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under
section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the
petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s
final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND
On July 14, 2003, the agency appointed the appellant to the position of Air
Traffic Control Specialist, GS-2152-11. Simpson v. Department of the Navy,
MSPB Docket No. AT-0842-18-0549-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10
at 127; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 139 (testimony of the appellant). On
February 16, 2017, the appellant requested a position review, seeking a
determination that she was entitled to special retirement coverage retroactive to
her appointment date. IAF, Tab 24 at 44. On May 8, 2018, the agency issued a
final decision finding that the appellant’s request was untimely and that her
position did not meet the requirements for special retirement coverage. IAF,
Tab 13 at 21-23.
The appellant filed a Board appeal contesting the agency’s decision. IAF,
Tab 1. After a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
reversing the agency’s determination and ordering the agency to grant the
appellant ATC special retirement coverage. Simpson v. Department of the Navy,
3

MSPB Docket No. AT-0842-18-0549-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 20, Initial
Decision (ID). The agency has filed a petition for review, disputing the initial
decision on several bases. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The appellant
has responded in opposition to the petition for review, and the agency has filed a
reply to the appellant’s response. PFR File, Tabs 7-8.

ANALYSIS
Under 5 U.S.C. § 8412(e), an individual employed as an ATC is entitled to
an immediate retirement annuity after 25 years of service or after becoming
50 years of age and completing 20 years of service. This is earlier than most
employees covered under FERS may retire. See 5 U.S.C. § 8412(a)-(c). In
addition, individuals covered by 5 U.S.C. § 8412(e) receive an enhanced annuity
compared to most employees covered under FERS. Compare 5 U.S.C.
§ 8415(a), (i), with 5 U.S.C. § 8415(e). The agency head is responsible for
determining, based on the position description and other appropriate evidence,
whether a given position is an ATC position. 5 C.F.R. §§ 842.803(c), .804(b).
The agency’s final decision is appealable to the Board. 5 C.F.R. § 842.807(a).
An employee seeking special retirement coverage bears the burden of proving, by
preponderant evidence, her entitlement to such coverage. Fritts v. Department of
Homeland Security, 102 M.S.P.R. 265, ¶ 6 (2006).

The appellant has rebutted the presumption that the agency’s retirement status
determination was correct.
If the agency head has not determined that a given position is an ATC
position, and the incumbent employee has not requested such determination
within 6 months of entering the position, then the agency head’s determination
that the service was not so covered at the time of the service is presumed to be
correct. 5 C.F.R. § 842.804(c). The employee may rebut this presumption by
showing that she was unaware of her status or was prevented by cause beyond her
control from requesting that the official status be changed at the time the service
4

was performed. Id. If the employee does not request ATC credit within the
6-month period specified in section 842.804(c) or show good cause for the failure
to do so, the agency’s determination will be deemed conclusive and the Board
will not review the merits of that determination. Bingaman v. Department of the
Treasury, 127 F.3d 1431, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
In her initial decision, the administrative judge found that, although the
appellant did not request a coverage determination within 6 months of entering
the Air Traffic Control Specialist position, she was unaware of her status at the
time and requested a coverage determination promptly after she learned of her
status. ID at 2-4. Specifically, the administrative judge found that the appellant
was not initially aware of her status and believed that she was covered under the
ATC retirement system. ID at 3. It was not until she attended a 2013 retirement
seminar that the appellant noticed that her leave and earnings statement indicated
that she was not in the ATC special retirement system. Id. The seminar
instructor told the appellant that this was probably a coding error, and that she
should contact the Defense Finance Accounting Service to get it corrected.
ID at 3-4. However, once it became clear that this was more than a coding issue,
the appellant “began to vigorously pursue[] the matter.” ID at 4. Based on these
facts, the administrative judge found that the appellant successfully rebutted the
presumption of 5 C.F.R. § 842.804(c) and proceeded to the merits of the
retirement coverage determination. ID at 4.
On review, the agency argues that the evidence does not support the
administrative judge’s findings. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-12, 17-25. Specifically, the
agency argues that there is no evidence to support the appellant’s testimony that
she attempted to correct her retirement coverage expeditiously after the 2013
retirement seminar; the earliest documentary evidence of the appellant’s attempt
to correct her retirement coverage dates to March 2016—3 years after the 2013
retirement seminar. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-11, 19-20; IAF, Tab 13 at 7-9. In fact,
the appellant made several prior inconsistent statements about when the
5

retirement seminar was held and when she first attempted to contest her
retirement coverage. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12, 20-23. The agency argues that,
by waiting 3 years to pursue special retirement coverage, the appellant did not act
expeditiously and therefore failed to rebut the presumption of correctness as set
forth in 5 C.F.R. § 842.804(c). Id. at 23-25.
We find that the agency’s arguments provide no basis to disturb the initial
decision because they conflate the date on which the appellant became aware of a
problem with her retirement coverage code with the date on which she became
aware of a problem with her actual retirement coverage. The administrative judge
did not find that the appellant became aware of her retirement status during the
2013 seminar. Rather, she found that the appellant became aware that the coding
on her leave and earnings statement was inconsistent with ATC special retirement
coverage. ID at 3-4. Her efforts to correct the coding issue do not show that she
was yet aware that she was actually in a non-ATC retirement system. See
Streeter v. Department of Defense, 80 M.S.P.R. 481, ¶ 9 (holding that, when an
appellant claims that she was unaware of her retirement status under 5 C.F.R.
§ 842.804(c), the question is whether she was actually unaware). In other words,
the appellant was under the impression that the coding did not match her
coverage. It was during this process of attempting to correct the presumed coding
error that the appellant learned that the coding was correct and that her position
had been excluded from ATC special retirement coverage. ID at 4.
There is nothing in the record to contradict the administrative judge’s
finding that the appellant worked expeditiously thereafter to attain ATC special
retirement coverage. ID at 3-4. Not only is this finding consistent with the
appellant’s testimony, HT at 142-82 (testimony of the appellant), but it is also
consistent with the documentary evidence that the agency cites on review. This
evidence shows that, on March 23, 2016, the appellant contacted the agency’s
Civilian Benefits Center (CBC), stating that she was “in the Wrong [sic]
retirement code.” I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 7-8. The CBC worked on the issue for
6

several months, trying to get the retirement code “corrected.” Id. at 8. It was not
until June or July 2016 that a human resources official notified CBC that the
coding was not a clerical error because the appellant’s position description “does
not reflect the duties of an ATC and should not be in the coverage.” Id. The
earliest documentary evidence even suggesting that the agency informed the
appellant of her status is a CBC case log entry dated July 6, 2016, stating that the
appellant’s supervisor had briefed her on the issue. Id. According to the agency,
the appellant requested a new coverage determination on October 13, 2016—
approximately 3 months later. IAF, Tab 13 at 21. Because the appellant sought a
special retirement coverage determination within 6 months of the date that she
became aware of her status, we find that the presumption of correctness under
5 C.F.R. § 842.804(c) has been rebutted and that the Board may review the merits
of the agency’s determination. See Mosely v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
86 M.S.P.R. 302, ¶¶ 8-9 (2000).

The appellant has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
An appeal within the Board’s jurisdiction may be dismissed for failure to
state a claim if the appellant cannot obtain effective relief before the Board even
if her allegations are accepted as true. Young v. Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, 93 M.S.P.R. 99, ¶ 5 (2002), aff’d, 66 Fed. App’x 858
(Fed. Cir. 2003). In this case, the agency argued that, if the Board were to find
that the appellant’s Air Traffic Control Specialist position met the requirements
for ATC coverage, then the maximum separation age provisions of 5 U.S.C.
§ 8425(a) would also apply. I-2 AF, Tab 5 at 5. Applying those provisions, the
appellant’s age would preclude her from serving the minimum 20 years in her
position before reaching her mandatory separation date. Id. at 6. The agency
argues that, therefore, the appellant can present no set of facts in which she could
actually obtain an ATC retirement, and so her appeal should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 7-8. The
administrative judge denied the agency’s motion, finding that the issue before her
7

was the retirement system in which the appellant should be placed—not whether
she is ultimately entitled to receive an ATC annuity. I-2 AF, Tab 10 at 1-2. The
agency contests this ruling on review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-17.
We decline to revisit the administrative judge’s ruling because, whatever
the merits of the agency’s argument, the issue is now moot. According to the
agency, the appellant’s mandatory separation date would have been in April 2023,
but she would not have had 20 years of service as an Air Traffic Control
Specialist until 3 months later—July 14, 2023. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16. Both of
those dates have now passed. Therefore, the appellant now has more than
20 years of service in her position, regardless of whether she should have, in
hindsight, been separated before she reached that mark. In other words, even
assuming that the agency should have separated the appellant from service in
April 2023, the agency did not do so, and the appellant’s age is no longer a bar to
her earning an ATC annuity.

The appellant’s Air Traffic Control Specialist position meets the requirements for
air traffic controller special retirement coverage.
For purposes of special retirement coverage, an ATC is “a civilian
employee of the Department of Transportation or the Department of Defense in an
air traffic control facility or flight service station facility who is actively engaged
in the separation and control of air traffic or in providing preflight, inflight, or
airport advisory service to aircraft operators.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 2109(1), 8401(35);
5 C.F.R. § 842.802. The agency denied the appellant’s request for ATC
coverage, finding that the “primary duties” of her position were not to engage in
the separation and control of aircraft but to “plan, establish, and conduct a
continuing training and proficiency development program for the local ATC
facility.” IAF, Tab 13 at 21-22, 61-63. According to the agency, to meet the
“actively engaged” requirement of the statute, Department of Defense (DOD)
components require that an employee be actively engaged in separating and
controlling aircraft at least 25% of the time, whereas the appellant was actively
8

engaged in separating and controlling aircraft only about 15% of the time.
Id. at 12-14.
In her initial decision, the administrative judge found that the agency’s
25% requirement had no support in the statute or the Office of Personnel
Management’s (OPM) implementing regulations. ID at 7. She found that,
although the statute required firefighters and law enforcement officers to perform
certain duties as their “primary duties” as a condition of special retirement
coverage, there was no such “primary duty” requirement for ATCs. Id. Because
it was undisputed that the appellant was actively engaged in the separation and
control of aircraft at least some of the time, even if was not her primary duty, the
administrative judge found that she was entitled to ATC special retirement
coverage. ID at 6-8.
On petition for review, the agency argues that the Department of the Navy,
the Department of the Army, and the Department of the Air Force all use the 25%
requirement for ATC special retirement coverage. PFR File, Tab 1 at 25.
It explains that, because the statutes and regulations do not specify what
percentage of time an employee must spend actively engaged in separating and
controlling aircraft, DOD looked to OPM’s classification standards for guidance.
Id. The classification standards provide that an employee’s duties are
“significant and substantial” when they occupy at least 25% of her time, and so
the agency adopted this as a reasonable threshold for ATC special retirement
coverage. Id.; IAF, Tab 10 at 26, Tab 13 at 62.
However, the question is not whether the 25% requirement is reasonable—
the question is whether it is lawful. For the reasons explained by the
administrative judge, we find that it is not. ID at 6-8. The agency does not seem
to have considered that the statutes and regulations are silent on the minimum
percentage of ATC duties required because there was no minimum percentage
intended. The plain language of the statute provides ATC retirement coverage for
employees who are actively engaged in the separation and control of aircraft—
9

full stop. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2109(1)(A)(i); 8401(35), 8412(e). Unlike special
retirement for firefighter and law enforcement positions, there is no requirement
that such ATC duties be “primary,” “significant and substantial,” occupy a certain
percentage of the employee’s time, or anything of the sort. 5 U.S.C. § 8401(14)
(A)(i), (17)(A)(i); 5 C.F.R. § 842.802. Congress’s decision to omit a primary
duty requirement from its definition of ATC has every appearance of being
intentional in light of its decision to include such a requirement for firefighters
and law enforcement officers in the very same statute. “When Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Moulton v. Office of
Personnel Management, 2023 MSPB 26, ¶ 17 (citing Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); see Hyundai Steel Co. v. United States, 19 F.4th 1346,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2021). This principle applies all the more strongly when
comparing provisions found in the same section of a statute.
DOD’s policy imposing a 25% time threshold is not a procedural
mechanism, a gap-filling measure, or a resolution of ambiguity. It is an
additional substantive requirement for ATC special retirement coverage that the
agency has added on top of the requirements already imposed by Congress. As a
result, the agency’s ATC special retirement coverage policy is contrary to the
law. See United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding
that a policy that adds a requirement not found in the relevant statute and
regulation is a substantive rule that is invalid unless it is promulgated with notice
and comment). 2 The agency is attempting to make this case more complicated
than it is. It is undisputed that the appellant is actively engaged in ATC duties at

2
We note that OPM—not DOD or any DOD component—is the agency authorized to
prescribe regulations to carry out 5 U.S.C. chapter 84. 5 U.S.C. § 8461(g). The agency
has identified nothing in OPM’s regulations or guidance to support its position in this
case. In this regard, we observe that not even OPM has been authorized to create new
substantive requirements for ATC special retirement coverage.
10

least some of the time. PFR File, Tab 1 at 26. Therefore, she meets the
definition of ATC for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 8401(35). Because the appellant
meets this definition, she is entitled to special retirement coverage under 5 U.S.C.
§ 8412(e). No further analysis is required.

ORDER
We ORDER the agency to grant the appellant the appropriate amount of
ATC retirement credit. In connection with these awards, the appellant is
ORDERED to make appropriate arrangements with the agency to deposit into the
Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund an amount to cover the higher
withholding rate that applies to aircraft controller positions.
We also ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing when
it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
11

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

3
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
13

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
14

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 4 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

4
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10815199. Public record. Not legal advice.